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ABSTRACT
This thesis examines the effects of changes in minimum wage on wages, employment 
and hours worked in Indonesia. This study is important for Indonesia as a part of the 
policy evaluation relating to the minimum wage policy changes since the end of 
1980s. Based on the standard competitive model, an increase in minimum wage is 
predicted to decrease the level of employment. More specifically, under the two-sector 
model, an increase in minimum is predicted to decrease employment in the covered 
sector and to increase employment in the uncovered sector, given a high proportion of 
uncovered sector employment in developing countries.
Three main empirical analyses are conducted in this thesis. Firstly, using a regional 
panel data method, this study examines the effects of changes in minimum wage on 
wages and employment in Indonesia. Although the findings vary across different 
minimum wage measures and panel data methods, the result suggests that an increase 
in minimum wage increases wages and reduces paid employment in the covered 
sector, as predicted by the standard competitive model. The result shows that there is
no significant impact on total paid employment because o f the non-compliance 
problem in Indonesia.
Secondly, extending the analysis, this thesis examines the effects of changes in 
minimum wage on employment in the covered and uncovered sectors using an 
individual micro-level data. The results suggest that an increase in minimum wage is 
more likely to decrease the covered sector employment and to inrease the uncovered 
sector employment. These results also indicate a displacement effect from the covered 
sector to the uncovered sector, as suggested by the two-sector model.
Thirdly, providing a complete analysis of any adjustments in labour demand, this 
thesis examines the effects of changes in minimum wage on hours worked as an 
alternative measure of employment. Using a selection biased correction method based 
on multinomial logit, the empirical results suggest that an increase in minimum wage 
increases paid employment hours worked. However, compared to the minimum wage 
effects on employment, this hours effect is relatively small. The main reason is 
because the Indonesian minimum wage is set based on monthly term, suggesting a 
greater change in per-worker cost than in per-hour cost.
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The effect o f minimum wage laws on employment has been the subject of much 
debate in the literature since the early 1990s (see for example the debate over the 
minimum wage effects in the United States between Card et al (1994) and Neumark 
and Wascher (1992)). Based on the standard theory, a standard competitive model 
predicts that a minimum wage which is above the equilibrium level will lower the 
level of employment. Contrary to the standard competitive model, the monopsony 
model predicts that an increase in minimum wage, under particular conditions, leads 
to an increase in employment. The empirical results depend on several factors, 
including the labour market conditions, the methodology (time-series, cross-sectional 
or panel data), the object of the study (developed or developing countries), the 
measurement o f the minimum wage variable, and the unit of observation (individual 
or aggregate level).
There are large numbers of empirical studies on the effects of minimum wage on 
employment in developed countries. One of the most influential of such studies was 
the “natural experiment” study conducted by Card and Krueger (1994) in the United 
States. Using the data from fast-food restaurants in New Jersey and Pennsylvania, they 
found that an increase in New Jersey’s minimum wage had positive effects on 
employment, supporting the presence of the monopsony model. Contrary to Card and 
Krueger (1994), the other influential studies conducted by Neumark and Wascher
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(1992 and 2004) consistently found negative effects of minimum wage on 
employment, supporting the presence of the standard competitive model.
Contrary to developed country studies, there are limited empirical studies on the 
effects of minimum wage on employment in developing countries. Most have been 
conducted in Latin American developing countries (see for example Lemos (2004d) in 
Brazil and Gindling and Terrell (2006 and 2007) in Honduras and Costa Rica). 
Compared to developed countries, developing countries generally show different 
characteristics, given a high proportion of workers in the uncovered sector. An 
increase in minimum wage is therefore also predicted to have a substantial indirect 
impact on workers in the uncovered sector, assuming flexible labour mobility between 
covered and uncovered sectors.
In Indonesia, the minimum wage coverage depends on the category (status) of 
employment. Paid employment is the category of employment legally covered by the 
minimum wage policy in Indonesia (the so-called covered sector employment), 
accounting for approximately 35% of total employment. On the other hand, self- 
employed and unpaid family workers are categorized as the uncovered sector 
employment. According to the Indonesian Central Bureau of Statistics definition, self- 
employed is defined as own-account workers employed in their own enterprises with 
or without assistance from their household members/temporary workers (such as street 
traders, self-employed farmers or taxi drivers), while unpaid family work is defined as 
those people who worked on their family-owned business or farm without any wage 
for their work. As pointed out by Rice (2004), unpaid family work in Indonesia is
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usually given compensation in an informal manner, such as sharing the room in their 
household or sharing the foodstuff from their own farm.
The main focus of this thesis is to examine the effects of changes in the minimum 
wage on wages, employment and hours worked in Indonesia. The minimum wage 
policy in Indonesia was firstly introduced in the early 1970s, but the implementation 
was not effective in earlier periods (Suryahadi et al, 2003). The Indonesian 
government has become more concerned about the minimum wage policy since the 
end o f the 1980s, as a result of international pressures relating to the violation of 
international labour standard issues in Indonesia. In that period, the United States 
trade union organization (the AFL-CIO) and some international human right activists 
complained to a well-known US multinational firm operating in Indonesia about their 
low wages and poor working conditions by creating a “social clause” which suggested 
rejecting a product from Indonesia (Gall, 1998 and Suryahadi et al, 2003). As a result, 
this condition forced the Indonesian government to become more concerned about 
their minimum wage policy by increasing the minimum wage level three-fold in 
nominal terms (or two-fold in real terms). More detail about the minimum wage 
policy implementation in Indonesia is presented in chapter 3. This study is therefore 
important for Indonesia as a part of the policy evaluation relating to the minimum 
wage changes during the reference period. This evaluation can also be used as 
recommendations for the government in making decisions relating to minimum wage 
policy implementation in Indonesia in the future.
This thesis is not the first study on the effect of minimum wage on employment in 
Indonesia. Rama’s (2001) pioneering study on the impact of the minimum wage in
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Indonesia using regional panel data methods focused primarily on urban areas and the 
manufacturing sector. Using a similar regional panel data method, Suryahadi et al 
(2003) extended Rama’s (2001) study by examining the effects of the minimum wage 
on specific groups of workers such as females, youths and less educated workers in 
the urban formal labour market. The most recent minimum wage study in Indonesia 
was a case study conducted by Alatas and Cameron (2008) studying the impact of 
compliance extension of Jakarta’s provincial minimum wage on the Botabek area 
(Jakarta and West Java border) which is administratively under the province of West 
Java.
Compared to the previous Indonesian minimum wage studies, this thesis generally 
provides a more comprehensive study of the impact of minimum wage on 
employment in Indonesia using both aggregate regional panel data and individual 
pooled cross-sectional time-series data methods. This study not only focuses on 
workers in the covered sector, but also looks at the impact of minimum wage on 
employment in the uncovered sectors, given a high proportion o f workers in the 
uncovered sector in Indonesia. This study will also treat these impacts separately in 
terms o f the urban and rural labour markets, as well as in terms of the male and female 
labour market, which have not been considered in previous studies. In addition, this 
study fills the gap by estimating the effects of changes in the minimum wage on hours 
worked as an alternative measure to employment, providing a complete analysis of 
any shifts in labour demand as the minimum wage increases. The Indonesian data 
have never been used for these purposes.
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Compared to the other developing country studies, Indonesia’s case provides a unique 
characteristic in that the minimum wage is set differently across provinces (regions), 
providing an ideal source for a regional panel data study. In Brazil and Colombia (see 
Lemos, 2004d and Arango and Pachon, 2004), the minimum wage is set at a national 
level, while in Costa Rica and Honduras (see Gindling and Terrell, 2006 and 2007), 
the minimum wage is set at an industrial and firm-size level. As mentioned above, this 
study also contributes to the developing country literatures by providing a complete 
specification of the impact of minimum wage on employment in the covered and 
uncovered sectors. There are only a few studies examining the effects of minimum 
wage on employment in the covered and uncovered sectors in developing countries, 
such as Gindling and Terrell in Costa Rica and Honduras (2006 and 2007). Although 
this study specifically focuses on the impact o f minimum wage on employment (and 
hours worked) in Indonesia, its results will also be relevant for other developing 
countries with similar labour market characteristics.
This thesis primarily uses the Indonesian Labour Force Survey (the so-called 
Sakemas) data from 1989 to 2003 for the regional panel data method (chapter 5) and 
from 1996 to 2003 for the pooled cross-sectional time-series method (chapters 6 and 
7). This thesis does not compare a period with no minimum wage (before the 
introduction o f the minimum wage) and a period with minimum wage (after the 
introduction o f the minimum wage) as the minimum wage policy exists throughout the 
reference period. In practice, the minimum wage is adjusted annually depending on 
the cost of minimum basic living needs (the so-called KHM or Kebutuhan Hidup 
Minimum). In this case, several econometric techniques will be employed including 
panel data methods, the multinomial logit model, and the selection biased correction
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model based on multinomial logit. In addition, unlike the common labour force survey 
in developed countries, Sakemas data used in this study does not provide the 
longitudinal change across individuals in the labour market. Therefore, aggregate 
regional panel data and the individual pooled cross-sectional time-series methods will 
be employed in this study.
The remainder o f this thesis is organized as follows. Chapter 2 reviews the labour 
market situation in Indonesia. Some major labour market statistics in Indonesia will be 
presented in this chapter, including the labour force participation rate, unemployment 
rate, labour force educational attainment, status o f employment, sector o f activities 
and wages. These statistics are also important to see the employment and labour force 
conditions in response to labour market policies and macro-economic shocks in 
Indonesia.
Chapter 3 discusses minimum wage policy implementation in Indonesia, including the 
mechanism to set the minimum wage level and the effectiveness of minimum wage 
compliance in Indonesia. This chapter will also specifically discuss the minimum 
wage fixing in the decentralization era (after the new regime), where the provinces 
and local district governments have the power to set their own minimum wage level. 
In practice, before 2001, the central government determined the level of each 
provincial minimum wage (centralization era) based on the provincial level 
governments recommendations. In addition, the trend in the average minimum wage 
level and its ratio to the average wage will also be presented in this chapter. The ratio 
of minimum wage level to the average wage (the so-called toughness) simply
measures the level of minimum wage and how consistent the minimum wage is kept at 
its level (Machin and Manning, 1994).
Chapter 4 presents the standard theoretical framework relating to the effect of the 
minimum wage on employment. According to the standard competitive model, an 
increase in the minimum wage that has a positive impact on wages is predicted to 
reduce employment. This model will also be extended using the two-sector model of 
covered and uncovered sectors. In practice, the two-sector model might be more 
complete for developing countries, given a high proportion of workers in the 
uncovered sector. In comparison, the monopsony model will also be reviewed where 
the minimum wage might have a positive impact on employment under particular 
conditions.
In chapter 5, the effects of changes in minimum wage on wages and employment in 
Indonesia are examined using the aggregate regional panel data method over the 
period 1989 to 2003. This chapter provides a basic analysis of the impact of minimum 
wage on wages and employment in Indonesia using a similar aggregate panel data 
method employed by the previous minimum wage studies in Indonesia (see Rama, 
2001 and Suryahadi et al, 2003). As mentioned above, compared to the other 
developing countries, Indonesia provides a better source for a panel data study as the 
minimum wage is set differently across regions (provinces), giving more regional 
variation. The effect of the minimum wage on the wage level will be examined before 
examining the effect of the minimum wage on employment. We might expect that an 
increase in the minimum wage will affect employment in the covered sector if it has a 
significantly positive effect on the covered sector wage. In addition, this chapter also
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compares five different minimum wage measurements commonly used in the 
literature (a) the log of real minimum wage; (b) toughness; (c) the fraction below the 
minimum wage; (d) the fraction at the minimum wage; (e) the fraction affected by the 
minimum wage. There is no clear justification of which measure is the most effective 
to measure the minimum wage effect in the literature, depending on the methods and 
the object of study.
Chapter 6 extends the analysis by estimating the effects of changes in the minimum 
wage on employment in the covered and uncovered sectors using an individual micro­
level data set, providing a complete analysis of the effects of the minimum wage on 
employment in Indonesia. Under the two-sector model, an increase in the minimum 
wage is predicted to decrease employment in the covered sector and to increase 
employment in the uncovered sector (see chapter 4 for theoretical framework 
discussion). Using the multinomial logit model, I examine the effects of the minimum 
wage on several employment categories including paid employed (covered sector), 
self-employed and unpaid family worker (uncovered sector), and unemployed. The 
analysis is also separated across gender (male and female workers) and their residence 
location (urban and rural areas). In addition, this chapter is extended by examining the 
effect o f the minimum wage on youth employment in both the covered and uncovered 
sectors. In practice, youth employment is generally known as the category of 
employment that is typically at the bottom of the wage distribution. Therefore, it is 
predicted that they are more likely to be affected by the minimum wage.
In order to provide a complete analysis of the effects of the minimum wage on labour 
demand, in chapter 7, the effect o f the minimum wage on hours worked is examined
as an alternative to employment using an individual micro-level data set. As pointed 
out by Hamermesh (1993), employers might respond to a change in minimum wage 
by changing their number of workers (employment) at the extensive margin and by 
adjusting their workers’ hours at the intensive margin. This chapter contributes to the 
literature by employing selection biased corrections based on the multinomial logit 
model for a potential selection bias from a non-random sample. In practice, 
individuals selected in the sample might select themselves (self-selection) into an 
employment sector (or category) where they have a preference depending on their 
potential hours worked, suggesting that they are likely to be non-random samples 
from the population. Specifically, individuals who expect fixed (or standard) working 
hours are more likely to select themselves (self-selection) into the paid employment 
category, while individuals who expect more flexible (such as part-time) working 
hours might put themselves into the self-employed and unpaid family workers 
categories. Two different approaches of selection bias correction, including Lee’s and 
Bourguignon et al’s methods, are performed in this chapter. Similar format to chapter 
6, the effects of minimum wage on hours worked are also examined separately across 
urban-rural areas and male-female workers.
Finally, chapter 8 summarises the findings and provides conclusions. As part o f the 
policy evaluation, this chapter also suggests some policy implications relating to 




Indonesia is the fourth most populous country in the world after China, India, and the 
USA with a total population of more than 205 million in the 2000s (based on the 2000 
population census result). The working age population (defined as 15 years of age and 
older) accounts for approximately 150 million in 2002, growing significantly by 31% 
from 1990 to 2002 (see table 2.1). However, the growth in the working age population 
has tended to decrease over time due to a decrease in total fertility rate as a result of an 
effective national family planning program by the government since the 1980s.
In line with the growth in working age population, the Indonesian labour force grew 
by approximately 33% from 1990 to 2002. Although there was a significant growth in 
the labour force, the labour force participation rate (LFPR) was relatively stable at 
around 66%-69% during the reference period (see table 2.1). This condition confirms 
that the growth of the labour force in Indonesia is mostly affected by the natural 
growth in population (Irawan et al, 2000 and Suryahadi et al, 2001). Compared to the 
other South East Asian countries, the LFPR in Indonesia is slightly higher than the 
LFPR in the Philippines, Singapore, and Malaysia with about a 60% participation rate, 
but it is lower than the LFPR in Vietnam and Malaysia with more than 70% 
participation rate (Irawan et al, 2000).
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Table 2.1. Labour Market Characteristics, 1990-2002
1990 1993 1996 1999 2002
Population and Labour Force
Population aged 15+ (million) 113.09 120.30 131.37 141.10 148.73
Labour Force (million) * 75.02 78.92 88.37 97.42 100.32
Labour Force Participation Rate b 66.33 65.60 67.26 69.05 67.45
Unem ploym ent Rate (% )c 2.55 2.79 5.45 8.83 8.65
Urban Labour Force (%) 25.65 29.60 34.06 38.26 41.79
Female Labour Force (%) 38.79 38.55 38.71 38.98 37.13
Youth Labour Force (% ) d 23.04 22.20 22.44 22.18 20.45
Education e
< Prim ary (%) 40.13 35.48 28.43 24.9 21.94
Prim ary (%) 36.27 36.94 37.27 36.03 36.7
Junior High School Qual. (%) 10.1 11.31 13.04 15.5 17.32
Senior High School Qual. (%) 11.52 13.59 17.45 19.06 19.18
University Qualification (% )f 1.97 2.68 3.81 4.51 4.87
Note: a The labour force is the numbers o f person in the workforce (the employed) and the unemployed
b The Labour Force Participation Rate is the labour force, as a percentage o f working-age population 
c The unemploym ent rates before 1994 are slightly underestimated as it does not include discourage 
workers. Discourage workers data is collected by the government from 1994 onward. 
d Youth labour force is defined as persons aged 15-24 years old in the labour force 
e Proportion o f  the Labour Force relating to the education attainment 
f University Qualification includes academy/college and diploma 
Source: Calculated from the Indonesian Labour Foce Survey (Sakernas)
The unemployment rate had increased from only 5.45% in 1996 to 8.65% in 2002. In 
this case, following the National Central Bureau of Statistics (BPS) definition, the 
unemployment rate is defined as the percentage of the labour force who do not have a 
job and who are actively looking for a job, including discouraged workers who are 
still willing to work, as suggested by the relaxed ILO’s labour force definition (see 
Hussmanns et al, 1990 and Suryadarma et al, 2005). Although this definition (which 
includes discourage workers who are still willing to work) is not a common practice in 
the literature, Suryadarma et al (2005) argued that those discouraged workers behave 
similarly to the unemployed particularly during the slow growth of an economy after 
the major economic crisis in 1997-1998, providing a valid measure of labour force. In 
addition, Ahmed and Dhanani (1999), also argued that including those discouraged 
workers who were willing to accept work at the time of the survey will provide true
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magnitude o f unemployment and will not understate the actual labour force size in 
Indonesia.
As the country worst affected by the East Asian economic crisis in 1997-1998, the 
unemployment rate in Indonesia was lower than had been predicted (see Irawan et al, 
2000 and Feridhanusetyawan and Gaduh, 2000). The Indonesian economic crisis 
primarily caused by the financial market contagion had been characterized by a 
devaluation of Rupiah by more than 80% and a decrease in Gross Domestic Product of 
13% during that period. This crisis negatively affected employment in the construction 
sector and the export-oriented manufacturing sector which depended primarily on the 
imported raw-materials and associated credit arrangements (Manning, 2000).
In the absence o f any unemployment benefits provided by the government, people 
(especially from low-income households) were unlikely to be unemployed for a long 
period (long-term unemployed) and were likely to find a job in the informal sector, 
usually with low wages, short working hours and few employment benefits. As 
pointed out by Islam (2002), long-term unemployment (defined as those unemployed 
for a year or more) was only around one percent of total unemployment in Indonesia. 
This condition actually also indicates a flexible labour market in Indonesia 
(Feridhanusetyawan and Gaduh, 2000). Moreover, although there are no particular 
unemployment benefits, the government of Indonesia has created programs to address 
the problem of unemployment in some areas, such as a public works scheme designed 
by the Ministry of Manpower and training and counselling programmes for the 
unemployed by the Department of Social Affairs (Wiebe 1996).
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There are some important characteristics of unemployment in Indonesia. Firstly, 
among the unemployed, most are young people who entered the labour market for the 
first time with relatively little work experience (Agrawal, 1995 and 
Feridhanusetyawan and Gaduh, 2000). In addition, as pointed out by Dhanani (2004), 
a higher rate of youth unemployment is also caused by youths making the transition 
from full-time education to the labour market. As presented in table 2.2, the 
unemployment rate among young people (15-24 years old) is much higher than the 
unemployment rate among adults (25+ years old) during the reference period. In 2002, 
the youth unemployment rate was 27.3%, while adult unemployment rate was only 
3.85%.
Table 2.2. Unemployment Rates by Age, Education, Location and Gender (%), 
1990-2002
1990 1993 1996 1999 2002
Age:
15-24 7.98 8.94 16.59 25.08 27.30
25+ 0.92 1.03 2.22 4.20 3.85
Education:
< Primary 0.51 0.41 1.36 3.41 3.53
Primary 1.27 1.45 3.04 6.14 6.00
Junior High School Qual. 4.14 3.99 7.76 11.43 11.69
Senior High School Qual. 11.34 10.24 14.09 17.89 16.38
University Qualification 7.96 9.77 12.03 13.11 10.39
Location:
Urban Areas 5.98 5.55 8.98 13.28 11.53
Rural Areas 1.36 1.63 3.62 6.08 6.58
Gender:
M ale 2.46 2.63 4.56 7.64 7.11
Female 2.69 3.04 6.85 10.70 11.25
Source: Calculated from the Indonesian Labour Foce Survey (Sakemas)
Secondly, the unemployment rate is higher among those with higher levels of 
education (Feridhanusetyawan and Gaduh, 2000). This evidence indicates that only 
people with higher levels of education (usually with higher family incomes) might 
remain unemployed in order to wait for a better-paid job, while people with lower 
education levels (usually with lower family income) cannot afford to be unemployed
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for a long period and will find a job either in the informal sector or the formal sector 
but with lower wages (Agrawal, 1995 and Irawan et al, 2000). As presented in table 
2.2, the unemployment rate among people with senior high school and university 
qualifications was 16.38% and 10.39% respectively in 2002, while the unemployment 
rate among less educated people (a primary or less than primary education) was less 
than 7%.
Thirdly, comparing residence location, the unemployment rate in urban areas is higher 
than in rural areas. The main reason is that the proportion of people who are looking 
for a job is higher in urban areas than in rural areas (Dhanani, 2004). As pointed out 
by Dhanani (2004), it is generally assumed that the probability of getting a job is 
higher in urban areas than in rural areas because the job choices in rural areas are 
relatively limited (particularly in the agriculture sector) compared to urban areas. In 
addition, wage expectations are relatively low in rural areas compared to urban areas.
Comparing urban and rural areas, similar to the other developing countries, the highest 
proportion o f the labour force in Indonesia is located in rural areas with the dominance 
o f workers in the agriculture sector (Manning, 2003a). However, the proportion of the 
labour force in rural areas showed a significant decrease from 74.35% in 1990 to 
58.21% in 2002. This decrease indicated a substantial urbanization process from rural 
areas to urban areas, and this was further supported by the evidence of structural 
employment shifts from the agriculture sector in rural areas to the manufacturing, 
trade, and service sectors (modem sectors) in urban areas.
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Moreover, as presented in table 2.1, the proportion of females within the total labour 
force changed only a little around 37-38%, except during the 1997-1998 economic 
crisis where the proportion of females in the labour force was more than 40%. In 
practice, as pointed out by Feridhanusetyawan and Gaduh (2000), the economic crisis 
has forced more females to enter the labour market to bring in additional income to 
their household. In addition, Manning (2003a) noted that a high proportion of female 
workers (about 40% of all female workers) in Indonesia is represented in less 
productive sectors and low wage occupations, such as retail trade and labour-intensive 
manufacturing sectors.
On the other hand, the youth labour force slightly declined from 23% in 1990 to 20% 
in 2002 (see table 2.1). As pointed out by Manning (2003a), this decline is, firstly, 
because o f the lower fertility rate as a result of an effective family planning program 
since the 1980s. Secondly, this is because of a rapid growth in schooling opportunities 
with the nine-year compulsory basic education scheme encouraged by the government 
over the last two decades.
Looking at educational attainment, there was only a small proportion of the total 
labour force with senior high school or university (tertiary) qualifications. However, 
these education qualifications showed a significant increase from 13.5% in 1990 to 
24.05% in 2002, suggesting that the Indonesian labour force has become more 
educated. On the other hand, there was a significant drop in the proportion of those 
with a primary or less than primary education (less educated). As pointed out by 
Agrawal (1995), this significant drop was induced by a substantial investment in basic 
education by the government with their nine-year compulsory basic education
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program. In addition, as pointed out by Manning (2003a), the majority of more 
educated people are more likely to be employed in the formal sector in paid 
employment, while less educated people tend to be self-employed and unpaid family 
workers (see figure 2 .1).
Figure 2.1 Status of Employment by Educational Attainment in 2002 (%)
□ Unpaid Family Worker 
■ Paid Employment
□  Self Employment
< Prim Primary Junior Senior Univ.
H.S. H.S.
Source: Calculated from the Indonesian Labour Foce Survey (Sakernas)
Relating to sector of activities, the agriculture sector is still the most dominant sector, 
accounting for more than 40% of total employment. However, its share of 
employment decreased significantly from 55% in 1990 to only 44% in 2002 (see 
figure 2.2). On the other hand, the manufacturing sector slightly increased from 10.2% 
in 1990 to 13.21% in 2002. This feature clearly confirms the process of structural 
transformation in Indonesia marked by the shift in employment from the agriculture 
sector to modern sectors, such as manufacturing industry, trade, and services1. The 
exception was found during 1997-1998 economic crisis when there was a significant
1 C o m p ared  to  th e  o th e r E ast A s ian  d e v e lo p in g  co u n tries , th is s tru c tu ra l tran sfo rm a tio n  in Ind o n esia  is 
re la tiv e ly  s lo w  p a rticu la rly  b ecau se  o f  the  In d o n esian  e co n o m y  d ep en d en ce  on oil and gas m in in g  
(n a tu ra l re so u rce s)  b e fo re  the  1990s (F e rid h an u se ty aw an  and  G aduh , 2 0 0 0 )
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increase in agricultural sector activities. As pointed out by Feridhanusetyawan and 
Damuri (2004), this crisis period was generally characterized by a substantial decrease 
in the construction, financial, and capital-intensive manufacturing sector activities and 
the movement of resources to agricultural and export-oriented activities. However, 
this did not occur in the longer period because of the limited absorption capacity of 
the agricultural sector (Feridhanusetyawan and Gaduh, 2000).







S ource : C a lcu la ted  from  the Indonesian Labour Foce Survey (Sakernas)
Although there is a high proportion of employment in the agricultural sector, their 
contribution to the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) is relatively low compared to the 
other sector of activities. The biggest sector that contributed to the GDP is the 
manufacturing sector, accounting for more than 25% of total GDP. As presented in 
figure 2.3, the manufacturing sector also grew at a higher rate compared to the other 
sectors, except during the economic crisis in 1997-1998. In practice, this significant 
growth in the manufacturing sector was a result of considerable Foreign Direct 
Investment (FDI) inflows from the end of the 1980s when the government had started 
to change their development strategy from the dependence on natural resources,
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particularly from oil exports, to the export-oriented manufacturing activities (Agrawal, 
1995). In addition, Manning (2003a) pointed out that the manufacturing sector is 
characterized by higher productivity compared to the other sectors.












S ource: A sian  D ev e lo p m en t B ank  D ata
In terms of employment status, the workforce (employment) is generally divided into 
three main different categories: paid employment, self-employment, and unpaid 
family workers. In this case, we focus only on the primary status of employment or 
activity during the previous week of survey due to data unavailability for workers with 
secondary job (more than one job). As mentioned above, relating to minimum wage 
coverage in Indonesia, paid employment is categorized as covered sector employment 
(also defined as formal sector employment), while self-employed and unpaid family 
workers are grouped as uncovered sector employment (also defined as informal sector 
employment).
As presented in table 2.3, the informal sector (self-employed and unpaid family 
workers) has a relatively large proportion in the labour market. According to Irawan et 
al (2000), a large proportion of the informal sector indicates limited work in the
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formal sector (paid employment) in Indonesia. However, according to the Sakemas, 
the proportion o f informal sector employment, such as self-employed farmers, unpaid 
family workers or street traders, which is mainly found in rural areas, declined from 
71.32% in 1990 to 64.08% in 2003, except during the 1997-1998 crisis period when 
the informal sector played an important role as a ‘safety valve’ by absorbing 
employment from the urban formal sector which has suffered a deep contraction.
Table 2.3 Status of Employment (%), 1990-2003
Y ear
S e lf-
E m p loyed
Paid
E m p lo y m en t
U npaid  Fam ily  
W orker
1990 4 4 .9 2 8 .68 2 6 .4 2
1991 4 4 .5 9 3 0 .08 2 5 .3 3
1992 4 4 .8 3 30.21 2 4 .9 6
1993 44.91 3 1 .74 2 3 .3 5
1994 4 4 .3 7 3 4 .52 21.1
1995 4 5 .8 6 3 6 .69 17 .45
1996 4 7 .5 6 34 .78 17 .65
1997 4 5 .0 7 3 6 .1 4 18 .79
1998 4 6 .6 2 33.51 19 .86
1999 4 7 .0 9 3 4 .06 18 .85
2 0 0 0 45.81 33 .5 9 2 0 .6
2001 4 2 .9 2 37.1 19 .98
2 0 0 2 4 4 .6 2 37 .28 18.1
2 0 0 3 4 3 .9 3 35 .9 3 2 0 .1 5
Source: Calculated from the Indonesian Labour Foce Survey (Sakemas)
On the other hand, the proportion of formal sector employment (paid employment), 
which is mainly found in urban areas, increased from 28.68% in 1990 to 35.93% in 
2003, suggesting a tendency of formalization in the Indonesian labour market 
(Feridhanusetyawan and Gaduh, 2000). This evidence was consistent with the 
structural transformation process mentioned above, which is supported by the 
development of the manufacturing sector and the strong urbanization process. As 
pointed out by Irawan et al (2000), an increase in the share of formal sector 
employment also indicated an improvement in the level of development achieved.
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Figure 2.4 Real Average W age and Nom inal Average W age of Paid Employment
9 0 0 ,0 0 0
8 0 0 ,0 0 0
7 0 0 ,000
6 0 0 ,0 0 0
5 0 0 ,000 Nominal Wages 
Real Wages4 0 0 ,0 0 0
3 0 0 ,0 0 0  -
200,000
100,000
Source: Calculated from the Indonesian Labour Foce Survey (Sakernas)
The nominal average wage (including bonuses, regular allowances and overtime 
payments) of paid employment in Indonesia was relatively low at around Rp. 800,000 
or around US$ 80 per month in 2003 (see figure 2.4), increasing by about 15%-20% 
per year. On the other hand, the real average wage also increased steadily at around 
6% per year, except during the 1997-1998 crisis when it dramatically decreased by 
more than 20% per year. Compared to the other South East Asian countries, the real 
wage in Singapore and Malaysia increased much faster than the real wage in 
Indonesia, while in contrast, the Philippines experienced a decrease in the real wage 
during the 1990s (Irawan et al, 2000).
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Table 2.4. Real Average M onthly W age by Sector o f Activity (Rupiah), 1996-2003
Sector 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
Agriculture 5 8 ,5 9 4 6 1 ,3 1 4 5 7 ,0 0 4 52,221 5 5 ,7 5 0 8 2 ,6 0 2 8 8 ,3 9 5 9 3 ,2 3 0
Mining 1 6 7 ,700 177 ,7 2 0 2 0 1 ,5 7 5 166 ,2 7 3 173 ,0 5 6 2 0 6 ,8 7 2 2 4 2 ,6 5 4 2 2 2 ,0 7 6
Manufacturing 1 0 5 ,797 117 ,432 8 5 ,2 9 0 8 6 ,5 1 4 102 ,6 8 0 124 ,2 3 0 130 ,996 1 35 ,313
Electricity 165 ,158 2 1 0 ,6 4 0 148 ,9 2 6 159 ,3 9 5 156 ,9 6 6 2 0 3 ,7 0 2 2 0 0 ,0 8 6 2 1 5 ,3 2 6
Construction 1 1 5 ,380 125 ,122 9 3 ,0 2 3 9 4 ,1 7 9 106 ,126 1 2 1 ,5 9 0 134 ,213 138 ,916
Trade 1 1 3 ,4 8 5 118 ,9 9 5 9 3 ,4 4 0 9 5 ,5 8 7 9 8 ,6 0 4 115 ,327 123 ,827 135 ,087
Transportation 1 4 3 ,222 150 ,196 119 ,472 115 ,7 0 9 1 3 7 ,815 1 6 0 ,669 161 ,240 167 ,396
Finance 2 3 0 ,8 6 7 2 1 3 ,8 5 2 174 ,228 178 ,6 2 4 2 1 8 ,0 3 5 2 5 5 ,3 4 9 2 2 9 ,0 1 6 2 4 6 ,0 8 7
S erv ices 1 3 0 ,818 145 ,603 111 ,4 8 7 120 ,843 1 3 9 ,916 172 ,619 1 75 ,266 182 ,253
Source: C alculated from  the Indonesian Labour Force Survey (Sakem as)
Comparing gender, the real wage of female workers increased much faster than the 
real wage of male workers (Irawan et al, 2000). This evidence implies that the wage 
differences between female workers and male workers tend to become smaller due to 
an improvement in education attainment among female workers and a reduction in 
discrimination, particularly for uneducated female workers (Feridhanusetyawan et al, 
2001). However, Irawan et al (2000) noted that, on average, male workers still earned 
a wage 1.5 times higher than female workers. In addition, comparing sector of 
activities, the real average wage is highest in the finance and mining sectors, while the 
lowest real average wage is found in the agriculture sector (see table 2.4). In 2003, the 
real average wage in finance and mining sectors was more than Rp. 200,000 per 
month, while in agriculture sector was less than Rp. 100,000 per month.
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CHAPTER III 
MINIMUM WAGE POLICY IN INDONESIA
3.1 Minimum Wage Policy in Practice
The minimum wage policy in Indonesia was firstly introduced at the beginning of the 
1970s (Rama, 2001 and Suryahadi et al, 2003). Although it has a long history, the 
implementation was not effective in the earlier periods. In these periods, the minimum 
wage was set much below the wage equilibrium level, suggesting that the minimum 
wage was not binding for most workers (Sugiyarto and Endriga, 2008). In addition, 
Sugiyarto and Endriga (2008) pointed out that minimum wages were relatively 
unenforced and used only for symbolic purposes.
The minimum wage began to be used as an important instrument for labour market 
policy by the Indonesian government at the end of the 1980s, as a result of 
international pressure relating to the evidence of violation of international agreed 
labour standard in Indonesia, particularly in the export-oriented sector (Rama, 2001 
and Suryahadi et al, 2003). Specifically, a well-known United States labour-intensive 
multinational firm operating in Indonesia in that period had been complained about by 
the United States trade union organization (the AFL-CIO) and some international 
human right activists about their low wages and poor working conditions (Gall, 1998). 
In this case, the international pressure created a “social clause”, under General 
Scheme Preferences (GSP), which suggested rejecting a product from developing 
countries, including Indonesia, where labour standards remained insufficient 
(Suryahadi et al, 2003).
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In practice, this condition forced the Indonesian government to become more 
concerned about their labour market policy, including the minimum wage, by 
increasing the minimum wage level three-fold in nominal terms (or two-fold in real 
terms) at the end o f the 1980s in order to bring it in line with the cost o f the Minimum 
Physical Needs (the so-called KFM or Kebutuhan Fisik Minimum) (see Suryahadi et 
al, 2003, and Rama, 2001). The KFM was measured by the cost of minimum 
consumption packages, including food, housing, clothing, and selected other items for 
a single worker in a month (Sukatrilaksana, 2002).
The KFM measure was then revised in 1996 by a wider range o f consumption 
packages and recognized as the Minimum Living Needs (the so-called KHM or 
Kebutuhan Hidup Minimum) in order to generate a higher standard of living. 
According to the Minister of Manpower Regulation No.61/1995, the KHM is 
measured by a more detailed consumption package of 43 items, consisting of 11 items 
in the food group, 19 items in the housing group, 8 items in the clothing group, and 5 
items in the selected other items group, which costs 15% to 20% more than the KFM 
in Rupiah terms.
According to the Ministry of Manpower Regulation No. 1/1999, the minimum wage in 
Indonesia is defined as: “the lowest monthly wage that consists o f  a basic salary and a 
regular allowance” (Widarti, 2006). Besides the basic monthly salary, therefore, the 
minimum wage should include a regular allowance if it is offered by the employer. A 
regular allowance is an allowance that is given regularly without considering workers’ 
attendance or output, such as regular family allowance and an allowance based on the 
work tenure.
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The minimum wage in Indonesia is set based on the monthly terms (not the hourly 
terms like in many developed countries). Typically, the Indonesian minimum wage is 
set for full-time workers with a standard of 40 hours worked per week or about 173 
hours worked per month (see Rama, 2001). However, the minimum wage is flexible 
and can be adjusted for part-time workers who work less than 40 hours per week on a 
pro-rata basis. In addition, the minimum wage policy is legally applied to all paid 
employment without considering firms’ size and sector of activity, while self- 
employment and unpaid family workers are not covered by the minimum wage policy.
Based on the Ministry o f Manpower Regulation No. 1/1999 (see Widarti, 2006), the 
main objectives of the minimum wage policy in Indonesia are:
(1) to materialize a decent income for workers; some considerations are taken 
into account, including raising the welfare o f  workers without ignoring 
companies ’ productivity and its advancement as well as a consideration o f  
general economic conditions
(2) determination o f a realistic regional (and sectoral) minimum wage should 
take into account aspects such as a company’s capability to pay, the 
conditions o f the sector in which the company operates and the regional 
economy in which the firm is located; it is also necessary to determine 
regional (and sectoral) minimum wage.
These objectives indicate that the minimum wage level is not only considered as a 
wage floor for workers who are low-paid but also as an instrument to increase the 
welfare and standard o f living for all workers (Manning, 2003a). However, besides 
workers’ welfare, some considerations should also be taken into account in setting the 
minimum wage level, such as maintain companies’ productivity and sustainable 
national (and regional) economic conditions (Hendrani, 2002).
The minimum wage level in Indonesia is generally set provincially. Before 2001, in 
the centralization era, the central government (in this case the Ministry of Manpower)
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determined the level of each provincial minimum wage based on the recommendation 
from the provincial (regional) government, while after the decentralization era (after 
2001) the regional government has the power to set their minimum wage level. Before 
decentralization, provinces mainly had just one level of the minimum wage that was 
applied throughout the entire region, but after the decentralization era, several 
minimum wages (sub-minimum wage) are allowed to exist for different local 
districts/cities (lower level region) within a province and, in some cases, for specific 
sectors of activity, as long as they are not below the provincial minimum wage level 
(Suryahadi et al, 2003). In practice, four provinces in Java and Bali (West Java, 
Central Java, East Java, and Bali) have their own local district and city minimum 
wages besides their provincial minimum wage, while provinces outside Java tend to 
set only one minimum wage level within a province. More detail about minimum 
wage setting during the decentralization era will be discussed in the next section.
The compliance with the minimum wage policy in Indonesia, and also in most 
developing countries, is likely to be low. In Honduras, for example, 32% of total 
employment is paid below the minimum wage level, while in Costa Rica, more than 
25% of full-time paid employees are paid below the minimum wage level (Gindling 
and Terrell, 2007). In Indonesia, in 2003, more than 18% of paid employees in urban 
areas are paid below the minimum wage level, while in rural areas more than 29% of 
paid employees are paid below the minimum wage level (see table 3.1 below).
As pointed out by Rama (2001), there are two main reasons for non-compliance with 
the minimum wage policy. Firstly, there is lack of enforcement and weak control by 
the government particularly on the firms who fail to comply with the policy
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(Suryahadi et al, 2001). Although the minimum wage policy is applied to all paid 
employment without considering firms’ size and sector of activity, the focus of the 
enforcement by the government is still limited to the large and medium enterprises 
and workers living in urban areas. Therefore, it is not surprising that many small 
enterprises and workers who are living in rural areas are still paid below the minimum 
wage because of lack of enforcement and ineffective labour unions in that group of 
workers. As pointed out by SMERU (2003) and Rooney and Anggriani (2006), 
control from the government officers for the minimum wage compliance is usually 
taken by regular inspection to the companies every six months. Companies also need 
to provide regular reports every 3-6 months for their minimum wage compliances to 
the Ministry of Manpower office. In addition, the minimum wage compliances can 
also be checked from the data of employees’ that join the National Social Security 
Program (the so-called Jamsostek). Jamsostek is the social security scheme for private 
sector workers that is mainly sponsored and administered by the government, covering 
worker injury benefits, death benefits, retirement benefits, and healthcare benefits 
(Arifianto, 2004). In practice, as pointed out by Arifianto (2004), employers have to 
contribute to this scheme by between 7-11% of the total wages paid to their workers, 
while workers have to contribute about 2% of their wages. However, this scheme 
covers only workers in the formal sector and does not cover workers in the informal 
sector and workers employed by small businesses.
Moreover, in practice, the government has never issued effective sanctions for those 
employers who continue to pay their workers below the minimum wage (SMERU, 
2003). It seems that government still tolerates them in order to avoid lay-offs and an 
increase in the unemployment rate. Although there is no detailed information on the
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number of minimum wage violations in Indonesia, Gall (1998) stated that only 0.15% 
of the 108,332 violation cases including health and safety provisions and the 
minimum wage policy violations reported to the Indonesian Ministry of Manpower 
office between 1985 and 1990 got penalties for their violation. However, as noted 
above, the minimum wage was still not effective during that period. The minimum 
wage started to be used an important instrument for labour market, as the focus of this 
study, at the end o f the 1980s.
Based on the new regulation (after decentralization era), the penalties for non- 
compliance range from Rp. 10 million to Rp. 100 million (about US$ 1000 to US$ 
10,000), while before new regulation it is relatively low at around US$ 50 (Rama, 
2001 and Manning, 2003). However, Rama (2001) pointed out that penalties or 
economic sanctions are not effective in Indonesia as bribes and corruptions are 
sometimes still found in practice. As an alternative, publicity and blacklisting of the 
companies that violate the regulation are also used by the government as a mechanism 
to enforce the minimum wage (Rama, 2001).
The second reason for non-compliance is that, based on government regulation, 
employers might propose a temporary waiver if they are unable to comply with the 
minimum wage regulation. However, the requirements to obtain a temporary waiver 
tend to be difficult and costly, particularly for medium and small enterprises because it 
requires a financial audit from a public auditor (Suryahadi et al, 2001). In practice, 
Rama (2001) confirmed only about 135 of waiver requests per year in Indonesia from 
more than 20,000 firms in the manufacturing sector, suggesting that the number of 
temporary waivers proposed by the companies is not significant.
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Table 3.1. Compliance with the Minimum Wage (%), 1996-2003
1996 1997 1998
\  '  ” n
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
National (Aggregate)
L ess than M W a 3 8 .2 0 3 3 .79 33.43 30 .78 2 9 .6 2 24 .7 2 24 .78 21 .53
Fraction at M W b 6.44 5.86 5.42 5 .09 5 .06 4 .48 5 .05 3 .75
M ore than M W C 55.36 60 .35 61 .15 64.13 6 5 .32 7 0 .8 0 7 0 .17 74 .72
Urban
L ess than M W 2 8 .4 0 24.41 26 .05 24 .13 2 3 .1 9 2 1 .5 9 21 .75 18.19
Fraction at M W 6.32 5.53 4.91 4 .7 7 4 .95 4 .0 2 4 .95 3.69
M ore than M W 65.28 70 .06 6 9 .04 71 .10 71 .86 74 .39 73 .30 78 .12
Rural
L ess than M W 4 9 .2 0 44 .42 4 2 .2 9 3 9 .2 4 39 .08 3 1 .20 31 .72 29.51
Fraction at M W 6.57 6.23 6.03 5.51 5.21 5 .42 5.28 3 .89
M ore than M W 44.23 49 .35 51 .68 55 .25 55.71 63 .38 63 .00 6 6 .6 0
Note :a Less than MW is the fraction o f workers which earn below the minimum wage level
bFraction at MW is the fraction of workers which earn around the minimum wage level (using 5% 
rounding approximation) 
c More than MW is the fraction o f workers which earn above the minimum wage level 
Source : Calculated from Sakernas
Although the compliance is relatively low, there is a tendency for it to increase 
substantially in medium and large-scale establishments when labour unions become 
effective, especially after the political liberalization which followed the economic 
crisis and downfall of Soeharto’s political dictatorship in 1998. Before 1998, there 
was a strong political campaign during President Soeharto’s heavily centralized era to 
prevent labour unions as a crucial part of regional labour market policy, allowing only 
one pro-govemment labour union (SPSI) to exist (Rama, 2001 and Suryahadi et al, 
2003). In the public sector, all o f the employees must also be a member of corps of 
labour organization (the so-called KORPRI) created by the government. In general, 
the employees do not have collective bargaining and representative functions during 
that period (Gall, 1998). After the new regime, in contrast, the industrial relations 
system now becomes more decentralized where employers and employees have its 
representative functions. After 2001, for example, more than 141 national labour 
unions exist with more than 11,000 registered members (SMERU, 2003). However, in 
practice, the union is still mostly found in the large and medium enterprises and is 
rarely found in the small enterprises.
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As presented in table 3.1, a decline in the percentage o f earnings below the minimum 
wage after 1996 was one indication that the minimum wage has become more binding 
in Indonesia. When workers are separated into different areas, it becomes clear that 
the minimum wage mostly affects urban areas. The high percentage of workers who 
earn below the minimum wage level in rural areas suggests that workers in rural areas 
are not greatly affected by the minimum wage, given the low compliance and lack of 
enforcement in those areas. On the other hand, urban areas, where medium and large- 
scale establishments are mostly situated, are the most likely to see compliance with
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the minimum wage regulation . In consequence, if the goal of the minimum wage is to 
reduce poverty, this is unlikely to be an effective tool due to the fact that poverty in 
Indonesia is largely in the rural and informal sectors (Islam, 2002), which are not 
covered by the minimum wage.
Compared to other countries, table 3.1 suggests that the fraction of workers which 
earn near or at the minimum wage level (the so-called fraction at) is relatively small. 
In Brazil, the fraction at the minimum wage level is 12% (Lemos, 2004c), while in 
Thailand, it is more than 20% (ILO, 1999). One possible reason is the fact that the 
minimum wage does not act as the exact wage floor in Indonesia. According to the 
Ministry of Manpower Regulation No.01/1999, it is important to note that the 
minimum wage level can only be applied to workers who have worked for less than 
one year. In other words, if the duration of work is more than one year, the company 
should pay a salary greater than the minimum wage level, although it is not clear by 
how much. This evidence supports Manning’s (2003a) analysis that the Indonesian
2 Suryahadi et a l’s (2 0 0 1 ) survey found that only  4.9%  workers in large-scale establishm ent are paid 
below  the m inim um  w age level. In contrast, 63.3%  and 30.4%  workers are paid below  the m inim um  
w age level in sm all and m edium  scale establishm ents respectively.
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minimum wage policy is likely to be considered as a tool or instrument for raising the 
workers’ standard o f living rather than considered as a floor to the wage levels. 
Unfortunately, there is no information in our labour force data set about the job tenure. 
This information, in practice, will be important in order to indicate whether a 
differential influence between workers employed less than a year (who are paid the 
exact wage floor in Indonesia based on the regulation) and workers employed more 
than a year exists in Indonesia.











Source: Computed from Sakemas
In summary, figure 3.1 shows some trends in the real average wage, the real average 
minimum wage and the ratio of real average minimum wage to real average wage in 
Indonesia (the so-called toughness). It shows that before the international pressures of 
the early 1990s, the increasing trends of the minimum wage were somewhat below the 
rising trend in average wages. After 1990, there is a constant increase in real terms, 
indicating that the minimum wage has become an important labour market policy in 
Indonesia. However, given the steep depreciation of the Rupiah in the wake of the
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1997 financial crisis, real average minimum wages have fallen to their lowest level for 
almost a decade. The surge in inflation in 1998 decimated the level of the minimum 
wage. Therefore, in real terms, they actually fell significantly. On the other side, 
toughness fluctuated more slightly. Because real average minimum wages rose faster 
than real average wages, toughness had a tendency to increase after 1990. However, 
after the crisis in 1997, toughness declined slightly and stayed at around the same 
point.
3.2 Minimum Wage Fixing in the New Regime (Decentralization Era)
Since 2001, as part of a political regime changing from centralization to greater 
decentralization, the power to set the minimum wage level has also been transferred to 
the provinces and local district governments (the lower level of government), who 
collaborate with the wage commission at a regional level. Each wage commission is 
comprised of a regional manpower office, employer, labour union representatives, and 
some expert advisors (Manning, 2003a). The main objective of this decentralization 
policy is to gain economic effectiveness, efficiency and equitable access to public 
services (Sugiyarto and Endriga, 2008)3. In addition, local governments are also 
assumed to understand more about the problems and conditions of their region rather 
than the central government.
Based on new regulation, the government at the provincial level sets a minimum wage 
floor for the entire region, while the local districts and municipalities (the lower level 
government) have an option to follow or set the minimum wage above the provincial
3 SM E R U  (2 0 0 3 ) a lso  argued that decentralizing the pow er to set the m inim um  w age level w as also  
aim ed at sharing the risks o f  negotiating w ith the labour unions in each region, such as big  
dem onstrations w hen the m inim um  w age changes, by delegating the pow er to the low er level 
governm ent.
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wage level, but not lower than the provincial minimum wage level. As pointed out by 
Manning (2003a), the implementation varies across provinces. Some provinces, such 
as Greater Jakarta and most of the provinces outside Java, use their provincial 
minimum wage level across their districts and municipalities. On the other hand, some 
other provinces, including West Java, East Java, Central Java, and Bali allow the 
variation of minimum wages level across cities and municipalities. Although it has 
officially stated in the new regulation, in practice, the minimum wage setting across 
districts and municipalities is still under debate in Indonesia. Besides making the 
minimum wage fixing and its implementation more complicated, some Indonesian 
experts, including Widianto (2003), have criticized this in that it will increase the 
opportunity for corruption at the lower level of government and make enforcement 
more difficult4.
According to the new government regulation after the decentralization era, as pointed 
out by Hendrani (2002), in determining the level of the minimum wage, consideration 
must be given to:
(a) the cost of minimum basic living needs (KHM);
(b) the consumer price index;
(c) the capability, growth and continuation of the company;
(d) the rate of the minimum wage in neighbouring areas;
(e) labour market conditions;
(f) economic growth and per capita income.
4 I f  there are m ore than 3 0 0  local districts and m unicipalities, it is possib le  that Indonesia w ill have  
m ore than 30 0  different leve ls o f  the m inim um  w age across regions.
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However, there are still no clear and detailed guidelines on how the criteria might be 
collected across regions. In determining the cost o f KHM, for example, the assessment 
varies across regions depending on the type of market visited and the quality and the 
expertise o f the wage commission (Manning, 2003a). In addition, in most areas, there 
is a lack o f reliable data of these other criteria (besides the cost of KHM) at regional 
level. Therefore, in practice, the cost of minimum basic living needs (KHM) (and rate 
of minimum wages in neighbouring areas in some areas) is still the main consideration 
used to set up the minimum wage level (see for example Hendrani (2002) study of 
West Java).
Table 3.2 confirms that the Indonesian provincial minimum wages in 2003 were set 
primarily on the basis of the KHM. It can be seen from table 3.2 that in 2003 more 
than a half of all provinces had a ratio o f the minimum wage to the KHM at around 
90%-110%. Only a few provinces had a ratio below 70%, including Maluku, 
Bengkulu, and Riau. The exception was found in 1999, shortly after the major 
economic crisis in 1997-1998, when all of the minimum wages were below the KHM, 
indicating the decline of worker welfare in that period. As presented in table 3.2, the 
highest ratio o f the minimum wages to the KHM during this period was only 80.5% in 
Sumatera Utara and the lowest one was 55.6% in Aceh.
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Table 3.2. Nominal Minimum Wages and KHM by Provinces, 1999 & 2003
P ro v in ces
1999 200 3
M W  (R p ) K H M  (R p) R atio  (% ) M W  (R p ) K H M  (R p ) R a tio  (% )
N. Aceh 171,000 307 ,603 55.6 4 2 5 ,0 0 0 520 ,9 0 0 81.6
Sumatera Utara 2 1 0 ,0 0 0 2 6 1 ,0 0 0 80.5 5 0 5 ,0 0 0 4 5 5 ,9 9 6 110.7
Sumatera Barat 160,000 2 5 1 ,7 1 2 6 3 .6 4 3 5 ,0 0 0 4 1 9 ,6 5 0 103.7
Riau 2 4 2 ,0 0 0 355 ,515 68.1 4 3 7 ,5 0 0 647 ,403 67 .6
Jambi 150 ,000 21 5 ,463 69 .6 39 0 ,0 0 0 44 8 ,8 5 7 86.9
Sumatera Selatan 175,500 25 1 ,5 8 6 69.8 4 0 3 ,5 0 0 40 3 ,2 7 2 100.1
Bengkulu 150,000 21 0 ,1 6 2 71 .4 3 3 0 ,0 0 0 5 0 5 ,000 65.3
Lampung 160,000 22 0 ,5 0 0 72.6 3 5 0 ,0 0 0 4 0 3 ,925 86.6
DKI Jakarta 2 3 1 ,0 0 0 351 ,263 65.8 6 3 1 ,5 5 4 7 4 6 ,7 4 9 84.6
Jawa Barat 2 0 8 ,7 5 0 3 3 0 ,9 4 9 63.1 3 2 0 ,0 0 0 32 0 ,0 0 0 100.0
Jawa Tengah 153,000 23 5 ,7 5 0 64 .0 3 4 0 ,4 0 0 387,121 87.9
DI Yogyakarta 130,000 22 7 ,0 6 4 57.3 3 6 0 ,0 0 0 36 4 ,722 98.7
Jawa Timur 170,500 251,371 6 7 .8 2 7 4 ,0 0 0 2 6 0 ,6 5 9 105.1
Bali 176,500 2 8 8 ,0 0 0 61.3 4 1 0 ,0 0 0 4 3 3 ,6 4 0 94.5
N.T.B 145,000 2 5 7 ,1 5 0 56.4 3 7 5 ,0 0 0 395,831 94.7
N.T.T 143,000 2 3 7 ,425 60 .2 3 5 0 ,0 0 0 3 4 9 ,612 100.1
Kalimantan Barat 175 ,000 25 5 ,7 0 7 68 .4 4 0 0 ,0 0 0 4 3 9 ,9 1 8 90.9
Kalimantan Tengah 195,000 33 5 ,442 58.1 4 2 5 ,0 0 0 4 7 0 ,0 0 0 90.4
Kalimantan Selatan 166,000 233,721 71 .0 42 5 ,0 0 0 4 0 9 ,5 1 2 103.8
Kalimantan Timur 194,000 31 7 ,7 0 4 61.1 5 4 0 ,000 860 ,683 62 .7
Sulawesi Utara 155,000 2 4 8 ,7 0 6 62.3 49 5 ,0 0 0 4 8 1 ,7 8 0 102.7
Sulawesi Tengah 150,000 2 4 0 ,0 0 0 62.5 41 0 ,0 0 0 4 8 1 ,6 7 0 85.1
Sulawesi Selatan 148,000 2 57 ,0 3 5 57 .6 4 1 5 ,0 0 0 4 3 6 ,0 0 0 95 .2
Sulawesi Tenggara 160,000 2 5 4 ,2 5 0 62 .9 3 9 0 ,0 0 0 4 7 4 ,7 3 9 82.1
Maluku 180,000 2 2 3 ,9 6 8 80.4 3 7 0 ,0 0 0 5 62 ,222 65.8
P a p u a 2 2 5 ,0 0 0 3 3 1 ,5 7 9 67 .9 6 0 0 ,0 0 0 7 2 5 ,0 0 0 82.8
AVERAGE 174 ,009 .6 2 6 7 ,3 3 1 .7 65.1 4 15 ,652 .1 4 7 7 ,1 1 0 87.1
Note: Nominal Minimum Wage (MW) and KHM are in Rupiah
Ratio represents the ratio o f  the nominal minimum wage to the KHM 
Source: Indonesian CBS and Sukatrilaksana (2002)
In practice, the transfer of power in determining the level of the minimum wage to the 
regional government has had a big effect on minimum wage trends. In recent times, 
the combination of local pressures and stronger labour unions at regional level has 
significantly contributed to a large minimum wage increase in most Indonesian 
provinces. On average, nominal minimum wages increased by 30% per year in 2001 
and 2002 (see Suryahadi et al, 2003)5. Although this increase is based primarily on the 
increase of the cost of KHM, this all occurred against the slow growth of an economy 
which was still struggling to recover after the major economic crisis in 1997-1998.
5 T h ere  is ev en  ev id en ce  th a t an  increase  in m in im u m  w age is far above  the  reg io n a l in fla tion , such as 
in W est Jav a  and  E ast Jav a  (M an n in g , 2 003a).
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Compared to the other Asian countries with similar stages of development, the 
average minimum wage level in Indonesia is only lower than the minimum wages in 
Philippines and Thailand, but it is relatively higher than the minimum wages in 
Vietnam, Cambodia, Sri Lanka, Pakistan, and Bangladesh (Manning, 2003a).
This condition suggests that using only the cost of KHM as the main benchmark in 
determining the minimum wage level might not be enough without other 
considerations. Some Indonesian experts criticized the idea that the regional 
government may be more willing to support a populist approach to economic policy 
and mainly set the minimum wage level based on workers’ needs, without considering 
other economic factors (Suryahadi et al, 2003 and Widarti, 2006). In practice, there is 
little consideration of employment conditions or international competitiveness which 
both harm many employers. This condition clearly indicates the need for better 
understanding of how the increase in the minimum wage level will affect 
employment, making this study an important policy evaluation.
In addition, the minimum wage level, based on new regulation, should be set at least 
60 days before the effective date (Hendrani, 2002 and Widarti, 2006). The effective 
date o f the minimum wage policy is from 1st January and it will be reviewed each 
year. The dissemination of the minimum wage information is usually through the 
labour union and the company’s management. Otherwise, the dissemination is also 





This chapter reviews the standard theoretical framework regarding the effect of 
minimum wages on employment6. Firstly, it discusses the standard competitive model 
assuming labour is homogenous and one unit o f labour is a perfect substitute for 
another. According to this model, it is suggested that an increase in minimum wage 
that has a positive impact on the wage level will reduce employment. The standard 
competitive model is then extended using the two-sector model considering 
incomplete coverage of the minimum wage policy. In practice, the two-sector model 
might be more relevant for Indonesia and generally developing countries, given a high 
proportion of workers in the uncovered sector, providing a complete picture of the 
impact of minimum wage on employment. In contrast, the standard competitive model 
is more suitable for the countries where minimum wage coverage is complete. As an 
alternative, this chapter also reviews the monopsony model where the minimum wage 
might not have a negative impact but a positive impact on employment. Contrary to 
the two-sector model which was more likely to be found in developing countries, the 
evidence o f monopsony was likely to be found in developed country cases (see for 
example Dickens et al, 1994 and 1999; and Card and Krueger, 1994).
6 In this chapter, em ploym ent is m easured by the num ber o f  workers rather than number o f  hours 
worked although their analysis m ight not change i f  number o f  hours worked is used instead. The effects 
o f  m inim um  w age on hours worked w ill be discussed sp ecifica lly  in chapter 7.
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4.1 The Standard Competitive Model
The standard competitive model assumes that labour is homogenous and one unit of 
labour is a perfect substitute for another (with similar skills and labour services) 
(Jones, 1997). Using a profit-maximisation approach, employers will hire employment 
until their marginal cost equals their marginal revenue product of labour. In the 
competitive market, the marginal cost is simply the wage level w(N). Assume the firm 
has a total revenue R(N), therefore, the firms maximise their profits at the difference 
between the total revenue (R) and the total cost of labour (w(N)) given by:
U = R (N )-w (N )  (4.1)
By using the first order conditions, we can see that employers maximise their profits 
by employing their workers where the marginal cost (w ’) is equal to the marginal 
revenue product of labour (MRP) (Hinnosaar and Room, 2003) given by:
MRP -  w ' = 0 (4.2)
where MRP can be represented as the firm’s marginal product of labour (MPl) times
their marginal revenue (MR). If the minimum wage is set above the equilibrium wage
level, the marginal cost of labour will increase above the marginal revenue, leading to 
a new level of equilibrium with a lower level of employment.
Figure 4.1 presents the equilibrium level for wage and employment based on the 
standard competitive model. The labour demand curve is downward sloping 
representing the marginal revenue product of labour (MRP). This diminishing 
marginal productivity of labour implies that the contribution to output (productivity) 
increases at a decreasing rate when employment increases, assuming that the other 
inputs are constant. On the other hand, the labour supply curve is upward sloping 
showing the alternative earnings received by workers. The equilibrium of the
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competitive wage rate and employment is then simply determined by the interaction 
between labour demand (D) and labour supply (S). As presented in figure 4.1, 






Minimum Wage in the Competitive Market
Suppose the minimum wage is set above the equilibrium level, say at Wj. This 
condition generates an excess supply of labour, suggesting that only Ej will be 
employed with E2 available workers. This excess implies that employment will 
decline from Eo (the equilibrium level) to Ej. Ei also illustrates the new equilibrium 
level of employment after the minimum wage changes in the competitive market. 
However, if minimum wage is set below the equilibrium level (below Wo), it would 
not be effective as the wage rate and employment equilibrium will remain at Wo and 
E0.
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In practice, the excess supply of labour (E2-E1) is larger than the reduction in 
employment (E1-E0) because it includes not only workers who are displaced or 
affected by minimum wage, but also people who were previously not in the labour 
market and have been encouraged to enter the labour market by the higher minimum 
wage level (Filer et al, 1996). The more elastic labour demand, then the more 
employment is displaced or affected by minimum wage.
In the countries where minimum wage coverage is complete or compliance is high, the 
excess supply o f labour (E2-E1) can simply be viewed as unemployment. However, in 
the case of developing countries, with limited access to the unemployment benefits 
and incomplete coverage of minimum wage, workers who are affected by minimum 
wage do not always become unemployed; some will go to work in the uncovered 
sector (Jones, 1997). Therefore, the two-sector model of covered and uncovered 
sectors described below might be more relevant for developing countries rather than 
the standard competitive model, showing a complete analysis of workers in the 
covered and uncovered sectors.
4.2. The Two-Sector Model
As mentioned above, the standard competitive model is suitable for the countries 
where minimum wage coverage is high. However, this model might not be complete 
for developing country cases, given a high proportion of workers in the uncovered 
sector. The extension of the standard competitive model is given by the two-sector 
model firstly constructed by Welch (1974) by considering incomplete coverage of 
minimum wage. This model basically assumes that there are two sectors in the 
economy, one that is covered by the minimum wage policy (the so-called covered
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sector) and one that is not covered by the minimum wage policy (the so-called 
uncovered sector) with perfect mobility across two different sectors. In the absence of 
a minimum wage, these two sectors are assumed to be paid at the same wage level Wo.
Suppose there is an imposition of a minimum wage in the covered sector that is higher 
than the equilibrium wage rate Wo. The covered sector jobs then become preferable to 
the uncovered sector jobs, suggesting that more people become willing to work in the 
covered sector. In other words, an imposition of a minimum wage potentially creates 
an excess supply of labour in the covered sector. According to Welch (1974), the 
probability of finding a job in the covered sector (P) is therefore given by:
^  DcQVm) 
SQVm)
where Dc(Wm)  is the demand for covered sector jobs and S(Wm)  is the aggregate 
supply of labour.
Based on the two-sector model, this excess supply of labour in the covered sector 
potentially generates a displacement effect for employment in the covered sector into 
the uncovered sector or withdrawal from the labour market. Specifically, this effect 
not only shifts or affects workers who were previously in the covered sector but also 
moves people who were previously not in the covered sector and have been 
encouraged to enter the covered sector by the minimum wage imposition. This 
evidence is illustrated by the shift in the supply curve of the uncovered sector outward 
from So to Si in figure 4.2.
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Following Welch (1974), the supply o f labour in the uncovered sector (Su(Wo)) after 
the minimum wage imposition in the covered sector can be specified in general form 
as follows:
SUQV0) = S Q V )(}-P )  (4.4)
where S(W) is the total supply of labour. In consequence, the uncovered sector 
employment will increase (from Eo to Ei in figure 4.2) and wages paid to the workers 
in the uncovered sector will decrease below the original equilibrium level (from Wo to 
Wi in figure 4.2). At the new equilibrium wage level, Wj, demand in the uncovered 
sector at Wi (DU(W/)) is then given by:
Du{W,) = Du(W,){\ + r,co) (4.5)
where Du(Wo) is the demand of labour in the uncovered sector before the minimum 
wage imposition, 77 is the elasticity of labour demand, which is presumed the same as 
for the covered sector, andco is the proportionate wage reduction (or given as co = (Wj- 
W0)/W0).
On the other hand, the supply of labour in the uncovered sector, at the new 
equilibrium wage (SU(W/)), is given by:
Su(W1) = S(W)(l + sco )(l-P )  (4.6)
where s is the elasticity supply of workers in the uncovered sector. Equating the sum 
of the demand and supply changes related with the co proportionate wage reduction 
and the supply shifts induced by the minimum wage imposition in the covered sector 
gives:
~ ° V -  (4.7)
l - c  + ewm
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where c is the proportion of workers employed in the covered sector and wm is the 






Minimum Wages Effects in the Uncovered Sector
In Indonesia, the distinction between the covered and uncovered sectors depends on 
the category (status) of employment. As mentioned above, in Indonesia, paid 
employment is the category of employment legally covered by the minimum wage 
policy, while self-employed and unpaid family workers are the category of 
employment not covered by the minimum wage policy. Although the proportion has 
been increasing, paid employment in Indonesia is only 39% of total employment with 
more than 60% of them in urban areas. Given that there are no unemployment benefits 
provided by the Indonesian government, if there is some decline in the covered sector, 
it can be predicted that workers are likely to be displaced to the uncovered sector. In 
addition, Feridhanusetyawan and Gaduh (2000) argued that the labour market in
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Indonesia is flexible enough in supporting labour mobility from one sector to the other 
sector if there is a contraction in the covered sector. One of the examples of flexible 
labour mobility in Indonesia is the role of the urban informal sector as a “safety valve” 
for employment during the crisis of 1997-1998.
In addition, Mincer (1976) and Gramlich (1976) extend the standard two-sector model 
by considering that workers displaced from the covered sector will not automatically 
enter the uncovered sector when the wage rates offered in the uncovered sector are 
lower than their reservation (expected) wages (the so-called two-sector model with 
queuing for covered-sector jobs). These workers, specifically, will wait (queue) for the 
covered sector (as unemployed) because this sector generally has a higher expected 
wage than the uncovered sector. However, the probability of getting a job in the 
covered sector in practice is lower than the probability of getting a job in the 
uncovered sector. In this case, Gramlich (1976) specified the expected wage as 
follows:
E(W) = (P + r ( l - P ) W tn) (4.8)
where P  is the probability of being employed in the covered sector, r is income
replacement rate for unemployment benefits, and Wm is the wages in the covered
sector. Specifically, P depends on the number of unemployed queuing for the covered 
sector jobs (U) relative to the covered sector employment as follows:
/> =  X-rr -  (4.9)
1 +
+ DC(W„)
According to this model, the total supply of labour therefore consists of covered and 
uncovered sectors employment and unemployed, which is given by:
S(W)=Dc(Wm) + Du{Wi) + U (4.10)
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Assuming demand elasticities in covered and uncovered sectors are equal, total 
employment will be a function of proportion of workers employed in the covered 
sector (c), elasticity of demand for labour (rj), elasticity of supply for labour (s), 
unemployed parameter (a), and the wages in the covered sector (Wm), which is given 
by:
c{s + —)r}
In E = ----------- 2 -------In Wm (4.11)
£  H (1 -  C) l )
a
Solving for the unemployment rate (the ratio of unemployed to supply o f labour), this 
is given by:
U c{E -rj)
S(WU) sa  + c -  «(1 -  c)rj
In Wm (4.12)
The limitation o f this two-sector model with queuing for covered sector jobs 
developed by Gramlich (1976) and Mincer (1976) is that it assumes workers cannot 
search for covered sector jobs when they are employed in the uncovered sector 
(Brown et al, 1982). If covered and uncovered sectors are separated geographically, 
workers in uncovered sectors are unlikely to search for covered sector employment. 
However, the covered and uncovered sectors are usually separated based on their 
employment category (employment status), such as in Indonesia, suggesting that 
uncovered sector employment (those who are interested in entering covered sector 
employment) are likely to search for covered sector employment when they are 
employed in the uncovered sector. Therefore, the unemployment rate (from the 
queuing for covered sector jobs) might be less than predicted. In addition, this model 
assumes the availability of unemployment benefits, which is not the case of Indonesia.
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As a result, the simple two-sector model developed by Welch (1974) might be more 
relevant for Indonesia than the two-sector model with queuing for covered sector jobs 
developed by Mincer (1976) and Gramlich (1976).
4.3. The Monopsony Model
The monopsony model is an alternative theoretical model which might provide non­
negative effect o f minimum wage on employment. In this model, it is generally 
assumed that there is only a single (dominant) firm or buyer of labour in the labour 
market. Therefore, the firm has the power to set a wage level that maximises its profits 
(the so-called monopsony power). A higher wage paid to the workers, then, will lead 
to larger supply of workers (Dolado et al, 1996). In the absence of minimum wage, the 
marginal revenue product of labour (MRPl) is assumed to be downward sloping 
representing the addition to the total revenue as a result of employing each additional 
worker. As a single buyer, the labour supply curve (S) is upward sloping which means 
that a monopsonist should have to pay a higher wage in order to attract and to employ 
an extra unit of labour. S also represents their average cost (A C l) showing the average 
wage level that employers need to pay if they want to hire additional workers. Unlike 
the standard competitive model, the marginal cost of labour (M C l) is higher than the 
A C l curve because a monopsonist does not have to pay a higher wage only to the new 
additional worker, but also to the existing workers with at least at the same wage 
level.
According to the profit-maximisation approach, the firm will hire employment until 
their MCl equals their MRPl- As presented in figure 4.3, the firm therefore will 
maximise its profits where the MCl curve intersects with the MRP curve. As a result,
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the wage rate equilibrium in the absence o f minimum wage is at Wo and the 






Minimum Wage in the Monopsony Market
Suppose there is an introduction of minimum wage at Wi, which is higher than the 
wage rate equilibrium. The minimum wage makes the marginal cost of labour (and 
also the labour supply curve) perfectly horizontal at Wi, suggesting that employing 
additional workers does not need to raise the wage as long as workers are expecting to 
be paid at or below the minimum wage level. This condition exists until they intersect 
with their original labour supply curve. After M C l intersects its original labour supply 
curve, S is upward sloping (follow the original labour supply curve) suggesting that 
the firm needs to pay more than the minimum wage level if they want to hire 
additional workers than the workers who are expecting to be paid at or below the 
minimum wage level (Rocheteau and Tasci, 2007). This implies that the overall labour
4 6
supply curve is kinked at the point where the quantity of labour is Ei. The perfectly 
horizontal marginal cost curve now also follows the original marginal cost curve 
(M C l). The new equilibrium level after minimum wage introduction therefore 
becomes Ej and Wi where the perfectly horizontal marginal cost curve meets its 
marginal revenue product of labour. As a result, contrary to the standard competitive 
model, this condition leads to an increase in employment from Eo to Ej suggesting a 
positive impact of minimum wage on employment. However, the optimal level for the 
minimum wage setting that generates more employment for the firm is the intersection 
between M R P l and M C l (at W2 level). Therefore, if the minimum wage is set above 
the W2 level, similar to the competitive wage, employment will actually fall.
Dickens et al (1994) and Manning (2003b) concluded that the equilibrium level of 
wage and employment for monopsonist is determined by the elasticity of the MRPl 
with respect to employment (1/D) and the elasticity of the labour supply with respect 
to an individual firm (1/<S). The employment gain for the monopsonist is then given 
by In (1+ S) /  (D+S), while the wage increase is given by S In (1+ S) /  (D+S).
4.4 The Dynamic Monopsony Model
In reality, a single buyer of labour, such as the small town firm or the isolated 
employer in the outer islands, has rarely been seen in the labour market during recent 
years, which is mainly down to infrastructure and/or transportation improvement 
(Machin and Manning, 1994 and Ghellab, 1998). In addition, most minimum wage 
workers are likely to be found in small firms, not in a big single (dominant) firm. 
Relating to these issues, Machin and Manning (1994) and Manning (2003b) developed 
a comprehensive dynamic monopsony model which might be more relevant than the
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standard monopsony model as regards recent labour market analysis. As pointed out 
by Machin and Manning (1994) and Ghellab (1998), the main assumption of the 
dynamic monopsony model is, firstly, there could be several employers (firms) in the 
labour market indicating that there are several buyers of labour in the labour market 
(must not be a single buyer of labour). Secondly, workers have imperfect information 
about better job opportunities elsewhere offered by the other employers during the 
current time period, indicating their commitment to the current employer. Thirdly, it is 
easy to get an extra unit of labour as long as employers offer higher wages above the 
equilibrium level. As a consequence, consistent with the standard monopsony model, 
there will be a positive relationship between the wage changes and labour supply, 
represented by an upward labour supply curve. In other words, this condition can also 
be interpreted that employers have a monopsony power in the labour market.
As pointed out by Dickens et al (1994) and Manning (2003b) there are two important 
additional points to be considered in their model: (1) heterogeneity among 
monopsonist firms; and (2) interactions between monopsonist firms. Relating to 
heterogeneity, in practice, the effects of minimum wage on each monopsonist firm 
will be different depending on their productivity (the so-called demand or revenue 
shock) and the labour supply curve facing the employer (the so-called supply shock). 
Dickens et al (1994) and Manning (2003) provided three alternative regimes that 
might be faced by the employers, including the unconstrained regime, the supply- 
constrained regime, and the demand-constrained regime. They will be discussed 
below.
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Moreover, as pointed out by Dickens et al (1994), an increase in the wage paid to the 
workers by a monopsonist firm will induce the other monopsonist firms to increase 
their wages as well, suggesting the presence of “spillover effect” or “knock-on effect” 
in the interactions between firms. In this case, this effect is defined as an increase in 
wages in a monopsonist firm caused by an increase in wages of the reference firm in 
the same industry. As a result, this effect will also induce higher average wages in the 
industry, causing an increase in aggregate labour supply in the industry as predicted 
by the monopsony model.
Dickens et al (1994) and Manning (2003) provide a standard theoretical model of 
dynamic monopsony using a profit maximisation approach. Suppose that firm i has 
the marginal revenue product of labour which is simply given by:
where At is the firm-specific demand shock to the MRPt, and is the employment at 
firm i.
On the supply side, the labour supply to the firm i is given by:
where Wi is the firm-specific wage offered, W is the average log wage across firms 
(the aggregate wage), Bj is the firm-specific supply shock, and N  is the aggregate 
employment. Inverting the labour supply function to the wage equation, it takes the 
form:
MRP, = A ,N ^ (4.13)
(4.14)
Wi = W* (W, Nh Bi) (4.15)
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Taking the log-linear in the form and changing the log-linear variables by lower case 
gives:
Wi =J3w + brij + bi (4.16)
suggesting that the log wage in the firm i (w/) depends on the log average wage across 
firms (w), the log o f firm-specific labour supply shock (bi) and the log of employment 
(»).
According to the profit maximisation approach, employers will hire labour up to the 
point where the MRPj is equal to the marginal cost of labour (MCLi). Suppose, the log 
of MCU is given by In (1+ <5) + wh Substituting the labour supply function into the log 
of MCLh it takes the form:
MCLi = In (1+ S) + fiw + 5 nt + bt (4.17)
Equating the MRPLj and MCLt provides
cii - a rii= In (1+ 5) + pw  + 8 «,• + bj (4.18)
Solving for Nf (the equilibrium level of employment) gives:
- / f t* - ln ( l+ <?) + <>,-6, (419)
a  + 8
Substituting Nt to the labour supply function, the equilibrium level o f wages is given 
by:
w  -  a f i w  ~  8  +  +  5 0 i +  a b i (4  2 0 )
a  + S
As presented in the equilibrium level of wage and employment equations (equation 
4.19 and 4.20), we can conclude that revenue shocks (a) positively affect wage and 
employment, while supply shocks (b) positively affect wage and negatively affect
5 0
Sg ■ + ccb-
employment. Moreover, the change in— -------   is also defined as the wage shocks (V)
a  + S






Three Regimes for the Impact of Minimum Wage
Source: Dickens (1994) and Manning (2003b)
In the presence o f a minimum wage, say at wi, as pointed out by Dickens et al (1994) 
and Manning (2003), there are three possible regimes for monopsonists depending on 
the marginal revenue product of labour (.MRPj) curve position. Firstly, the 
monopsonists will be in the “unconstrained regime” if the MRP, intersects the MCLi at 
a level of employment requiring a wage paid above the minimum wage level (see 
MRPi curve in figure 4.4). In this case, the employment level is determined by the 
supply curve. However, although workers are initially paid above the minimum wage 
level, it does not mean that the equilibrium levels of wage and employment will not 
change when the minimum wage is introduced. As pointed out by Dolado et al (1996),
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the coefficient of the average wage {fi) in equations 4.19 and 4.20 will not equal zero 
because of the interactions between monopsonist firms that might induce the 
monopsonist to increase their wages perhaps through the spillover effect.
Secondly, the monopsonists will be in the “supply-constrained regime” if  the MRP/ 
intersects the MCLi at a level of employment requiring a wage paid at the minimum 
wage level but level of employment is determined by the supply curve (see MRP2 
curve in figure 4.4 which is slightly below MRP 1 curve). The equilibrium level of 
employment after the minimum wage introduction is then given by:
where the first term of the equation indicates the equilibrium level of employment 
before the minimum wage introduction, while the second term denotes the elasticity of 
the labour supply with respect to an individual firm (1/5) and the wage shocks (V).
Thirdly, the monopsonists will be in the “demand-constrained regime” if the MRP/ 
intersects the MCLi at a wage level below the level of minimum wage (see MRP3 in 
figure 4.4). The level of employment is therefore determined by the MRP (demand) 
curve. In this case, monopsonists will pay their workers at the minimum wage level, 
but it is not profitable to employ all workers at the minimum wage level. As noted by 
Dickens et al (1994), some firms still experience more employment than before 
minimum wage introduction, but very low productivity firms tend to reduce their level 
of employment. The equilibrium level of employment after the minimum wage 
introduction in this regime is given by:
(4.21)
— J3w — ln(l + S) + ci — f  n  1 ln(l + 8 ) (4.22)
a  + 5 •y 5  J £ +  S
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where \n(l +d)/(e+S) shows the standard monopsony formula for the maximal gain in 
employment, confirming that employment will be higher than in the competitive 
market (Manning, 2003a).
The standard application of this model in the international literature has been 
addressed, for example by Dickens et al (1994 and 1999); Machin and Manning 
(1994); and Stewart (2002). Although whether a country tends to have a monopsony 
or competitive labour market is an empirical matter, all of the empirical evidence of 
monopsony was likely to be found in developed countries. In developing countries, 
including Indonesia, there is still no empirical evidence of the existence of 
monopsony. In practice, almost all o f the previous studies in developing countries 
generally supported the standard competitive and two-sector models in terms of 
adverse employment effects, although some studies also found no significant impact 
on employment (see for example Bell, 1997; Maloney and Nunez, 2001; and Arango 
and Pachon, 2004).
CHAPTER V
THE EFFECTS OF CHANGES IN MINIMUM WAGE 
ON WAGES AND EMPLOYMENT:
Regional Panel Data Analysis 
5.1. Introduction
There are large numbers of studies on the effects of minimum wage on employment, 
particularly in developed countries. In earlier decades, most of the minimum wage 
studies, particularly in the United States, used aggregate time series data when 
examining the impact of minimum wage on employment (Brown et al, 1982). In 
general, teenage employment has become the focus of studies, since this sector of 
employment is typically at the bottom of the wage distribution and is most affected by 
an increase in minimum wage. As summarized by Brown et al (1982), a 10% increase 
in the minimum wage, on average, reduces teenage employment by between 1 % and 
3% using United States aggregate time series data before the 1980s. The main 
limitation of the time-series data studies is the difficulty in distinguishing between the 
minimum wage effect and the cyclical macro shocks effects that also influence the 
wage rates and employment (Yuen, 2003; Neumark et al, 2004; and Kawaguchi and 
Yamada, 2007). Time-series data are also not useful when there is relatively small 
variation of the minimum wage level across time in the country (Neumark and 
Wascher, 1992). In addition, time-series data studies are not popular in developing 
country studies due to data unavailability for long time periods.
In practice, there has recently been a shift from aggregate time-series data approaches 
into cross-sectional and panel data approaches particularly in the more recent
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developed country studies (Neumark and Wascher, 2004). In contrast to time-series 
data studies, the cross-sectional data studies in the United States have focused on the 
effect of minimum wage on employment using variations associated with the 
difference in state and federal minimum wage policy (Ghellab, 1998). According to 
Brown et al’s (1982) literature review, although the estimates using cross-sectional 
data on average are wider than the estimates of time-series data studies, most of the 
studies are still consistent with the standard competitive model prediction that an 
increase in the minimum wage is likely to decrease teenage employment. One of the 
limitations of the pure cross-sectional data approach is the difficulty in measuring the 
minimum wage effects when the single minimum wage level exists at one point in 
time across individual workers (Brown et al, 1982).
As an alternative, more recent minimum wage studies have applied the methodology 
of using both panel data and pooled time-series cross-sectional data approaches. 
Besides providing greater numbers of observations and minimum wage measure 
variations, these methodologies allow specific region (or industry) and year effects as 
separate effects to the minimum wage variable, providing a “cleaner evaluation” of 
the minimum wage effects from any specific region and year effects (Neumark and 
Wascher, 1992).
Using an aggregate provincial panel data set, this chapter specifically focuses on two 
main objectives. The first objective is to examine the effects of changes in minimum 
wage on the average wage paid to the worker in Indonesia. As pointed out by 
Burkhauser et al (2000), the effects of minimum wage on employment can only be 
found if there is a significant effect on the wage paid to the worker. Similar to Lemos
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(2004d), the effect of the minimum wage on the wage rate will also be explored across 
each level of the wage distribution. If the minimum wage is effectively enforced, we 
might expect that the distribution of wage becomes more compressed, indicated by the 
largest effect at the bottom part of the distribution, (see for example Dickens et al, 
1999 and Lemos, 2004b). However, it is interesting to note that some minimum wage 
studies also show that the effect of minimum wage is not strongest at the lowest part 
of distribution, indicating that the minimum wage is not effective in helping the 
bottom part of the wage distribution (Neumark et al, 2004; and Arango and Pachon, 
2004). This evidence is likely to be found particularly in developing country cases 
where the minimum wage compliance is relatively lower than in developed countries.
The second objective is to re-assess the impact of minimum wage policy on 
Indonesian employment using regional panel data method. The present study 
specifically focuses on the minimum wage effect on paid employment which is legally 
covered by the minimum wage policy (as a part of the formal sector employment). In 
Indonesia, similar to the other developing countries, although all workers or paid 
employment are legally covered by the minimum wage policy, the compliance is 
relatively low given the lack of enforcement and the large size of the informal sector 
(see Suryahadi et al, 2003 for Indonesia; and Gindling and Terrell, 2007 for Costa 
Rica). The proportion of paid employment in Indonesia is around 39% of the total 
employment, with about 20% still paid below the minimum wage level.
This chapter contributes to the international literature in two respects. First, compared 
to developed country studies, there has been very little empirical research on the effect 
of minimum wage in developing countries. Although there are some minimum wage
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studies o f Latin American developing countries, Indonesian data show a unique 
characteristic, in that the minimum wage varies across provinces (regions). In 
comparison, Brazilian and Colombian minimum wages are set at a national level (see 
Lemos, 2004d and Arango and Pachon, 2004), while Costa Rican and Hondurasian 
minimum wages are set at an industrial and firm-size level (see Gindling and Terrell, 
2006 and 2007). In other words, Indonesia is an ideal study to investigate the effects 
of changes in the regional minimum wage in the case of developing countries due to 
the fact that the minimum wage is set provincially rather than nationally, giving more 
regional variations in the minimum wage. Compared to the other developing countries 
with a single (national) minimum wage, therefore, the Indonesian case also provides a 
better source for a panel data study of the effects of minimum wage on wages and 
employment.
Second, this study compares five different measurements that are commonly used to 
measure the minimum wage variable in the international literature, including: (a) the 
log of real minimum wage; (b) toughness; (c) the fraction of workers below the 
minimum wage level; (d) the fraction of workers at the minimum wage level; (e) the 
fraction o f workers affected by the minimum wage (defined as the proportion of 
workers which earns a wage between the old minimum wage and the new one). There 
is no clear justification about which is the most effective type of measurement. The 
results might be different from one country to another and will depend on each 
minimum wage regime and also labour market characteristics. The detailed discussion 
about each measurement is presented in the methodology section. In addition, this 
research employs several different panel data methods, including the simple fixed 
effects model, Panel Corrected Standard Error (PCSE), and a Dynamic Arellano-Bond
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panel data model. The reason for using these different approaches is to obtain the most 
robust estimates of the effects of minimum wage on wages and employment in 
Indonesia.
The rest o f this chapter is organized as follows. Section 5.2 reviews the previous 
minimum wage studies using panel data sets. Section 5.3 discusses the methodology 
used in this study. Section 5.4 explains the main data sources for this research. Section 
5.5 analyses the main findings. Finally, section 5.6 provides conclusions.
7.8. Previous Minimum Wage Studies Using Regional Panel Data
This section reviews the previous minimum wage studies using regional (and 
industrial) panel data methods, while the previous minimum wage studies using 
individual level panel data (and pooled cross sectional-time series data) sets will be 
discussed in the next chapter. The previous studies are reviewed separately in the case 
of developed and developing country studies. In comparison, the minimum wage 
coverage in developed countries tends to be complete and fully enforced, while in 
developing countries, there is a tendency towards incomplete coverage, given the 
lower compliance and the lack of enforcement.
5.2.1. Developed Country Studies
The first influential study on the effects of minimum wage on wages and employment 
in developed countries using the regional panel data method was the study conducted 
by Neumark and Wascher (1992). Specifically, they estimated the effects of the 
minimum wage on teenagers and young adults using the United States the state-level 
panel data method for the years 1973 to 1989. In this case, the ratio of minimum wage
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to the average wage in the state level (multiplied by the minimum wage coverage) was 
employed as the minimum wage measure. Using year and state fixed effects, in 
general they found that the minimum wage had a negative effect on employment. In 
order to check the robustness of the result, they also modified their model using the 
two-stage least squares method (mean of the minimum wage level in the neighbouring 
states was used as an instrumental variable) and dynamic effects of the first-difference 
estimates. They concluded that a 10% increase in minimum wage decreased teenage 
employment by between 1% and 2% and decreased young adult employment by 
between 1.5% and 2%.
Using a panel data method similar to that used by Neumark and Wascher (1992), 
Williams (1993) examined more specific regional effects of the minimum wage on 
teenage employment in the United States for the years 1977 to 1989. Two different 
minimum wage measures were employed. Those were the ratio of minimum wage to 
the average wage in the manufacturing sector (relative minimum wage) and the real 
minimum wage (average wage in the manufacturing sector was included in the 
analysis as a separate explanatory variable). In order to obtain specific regional 
effects, the interactions between the minimum wage measures and region dummy 
variables were also employed in some specifications. Williams (1993) found that, on 
average, an increase in the minimum wage by 10% reduced teenage employment by 
4.8% using real minimum wages and by 3.3% using relative minimum wages. 
Although the coefficients were relatively higher than Neumark and Wascher’s (1992), 
the results were consistent with the standard competitive model, suggesting a negative 
relationship between minimum wage and employment.
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In the more recent study using the United States data, Burkhauser et al (2000) 
estimated the effects of the federal minimum wage on teenage wage and employment 
using monthly panel data for the years 1979 to 1997. Compared to the previous 
studies, one of the advantages of using the monthly data set is that it increased the 
number o f observations. Using the log of the greater of state or federal minimum wage 
as the minimum wage measure, they concluded that an increase in minimum wage 
increased teenage wage rate with the elasticity of between 0.3 and 0.48. Moreover, in 
measuring the employment effect, they found that minimum wage had a negative 
effect on teenage employment with the elasticity of between -0.2 and -0.6. However, 
they pointed out that the minimum wage coefficient was not significant when year 
dummies were included in the model due to their high correlation with the minimum 
wage.
Canada is another good ‘laboratory’ for minimum wage studies in developed countries 
using regional panel data as the minimum wage is set differently across provinces. 
Baker et al (1999) examined the effects of Canadian minimum wage on teenage 
employment using the regional panel data method over the periods 1975 to 1993. In 
their study, the minimum wage was measured by the ratio of the minimum wage to the 
average manufacturing wage. They found that, on average, a 10% increase in 
minimum wage reduced teenage employment by 2.5%. In addition, using a dynamic 
model, Baker et al (1999) decomposed the minimum wage effects into ‘low- 
frequency’ and ‘high-frequency’ variations. At low-frequency, which captured cycles 
of six years or longer, the elasticity was negative and significant, suggesting that the 
negative effect of minimum wage was dominated by the minimum wage changes in 
the long-run.
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McDonald and Myatt (2004) re-estimated the effects of minimum wage on teenage 
employment in Canada from 1976 to 2002 using a regional panel data set. Using the 
ratio of minimum wage to the average manufacturing wage as the minimum wage 
measure, McDonald and Myatt (2004) extended the previous Canadian minimum 
wage analysis by looking at the stability of the results across time and space. Although 
the minimum wage effects on employment remained negative and significant, they 
found that the effects were unstable across time and space. In terms of time period, for 
example, the minimum wage effects were large and negative during the period 1990- 
1996, but were not significant during the period 1997-2002 when the minimum wage 
was not relatively binding. In addition, the result suggests that the minimum wage 
effects were insignificant in some provinces because of insufficient variation in the 
minimum wage measure.
Campolieti et al (2006) compared different minimum wage measures, including the 
ratio of minimum wage to the average wage and the fraction of youth employment 
paid less than minimum wage level using a Canadian regional panel data set from 
1981 to 1997. In order to check the robustness of the result, they also separated the 
minimum wage and the average wage variables instead of using the ratio as the 
minimum wage measure. In general, they found that an increase in minimum wage 
reduced youth employment (aged 16-24) with the elasticities of between -0.17 and - 
0.44.
In the United Kingdom, Machin and Manning (1994) examined the effects of 
minimum wage changes on wage dispersion and employment using ten Wage Council 
industrial data sets. In practice, the industrial Wage Councils in the United Kingdom
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consisted of employers and workers representatives, as well as some independent 
members that set the minimum hourly wages for workers in their industries. Catering, 
retailing, and clothing manufacture were the largest industries in terms of employment 
covered by the minimum wage. Using toughness (ratio of the minimum wage to the 
average wage) as the minimum wage measure, Machin and Manning (1994) found 
that it was negatively associated with the wage dispersion in the Wage Councils 
industries. In terms of employment, interestingly, using different methods, including 
static, dynamic and instrumental variable methods, they found that an increase in 
minimum wage significantly increased employment, suggesting the presence of 
monopsony.
Dickens et al (1999) supported Machin and Manning’s (1994) finding about the 
presence of monopsony in the United Kingdom labour market. They specifically 
examined the effects of the minimum wage on wage distribution and employment 
using more detailed industrial and occupational information in the Wage Council 
industries panel data sets for the years 1975 to 1992. In terms of wage, specifically, 
they examined the effects of minimum wage on the hourly wage at each decile in the 
wage distribution. They found that the effects of the minimum wage were positive and 
significant only in the lower deciles. The strongest effect was found at the lowest 
decile of the wage distribution, indicating that there was a tendency for the minimum 
wage to compress the wage distribution. In terms of employment, using several 
methods including static and dynamic models, the toughness coefficient was positive. 
This result implied that there was no evidence of negative impact on employment, 
again suggesting the presence of monopsony power.
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Stewart (2002) estimated the impact of the 1999 minimum wage introduction on 
employment using geographical or regional variations across 140 areas in the United 
Kingdom. Besides employing regression of the relationship between the employment 
rate and the fraction of workers that earn a wage below the minimum wage level, he 
compared the difference-in-difference estimator in the high and low wage areas. The 
“high impact” regions are defined as the areas with the highest proportion of the low- 
paid workers, while in contrast, the “low impact” regions are defined as the areas with 
the lowest proportion of low-paid workers. As a result, contrary to the standard 
competitive model, Stewart (2002) concluded that there was no evidence of an 
adverse employment effect in the “high impact” areas that potentially contain a big 
proportion of low wage workers.
Using a different methodology and object of study, Machin et al (2003) investigated 
the impact o f the 1999 minimum wage introduction on employment in the residential 
care home sector. This sector is chosen as the focus of study since it contains more 
low-wage workers who are most affected by the minimum wage policy introduction. 
In this case, they employed two different measurements of the minimum wage, 
including the proportion of workers paid below the minimum wage level (before the 
minimum wage introduction) and the wage gap. Using reduced-form employment 
equations, they found that the introduction of minimum wage reduced the employment 
level and hours of work in the residential care home sector. Although the findings 
seem to contradict with the previous United Kingdom studies, Machin et al (2003) 
argued that their result did not provide the complete picture of the impact of minimum 
wage introduction on the overall labour market, due to their focus on the specific 
sector in which the minimum wage mostly affects.
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Neumark and Wascher (2004) investigated the effects of minimum wage on youth 
employment using cross-national data of 17 OECD countries for the years 1975 to 
2000. In this case, they employed the pooled cross-section time series data set because 
it was not possible to provide a complete panel data set with the same information 
from different countries for long time periods. The ratio of minimum wage to the 
average wage was employed to measure the minimum wage variable. In practice, this 
measure was useful to reduce the potential bias from the correlation between the 
minimum wage and the other economic conditions that affect the average wage rate. 
The result indicated that the effects of the minimum wage on youth employment were 
negative using different methods and specifications. Specifically, the effects of 
minimum wage on teenage employment were slightly higher than the effect of 
minimum wage on young adults employment, particularly when country-specific 
trends were included in the specification and when using a dynamic model.
In addition, Neumark and Wascher (2004) extended the analysis by adding some 
specific dummy variables in their specification in order to capture any differences in 
the minimum wage system and labour market policy in each country. In terms of the 
minimum wage system, it was indicated that the negative effect was smaller in the 
country where the minimum wage level was set by collective bargaining. In contrast, 
the negative effect of minimum wage was larger in the country with regional or 
industrial variations than in the country with single (national) minimum wage level. In 
terms of labour market policies, rigid labour standards lead to larger negative effects 
of minimum wage, while greater employment protections and the usage of the active 
labour market policies tend to reduce the negative effects of a minimum wage.
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5.2.2. Developing Country Studies
The minimum wage studies in developing countries are mostly dominated by the 
studies conducted in Latin America. One of the earliest developing country studies is 
the study of the United States minimum wage imposition in Puerto Rico’s labour 
market conducted by Castillo-Freeman and Freeman (1992) using pooled time-series 
cross-sectional method for the period 1951-1997. The minimum wage in Puerto Rico 
is operated under the US minimum wage laws due to that Puerto Rico is a semi- 
autonomous region of the United States7. In practice, it was interesting to see this 
impact due to the fact that the average wage in Puerto Rico was only a half that of in 
the United States. The ratio of minimum wage to the average wage was also 85% 
higher in Puerto Rico than in the United States, suggesting a potential large reduction 
in Puerto Rican employment.
Castillo-Freeman and Freeman (1992) found that the effects of the minimum wage on 
hourly wages for both total employment and manufacturing employment in Puerto 
Rico were positive and significant (the coefficients were 0.27 and 0.24 respectively). 
In terms o f employment, they found that the United States minimum wage led to a 
reduction in Puerto Rican employment with the coefficient of -0.54. Specifically, 
using separate regressions before and after 1974 (before and after the extension of the 
US minimum wage to Puerto Rico), they found that the minimum wage reduced 
employment particularly in the periods after 1974. After the extension of the US 
minimum wage, the coefficient of the minimum wage was -0.91, while before the 
extension of the US minimum wage, the coefficient was not significantly different 
from zero.
7 Although Puerto Rico is a semi-autonomous region of the United States, the analysis in this section is 
included in developing country studies because they have similar characteristics to developing 
countries’ labour markets.
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Bell (1997) compared the effects of minimum wage on skilled and unskilled 
employment in Mexico and Colombia using panel data on manufacturing firms. In 
Mexico, the minimum wage is set differently across 14 regions (although the numbers 
decreased after 1984), while in Colombia the minimum wage is set differently across 
large firms, small firms, and agricultural areas. Bell (1997) found that the effects of 
minimum wages on Mexico and Colombia are different, although they have similar 
labour market characteristics. In Mexico, she found that the minimum wage had no 
significant effect on formal sector wages and employment. The reason is because the 
minimum wage policy was not effective in Mexico as the average wage was relatively 
much higher than the minimum wage level. In contrast, the minimum wage had a 
positive and strong impact on the wages in Colombia as the minimum wage policy 
was more binding than in Mexico. In conclusion, Bell (1997) found that a 10% 
increase in minimum wage in Colombia reduced low paid unskilled labour by between 
2% and 12%.
Contrary to Bell (1997), Feliciano (1998) found different results using Mexican 
employment data from 1970 to 1990. He extended the Mexican minimum wage 
analysis by estimating the effects of the minimum wage separately by gender and age 
groups. Using the ratio of minimum wage to average wage as the minimum wage 
measure, he found that a reduction in the Mexican minimum wage increased female 
employment (with the elasticities of 0.58 and 1.25 using OLS and instrumental 
variable method respectively). However, there was no significant minimum wage 
effect on male employment, as their average wages were relatively higher than female 
employment (except for the age group 55-64). Feliciano (1998) argued that his result 
was relatively different from that of Bell (1997) because they used different dependent
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variables. In this case, Bell (1997) focused on employment in large manufacturing 
firms where the average wage was relatively higher than the minimum wage level, 
while Feliciano (1998) used total employment in the labour market where the 
minimum wage was more binding.
Arango and Pachon (2004) examined the effects of minimum wages on both family 
income per capita distribution and individual income distribution using a dynamic 
panel data set for the seven largest cities in Colombia from 1984 to 2001. Two 
different measures of minimum wage were employed including the fraction of 
workers affected by the minimum wage and the ratio of the minimum wage to the 
average wage. They found evidence that the minimum wage increased the family and 
individual incomes only at the middle and the upper part of distribution. They 
concluded that there was no significant effect on the incomes at the bottom part of 
distribution, suggesting that the minimum wage was not effective to induce a higher 
standard of living for workers at the lower part of distribution.
In contrast to the other developing country studies above, El-Hamidi and Terrell 
(2002) found potential monopsony evidence when estimating the effects of minimum 
wage on employment in Costa Rica using an industrial level panel data set as the 
minimum wage is set differently across industries and occupation categories. In order 
to investigate whether the minimum wage effects in Costa Rica were non-linear, a 
quadratic toughness (ratio of the minimum wage to the average wage) variable was 
employed as the minimum wage measure. The findings suggested that the minimum 
wage effect on employment was positive when toughness was low, supporting the 
monopsony model. However, after toughness reached 68% using total employment
6 7
data (and 75% using covered sector employment data), the minimum wage reduced 
employment by between 0.4% and 0.6%, suggesting that the minimum wage effect on 
employment was non-linear.
A more comprehensive study was conducted by Lemos (2004d and 2005) using panel 
data from 1982 to 2000 across six metropolitan regions in Brazil. The effects of 
minimum wage on wages and employment were estimated using five different 
measurements commonly used in the literature including the log of real minimum 
wage, toughness, the fraction affected, spike, and the fraction below. Lemos (2005) 
found that the minimum wage strongly compressed the wage distribution as indicated 
by stronger effects in the lower percentiles of distribution. Comparing minimum wage 
measures, she concluded that the fraction affected is the preferred minimum wage 
measure in estimating the effects of the minimum wage on the wage distribution as the 
findings were robust and unbiased compared to the other measures. Spike (the fraction 
at) tended to be endogenously determined with wage, while the log of real minimum 
wage and toughness are not well-suited measurements for Brazilian data as the 
minimum wage is set at national level.
Lemos (2004d) decomposed the total employment effect into jobs effect (the 
employment rate) and hours effect (the hours worked). In the short run, she found that 
an increase in minimum wage by 10% decreased the employment rate by 0.02% and 
decreased the hours worked per worker by 0.14%, suggesting a decrease in the total 
effect (man-hours) by 0.16%. In the long run, the total effect was relatively small with 
the coefficient of -0.05%. As pointed out by Lemos (2004d), the reason for a small
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employment effect is because there is a non-compliance problem in Brazil, as well as 
because the public sector has an inelastic labour demand.
Comparing minimum wage measures in the employment equation, Lemos (2005) 
found that the relative minimum wage measures, including the log of real minimum 
wage and toughness (Kaitz Index), were not robust enough in estimating the effects of 
minimum wage on employment. The main reason is because the minimum wage in 
Brazil was not set differently across regions (or industries); therefore, the variations of 
the measures (toughness, for example) came primarily from the variations in the 
denominator (i.e. did not come from the variations in the minimum wage (the 
numerator)). The negative and significant employment effects were only found using 
degree o f impact measures, including the fraction below, the fraction at, and the 
fraction affected. The coefficient of the fraction below was the largest of the other 
degree o f impact measures.
Gindling and Terrell (2007) estimated the impact of the minimum wage on different 
types of employment in Honduras using industrial and firm size panel data from 1990 
to 2004, as the minimum wage in Honduras is set over 11 industries and 2 firm sizes 
(small and medium/large firm sizes). Using the dynamic Arellano-Bond method, they 
found that the minimum wage had a negative impact only on medium and large-scale 
enterprises employment where the minimum wage was effectively enforced with the 
elasticity of 0.46. On the other hand, the minimum wage had a positive impact on 
small firm employment with the elasticity of 0.39, suggesting a possible employment 
shift from the medium and large enterprises to the small enterprises where non- 
compliance with the minimum wage is more likely to exist.
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The pioneering work on estimating the effect of minimum wage on employment in 
Indonesia was Rama (2001). He focused specifically on the effect of minimum wage 
on average wage, employment and investment in Indonesia from 1988 to 1995. Using 
regional panel data method, Rama (2001) found that the elasticity of the average wage 
with respect to the minimum wage was positive with the coefficient of 0.1. In terms of 
employment, Rama (2001) estimated the effect of minimum wage on urban 
employment as the category of employment that is most affected by the minimum 
wage policy. He used the ratio of employment to population in urban areas as the 
dependent variable, while the ratio of the minimum wage to some indicators of labour 
productivity was employed as the minimum wage measure. As a result, the coefficient 
of the minimum wage variable in the employment equation was negative and 
significant, although some labour productivity indicators were statistically 
insignificant. It was suggested that a higher minimum wage reduced urban paid 
employment in Indonesia, with the elasticities of between -0.025 and -0.014.
The other issue addressed by Rama (2001) was whether the minimum wage affected 
investment. His findings showed that a positive change in the minimum wage 
negatively affected total investment, excluding Foreign Direct Investment (FDI). In 
conclusion, Rama (2001) suggested that doubling the Indonesian minimum wage led 
to a 10% increase in the average wage, a 2% decrease in paid employment, and a 5% 
decrease in domestic investment. In addition, as pointed out by Rama (2001), a 
decrease in employment appeared to be considerable in small firms where the 
minimum wage was more binding, while in large firms where the average wage was 
relatively high, employment might actually increase, suggesting that minimum wage 
was not binding for workers in large firms.
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Islam and Nazara (2000) found interesting and different results from Rama (2001) 
using a pooled cross-sectional time-series data regression at provincial level in 
Indonesia from 1990 to 1998. In contrast to Rama (2001), they suggested that there 
was no adverse impact of minimum wage on employment in Indonesia. Although the 
minimum wage effect on employment was negative using added control variables, 
they argued that this negative impact was negligible. As suggested by Islam and 
Nazara (2000), if the Gross Domestic Regional Product (GDRP) can grow at least by 
4 percent every year, the minimum wage can still increase by 24 percent without any 
adverse impact on employment. In other words, with higher regional economic growth 
that potentially creates more employment, the negative effect of minimum wage on 
employment might be diminished.
Suryahadi et al (2003) estimated the effects of minimum wage on the Indonesian 
urban formal labour markets using a fixed effects model. As well as focusing on the 
effect of minimum wage on total employment, they also focused on specific groups of 
workers such as females, youths and less educated workers from 1988 to 1999, using 
data from 26 provinces. They found more specific results showing that the minimum 
wage gave advantages to some workers and disadvantaged others. Specifically, they 
found that the white-collar workers clearly benefited from an increase in the minimum 
wage. It was suggested that an increase in the minimum wage by 10% led to an 
increase in employment of the white-collar workers by 10%. On the other hand, 
employment of the most ‘vulnerable’ workers (i.e., females, youths, and less educated 
workers) significantly decreased as a result of an increase in minimum wage. 
Suryahadi et al (2003) argued that employers respond to an increase in the minimum 
wage by employing more capital-intensive and high-skilled workers than labour-
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intensive activities with more low-skilled workers. In addition, they also argued that 
these low-skilled affected workers might be shifted to the informal sector 
(displacement effect) with lower wages and poorer working conditions. However, 
there is still no justification about this potential displacement effect in the case of 
Indonesia.
The latest Indonesian minimum wage study was a case study conducted by Alatas and 
Cameron (2008) focusing specifically on the extent of compliance of Jakarta’s 
provincial minimum wage on the Botabek area (Jakarta and West Java border) which 
is administratively under the province of West Java. Unlike the previous Indonesian 
minimum wage studies which use a regional panel data method, they employed a 
difference-in-difference method using the household level data from 1990 to 1996 
specifically on the clothing, textiles, footwear, and leather industries. They found that 
the minimum wage increased the average wage more in Botabek area than Jakarta 
because the minimum wage was originally lower in Botabek (West Java) than Jakarta. 
Relating to employment, they found that the minimum wage decreased employment in 
small firms with elasticities of between -0.31 and -0.55. Similar to Rama (2001), they 
found that there was no evidence of an adverse impact of the minimum wage on 
employment in large firms where the minimum wage was less binding.
Comparing this chapter to the previous minimum wage studies in Indonesia, firstly, 
there is a difference in the sample period used as this chapter data is based on the 
more recent sample period (from 1989 to 2003). Secondly, there is a difference in 
methodology. Most of the previous Indonesian minimum wage studies used the fixed 
effects method appropriate for panel data. However, none of them were concerned
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with the potential bias from the simple fixed effects estimates. As pointed out by 
Gindling and Terrell (2007), simple fixed effects estimates are potentially biased 
because o f serial correlation across error structure and because of endogenous 
correlation between minimum wage and wages and/or employment. This issue will be 
observed further in the empirical results section. As an alternative, three other panel 
data methods will also be employed, including Panel Corrected Standard Errors 
(PCSE), instrumental variable and Dynamic Arellano-Bond estimates, which tend to 
provide more robust estimates.
Although this chapter’s methodology is relatively similar to Lemos (2004d and 2005) 
in Brazil, we might expect to see different results in the case of Indonesia. Firstly, the 
minimum wage in Brazil is set at a national level, while in Indonesia the minimum 
wage is set at a provincial (regional) level. Therefore, it might be expected that the 
Indonesian panel data set will explain the variation across regions better than Brazil. 
Secondly, Lemos (2004d) assumed the Brazilian minimum wage coverage to be full, 
while in Indonesia there is a tendency towards incomplete coverage, given a high 
proportion of workers in the uncovered sector. In addition, paid employment that 
earns a wage below the minimum wage level is about 20% of total paid employment, 
creating an uncovered sector as well. Few studies examine the impact of the minimum 
wage on employment where coverage is incomplete (for an exception, see Jones, 
1997).
Table 5.1 summarizes the estimated effects of the minimum wage on wages and 
employment using regional (and industrial) panel and pooled cross-section time-series 
data in the literature. In summary, previous minimum wage studies showed that a
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higher minimum wage led to an increase in the average wage. Relating to the wage 
distribution, some studies found that the minimum wage effect had the strongest effect 
in the lower part of wage distribution (see for example, Dickens et al, 1999 and 
Lemos, 2004d), while the other studies found that there was no evidence of significant 
effect at the lowest part of the wage distribution particularly when the compliance was 
low (Arango and Pachon, 2004). In terms of employment, although most of the 
previous studies showed a negative employment effect supporting the standard 
competitive model, some previous studies also showed an increase in employment 
supporting the presence of monopsony (see for example Machin and Manning, 1994 
and Dickens et al, 1999 in developed countries and El-Hamidi and Terrell, 2002 in 
developing countries).
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Table 5.1 Summary of Previous Minimum Wage Studies Using Panel Data 
Method
Panel A: Developed Country Studies
C o u n tr y /A u th o r M eth od M in im u m  W a g e  M ea su re C on clu sio n
United States:
Neum ark and Wascher 
(1992)
State-level panel data Ratio o f the minimum wage to 
the average wage in the state 
level
a 10% increase in the minimum wage 
decreased the teenage employment by 
between 1% and 2% and decreased the 




State-level panel data Ratio o f minimum wage to the 
average wage in manufacturing 
sector (relative minimum wage) 
and real minimum wage
An increase in the minimum wage by 
10% reduced the teenage employment b\ 
4.8%  using real minimum wage and by 
3.3% using relative minimum wage.
United States: 
Burkhauser et al (2000)
State-level monthly -  
panel data
Log o f  the greater o f  state or 
federal minimum wage
An increase in the minimum wage 
increased the hourly teenage wage rate 
with the elasticity o f between 0.3 and 
0.48. In terms o f employment, minimum 
wage had a negative effect to the teenage 
employment with the elasticity of 
between -0.2 and -0.6.
Canada:
Baker et al (1999)
Provincial panel data Ratio o f minimum wage to the 
average manufacturing wage
a 10% increase in the minimum wage 
reduced the teenage employment bv 
2.5%.
Canada:
M cDonald and Myatt 
(2004)
Provincial panel data Ratio o f minimum wage to the 
average manufacturing wage
The minimum wage effects were large 
and negative during 1990-1996 periods, 
but were not significant during 1997- 
2002 periods when the minimum wage 
was not relatively binding.
Canada:
Campolieti et al (2006)
Provincial panel data Ratio o f minimum wage to the 
average wage and fraction of 
youth employment who earn 
less than minimum wage
An increase in the minimum wage 
reduced youth employment (aged 16-24) 
with elasticities o f  between -0.17 and - 
0.44 across specification.
United Kingdom: 
M achin and Manning 
(1994)
Panel data on ten 
Wage Council’s 
industries
Toughness An increase in the minimum wage 
decreased the wage dispersion. In terms 
of employment, an increase in the 
minimum wage significantly increased 
employment, suggesting the existence of 
monopsony power.
United Kingdom: 
Dickens et al (1999)
Industrial Panel Data Toughness The effects o f minimum wage on the 
wages were positive and significant only 
at lower deciles. In terms o f employment, 
there was no evidence of negative 






Individuals in the “high impact” 
and “ low impact” regions
No evidence of an adverse employment 
effect in the “high impact” areas.
United Kingdom: 




(1) Proportion o f workers paid 
below the MW level
(2) Wage Gap
The introduction o f the minimum wage 
policy reduces the employment and 
hours o f work in the residential care 
home sector.
17 OECD Countries: 




Ratio o f minimum wage to 
average wage was employed to 
measure the minimum wage
The effects o f minimum wage on youth 
employment w'ere negative using 
different methods. Specifically, the 
effects o f minimum wage on teenage 
employment are slightly higher than 
young adults employment.
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Panel B: Developing Country Studies
C o u n tr y /A u th o r M eth od M in im u m  W a g e  
M ea su re








Ratio o f minimum wage to 
the average wage
The effects o f minimum wage on average 
hourly wages were positive for both all 
employment and manufacturing 
employment (the coefficients were 0.27 and 
0.24, respectively). In terms of 
employment, the ratio o f minimum wage to 
the average wage was negative with the 
coefficient o f  -0.54.
M exico & Colombia: 
Bell (1997)
Panel data on 
manufacturing firms
Ratio o f  minimum wage to 
the output price deflator
The minimum wage had no significant 
effect on formal sector wages and 
employment in Mexico. A 10% increase in 
the minimum wage in Colombia reduced 




Panel data on 
manufacturing firms
Ratio o f  minimum wage to 
the average wage
A reduction in the Mexican minimum wage 
increased female employment (the 
elasticity is 0.58 using OLS and 1.25 using 
instrumental variable method).
Colombia:
Arango and Pachon 
(2004)
Dynamic panel data 
for 7 largest cities
Fraction o f affected by the 
minimum wage and the ratio 
o f minimum wage to the 
average wage.
The minimum wage increased the family 
and individual incomes only at the middle 
and the upper part o f distribution.
Costa Rica:
El-Hamidi and Terrell 
(2002)
Industry level panel 
data
Toughness The minimum wage was positive when the 




Panel data across 
regions
log o f real minimum wage, 
toughness, fraction affected, 
spike, and fraction below
The minimum wage strongly compressed 
the wage distribution. In terms o f 
employment, an increase in the minimum 
wage by 10% decreased the employment 
rate by 0.02% and the hours worked per 
workers by 0.14%, suggesting a decrease 
in the total effect by 0.16%. In the long run. 
the effects was less than -0.05%.
Honduras:
Gindling and Terrell 
(2007)
Industrial and firm 
size panel data
log o f real hourly minimum 
wage and the fraction at
The minimum wage had a negative impact 
on medium and large-scale employment 
with the elasticity o f 0.46. In contrast, the 
minimum wage had a positive impact on 




Regional Panel Data Ratio o f the minimum wage 
to some indicators o f labour 
productivity
The elasticity o f the average wage with 
respect to the minimum wage was 0.1 and 
positive. A higher minimum wage reduced 
urban paid employment in Indonesia. The 
average elasticity is in the range between - 
0.025 and -0.014.
Indonesia:





Log o f real minimum wage The result showed a positive relationship 
between the minimum wage and 
employment. However, if the Gross 
Domestic Regional Product (GDRP) and 
dummy variables o f region and time are 
used as control variables, the result will be 
negative.
Indonesia:
Suryahadi et al (2003)
Regional panel data Log o f real minimum wage An increase in the minimum wage by 10"» 
led to an increase of 10% of employment 
o f the white-collar workers. There was no 
evidence that the minimum wage ma\ 
increase the average wage across all types 




This section outlines the research methodology used in this chapter to examine the 
effects of changes in the minimum wage on wages and employment in Indonesia. In 
general, similar to Rama (2001) and Suryahadi et al (2003), this chapter uses the 
aggregate provincial panel data set from 1989 to 2003 for 26 provinces in Indonesia, 
providing a balanced panel data set. Relating to the first objective, this chapter 
specifically estimates the effect of the minimum wage on wages. This is important 
because the minimum wage is predicted to affect employment only if they first show 
the significant impact on the wage rates (Burkhauser et al, 2000). Therefore, this wage 
effect o f minimum wage can be viewed as a necessary condition for the employment 
effect of minimum wage. Specifically, the wage equation used in this chapter is as 
follows:
Wage equation:
lnWH = 0 .0  + 0 .! In MWit + y/Xit + x  + 7/ + v* + eit (5.1)
The dependent variable in this equation (W) is the log of the average monthly wages 
of paid employment in province i and year t. Paid employment is the focus of study as 
this category of employment is legally covered by the minimum wage policy in 
Indonesia8. The monthly wages are used rather than hourly wages in order to make it 
comparable with the minimum wage variable which is set based on monthly terms
8 Although in practice, some of them are still paid below minimum wage level, given the lack of
en fo rcem en t and  in effective  labour unions.
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(not hourly terms)9. In addition, the Indonesian Labour Force Survey also reports the 
wage data in monthly terms, although it is possible to obtain the hourly wage data by 
dividing the monthly wage data into the total hours worked per month. In order to see 
the full effects of the minimum wage on the wages across the distribution, this 
equation is not only estimated on the log of the average monthly wage (as a dependent 
variable) but also the log of the average monthly wage at the percentile (decile) points 
in the wage distribution. If the minimum wage is binding, we might expect that the 
minimum wage effect will be larger in the lower percentile points of the distribution.
The main explanatory variable is the minimum wage (MW) that applies to each paid 
employment in province / and year t based on their residence location. In this case, 
there is no information in our data set about paid employment based on their 
workplace location. In other words, this study cannot provide information about how 
many workers live in a different region to which they actually work in order to assess 
potential inter-regional spillover effects. However, we argue that this is less likely due 
to the fact that transportation infrastructure inter-provinces outside Java is relatively 
weak, while the minimum wage levels in Java (the mainland) are relatively similar 
across provinces.
Moreover, as noted above, five different measurements that are commonly used in the 
literature will be compared to measure the minimum wage variable used in this study. 
Further detail about the minimum wage measurements used in this study will be 
discussed below.
9 The minimum wage level in Indonesia is set based on the monthly terms, particularly for full-time
w o rk ers  w ith  a stan d ard  40  hours w orked  per w eek , w hile  for part-tim e  w o rkers, the m in im um  w age 
level is ad ju s ted  on a p ro -ra ta  basis
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The choices of the control variables are generally motivated by Lemos (2004d and 
2005). The vector URit contains the demand side shifter, which is the unemployment 
rate. The unemployment rate is used as a proxy of the business cycle to measure 
labour demand variations. Similarly to Lemos (2004d), the unemployment rate is 
applied with a one year lag in order to consider the lagged response of the 
unemployment rate in wages and to reduce the potential simultaneity bias with the 
average wage.
In addition, vector Xit contains the supply side shifters to capture the labour supply 
characteristics, including the proportions of the labour force who are youth, women, 
living in urban areas, have high school and university qualifications (high level 
education), and the proportions of the work force in the manufacturing industry, trade, 
construction and services sectors. In practice, the effects of the minimum wage on 
wages and employment have been typically analyzed as the labour demand equation. 
However, using the exogenous supply side shifters as control variables is necessary to 
explain the effect from the supply side as well as the demand side, indicating a 
reduced form equation from a simple interaction between labour supply and labour 
demand (Brown et al 1982). Moreover, Brown et al (1982) argued that the supply side 
shifter might be excluded if we focus specifically on workers paid at the minimum 
wage level. In practice, the effect of the minimum wage on overall paid employment 
is estimated in this study; including workers paid above the minimum wage level 
which is determined by an interaction between the demand and supply of labour, 
hence the inclusion of supply side shifters in the equation is needed and does not bias 
the estimation.
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The variables y, and vt are included to control for provinces and yearly fixed effects 
respectively. The inclusion of the provinces dummy variables reduces the potential 
bias from unmeasured provinces-specific demand shocks. In addition, yearly dummy 
variables are useful to control for year-specific characteristics and to control for the 
potential endogenous changes in the yearly minimum wage.
In practice, the minimum wage is potentially endogenous if it is affected by the 
regional labour market conditions. However, Rama (2001) pointed out that there is no 
evidence of endogeneity in the mechanism to set the Indonesian minimum wage. As 
pointed out by Rama (2001), the index of minimum living needs (KHM), as the main 
consideration to set the Indonesian minimum wage, is not directly affected by the 
labour market conditions suggesting that an increase in minimum wage is mainly 
exogenous. In contrast, specifically, Suryahadi et al (2001) argued that the minimum 
wage might be simultaneously determined with wage rates because the existing wage 
rates were usually also used as the consideration for regional government to set their 
minimum wage level, while relating to employment, the minimum wage tended to be 
exogenous. In order to check the potential endogeneity of the minimum wage 
measures used in this study, the Davidson-MacKinnon test of endogeneity for a panel 
data regression will be provided. This test will also be useful to decide which 
minimum wage measure is the most effective in the case of Indonesia.
Relating to the second objective, this chapter estimates the effects of changes in the 
minimum wage on employment using the aggregate provincial panel data set. As 
noted above, this effect is focused on paid employment which is legally covered by
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the minimum wage policy. Specifically, the reduced form employment equation is as 
follow:
Employment Equation:
InEmpit = ao + ai In MWit + \uitX  + ji + v, + eu (5.2)
where Emp is number of total paid employees that are employed in province i and 
year t]0. As indicated in the wage equation, paid employees are aggregated based on 
their residence location because of data unavailability on worker’s workplace location 
(region). In this chapter, I focus on total (aggregate) paid employees providing a basic 
analysis on the impact of minimum wage on employment in the covered sector in 
Indonesia, while in the next chapter the impact of minimum wage will be extended for 
workers in both the covered and uncovered sectors, presenting a complete analysis in 
the labour market. According to the standard competitive model, an increase in the 
minimum wage is generally predicted to reduce total paid employment as the category 
of employment legally covered by the minimum wage policy. In this case, the 
affected paid employment tends to be displaced to the uncovered sector employment 
rather than become unemployed in the absence of unemployment benefits. Compared 
to paid employment category, the uncovered sector employment usually does not 
benefit from permanent job security, health insurance, and old-age pensions. 
Therefore, we argue that it is also a bad thing if the minimum wage reduces paid 
employment and increases uncovered sector employment which will be explored in 
the next chapter. Moreover, the minimum wage measures and the other explanatory
10 As suggested by Brown et al (1982), total employment is used as a dependent variable rather than 
employment rate if we believe that the minimum wage is mainly demand determined, while the supply
side  sh ifters are included  as the  con tro l variab les.
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variables used in this equation tend to follow the wage equation, except that the 
unemployment rate is excluded from the equation in order to reduce potential spurious 
correlation with employment in the left-hand-side of the equation.
Following the ideas of Lemos (2004d and 2005), this chapter presents the comparison 
of five different measurements which are commonly used in the literature to measure 
the minimum wage, including: (a) the log of real minimum wage; (b) toughness; (c) 
the fraction below; (d) the fraction at; (e) the fraction affected11. These five measures 
are employed in both wage and employment equations, except toughness, which is 
only used in the employment equation12. The main reason for using different 
measurements is to compare the results from the different common measures of the 
minimum wage in the literature. In practice, there is no clear justification of which 
minimum wage measure is the most effective in the literature, depending on the 
methods and the object of study. In addition, the finding will be stronger when it 
shows a similar direction across different measurements.
The first measure used to examine the effects of minimum wage on wages and 
employment is the log of real monthly minimum wage. The real minimum wage is 
simply the nominal minimum wage adjusted according to the price index. As pointed 
out by Lemos (2004d), one of the limitations of this type of measure in her context is 
that it does not identify the relative level of the minimum wage on earnings (compared
11 In order to include part-time workers (workers who work less than 40 hours per week and who are also 
legally covered by the minimum wage policy), particularly in the fraction below, the fraction at, and the 
fraction affected measures, the monthly minimum wage is converted to the hourly minimum wage due to 
the fact that the minimum wage for part-time workers is set on a pro-rata basis depending on how many 
hours they worked.
12 Toughness is not applicable for the wage equation due to the correlation between the denominator
and the le ft-h an d -s id e  o f  the estim ato r, p ro v id in g  a sp u rio u s co rre la tion  b e tw een  to u g h n ess and the 
average  w age. See B u rk h au se r et al (20 0 0 ) for a com ple te  d iscussion .
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to toughness, for example). In addition, Dolado et al (1996) argued that real minimum 
wage is not suitable to compare the minimum wage level of regions or industries with 
different levels of productivity, although it might be controlled by using regions and 
industries fixed effects.
In practice, the log of real minimum wage variation in the case of Brazil is mostly 
caused by the variations in the regional deflator as the minimum wage is constant 
across regions (Lemos, 2005). This evidence implies that the log of real minimum 
wage is not an effective measure in the case of Brazil as the variations do not arise 
primarily from the minimum wage. In contrast to Lemos (2005), the log of real 
minimum wage is expected to provide a better suited measurement in the case of 
Indonesia as the minimum wage is set differently across provinces; hence, the log of 
real minimum wage variations is primarily driven by the variation in the minimum 
wage itself. Besides Lemos (2005), there are a number of studies that used the log of 
real minimum wage as the minimum wage measure in the literature, including 
Burkhauser et al (2000) for the US, Gindling and Terrell (2006) for Costa Rica, and 
Suryahadi et al (2003) for Indonesia.
The second measure o f the minimum wage used in this chapter is toughness. 
Toughness (or Kaitz Index) is basically the ratio of the minimum wage to the average 
wage, and is given this intuitive name by Machin and Manning (1994). As pointed out 
by Machin and Manning (1994), toughness is useful to measure the level of the 
minimum wage and how consistent the minimum is kept at its level. A high rate of 
toughness indicates that the minimum wage is binding for workers, while a low rate of 
toughness indicates that workers are less affected by the minimum wage policy.
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However, toughness may be less relevant than a variable defined as the ratio of the 
minimum wage to the wage at the bottom of distribution since those people at the 
bottom end of distribution is supposed to benefit by the minimum wage policy.
In practice, toughness is not suitable for the wage equation because the wage rate 
employed as a denominator in the toughness variable is potentially correlated with the 
wage rate in the left-hand-side of the equation, providing a spurious correlation 
between toughness and the wage rate (Card et al, 1994). Therefore, this study only 
uses toughness in the employment equation in order to avoid potentially biased 
estimates. In Brazil, similarly to the log of real minimum wage, the toughness 
variation primarily caused by the variation in the average wage as denominator (not 
that which comes from the variation in the minimum wage) as the minimum wage is 
set at a national level, suggesting an ineffective minimum wage measure (Lemos, 
2004d).
The third measure of the minimum wage is the fraction affected. The fraction affected 
variable was developed by Card (1992a and 1992b) to measure the proportion of 
workers which earns a wage between the old and new level of minimum wage. In 
practice, this measure was effective in measuring the impact of the minimum wage 
policy in developed countries, particularly using the natural experiment approach (see 
Card, 1992a and 1992b). As pointed out by Brown (1999), this measure is cleaner 
than toughness because the fraction affected focuses on the workers affected by the 
minimum wage, while toughness is determined by variables other than minimum 
wage (i.e. the wage rates). There is some evidence in developing countries which use 
the fraction affected as the minimum wage measure, such as Arango and Pachon
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(2004) for Colombia and Lemos (2005) for Brazil. It is important to note that this 
measure will not be effective when the nominal minimum wage is constant over time 
as there are no workers affected by the minimum wage implying that the fraction 
affected will be zero (Brown, 1999 and Lemos, 2005)13. However, we might expect 
that this measure is effective in the Indonesian case as the nominal minimum wage 
tends to increase over time depending on the costs of minimum living needs (KHM). 
Specifically, all o f the equations that use this measure will be changed to the first- 
difference model in order to capture the proportion of paid employment affected by 
the differences between the old and new levels of the minimum wage.
In addition, this chapter also employs the “fraction below” and the “fraction at” 
measures, developed by Dolado et al (1996). The fraction at is the proportion of 
workers which earn a wage at or near the minimum wage level, while the fraction 
below is the proportion of workers which earn a wage below the minimum wage 
level14. Both of them also measure how binding the minimum wage is when it is 
increasing. As pointed out by Lemos (2004d), the “fraction at” also measures the 
effectiveness of an increase in the minimum wage. Lemos (2004d) argued that the 
“fraction at” is a well-suited minimum wage measure for the Brazilian case because it 
is directly affected by the minimum wage. However, this measure potentially 
underestimates the degree of impact of the minimum wage in Indonesia because based 
on the regulation the minimum wage level can only be applied to workers who work
13 Although it is possible that the real minimum wage varies over time, the fraction affected value 
obtained from the difference between the old and new real minimum wage is not appropriate because 
the variation in the fraction affected is not only driven by the variation in the minimum wage but also 
by the variation in the price index (the denominator used to transform the minimum wage in the real 
terms).
14In addition, in order to capture any measurement error, similar to Lemos (2004d), the fraction at and
fraction  be lo w  is calcu la ted  using  a 5%  ro u n d in g  ap p rox im ation .
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for less than one year15. As pointed out by Manning (2003a), the minimum wage in 
Indonesia seems not to exactly act as the wage floor, but it is more likely to be an 
instrument for raising the workers standard of living. Not surprisingly, the fraction at 
in Indonesia is only around 4% of total paid employment, while in Brazil it is 12% of 
total employment.
On the other hand, the “fraction below” measures the degree of non-compliance with 
the minimum wage. Although the minimum wage policy legally covers all of the paid 
employment in Indonesia without exception, some workers remain paid below the 
minimum level, particularly in rural areas and small enterprises where labour unions 
are not effective. This condition is also combined with the lack of enforcement 
capabilities by the government and ineffective sanctions for those employers who do 
not comply with the policy. A higher minimum wage level might indicate an increase 
in the proportion of workers paid below the minimum wage level because workers 
who experience a job loss after the minimum wage increases are likely to accept 
wages below the minimum wage level rather than become unemployed in the absence 
of unemployment benefits. On average, the fraction below in Indonesia is 22% of total 
paid employment.
15 I f  the d u ra tion  o f  w o rk  is m ore  than  one year, em p lo y ers  shou ld  pay  the sa lary  o f  th e ir m in im um  
w'age w o rk ers  m ore than  the m in im um  w age level, a lth o u g h  it is no t c lea r by h ow  m uch.
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5.4. Data Sources
The main source of the aggregate data used in this study is the Indonesian Labour 
Force Survey (Sakemas). It is a regular labour force survey in Indonesia conducted by 
the National Central Bureau of Statistics (BPS) annually and/or quarterly since 1986, 
except in 1995 when BPS conducted the Intercensal Demographic Survey (SUPAS)16. 
In practice, SUPAS 1995 covered the same questions as Sakemas in the labour force 
section with a sample which was three times bigger than the common Sakemas. The 
main objective of Sakernas is to estimate and monitor the labour force statistics and 
characteristics in Indonesia. This survey provides a rich source of the cross-sectional 
labour force data, covering about 160,000 respondents (about 0.1% of population) 
each year. Relating to the objective of this study, the individual data used in this study 
is aggregated at provincial level.
As pointed out by Smith et al (2002), compared to the other countries’ labour force 
surveys, there are two main limitations of the Sakemas. Firstly, this survey is a cross- 
sectional labour force survey. Therefore, there is no information about the longitudinal 
change in the labour force across individuals. As a result, respondents might be 
different across years. Secondly, relating to the earnings data, this survey does not 
cover the self-employed (informal sector) earnings before 2002. The only earnings 
data available before 2002 are for respondents with paid employment status.
However, in accordance with this chapter’s objective, this survey is powerful enough 
to capture most of the changes in the labour force characteristics across provinces. As 
noted above, this chapter uses survey data from 1989 to 2003 across 26 provinces in
16 S akernas has been  co nducted  annually  since 1994, w hile  it w as qu arte rly  befo re  1994.
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Indonesia. The reason for using data from 1989 is the fact that the minimum wage 
began as an important policy in the Indonesian labour market in the late 1980s. 
Following a similar format to Suryahadi et al (2003), the panel data set is only 
constructed for 26 provinces in Indonesia. To simplify, this panel data set does not 
cover some new provinces that have been formed in 2001 during the decentralization 
era. In practice, there have been 33 provinces in Indonesia since 2001, including seven 
newly formed provinces being added to the former ones. In this case, data from the 
newly formed provinces are combined with those of their original provinces. In 
addition, East Timor data is excluded because of its independence from Indonesia in 
1999.
Based on Sakemas, the employment status is divided into five different categories, 
including (a) self-employed; (b) self-employed and assisted by non-permanent 
employees; (c) employer and assisted by permanent employees; (d) workers or paid 
employment; (e) family or unpaid workers. Although the self-employed is the largest 
group of employment which contributes to the informal sector, this study specifically 
focuses on the workers or paid employment category as the sector of employment 
legally covered by the minimum wage. The effects of the minimum wage on the other 
employment categories, including employment in the uncovered sector, will be 
specifically discussed in the next chapter.
The other crucial data used in this chapter are obtained from different sources. The 
provincial level minimum wage data are obtained from the Department of Manpower
and the BPS publications17. The provincial consumer price index data which are used 
to transform the minimum wage and the average wage variable in real terms are 
obtained from the BPS publication.
Table 5.2 Descriptive Statistics Panel Data 1989-2003)
Variables Mean Std. Deviation Minimum Maximum
Log of number of paid employment 13.03 1.15 11.04 15.96
Log of the average monthly wage 11.69 0.30 10.87 12.55
Log of real minimum wage 10.88 0.36 9.80 11.71
Toughness 0.46 0.12 0.08 0.85
Fraction affected 0.12 0.07 0 0.40
Fraction at 0.04 0.02 0.003 0.11
Fraction below 0.22 0.10 0.02 0.53
Urban Areas 0.30 0.18 0.07 1
Youths 0.23 0.03 0.13 0.28
Women 0.39 0.05 0.25 0.49
Industry 0.08 0.05 0.01 0.23
Trade 0.15 0.06 0.03 0.37
Services 0.13 0.04 0.06 0.37
Construction 0.03 0.02 0.01 0.09
High School 0.17 0.07 0.06 0.46
University 0.04 0.02 0.01 0.15
Unemployment Rate (-1) 0.05 0.03 0.01 0.18
Source: Calculated from Sakemas and BPS publication
Table 5.2 provides the descriptive statistics of variables used in this study across years 
and provinces during the sample period. In comparison, the ratio of minimum wage to 
average wage (toughness) in Indonesia is relatively higher than Brazil (see Lemos, 
2004d), suggesting that the minimum wage is more binding in Indonesia than in 
Brazil. Toughness is approximately 46% for Indonesia, while for Brazil it is between 
27% and 45%. The fraction affected is 12% for Indonesia, while the fraction affected 
for Brazil is 8%. On the other hand, the fraction at is only 4% for Indonesia, while for 
Brazil it is 12%.
17 Local district and city (lower level region) minimum wages that exist in four provinces in Java and 
Bali, particularly after decentralization era in 2001, are not used in this chapter in order to make it 
comparable with the other provinces.
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The proportion of urban labour force is approximately 30% of total labour force in 
Indonesia, indicating that the highest proportion of labour force is located in rural 
areas. The proportion of females in the labour force accounts for approximately 40% 
of total labour force. Although the proportion is relatively high compared to the other 
developing countries, the female labour force is most likely represented in the less 
productive sectors and low wage occupations compared to male workers (Manning, 
2003a).
Looking at the sector of activities, the proportions of the workforce in the 
manufacturing industry, trade, construction and services sectors are less than 20% of 
total workforce. In other words, the agriculture sector is still the most dominant sector, 
accounting for more than 40% of total workforce, although the proportion has dropped 
significantly in the recent period. Relating to educational attainment, only a small 
proportion of the total labour force has high school or university (tertiary) 
qualifications, indicating a high proportion of less educated labour in Indonesia. 
Finally, over the sample period, the unemployment rate is relatively small (about 5%) 
relating to the absence of the unemployment benefits.
5.5. Empirical Results
5.5.1 The Effect of Minimum Wage on Average Wage
Based on the standard prediction, an increase in minimum wage is expected to 
increase the average wage if the minimum wage is effectively enforced within the 
covered sector. The effect of the minimum wage on wages is also a necessary 
condition before examining the employment effect of the minimum wage. We might 
expect that the minimum wage will affect employment significantly if it has a
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significant effect on the wage. As mentioned in the methodology section, the effects 
of changes in minimum wage on average wage will be estimated using four different 
measures of minimum wage, including (a) the log of real minimum wage; (b) the 
fraction affected; (c) the fraction below; and (d) the fraction at18. Extending Lemos 
(2004d and 2005), four alternative panel data regression techniques will also be 
employed, including the simple fixed effects, Panel-Corrected Standard Errors 
(PCSE), instrumental variable, and Dynamic Arellano-Bond methods.
5.5.1.1 The Simple Fixed Effects
Firstly, the effect of changes in minimum wage on average wage is estimated using 
the simple fixed effects method. Table 5.3 presents a set of simple fixed effects 
method results using four different measures of minimum wage. As presented in the 
first column, the coefficient of log of real minimum wage is estimated to be positive 
and significant at 1% level. Using the log of real minimum wage, it is suggested that a 
10% increase in the real minimum wage raises the real average monthly wage by 
1.66%. The estimated coefficient is relatively higher than Rama’s (2001) which use 
the same measure in the previous Indonesian minimum wage study. In comparison, 
Rama (2001) found that an increase in the minimum wage by 10% increased the 
average wage by 1 %.
Compared to Rama (2001), firstly, there is a difference in the sample period as this 
study uses a more recent panel data set. Secondly, relating to the control variables, 
Rama (2001) used urban population and the Gross Domestic Product as the control 
variables, while some more specific demand and supply shifters are employed in this
18 T o u g h n ess is ex c lu d ed  in the w age equation  as a result o f  the  po ten tial co rre la tion  w ith the w age rate 
in the le ft-hand  sid e -es tim a to r (see B urkhauser et al. 2000).
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study. Thirdly, Rama (2001) focused on the effects of minimum wage on average 
wage of full-time workers in urban areas and in the manufacturing sector, while the 
effects of the minimum wage on the average wage of total paid employment is 
discussed in this study, including the average wage of part-time workers that are also 
legally covered by the minimum wage policy.
In the second column, the minimum wage is measured by the fraction affected which 
comprises the proportion of workers that earn a wage between the old and new level 
of minimum wage. Similar to the log of real minimum wage, the fraction affected 
coefficient is positive and significant. In comparison, the coefficient of the fraction 
affected is relatively higher than the log of real minimum wage with the coefficient of 
0.293. However, as pointed out by Lemos (2005), the coefficient of the fraction 
affected is not directly comparable to the log of real minimum wage coefficient 
because they measure the minimum wage effect in a different way. In practice, the log 
of the real minimum wage measures the level of the minimum wage, while the 
fraction affected measures the proportion of workers affected by the minimum wage. 
To make it comparable with the log of real minimum wage coefficient, as pointed out 
by Lemos (2005), the fraction affected coefficient needs to be multiplied with the 
elasticity of the fraction affected with respect to the log o f real minimum wage19. The 
result shows that an increase in minimum wage by 10% raises the fraction affected by 
3.73%, suggesting an increase in average wage by 1.09%. In other words, the result 
indicates that the “comparable” or adjusted coefficient of the fraction affected (0.109) 
is slightly lower than the log of real minimum wage coefficient (0.166).
19 S pec ifica lly , the  frac tion  a ffec ted  e lastic ity  is ob ta in ed  by  e stim a tin g  the  frac tion  a ffec ted  variab le  on 
the log o f  real m in im um  w age and all o f  the con tro l variab les.
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In the next two columns, the minimum wage is measured by the fraction at and the 
fraction below, which also measures the degree of impact of the minimum wage. 
Unlike the previous measures, the fraction at and the fraction below estimates show 
inconsistent results with what we would expect, suggesting negative effects of the 
minimum wage on the average wage. This contrary result can be explained by writing 
that a rightward shift of the earnings distribution automatically raises the average 
wage and reduces the fraction at and the fraction below measures, suggesting a 
potential endogeneity bias.
In addition, as noted above, these minimum wage measures might not be effective for 
the Indonesian case for a number of reasons. Firstly, the fraction at is potentially 
underestimated to measure the degree of impact of minimum wage in Indonesia 
because the minimum wage can only be applied to the workers who work for less than 
one year20. It seems that the Indonesian minimum wage tends to be an instrument for 
raising the standard of living of workers rather than exactly as a wage floor (Manning, 
2003a). Secondly, Lemos (2004d) also pointed out that the fraction at is potentially 
endogenously determined with the labour market condition because the wage 
bargaining will decide which workers are paid at (or around) the minimum wage 
level, suggesting a potential endogeneity biased estimate. Specifically, as pointed out 
by Lemos (2004d), the fraction at will increase when the minimum wage increases 
and then will decrease when workers who are previously not paid below the minimum 
wage level bargain to increase their wages above the minimum wage level. Further 
details about the endogeneity problem will be discussed in the next section. On the 
other hand, the fraction below measure potentially includes workers (paid
20 B ased  on g o v ern m en t regu la tion , m in im um  w age w orkers w ith one year du ra tion  o f  w ork m ust be 
p a id  above  the m in im um  w age level, a lthough  it is not c lear by how' m uch.
93
employment) not truly affected by the minimum wage because of a large non- 
compliance problem and the greater proportion of workers in the uncovered sector in 
Indonesia, suggesting a non-effective minimum wage measure for Indonesia.
Table 5.3 Wage Equation using the Simple Fixed Effects Estimate
Log of Real 
Minimum Wage Fraction Affected Fraction At Fraction Below
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Coef. P value Coef. P value Coef. P value Coef. P va lue
MW measure 0.1656 0.000 0.2935 0.021 -0.9075 0.019 -0.1599 0.087
Urban 0.7044 0.000 0.3446 0.021 0.6432 0.000 0.6422 0.000
Youth -0.2460 0.542 -0.4899 0.263 -0.4243 0.298 -0.4845 0.239
Women 0.4043 0.294 -0.4727 0.319 0.3434 0.381 0.4427 0.261
Industry -0.9629 0.015 -0.6700 0.124 -0.8183 0.042 -0.8556 0.034
Trade -1.4901 0.000 -0.8123 0.056 -1.3792 0.000 -1.3426 0.001
Services -0.1874 0.606 -0.2056 0.632 -0.2392 0.517 -0.1591 0.667
Construction 0.5543 0.511 -0.6238 0.484 0.6990 0.414 0.7852 0.362
High School -0.0818 0.773 0.4359 0.126 -0.1790 0.534 -0.1655 0.567
University 1.0618 0.175 3.4082 0.000 1.3898 0.081 1.2771 0.109
Unemp Rate (-1) -0.8432 0.057 -0.6435 0.218 -0.9136 0.042 -0.9514 0.035
Year 1990 0.0800 0.006 0.0939 0.002 0.1023 0.001
Year 1991 0.0629 0.060 -0.0823 0.034 0.1323 0.000 0.1403 0.000
Year 1992 0.0977 0.004 -0.0392 0.303 0.1770 0.000 0.1833 0.000
Year 1993 0.1950 0.000 0.0077 0.841 0.2915 0.000 0.3003 0.000
Year 1994 0.1925 0.000 -0.0859 0.029 0.3230 0.000 0.3414 0.000
Year 1995 0.2293 0.000 -0.0137 0.779 0.3754 0.000 0.3944 0.000
Year 1996 0.2731 0.000 -0.0821 0.093 0.4225 0.000 0.4389 0.000
Year 1997 0.3373 0.000 -0.0295 0.450 0.4920 0.000 0.5039 0.000
Year 1998 0.1428 0.002 -0.3399 0.000 0.2452 0.000 0.2540 0.000
Year 1999 0.2154 0.000 -0.0402 0.304 0.3069 0.000 0.3148 0.000
Year 2000 0.3451 0.000 0.0629 0.090 0.4613 0.000 0.4730 0.000
Year 2001 0.4775 0.000 0.0428 0.295 0.6249 0.000 0.6325 0.000
Year 2002 0.4597 0.000 -0.1030 0.007 0.6254 0.000 0.6374 0.000
Year 2003 0.4785 0.000 -0.0642 0.083 0.6628 0.000 0.6674 0.000
Constant 9.6720 0.000 0.0542 0.072 11.4655 0.000 11.4153 0.000
Observations 390 364 390 390
Number of Areas 26 26 26 26






















Note: Dependent variables are measured as the log of real monthly average wage.
Wald test is used for group-wise heteroscedasticity with the null hypothesis o f homoscedasticity. 
W ooldridge test is used for first-order autocorrelation test with the null hypothesis o f no first order 
autocorrelation.
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In order to check the robustness of these results, the diagnostic tests for serial 
correlation and heteroscedasticity are undertaken for the simple fixed effects 
estimates. The Wooldridge serial correlation test provides information about evidence 
of serial correlation in the error term over time within provinces. If the null hypothesis 
is rejected, it would imply that there is evidence of serial correlation in the estimation. 
Moreover, a Wald test of heteroscedasticity is also undertaken to examine whether the 
panel residuals change over time. The simple fixed effects model assumes the 
estimation to be homoscedastic in the regression residuals across provinces and years. 
Ignoring both of these issues would make our estimates inefficient. The estimated 
standard errors of the regression coefficient would also be biased and inconsistent.
The diagnostic test results for serial correlation and heteroscedasticity are presented in 
the lower part of table 5.3. The p-values for the Wooldridge test are significant at 5% 
level suggesting that there is no evidence of serial correlation using the simple fixed 
estimate. However, according to Wald test results, all of the minimum wage measures 
suffer from heteroscedasticity. Ignoring this issue will make our estimates inefficient. 
Therefore, we argue that the results of the simple fixed effect estimates are not robust 
enough in examining the effect of minimum wage on the average wage in Indonesia.
5.5.1.2 Panel Corrected Standard Errors (PCSE)
In order to deal with heteroscedasticity and/or serial correlation issues, as the second 
alternative, the wage equation is estimated using the Panel Corrected Standard Errors 
(PCSE) estimate. In practice, the PCSE, which is recommended by Beck and Katz 
(1995), allows for the presence of the first-order autocorrelation AR(1) parameter 
within the panel. The standard model of PCSE also allows the presence of
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heteroscedastic disturbances and shows a consistent estimate. Compared to the simple 
fixed effects model, PCSE is therefore relatively corrected from the presence of serial 
correlation and heteroscedasticity.
Table 5.4 Wage Equation using Panel Corrected Standard Errors (PCSE) Estimate
Log of Real 
Minimum Wage Fraction Affected Fraction At Fraction Below
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Coef. P value Coef. P value Coef. P value Coef. P value
MW Measure 0.1669 0.000 0.2881 0.009 -0.8040 0.042 -0.1766 0.098
Urban 0.6289 0.000 0.2699 0.020 0.5900 0.000 0.5682 0.000
Youth -0.2656 0.477 -0.3703 0.329 -0.3965 0.292 -0.4710 0.209
Women 0.2699 0.446 -0.0880 0.849 0.2359 0.501 0.3085 0.386
Industry -0.8475 0.015 -0.8778 0.038 -0.7214 0.050 -0.7194 0.051
Trade -1.4159 0.000 -0.5848 0.124 -1.3359 0.000 -1.2702 0.000
Services -0.1850 0.627 -0.0783 0.857 -0.2019 0.583 -0.1288 0.726
Construction 0.2269 0.771 -0.2186 0.777 0.3992 0.615 0.3933 0.625
High School 0.0366 0.902 0.3448 0.152 -0.0713 0.817 -0.0489 0.875
University 1.4424 0.049 3.1051 0.001 1.6471 0.021 1.6320 0.021
Unemp Rate (-1) -0.7675 0.063 -0.4424 0.363 -0.8596 0.027 -0.8808 0.028
Year 1990 0.0765 0.000 0.1131 0.000 0.0914 0.000 0.0995 0.000
Year 1991 0.0591 0.006 0.0230 0.000 0.1284 0.000 0.1389 0.000
Year 1992 0.0942 0.000 0.0609 0.000 0.1735 0.000 0.1825 0.000
Year 1993 0.1888 0.000 0.1097 0.000 0.2858 0.000 0.2976 0.000
Year 1994 0.1836 0.000 0.0153 0.067 0.3150 0.000 0.3371 0.000
Year 1995 0.2251 0.000 0.0746 0.007 0.3714 0.000 0.3952 0.000
Year 1996 0.2586 0.000 0.0287 0.391 0.4109 0.000 0.4297 0.000
Year 1997 0.3208 0.000 0.0719 0.000 0.4784 0.000 0.4928 0.000
Year 1998 0.1260 0.001 -0.2332 0.000 0.2318 0.000 0.2417 0.000
Year 1999 0.1949 0.000 0.0577 0.000 0.2903 0.000 0.2979 0.000
Year 2000 0.3251 0.000 0.1686 0.000 0.4470 0.000 0.4581 0.000
Year 2001 0.4557 0.000 0.1555 0.000 0.6089 0.000 0.6162 0.000
Year 2002 0.4370 0.000 0.6089 0.000 0.6211 0.000
Year 2003 0.4553 0.000 0.0446 0.000 0.6451 0.000 0.6510 0.000
Constant 9.7655 0.000 -0.0515 0.028 11.5656 0.000 11.5198 0.000
Observations 390 364 390 390
Number of Areas 26 26 26 26
R-sq 0.954 0.521 0.940 0.952
Note: Dependent variables are measured as the natural logs o f the real monthly average wage. All regressions
include province dummies and are estimated assuming a AR(1) error structure.
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Table 5.4 provides a set of results using the PCSE estimate. Most of the control 
variables are significant with the expected signs. The proportion of labour force in 
urban areas shows a significantly positive effect on the average wage in different 
regressions. This positive effect is potentially stimulated by a higher economic growth 
rate in urban areas compared with rural areas. In practice, this effect is bigger when 
using the log of real minimum wage as the minimum wage measure compared to 
using the other measures. Using the log of real minimum wage, it is suggested that an 
increase in the proportion of workers in the urban areas by 10% increases the average 
monthly wage paid to the workers by 6.3%.
The effects of the proportion of workforce in the manufacturing and trade sectors are 
significantly negative to the average wage. A deep economic recession at the end of 
the 1990s seems to be the main reason for this negative effect of the manufacturing 
and trade sectors especially in the highly import-dependent manufacturing sector. As 
pointed out by Islam (2002), the real wages of workers in the manufacturing and trade 
sectors in Indonesia declined by 7% per year during the 1997-2000 period.
In terms of educational attainment, the proportion of the workforce with university 
qualifications is strongly and positively associated with the average wage. As pointed 
out by Feridhanusetyawan and Gaduh (2000), this is due to the scarcity of skilled 
labour in Indonesia. Using the log of real minimum wage measure, the result suggests 
that an increase in the proportion of the workforce with university qualifications by 
10% increases the average monthly wage paid to the workers by 14.4%. In addition, 
relating to the demand side, the unemployment rate shows a significant negative 
effect, although it is only significant at 10% level. Regarding unemployment rate
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variable, I have tried to use the log of the lagged unemployment rate instead of using 
the lagged unemployment rate, as suggested by the wage curve literature, but the 
result is insignificant.
The log of real minimum wage and the fraction affected consistently show a positive 
and significant effect on the average wage. On the other hand, similar to the results 
from the simple fixed effect estimates, the fraction below and the fraction at measures 
show unexpectedly negative effects of the minimum wage. These results are 
consistent with the simple fixed effect estimates, suggesting that the fraction below 
and the fraction at measures are less effective in measuring the effects of minimum 
wage on average wage.
As mentioned above, the PCSE estimate theoretically provides a well-suited 
specification. However, the estimated coefficients of the minimum wage measures are 
relatively similar. Using the log of real minimum wage, it is suggested that a 10% 
increase in minimum wage increases the average wage by 1.67%, while using the 
fraction affected, it is suggested that an increase in minimum wage by 10% increases 
the average wage by 1.07%21. Similarly to the simple fixed effect estimate, we can 
conclude that the coefficient of the log of real minimum wage is higher than the 
fraction affected measure, suggesting that the log of real minimum wage measure will 
potentially provide a stronger effect on employment than the fraction affected.
Simple fixed effects and PCSE estimates discussed above generally assume that the 
minimum wage measures are exogenous. The potentially biased estimate will arise if
21 S im ilarly  to  the  p rev io u s sec tion , th is co effic ien t is ob ta in ed  a fte r m u ltip ly in g  the raw  co effic ien t o f  
the fraction  affec ted  and the fraction  affec ted  e lastic ity  w ith respec t to the log o f  real m in im um  w age, 
as su ggested  by L em os (2004d).
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the minimum wage measures are endogenously determined with the labour market 
condition. If the minimum wage measures are endogenous, the OLS estimate (simple 
fixed effects and PCSE estimates) will not only biased but also provide an inconsistent 
estimate.
Although Rama (2001) argued that the index of minimum living needs (KHM), as the 
main consideration to set the Indonesian minimum wage, is not directly affected by 
labour market conditions, Suryahadi et al (2001) found that the real minimum wage in 
Indonesia is endogenously determined with real wages because in practice the existing 
wage rate are also used as one of the considerations for regional government to set 
their minimum wage level. In addition, Lemos (2004d) also found that the spike 
measure (the fraction at) tends to be endogenously determined with wages in the case 
of Brazil because in practice wage bargaining decides which workers are paid at 
(around) the minimum wage level. If there is evidence of endogeneity, then it is 
important to control for this bias using the instrumental variable method.
5.5.1.3 Instrumental Variable Method
In order to ensure whether the minimum wage measures used in the previous 
estimates are endogenously determined with average wages, the Davidson- 
MacKinnon test of endogeneity for panel data is reported in this section. If the null 
hypothesis is rejected, it would imply that the minimum wage measure is 
endogenously determined with wage, and therefore an instrumental variable is 
required, suggesting that the OLS (PCSE) estimates which assume the exogenous 
minimum wage are biased. In contrast, if the null hypothesis is accepted, it means that
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the minimum wage measure is exogenously determined with wage and hence the 
previous section estimates are unbiased and consistent.
Table 5.5 Davidson-MacKinnon Tests of Endogeneity for a Panel Data regression
M in im u m  W a g e  M ea su re C h i-S q u a red
Log of Real Minimum Wage 13.182 (0 .00 )
Fraction Affected 0.761 (0 .38 )
Fraction At 4 .8 0 0  (0 .03 )
Fraction Below 4 .1 7 6  (0 .04 )
Notes: H0: OLS estimator yield a consistent estimate
The results from Davidson-MacKinnon tests for endogeneity are reported in table 
22
5.5 . The result confirms that the log of real minimum wage is suffered from 
endogeneity as the null hypothesis that OLS yield a consistent estimate is rejected at 
1% level. In practice, this is consistent with the results obtained by Suryahadi et al 
(2001) in the previous Indonesian minimum wage study. Suryahadi et al (2001) 
argued that the existing average wage is considered as one of the important factors for 
regional government to set their minimum wage level, suggesting that the minimum 
wage and the average wage are simultaneously determined. The other potential reason 
is because both average wage and minimum wage are employed in real terms with the 
same denominator (consumer price index). This implies that they potentially move 
together in a similar way across the business cycles, suggesting a strong simultaneous 
correlation between average wage and minimum wage.
On the other hand, the fraction at and the fraction below measures also tend to be 
endogenous. This result is similar to results obtained by Lemos (2004d), which found 
that the spike (the fraction at) is endogenously determined with wages in the case of
22 T he D av id so n -M acK in n o n  test is estim ated  using  D M E X O G X T  Stata com m and  w ith a lagged value 
o f  the m in im um  w ane m easure  as the instrum ental variable .
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Brazil. As pointed out by Lemos (2004d) the fraction at is endogenously determined 
with wage and employment because of the wage bargaining process (see above). 
Relating to the fraction below measure, it seems that an exogenous labour demand 
shift has potentially induced the extent of non-compliance, suggesting a potential 
endogenous correlation between the fraction below and the labour market condition. 
This extent of non-compliance can also be viewed as a displacement effect from the 
covered sector to the uncovered sector as a result of exogenous labour demand shift.
In contrast, there is no evidence that the fraction affected is endogenously determined 
with average wage, suggesting that the fraction affected is exogenous with respect to 
the average wage. In practice, the fraction affected primarily depends on the size of 
the minimum wage increases and are less likely to depend on the average wage. This 
result is consistent with Brown’s (1999) argument that the fraction affected is 
relatively a cleaner measure of minimum wage than toughness as it directly measures 
workers affected by the minimum wage. In addition, the size of the minimum wage 
increases in Indonesia primarily depend on the minimum basic living needs index 
changes, suggesting that the fraction affected measure is less affected by labour 
market conditions.
In order to deal with the endogeneity problem of the minimum wage measures, the 
wage equation is re-estimated using the instrumental variable method with the fixed 
effects specifications. The instrumental variable method requires that the instrument is 
strongly correlated with the minimum wage measure (the endogenous independent 
variable) but it is not directly correlated with the error terms in the wage equation (in 
the second-stage estimation). Lemos (2005) used political variables as the
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instrumental variables for the minimum wage measures in the case of Brazil. 
However, political variables at the regional level might not be a valid instrument for 
Indonesia as the political regime tended to be strongly centralized particularly before 
1999 during Soeharto’s regime.
Table 5.6 Wage Equation using IV Method (First-stage estimation)
In stru m en ta l V a riab le: M in im u m  w a g e  leve l in th e  b o rd er in g  p ro v in ces







Coef P value Coef P value Coef P value
MW Bordering 
Regions (-1) 0.1014 0.147 0.0032 0.681 0.0247 0.461
Urban -0.1174 0.508 -0.0442 0.028 -0.3324 0.000
Youth -1.0043 0.072 -0.0494 0.433 -0.3427 0.200
Women 0.1464 0.777 -0.0149 0.799 0.4141 0.097
Industry -0.2104 0.689 0.0631 0.290 0.1994 0.431
Trade 0.4022 0.412 0.0603 0.277 0.7311 0.002
Services 0.1025 0.842 -0.0831 0.155 0.1163 0.638
Construction 0.7217 0.511 0.0509 0.682 0.5411 0.305
Highschool -0.2386 0.514 -0.0490 0.237 -0.1285 0.465
University 1.1798 0.288 0.2034 0.106 0.2500 0.639
Unempl (-1) -1.0790 0.060 0.0556 0.391 -0.0108 0.969
Year 1991 -0.8150 0.000 -0.0188 0.069 -0.0954 0.030
Year 1992 -0.5675 0.000 -0.0052 0.588 -0.0195 0.634
Year 1993 -0.5428 0.000 -0.0055 0.499 -0.0305 0.379
Year 1994 -0.4546 0.000 -0.0038 0.626 -0.0060 0.856
Year 1995 -0.2470 0.000 -0.0046 0.505 0.0510 0.082
Year 1996 -0.1558 0.025 -0.0041 0.598 0.0571 0.087
Year 1997 -0.1555 0.003 -0.0071 0.226 0.0202 0.415
Year 1998 -0.1493 0.006 -0.0034 0.570 0.0142 0.581
Year 1999 -0.4559 0.000 -0.0070 0.181 -0.0238 0.281
Year 2000 -0.4583 0.000 -0.0098 0.084 -0.0436 0.070
Year 2001 -0.2784 0.000 -0.0150 0.007 -0.0451 0.056
Year 2002 -0.1426 0.001 -0.0086 0.069 -0.0306 0.128
Year 2003 -0.0425 0.233 -0.0099 0.015 -0.0095 0.579
Constant 10.3188 0.000 0.0392 0.679 -0.1558 0.698
Observations 
Number of Areas 














Note: Dependent variable is the minimum wage measure. All regressions include province dummies.
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In contrast, Neumark and Wascher (1992) employed the one year lag of minimum 
wage level in the bordering regions as the instrument variable for minimum wage 
measure. Contrary to Neumark and Wascher (1992), my study found that the one year 
lagged value of the average minimum wage level in the bordering provinces is not a 
good instrument for Indonesian case. Table 5.6 presents the first-stage estimation of 
the instrumental variable method using the one year lagged value of the average 
minimum wage level in the bordering provinces as an instrument for the minimum
23wage measure . As presented in table 5.6, the instrument variable is not significantly 
different from zero in all specifications, suggesting that the instrument is relatively 
weak because it is not strongly correlated with the minimum wage measure. The 
potential problem with using this instrument is that consumption packages used to 
measure the minimum wage level in Indonesia can be traded easily across provinces 
suggesting that bordering provinces might have similar business cycles (Rama, 2001).
As an alternative, following Suryahadi et al (2001) for Indonesia and Gindling and 
Terell (2006) for Honduras, this study instruments the minimum wage measure using 
one period lagged value of its minimum wage measure in each specification. Using 
the lagged value of the minimum wage measure as an instrument is theoretically 
appropriate as it is strongly correlated with the minimum wage measure and is not 
determined by the labour market in the current period. Lemos (2005) argued that the 
lagged value of the minimum wage is not a valid instrument for Brazil as there is 
evidence of serial correlation. However, there is no evidence of serial correlation for 
the Indonesian case suggesting that the lagged value of the minimum wage is a 
suitable instrument.
2'  T he fraction  affec ted  estim ate  is ex cluded  from  the in strum en tal v a riab le  m ethod  as there  is no 
ev id en ce  o f  en d o g en e ity  w ith the average  w age.
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Table 5.7 Wage Equation using IV Method (First-stage estimation) 
In stru m en ta l V ariab le: O n e y ea r  lag o f  its m in im u m  w a g e  m easu re





Fraction Below  
(3)
Coef P value Coef P value Coef P value
MW Measure (-1) 0.5237 0.000 0.1212 0.038 0.3833 0.000
Urban -0.1544 0.307 -0.0408 0.042 -0.2790 0.001
Youth -0.5623 0.233 -0.0461 0.457 -0.2681 0.276
Women 0.2660 0.547 -0.0201 0.730 0.4394 0.058
Industry -0.3123 0.486 0.0517 0.384 0.1578 0.502
Trade 0.5185 0.214 0.0511 0.354 0.6176 0.005
Services 0.3600 0.412 -0.0771 0.184 0.1660 0.471
Construction 0.3584 0.701 0.0681 0.582 0.4176 0.394
Highschool -0.1965 0.525 -0.0492 0.228 -0.1718 0.289
University 1.1688 0.213 0.1927 0.121 0.1290 0.793
Unempl (-1) -0.8148 0.095 0.0528 0.411 -0.0027 0.992
Year 1991 -0.4208 0.000 0.0138 0.000 0.0686 0.000
Year 1992 -0.2123 0.001 0.0130 0.001 0.0386 0.016
Year 1993 -0.2924 0.000 0.0148 0.000 0.0661 0.000
Year 1994 -0.2302 0.000 0.0143 0.002 0.1133 0.000
Year 1995 -0.0728 0.150 0.0152 0.020 0.0999 0.000
Year 1996 -0.0750 0.198 0.0122 0.018 0.0655 0.004
Year 1997 -0.1046 0.018 0.0167 0.003 0.0709 0.002
Year 1998 -0.1127 0.014 0.0127 0.018 0.0309 0.175
Year 1999 -0.4294 0.000 0.0095 0.112 0.0224 0.357
Year 2000 -0.3122 0.000 0.0048 0.466 0.0343 0.192
Year 2001 -0.0902 0.024 0.0118 0.074 0.0518 0.051
Year 2002 -0.0263 0.441 0.0101 0.154 0.0726 0.011
Year 2003 -0.0019 0.949 0.0202 0.006 0.0769 0.009
Constant 5.4006 0.000 0.0516 0.061 -0.0547 0.617
Observations 
Number of Areas 














Note: Dependent variable is the minimum wage measure. All regressions include province dummies.
Table 5.7 presents the first-stage of the instrumental variable method results using one 
year lag of its minimum wage measure as an instrument variable. As presented in 
table 5.7, the instrument is significant and positive in all specifications, indicating that 
the first-stage estimation is plausible. In addition, the F test of joint significance of the 
instrument in the first-stage estimation is used to measure the quality of instruments. 
As pointed out by Staiger and Stock (1997), a large F statistic (above the rule of 
thumb of ten) implies that the instrument is strong in explaining the endogenous
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variable variation. The F test of the first-stage estimation for the log of real minimum 
wage and the fraction below measures are relatively high indicating a strong 
instrumental variable. In contrast, the F test for the fraction at measure is low (below 
the often-used threshold of ten), suggesting that a one year lag of the fraction at is a 
weak instrument for the fraction at24. This result supports the previous section finding 
that the fraction at is not an effective minimum wage measure for Indonesian case.
Table 5.8 presents the second stage of the instrumental variable method results for 
wage equation using different minimum wage measures. As presented in the first 
column, the log of real minimum wage shows a consistently positive effect on average 
wage. It is suggested that an increase in the real minimum wage by 10% raises the real 
average wage by 2.61%. Compared to the PCSE estimate, the estimated coefficient is 
slightly higher suggesting a downward bias in the OLS estimator. In contrast, 
Williams and Mills (2001) and Gindling and Terrell (2007) argued that the estimated 
coefficient should be upwardly biased as governments are likely to increase the 
minimum wage level when the economy is in a good condition. However, this is not 
the case of Indonesia as the minimum wage tends to be adjusted (increased) every 
year depending on the minimum basic living need index (KHM) regardless of the 
regional economic performance.
241 have  a lso  tried  to  use a one y ear lag o f  the log o f  real m in im um  w age  as the  in stru m en t v a riab le  for 
the frac tion  at, but the resu lt rem ains the sam e, sugg estin g  a w eak  instrum en t fo r the fraction  at.
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Table 5.8 Wage Equation using IV Method (Second-stage estimation) 
In stru m en ta l V ariab le: O ne y ear  lag o f  its m in im um  w a g e  m easu re





Fraction Below  
(3)
Coef P value Coef P value Coef P value
MW Measure 0.2613 0.002 -4.8939 0.209 0.1648 0.522
Urban 0.7738 0.000 0.5267 0.026 0.7978 0.000
Youth -0.3444 0.441 -0.9003 0.097 -0.5776 0.208
Women 0.2511 0.542 0.2169 0.649 0.2214 0.612
Industry -1.2544 0.003 -1.0146 0.059 -1.3496 0.002
Trade -1.6016 0.000 -1.2113 0.016 -1.6223 0.000
Services -0.1224 0.765 -0.5083 0.374 -0.1180 0.779
Construction 0.7974 0.362 1.2656 0.216 0.9129 0.314
Highschoo! -0.1688 0.560 -0.4991 0.196 -0.2249 0.451
University 1.1638 0.187 2.5617 0.048 1.4807 0.100
Unempl (-1) -0.6489 0.161 -0.6571 0.245 -0.9280 0.046
Year 1991 -0.0605 0.431 -0.2571 0.000 -0.0084 0.805
Year 1992 -0.1063 0.080 -0.1678 0.000 0.0437 0.107
Year 1993 -0.0773 0.178 -0.1217 0.000 0.1519 0.000
Year 1994 0.0108 0.838 0.0331 0.305 0.1771 0.000
Year 1995 -0.0116 0.784 0.0773 0.132 0.2150 0.000
Year 1996 0.0603 0.160 0.1292 0.000 0.2845 0.000
Year 1997 0.1203 0.005 0.2096 0.000 0.3477 0.000
Year 1998 -0.0473 0.355 -0.0544 0.155 0.1067 0.004
Year 1999 0.0288 0.572 -0.0056 0.908 0.1787 0.000
Year 2000 0.1449 0.005 0.1293 0.045 0.3405 0.000
Year 2001 0.2532 0.000 0.3101 0.000 0.4850 0.000
Year 2002 0.2211 0.000 0.3050 0.000 0.4793 0.000
Year 2003 0.2311 0.000 0.3789 0.000 0.5012 0.000
Constant 8.9144 0.000 12.1437 0.000 11.6248 0.000
Observations 364 364 364
Number of Areas 26 26 26
Within group R-sq 0.801 0.738 0.791
N o te : D ep en d en t v a riab le  is m easu red  as the  log o f  real av erag e  w age.
On the other hand, the fraction at and the fraction below measures are not significantly 
different from zero using the instrumental variable method. These results, once again, 
suggest that these minimum wage measures are not effective in explaining the effect 
of minimum wage on average wage. As a result, we conclude that they are not valid 
measures of the minimum wage level for Indonesia in terms of wage equation. In 
other words, this conclusion suggests that the log of real minimum wage and the
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fraction affected is superior to the fraction at and the fraction below in measuring the 
minimum wage effect on the average wage.
5.5.1.4 Dynamic Arellano-Bond Method
In order to check the robustness of the result obtained by changing the methodology, 
as an alternative, this study attempts to use the one-step version of the Dynamic 
Arellano-Bond estimate in estimating the effect of minimum wage on average wage. 
In practice, the Dynamic Arellano-Bond method has some advantages. Firstly, it 
accounts for the lagged response of the dependent variable (i.e. the average wage) as a 
result of changes in the determinants of labour demand and supply. Arellano and Bond 
(1991) argued that the inclusion of the lagged dependent variable which is not 
correlated with the error term (based on orthogonality to the error process) provides a 
more efficient estimate because it provides more complete available information in the 
sample. In contrast, the instrumental variable and PCSE methods discussed above do 
not include this information, because the lagged dependent variable will be correlated 
with the error term of the equation, providing a biased estimate (Wooldridge, 2006). 
This is different with the Dynamic Arellano-Bond method, where first-differencing of 
the equation eliminated this correlation, providing a more efficient estimate, except if 
the error term is serially correlated. In addition, Neumark et al (2004) argued that the 
inclusion of the lagged dependent variable is also useful to measure a “sluggish” 
response (the speed of adjustment) of wage and employment to changes in labour 
demand and supply. Secondly, the lagged dependent variable coefficient can also be 
used in distinguishing the short-run and long-run effects of the minimum wage. The 
long-run effect of the minimum wage can be calculated as the minimum wage 
measure coefficient divided by one minus the lagged dependent variable coefficient
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(Neumark and Wascher, 2004). Thirdly, similar to the instrumental variable method, it 
controls for endogeneity by using the instruments for the endogenous variable.
This section specifically focuses on the log of real minimum wage and the fraction 
affected measures, given the irrelevant results of the fraction at and fraction below 
measures from the previous section. Similar to the previous section, the log of the real 
minimum wage is treated as an endogenous variable by using the one year lagged 
value of the log of real minimum wage as an instrument, while the fraction affected is 
exogenously determined with average wage.
Table 5.9 shows consistently that the minimum wage has a positive significant impact 
on the real average wage using the log of real minimum wage and the fraction affected 
measures, suggesting that the positive effects of the minimum wage on average wage 
are robust across estimates. However, the lag of dependent variable is not significant 
using both minimum wage measures indicating that the labour demand and supply 
shifters (control variables) have a stronger impact in influencing the average wage 
than the lagged average wage itself. The other reason is because of the price index (the 
real average wage denominator) effects which tend to be fluctuated suggesting that the 
real average wage might not be positively and significantly affected by the lagged of 
the real average wage.
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Table 5.9 Wage Equation using a Dynamic Arellano-Bond Estimate





Coef. P value Coef. P value
Lrealwages (-1) -0.0070 0.901 0.040 0.545
MW measure 0.1221 0.008 0.099 0.071
Urban 0.5037 0.000 0.440 0.004
Youth -0.8638 0.055 -0.942 0.054
Women -0.0991 0.828 -0.567 0.267
Industry -0.9757 0.024 -0.992 0.039
Trade -1.3060 0.001 -1.110 0.011
Services 0.3879 0.356 0.167 0.723
Construction 0.4442 0.608 -0.224 0.815
High School -0.0056 0.984 -0.008 0.980
University 2.0130 0.035 2.558 0.014
Unemp. Rate (-1) -0.3628 0.442 -0.320 0.539
Year 1991 0.0461 0.264 0.033 0.434
Year 1992 0.1012 0.003 0.088 0.010
Year 1993 0.0124 0.715 0.007 0.851
Year 1994 0.0316 0.500 0.014 0.775
Year 1995 0.0648 0.173 0.048 0.328
Year 1996 0.0587 0.098 0.040 0.254
Year 1997 -0.1919 0.000 -0.264 0.000
Year 1998 0.0661 0.109 0.045 0.274
Year 1999 0.1668 0.000 0.155 0.000
Year 2000 0.1261 0.000 0.108 0.002
Year 2001 -0.0067 0.843 -0.031 0.365
Year 2002 0.0303 0.390 0.007 0.842
Constant -0.0104 0.700 0.001 0.965
Long Run Effect: 











Note: Dependent variables are measured as the natural logs o f the real monthly average wage. All regressions
are estimated using Arellano-Bond one-step GMM estimator.
Compared to the previous section, the inclusion of the lag of the dependent variable in 
this estimate has somewhat lowered the coefficient of the log of real minimum wage 
and the fraction affected. Using the one-step version of Dynamic Arellano-Bond, the 
coefficient of the log of real minimum wage is 0.122, suggesting that a 10% increase 
in minimum wage leads to a 1.22% increase in the real average wage. On the other 
hand, the fraction affected coefficient is also positive with the coefficient of 0.099, but
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it is only significant at 10% level. This result implies that the result using the log of 
real minimum wage measure is more robust than using the fraction affected measure. 
In addition, the long-run effects of the minimum wage on the real average wage are 
also positive and significant. As noted above, the long-run effect is calculated as the 
minimum wage measure coefficient divided by one minus the lagged real average 
wage coefficient, while the p-values (and the estimated standard error) are based on 
the delta method, an approximation for inference on the size of the long run effects 
appropriate in large samples (see Papke and Wooldridge, 2005)25. Using the log of 
real minimum wage masure, it is suggested that an increase in minimum wage by 10% 
increases the real average wage by 1.21% in the long run.
In order to check the robustness of the estimates, diagnostic tests for second-order 
autocorrelation and the Sargan test of over-identifying restrictions as recommended by 
Arellano and Bond (1991) are undertaken over the estimates (see lower part of table 
5.9). According to them, the presence of the first-order autocorrelation does not imply 
an inconsistent model, but the second-order autocorrelation does. Moreover, the 
Sargan test is used to check the specification of the model and to check the potential 
heteroscedasticity problem. As a result, we can reject the null hypothesis of the 
second-order autocorrelation (the p-values of both estimates are large) indicating that 
both of the estimates are consistent. In addition, the null hypothesis of the Sargan test 
in both the log of real of minimum wage and the fraction affected specifications are 
also rejected, indicating that both estimates are well-specified. Therefore, we can 
conclude that the Dynamic Arellano-Bond estimates are robust in estimating the effect 
of minimum wage on average wage.
25 It is e stim ated  using  the co m m ands nlcom  and testn l in the sta tistica l p ro g ram  ST A T A .
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In summary, the full results relating to the effect of minimum wage on average wage 
reveals that the log of real minimum wage and the fraction affected are the most 
effective measures for the Indonesian case. It is suggested that an increase in 
minimum wage by 10% increases the average wage by 1.22%-2.61% depending on 
the method used. In comparison, the log of real minimum wage shows consistently a 
positive significant effect on average wage across estimates but it is simultaneously 
determined with average wage, while the fraction affected is a cleaner measure of 
minimum wage with respect to the average wage effect, but it is only significant at 
10% level using the dynamic Arellano-Bond method. The Dynamic Arrelano-Bond 
estimate generally is superior to the other estimates. In addition, the PCSE and simple 
fixed effect estimates suffer from the endogeneity bias and from the heteroscedasticity 
problem.
In comparison, Lemos (2005) argued that the degree of impact measures, including 
the fraction at, the fraction below and the fraction affected are generally well-suited 
measures for the Brazilian case, while the log of real minimum wage is not an 
effective measure due to the fact that the variations in the log of real minimum wage 
did not come primarily from the variation in minimum wage (as minimum wage did 
not vary across regions). Specifically, as pointed out by Lemos (2005), the fraction at 
is the best measure because it is directly affected by minimum wages and it is the 
“cleaner” measure of the minimum wage than the other measures. This is actually 
different with the Indonesian case where the minimum wage varies across regions 
(provinces), suggesting that the log of real minimum wage is an appropriate minimum 
wage measure for Indonesia.
I l l
5.5.2 The Effect of Minimum Wage on Wages throughout the Distribution
Using a method similar to that used by Dickens et al (1999), this section examines the 
effect of minimum wage on wages throughout the distribution. Specifically, the 
average monthly wage as dependent variable is divided into each percentile (decile) in 
the wage distribution, while the independent variables follow the previous section 
estimates. In other words, the effect of minimum wage on wages is estimated at each 
decile in the wage distribution. Besides showing the full effect of minimum wage 
throughout the wage distribution, this investigation is also useful to check the 
effectiveness of different minimum wage measures relating to the wage effects. This 
section continues to compare the minimum wage measures using the dynamic 
Arellano-Bond method, given the biased estimate of the simple fixed effect and the 
PCSE methods findings.
Table 5.10 Effect on Wages Throughout the Distribution using Dynamic Arellano-Bond
Estimates
Log of Real 
Minim um  W age  
(1)
Dynam ic A-B






Fraction B elow  
(4)
Dynamic A-B
Deciles C oef P value C oef P value C oef P value C oef P value
1st 0.014 0.863 0.205 0.038 -0.282 0.690 -0.947 0.000
2^d 0.063 0.291 0.260 0.001 -0.933 0.023 -0.767 0.000
3rd 0.051 0.349 0.372 0.000 -1.453 0.000 -0.693 0.000
4th 0.066 0.172 0.246 0.000 -1.438 0.000 -0.578 0.000
5th 0.115 0.008 0.194 0.000 -1.126 0.000 -0.395 0.000
6th 0.101 0.009 0.123 0.011 -1.226 0.000 -0.288 0.000
7th 0.079 0.013 0.087 0.029 -1.100 0.000 -0.156 0.020
8th 0.098 0.001 0.138 0.000 -0.864 0.007 -0.084 0.187











Note: Dependent variables are measured as the natural logs o f the real monthly average wage at each decile point
o f distribution. Dynamic Arellano-Bond estimate results include year dummies and are estimated using
Arellano-Bond one-step GMM estimator.
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In the first column of table 5.10, the effect of minimum wage on wage throughout the 
distribution is estimated using the log of real minimum wage as the minimum wage 
measure. Similar to the previous section, the wage equation is instrumented using the 
one year lagged value of the log of real minimum wage in order to control for the 
endogeneity problem. The result shows that there is no significant effect of minimum 
wage at the lowest point of wage distribution. The main reason is the fact that there is 
a non-compliance issue with the minimum wage policy in Indonesia, which is likely to 
be found at the lowest part of the wage distribution. Specifically, the log of real 
minimum wage shows positive and significant effects only from the 5th to the 8th 
deciles of the distribution, while at the bottom and upper levels of the distribution the 
effects of minimum wage are not significantly different from zero. The result 
potentially suggests that the maximum impact is on the part of the distribution 
occupied by the minimum wage itself. In addition, the result also suggests the 
presence of spillover effect, where the minimum wage effect is strong up to the 8th 
decile. As pointed out by Card and Krueger (1995), the spillover effect is defined as 
an increase in the wages of workers who are already paid above the minimum wage 
level before the minimum wage increases. This effect is present due to the fact that the 
wage o f workers who are already paid above the minimum wage level should not be 
the same level or lower than the minimum wage workers’ wages. Compared to the 
other developing countries, Gindling and Terrell (2007) found significant effects 
throughout the distribution using the log of real minimum wage measure, also 
suggesting the presence of spillover effect, but the largest effect was in the 3rd decile 
of distribution.
Moreover, my result shows that the fraction affected has significant and positive 
effects on wages throughout the distribution, representing an extensive spillover 
effect. Consistent with the log of real minimum wage estimate, the effect of minimum 
wage is not strongest at the bottom of the distribution, suggesting that minimum wage 
is not effective in helping the lowest part of the wage distribution. Specifically, this 
result indicates an inverse U-shaped relationship of distribution where the 3rd decile is 
the highest point of the wage effects, confirming the part of the distribution mostly 
affected by the minimum wage policy. In comparison, the effect of minimum wage on 
average wage at the 30th percentile (0.372) is about three times bigger than at the 9th 
decile (0.116) These results are consistent with the view that the main goal of the 
Indonesian minimum wage seems to be an instrument for raising the standard of living 
of workers, suggesting an extensive “spillover effect” of the minimum wage 
(Manning, 2003a). Comparing this result to the similar fraction affected measure in 
the Colombian case, Arango and Pachon (2004) found a positive effect on the family 
income above the 25th percentile of family earnings distribution and between the 45th 
and 60th percentiles of the individual earnings distribution.
In the next two columns, the effects of minimum wage on wages throughout the 
distribution are estimated using the fraction at and the fraction below measures. 
Consistent with the previous section estimates, the fraction at and the fraction below 
shows irrelevant negative effects of minimum wage on wage throughout the 
distribution. Once again, these results confirm that the fraction at and the fraction 
below are poor measures of minimum wage effects on wages in the case of Indonesia. 
As a result, we can conclude that the log of real minimum wage and the fraction
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affected measures are generally more effective in estimating the effects of minimum 
wage on wage throughout the distribution.
5.5.3. The Effect of Minimum Wage on Employment
In this section, the effect of minimum wage on employment is estimated using a 
provincial panel data set from 1989 to 2003 across 26 provinces in Indonesia. This 
study focuses on the effect of a change in minimum wage on paid employment which 
is the category of employment legally covered by the minimum wage policy. 
Compared to the previous Indonesian minimum wage studies, Rama (2001) focused 
only on the impact of minimum wage on full-time workers, while Suryahadi et al 
(2003) focused on the urban formal labour market. In other words, this study provides 
a more complete specification of minimum wage effect on total paid employment in 
Indonesia which includes part-time workers and workers in rural areas which are in 
practice also legally covered by the minimum wage policy.
In the previous section, the findings showed that the effect of minimum wage on 
average wage is strongly positive and significant using the log of real minimum wage 
and the fraction affected measures. This is actually one indication that the minimum 
wage will also significantly affect employment. As pointed out by Burkhauser et al 
(2000), the significant effect of minimum wage on employment is likely to be found if 
there is a significant effect on wages. If the labour market is competitive, the effect of 
minimum wage on employment is expected to be negative.
Similar to the previous section, the effect of the minimum wage on employment is 
estimated using different measures of minimum wage, including: (a) the log of real
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minimum wage; (b) toughness; (c) the fraction below; (d) the fraction at; (e) the 
fraction affected. Toughness which is excluded from the wage equation because of 
potential spurious correlation with average wage will be employed as an alternative 
minimum wage measure in this section. The employment equation will also be 
estimated using four different alternatives of the panel data regression techniques, 
including the simple fixed effects, Panel-Corrected Standard Errors (PCSE), the 
instrumental variable and the Dynamic Arellano-Bond methods.
5.5.3.1 The Simple Fixed Effects
In the first section, following the same format as the wage equation, the employment 
equation is estimated using the simple fixed effects method. The dependent variable is 
the log o f total paid employment that is employed in province i and year t, while the 
control variables tend to follow the wage equation except the unemployment rate 
which is excluded from the equation because of potential simultaneity bias with 
employment in the left-hand-side of equation. Table 5.11 reports a set of results of the 
effects of minimum wage on employment using five different measures of minimum 
wage.
Most of the control variables coefficients are significant and consistent across 
different specifications. The proportion of the labour force in urban areas has a 
negative and significant effect on total paid employment. This result indicates that a 
strong movement towards urbanization (from rural areas to urban areas) in the recent 
period tends to make it more difficult for the labour force find jobs as paid 
employment in the urban formal sector. This result also confirms that urban formal 
sector jobs are indeed limited.
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Table 5.11 Employment Equation using Simple Fixed Effects Estimate 
Dependent Variable: Total Paid Employment ________






















MW measure -0.0556 0.299 -0.0480 0.627 -0.1680 0.171 0.7734 0.114 -0.0039 0.974
Urban -1.6974 0.000 -1.7050 0.000 -1.8611 0.000 -1.6527 0.000 -1.6929 0.000
Youth 1.3003 0.010 1.3491 0.008 0.5689 0.168 1.3659 0.007 1.3634 0.007
Women -1.1349 0.021 -1.1246 0.022 -0.0093 0.984 -1.0894 0.026 -1.1231 0.023
Industry 1.0753 0.034 1.0901 0.034 0.7285 0.084 0.9863 0.051 1.0499 0.039
Trade 1.4097 0.004 1.4208 0.004 0.2416 0.555 1.3376 0.006 1.3981 0.005
Services 3.5455 0.000 3.5359 0.000 2.4886 0.000 3.5938 0.000 3.5443 0.000
Construction 2.9169 0.008 2.8783 0.008 2.8134 0.001 2.8639 0.009 2.8755 0.009
Highschool 0.5991 0.096 0.6195 0.085 0.4697 0.088 0.6528 0.069 0.6220 0.084
University 1.8759 0.063 1.8118 0.073 4.8306 0.000 1.6846 0.095 1.8191 0.072
Year 1990 -0.5222 0.000 -0.5253 0.000 -0.5256 0.000 -0.5276 0.000
Year 1991 -0.4211 0.000 -0.4335 0.000 0.6412 0.000 -0.4498 0.000 -0.4406 0.000
Year 1992 -0.3738 0.000 -0.3898 0.000 0.5681 0.000 -0.4063 0.000 -0.3962 0.000
Year 1993 -0.3295 0.000 -0.3515 0.000 0.5864 0.000 -0.3687 0.000 -0.3571 0.000
Year 1994 -0.2848 0.000 -0.3137 0.000 0.5984 0.000 -0.3352 0.000 -0.3231 0.000
Year 1995 -0.1737 0.008 -0.2043 0.000 0.6571 0.000 -0.2296 0.000 -0.2156 0.000
Year 1996 -0.1310 0.044 -0.1653 0.002 0.5500 0.000 -0.1871 0.000 -0.1760 0.001
Year 1997 -0.0799 0.232 -0.1160 0.032 0.5928 0.000 -0.1395 0.006 -0.1255 0.020
Year 1998 -0.0825 0.153 -0.1038 0.051 0.5281 0.000 -0.1231 0.015 -0.1116 0.034
Year 1999 -0.0842 0.142 -0.1041 0.050 0.5469 0.000 -0.1193 0.021 -0.1101 0.038
Year 2000 -0.0128 0.853 -0.0419 0.494 0.5754 0.000 -0.0539 0.363 -0.0485 0.424
Year 2001 -0.0894 0.218 -0.1273 0.035 0.4466 0.000 -0.1444 0.015 -0.1333 0.028
Year 2002 -0.1041 0.182 -0.1454 0.023 0.5182 0.000 -0.1650 0.007 -0.1539 0.016
Year 2003 -0.1335 0.106 -0.1773 0.009 0.5026 0.000 -0.2053 0.002 -0.1865 0.006
Constant 13.4108 0.000 12.8388 0.000 -0.5141 0.000 12.7801 0.000 12.8222 0.000
Observations 390 390 364 390 390
Number of Areas 26 26 26 26 26


























Note: Dependent variables are measured as the log of total paid employment.
Wald test is used for group-wise heteroscedasticity with the null hypothesis o f homoscedasticity.
W ooldridge test is used for first-order autocorrelation test with the null hypothesis o f no first order autocorrelation.
The proportion of the youth labour force is positively associated with total paid 
employment. Indonesia Youth Employment Network (2003) found that young people 
are generally more likely to work in paid employed than self-employed category, 
although in many cases youth employees tend to be paid below the minimum wage
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level 6. The potential reason that young people are less likely to be self-employed is 
because of their lack of entrepreneurship skills, and lack of access to credit loans or 
financial assistance from the official financial institutions required by most self- 
employed jobs (Indonesia Youth Employment Network, 2003).
On the other hand, the proportion of the female labour force is negatively associated 
with total paid employment. Compared to male workers, there is evidence that a high 
proportion of female workers works in the informal uncovered sector (as unpaid 
family workers, for example), particularly for female workers in rural areas, allowing 
them to combine employment with their domestic responsibilities that require more
97flexible working hours .
In terms of sector of activities, the coefficients are positive and significant. The 
strongest effect is found among workers in the services and construction sectors, 
indicating that a high proportion of workers in those sectors are in paid employment. 
Regarding educational attainment, the proportion of the workforce with high school 
and university qualifications has positive and significant effects on total paid 
employment. This result implies that skilled workers are more likely to work as paid 
employees in the formal sector, while unskilled workers tend to work in the 
uncovered informal sectors as self-employees or unpaid family workers, such as street 
traders, taxi drivers, or farmers in the agriculture sector.
26 About 50% of Indonesian youth paid employees are paid below the minimum wage. See a detailed 
discussion about the effects of minimum wage on youth employment in the next chapter.
27 In rural areas, the w om en unpaid  fam ily w orkers are about 4 5 %  o f  to tal labour force , w hile  in urban 
areas it is m ore  than  17%.
The coefficients of the minimum wage measures are negative but not statistically 
different from zero. This result is actually contrary to the prediction that the minimum 
wage will significantly reduce employment if the labour market is competitive. As 
noted above, in the absence of any unemployment benefits provided by the 
government, workers in the covered sectors who experienced job loss as the minimum 
wage increases tend to find a job in the uncovered sector which is paid below the 
minimum wage level rather than become unemployed. Therefore, the effects of 
changes in minimum wage on total paid employment might be less than had been 
predicted. Similarly, Lemos (2004d) also found difficulties in finding strong negative 
effects of minimum wage on employment in Brazil because of the non-compliance 
problem in the labour market.
Based on the above reasons, the effects of changes in minimum wage on employment 
using total paid employment is likely to be underestimated because it includes paid 
employment that earns a wage below the minimum wage level (paid employment in 
the uncovered sector). In practice, standard theory and developed countries’ literature 
assumed that the minimum wage compliance is always high. This is not the case in 
Indonesia where the compliance is relatively low, given the lack of enforcement and 
the greater proportion of workers in the uncovered sector.
In order to obtain valid estimates of the minimum wage effects on employment in 
Indonesia, it is important to separate the covered sector employment from the uncovered 
sector employment as the focus of study (see Wessels, 2004). Using a method similar to 
that used by Wessels (2004), paid employment that is paid below the minimum wage
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level (paid employment in the uncovered sector) will be excluded from the sample28. In 
this case, Wessels (2004) found that the minimum wage has a stronger negative effect 
on the covered sector employment than on the overall employment in the United States.
Table 5.12 presents the estimation results for the effects of changes in minimum wage 
on paid employment in the covered sector. The dependent variable is therefore the log 
of number of paid employees who are paid at or above the minimum wage level (paid 
employment in the covered sector), while the independent variables follow the previous 
estimates. As predicted by the standard competitive model, the effect of minimum wage 
on paid employment in the covered sector is negative and significant using different 
minimum wage measures.
Using the log of real minimum wage, it is suggested that a 10% increase in minimum 
wage reduces paid employment in the covered sector by 4.60%. On the other hand, an 
increase in minimum wage by 10% increases toughness by 3.72%, suggesting a 
decrease in covered sector employment by 3.11%29. In terms of degree of impact 
measures, it is indicated that an increase in minimum wage by 10% increases the 
fraction affected and the fraction below by 3.70% and 3.09%, suggesting a decrease in 
covered sector employment by 3.88% and 4.04% respectively. The fraction at 
coefficient is also negative but only significant at 10% level. In comparison, the
28 Although all paid employment is legally covered by the minimum wage policy in Indonesia, in this 
study, paid employees paid below the minimum wage level are classified as workers in the uncovered 
sector.
29 Similarly to the wage equation, following Lemos (2005), the adjusted coefficients of toughness and 
degree of impact measures are obtained by multiplying the raw coefficients with the elasticity of each 
measure with respect to the log of real minimum wage in order to make it comparable with the log of real 
m in im um  w age coeffic ien t.
findings suggest that the log of real minimum wage coefficient is larger than the 
coefficients of the other minimum wage measures.
Table 5.12 Employment Equation using Simple Fixed Effects Estimate 
Dependent Variable: Paid Employment in the Covered Sector
Log of Real 
Minimum Wage Toughness
Fraction












MW measure -0.4597 0.000 -0.8349 0.000 -1.0463 0.000 -1.0175 0.081 -1.3057 0.000
Urban -1.3228 0.000 -1.5069 0.000 -1.7256 0.000 -1.3279 0.000 -1.6643 0.000
Youth 1.4903 0.008 1.7485 0.002 0.5843 0.171 2.0251 0.001 1.4587 0.005
Women -1.5952 0.003 -1.5118 0.005 -0.1927 0.683 -1.5548 0.008 -1.0821 0.033
Industry 0.6970 0.209 1.1951 0.034 0.5447 0.211 0.5619 0.350 0.8072 0.122
Trade 0.5867 0.272 0.9088 0.092 0.0759 0.858 0.5467 0.345 1.3216 0.009
Services 3.5104 0.000 3.3594 0.000 2.2761 0.000 3.4308 0.000 3.6635 0.000
Construction 2.2990 0.054 2.0268 0.090 2.3539 0.008 1.9500 0.131 2.7143 0.016
Highschool 0.6245 0.114 0.7643 0.053 0.8007 0.005 0.7798 0.068 0.6054 0.103
University 1.7293 0.119 1.1430 0.303 5.7667 0.000 1.4266 0.235 1.6128 0.121
Year 1990 -0.5221 0.000 -0.5258 0.000 -0.5705 0.000 -0.5189 0.000
Year 1991 -0.4110 0.000 -0.4440 0.000 0.6638 0.000 -0.5642 0.000 -0.4263 0.000
Year 1992 -0.3368 0.000 -0.4072 0.000 0.6291 0.000 -0.5131 0.000 -0.3816 0.000
Year 1993 -0.2795 0.000 -0.4047 0.000 0.6239 0.000 -0.4974 0.000 -0.3341 0.000
Year 1994 -0.2324 0.000 -0.3782 0.000 0.6292 0.000 -0.5404 0.000 -0.3004 0.000
Year 1995 -0.1196 0.096 -0.2627 0.000 0.7047 0.000 -0.4548 0.000 -0.2063 0.000
Year 1996 -0.0047 0.947 -0.1843 0.002 0.6126 0.000 -0.3685 0.000 -0.1550 0.004
Year 1997 0.0657 0.370 -0.1401 0.019 0.6438 0.000 -0.2993 0.000 -0.0973 0.079
Year 1998 -0.0117 0.853 -0.1124 0.054 0.6641 0.000 -0.2417 0.000 -0.0854 0.115
Year 1999 -0.0036 0.955 -0.1090 0.062 0.6524 0.000 -0.2092 0.001 -0.0854 0.117
Year 2000 0.1545 0.041 -0.0218 0.746 0.6732 0.000 -0.1375 0.052 -0.0121 0.846
Year 2001 0.1121 0.160 -0.1422 0.032 0.5438 0.000 -0.2404 0.001 -0.1038 0.095
Year 2002 0.1032 0.228 -0.1547 0.028 0.5865 0.000 -0.2989 0.000 -0.1300 0.047
Year 2003 0.0823 0.364 -0.1910 0.011 0.5696 0.000 -0.3362 0.000 -0.1629 0.019
Constant 17.6679 0.000 13.0942 0.000 -0.4853 0.000 12.8592 0.000 12.8289 0.000
Observations 390 390 364 390 390
Number of Areas 26 26 26 26 26


























Note: Dependent variables are measured as the log o f paid employment in the covered sector.
Wald test is used for group-wise heteroscedasticity with the null hypothesis o f homoscedasticity. 
Wooldridge test is used for first-order autocorrelation test with the null hypothesis o f no first order 
autocorrelatio
In order to check the robustness of the results, the diagnostic tests for serial correlation 
and heteroscedasticity are presented in the lower part of table 5.12. Similar to the wage 
equation, all of the simple fixed effect estimates suffer from the presence of the 
heteroscedasticity and serial correlation. Using the Wooldridge test for serial 
correlation, we reject the null hypothesis suggesting that there is evidence of serial 
correlation using the simple fixed effect estimates. On the other hand, using the Wald 
test for heteroscedasticity, the null hypothesis is also rejected indicating that there is 
evidence of heteroscedasticity over the estimates. Failure to control for these issues will 
make our estimates inefficient. The result also suggests an adoption of the Panel 
Corrected Standard Errors (PCSE) estimate that assumes heteroscedastic disturbances 
and allows for the presence of the first-order autocorrelation AR(1) parameter within the 
panel.
5.5.3.2 Panel Corrected Standard Errors (PCSE)
In this section, the effect of minimum wage on employment is examined using the Panel 
Corrected Standard Errors (PCSE) estimate. As mentioned above, PCSE estimate is 
expected to be more robust to the presence of heteroscedasticity and serial correlation 
than the simple fixed effect method. Table 5.13 presents a set of results of the effects of 
minimum wage on employment using different minimum wage measures. In panel A, 
similar to the simple fixed effect estimates, the result shows that the effects of changes 
in the minimum wage on total paid employment are not significantly different from zero 
using different minimum wage measures. However, as discussed in the previous section, 
this result is likely to be underestimated because it includes workers paid below the 
minimum wage level (paid employment in the uncovered sector). Therefore, it is
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important to separate paid employment in the covered sector from paid employment in 
the uncovered sector in order to obtain a valid estimate of the effects of minimum wage 
on employment in Indonesia.
The effect o f the minimum wage on paid employment in the covered sector is presented 
in panel B of table 5.13. The full result suggests that the effects of changes in minimum 
wage on paid employment in the covered sector using different minimum wage 
measures are negative and significant, supporting the standard competitive model30. In 
comparison, the minimum wage measure coefficients using the PCSE method are 
slightly lower than using the simple fixed effect method. Using log of real minimum 
wage, it is suggested that an increase in minimum wage by 10% reduces paid 
employment in the covered sector by 4.17%. Comparing to the other measures, a 10% 
increase in minimum wage reduces paid employment in the covered sector by 2.55% 
using toughness, by 3.53% using the fraction affected and by 3.71% using the fraction 
below.
Relating to toughness, it is important to note that the average wage rate which is 
employed as a denominator also shows the interaction between labour demand and 
supply (Neumark and Wascher, 1992). This evidence suggests a potential simultaneous 
relationship between average wages in the right-hand-side of the equation and 
employment in the left-hand-side of the equation. By implication, the toughness 
estimate would potentially be biased because of this correlation, providing a spurious 
negative correlation between toughness and employment. In other words, toughness will
30 T he fraction  at e stim ate  is ex c luded  given  in sign ifican t resu lts in em p lo y m en t equation .
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potentially generate a poor measure of the minimum wage effects on employment 
(Burkhauser et al, 2000).
Table 5.13 Employment Equation using Panel Corrected Standard Errors (PCSE) 
Estimate
Panel A; Dependent Variable: Total Paid Employment
Log of Real 
Minimum Wage Toughness Fraction Affected Fraction Below
1 2 3 4
Coef. P value Coef. P value Coef. P value Coef. P value
MW Measure -0.0230 0.683 0.0303 0.762 -0.1651 0.178 0.0680 0.590
Urban -1.8131 0.000 -1.8031 0.000 -1.8160 0.000 -1.7954 0.000
Youth 0.8608 0.069 0.8861 0.061 0.7112 0.118 0.9024 0.059
Women -0.8016 0.060 -0.8034 0.057 -0.1650 0.698 -0.8197 0.052
Industry 0.8315 0.081 0.7955 0.101 0.9766 0.030 0.7996 0.099
Trade 0.9156 0.074 0.9006 0.081 0.2872 0.504 0.8805 0.088
Services 3.2755 0.000 3.2721 0.000 2.3928 0.000 3.2578 0.000
Construction 3.0095 0.002 3.0051 0.002 2.2275 0.015 2.9865 0.002
High School 0.6911 0.027 0.7029 0.023 0.4461 0.114 0.7138 0.020
University 3.1579 0.001 3.1467 0.001 4.9780 0.000 3.1307 0.001
Constant 12.6710 0.000 12.4198 0.000 0.0191 0.731 12.4307 0.000
R sq 0.99 0.99 0.76 0.99
Panel B; Dependent Variable: Paid Employment in the Covered Sector
Log of Real 
Minimum Wage Toughness Fraction Affected Fraction Below
1 2 3 4
Coef. P value Coef. P value Coef. P value Coef. P value
MW Measure -0.4175 0.000 -0.6851 0.000 -0.9590 0.000 -1.2063 0.000
Urban -1.5599 0.000 -1.6283 0.000 -1.6757 0.000 -1.7718 0.000
Youth 1.0619 0.037 1.3483 0.006 0.7706 0.091 0.9575 0.048
Women -1.2194 0.010 -1.1942 0.013 -0.4256 0.343 -0.7982 0.073
Industry 0.5281 0.319 0.8539 0.123 0.7914 0.087 0.5999 0.220
Trade 0.3830 0.459 0.6150 0.279 0.1075 0.812 0.8143 0.121
Services 3.1526 0.000 3.1756 0.000 2.3436 0.000 3.3231 0.000
Construction 2.4141 0.024 2.3392 0.030 1.6680 0.081 2.7194 0.006
High School 0.8463 0.010 0.8627 0.009 0.7712 0.005 0.6954 0.025
University 3.5022 0.001 2.3035 0.022 5.5792 0.000 3.0843 0.001
Constant 16.8870 0.000 12.6745 0.000 0.2031 0.000 12.4534 0.000
R sq 0.99 0.99 0.77 0.99
Note: All regressions include year and province dummies and are estimated assuming a AR( 1) error structure.
In order to check the robustness of the toughness estimate, the endogeneity test will be 
reported in the next section. This test is also useful to ensure whether all of the 
minimum wage measures are truly exogenous with respect to employment. If the
minimum wage measures are endogenously determined with employment, it would 
imply that the PCSE estimates are not robust because it assumes exogeneity.
5.5.3.3 Instrumental Variable Method
Similarly to the wage equation, the Davidson-MacKinnon test of endogeneity is 
conducted to test whether the minimum wage measures are endogenously determined 
with employment. In this case, this section focuses on paid employment in the covered 
sector as a valid measure of employment for the Indonesian case. The results from the 
Davidson-MacKinnon test for endogeneity of minimum wage measures with respect to 
paid employment in the covered sector are reported in table 5.14.
The result shows that the log of real minimum wage is exogenously determined with 
employment as the Davidson-MacKinnon test strongly rejects the null hypothesis that 
the log o f real minimum wage is endogenous. This result is consistent with Suryahadi ct 
al (2001) and Rama (2001) in the previous minimum wage studies, confirming that the 
real minimum wage is not endogenously determined with employment because the main 
consideration to set the minimum wage level (index of minimum living needs) is not 
directly related to the regional labour market. As pointed out by Suryahadi et al (2001). 
the log of real minimum wage is only endogenous in the wage equation because 
regional government is likely to use the existing average wage level as one of the 
important factors to set the minimum wage level. In addition, Zavodny (1998) argued 
that the timing of minimum wage increases is likely to be related to the general 
economic condition, such as when demand for paid employment is high, suggesting that 
the minimum wage level is endogenously determined with employment. In practice, this
is not the case of Indonesia as the minimum wage tends to be adjusted regularly (every 
year) depending on the index of minimum living needs.
Table 5.14 Davidson-MacKinnon Tests of Endogeneity for a Panel Data 
Regression
Minimum Wage Measure F test
Log of Real Minimum Wage 0.119(0.73)
Toughness 5.158 (0.02)
Fraction Affected 5.94 (0.01)
Fraction At 4.71 (0.03)
Fraction Below 2.40 (0.10)
Notes: H0: OLS estimator yield a consistent estimate
On the other hand, as predicted, toughness is endogenously determined with 
employment. The result indicates that the endogeneity in toughness is caused by the 
correlation between denominator (the real average wage) and employment as there is no 
evidence of endogenous correlation between the real minimum wage and employment. 
This result is consistent with Dickens et al’s (1999) finding that the toughness estimate 
is endogenously biased either because of real average wage (the denominator) or real 
minimum wage (the numerator). This result also confirms that the toughness measure is 
contaminated by the interaction between labour demand and supply, suggesting a poor 
measure of minimum wage on employment for the Indonesian case.
In addition, the Davidson-MacKinnon tests show that the fraction affected, the fraction 
at and the fraction below (degree of impact measures) estimates suffer from endogeneity 
bias. The main reason is because they measure the “group of paid employees” affected 
by the minimum wage suggesting a strongly simultaneous correlation with total number 
of paid employees in the left-hand-side equation.
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Based on the above reasons, the PCSE estimates are not robust in estimating the effect 
of minimum wage on employment because of the presence of endogeneity bias. In order 
to deal with the endogeneity problem of the minimum wage measures, similar to the 
wage equation, the employment equation is re-estimated using the instrumental variable 
method with the fixed effect specification. In this case, the one year lag of its own 
minimum wage measure is employed as the instrument31. The log of real minimum 
wage measure is not estimated using the instrumental variable method as there is no 
evidence of endogeneity with respect to employment.
Table 5.15 presents the first-stage of the instrumental variable method results using 
different minimum wage measures. The instrument variables (the one year lag of its 
own minimum wage measures) are strongly positive and significant, except for the 
fraction affected specification, indicating that the first-stage estimates are appropriate. 
The F tests for joint significance of the instrument in the first-stage estimation are 
relatively high for the toughness and the fraction below specifications. In contrast, the 
F tests for the fraction at and the fraction affected are low (less than the rule of thumb 
often  as pointed out by Staiger and Stock, 1997) implying that these specifications 
suffer from weak-instruments problem32. As a result, this result suggests focus on the 
toughness and the fraction below specifications in the second stage of the estimation 
which are more appropriate.
31 For toughness, the one year lagged value of the log of real minimum wage is employed as an 
instrument in order to ensure that the toughness variation is primarily caused by the variation in the 
minimum wage.
321 have also tried to use the other instruments, such as the one year lag of the log of real minimum 
wage and the mean of the bordering provinces minimum wage level, but the F tests of the first-stage
estim a tio n  rem ain  low.
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Table 5.15 Employment Equation using IV Method (First-stage estimation) 
In stru m en ta l V ariab le: O ne y ea r  lag o f  its m in im u m  w a g e  m easure
Toughness
(1)






Coef P value Coef P value Coef P value Coef P value
MW measure (-1) 0.1780 0.000 0.3833 0.000 0.1222 0.036 -0.0593 0.295
Urban -0.3595 0.000 -0.2790 0.000 -0.0400 0.046 -0.0889 0.190
Youth 0.1009 0.711 -0.2688 0.257 -0.0327 0.584 -0.1327 0.495
Women 0.0440 0.865 0.4389 0.053 -0.0104 0.856 0.1180 0.593
Industry 0.6165 0.021 0.1581 0.497 0.0460 0.435 0.4515 0.023
Trade 0.7899 0.002 0.6176 0.005 0.0513 0.353 0.2297 0.230
Services -0.0062 0.981 0.1659 0.470 -0.0764 0.187 0.1663 0.412
Construction -0.2126 0.704 0.4174 0.394 0.0722 0.558 -0.3642 0.362
Highschool -0.0006 0.997 -0.1721 0.278 -0.0428 0.285 0.0128 0.920
University -0.0682 0.903 0.1289 0.793 0.1948 0.117 0.1919 0.662
Year 1991 0.0047 0.905 0.0686 0.000 0.0138 0.000 -0.0961 0.103
Year 1992 0.0964 0.008 0.0386 0.016 0.0130 0.001 0.0442 0.006
Year 1993 0.0368 0.245 0.0661 0.000 0.0148 0.000 -0.0165 0.315
Year 1994 0.0118 0.696 0.1133 0.000 0.0150 0.001 -0.0066 0.687
Year 1995 0.0773 0.006 0.0998 0.000 0.0180 0.001 0.0416 0.013
Year 1996 0.0776 0.027 0.0654 0.003 0.0132 0.008 -0.0161 0.429
Year 1997 0.0463 0.060 0.0709 0.002 0.0177 0.001 -0.0376 0.072
Year 1998 0.0147 0.567 0.0308 0.163 0.0139 0.008 -0.0364 0.030
Year 1999 -0.0293 0.177 0.0223 0.301 0.0118 0.026 0.0076 0.634
Year 2000 -0.0166 0.494 0.0342 0.157 0.0069 0.254 -0.0099 0.538
Year 2001 0.0154 0.513 0.0516 0.033 0.0141 0.020 0.0245 0.143
Year 2002 -0.0205 0.311 0.0724 0.004 0.0129 0.040 0.0534 0.002
Year 2003 0.0039 0.827 0.0768 0.004 0.0229 0.000 0.0355 0.024
Constant -1.5720 0.000 -0.0543 0.603 0.0451 0.086 0.1292 0.000
Observations 



















Note: Dependent variable is the minimum wage measure. All regressions include province dummies.
The second stage of the instrumental variable method estimates for the employment 
equation is presented in table 5.16. Toughness and the fraction below show consistently 
negative effects of minimum wage on employment. Compared to the PCSE estimate, 
the toughness coefficient significantly decreases confirming a spurious negative 
correlation in PCSE estimate as predicted by Neumark and Wascher (1992). The 
results suggest that an increase in minimum wage decreased paid employment in the 
covered sector by 5.84% using toughness and by 5.4% using the fraction below. In
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contrast, the fraction affected and the fraction at are not significantly different from 
zero using the instrumental variable method.
Table 5.16 Employment Equation using IV Method (Second-stage estimation) 









Coef P value Coef P value Coef P value Coef P value
MW measure -1.5660 0.000 -1.7307 0.000 -11.8607 0.091 -6.2963 0.251
Urban -1.7085 0.000 -1.7386 0.000 -1.6777 0.000 -2.1648 0.001
Youth 1.2820 0.035 0.8102 0.143 0.9928 0.282 -0.3633 0.787
Women -1.0710 0.065 -0.3372 0.527 -1.1052 0.190 0.7347 0.620
Industry 1.8484 0.004 1.1645 0.030 1.4967 0.116 2.9393 0.292
Trade 1.0673 0.085 1.1606 0.035 0.6150 0.501 1.1414 0.498
Services 3.0059 0.000 3.3570 0.000 2.1789 0.035 3.0089 0.048
Construction 2.4752 0.048 3.5525 0.002 3.2684 0.079 0.4766 0.876
Highschool 0.5506 0.176 0.3738 0.306 0.1008 0.880 0.8623 0.239
University 1.6374 0.192 2.1514 0.055 4.1508 0.079 7.2313 0.009
Year 1991 0.1638 0.003 -0.3924 0.000 -0.1586 0.157 -0.7792 0.189
Year 1992 0.1851 0.000 -0.2628 0.000 0.0521 0.347 0.3459 0.214
Year 1993 0.1802 0.000 -0.2261 0.000 0.0914 0.125 -0.0383 0.780
Year 1994 0.2696 0.000 -0.1640 0.002 0.0516 0.430 0.0304 0.754
Year 1995 0.4109 0.000 -0.1048 0.028 0.1774 0.051 0.2821 0.262
Year 1996 0.4826 0.000 0.0352 0.501 0.2178 0.002 0.0514 0.734
Year 1997 0.5098 0.000 0.0936 0.075 0.3297 0.000 -0.1516 0.507
Year 1998 0.5084 0.000 0.0901 0.133 0.3514 0.000 -0.1041 0.621
Year 1999 0.4872 0.000 0.0843 0.192 0.3629 0.000 0.1469 0.171
Year 2000 0.5770 0.000 0.1441 0.046 0.3615 0.000 0.0371 0.724
Year 2001 0.4453 0.000 0.0545 0.421 0.3236 0.000 0.2349 0.174
Year 2002 0.4743 0.000 0.0405 0.542 0.2636 0.003 0.2509 0.414
Year 2003 0.4536 0.000 0.0196 0.781 0.3426 0.004 0.1931 0.346
Constant 12.7924 0.000 12.6634 0.000 12.9772 0.000 0.7190 0.281
Observations 














N ote: D ependent variable is the log o f  total paid em ploym ent in the covered sector
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5.5.3.3 Dynamic Arellano-Bond Method
To check the robustness of the results by changing the methodology, the effect of 
minimum wage on employment is estimated using a one-step Dynamic Arellano-Bond 
method. According to Arellano and Bond (1991), it is recommended to use the one- 
step estimator for inference of the coefficient when the sample is relatively small. As 
mentioned above, this method includes the lagged values of employment as additional 
explanatory variables to measure the adjustment of employment to changes in labour 
demand and supply, providing a more efficient estimate than the instrumental variable 
method. Similar to the previous section, the one year lagged value of the minimum 
wage measure is included as an instrument to control for endogeneity problem, except 
for the log of real minimum wage which is exogenously determined with employment. 
The robust standard error is reported to control for the heteroscedasticity problem. This 
section specifically focuses on the log of real minimum wage, toughness, and the 
fraction below measures, given the insignificant results using the fraction affected and 
the fraction at in the previous section.
The effect of minimum wage on paid employment in the covered sector using the 
Dynamic Arellano-Bond method is presented in table 5.17. All of the minimum wage 
measures consistently show significant negative effects of minimum wage on 
employment. Compared to the PCSE and instrumental variable estimates, the 
coefficients fall slightly but remain negative and statistically significant. Using the log 
of real minimum wage, it is suggested that a 10% increase in minimum wage decreases 
paid employment in the covered sector by 3.01%. Compared to the log of real 
minimum wage, the adjusted coefficients of toughness and the fraction below are 0.233 
and 0.356, suggesting that an increase in the minimum wage by 10% decreases paid
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employment in the covered sector by 2.33% and 3.56% respectively33. In addition, 
using the log of real minimum wage measure, an increase in minimum wage by 10% 
reduces paid employment in the covered sector by 4.14% in the long run.
Table 5.17 Employment Equation using a Dynamic Arellano-Bond Estimate







Coef P value Coef P value Coef P value
Employment (-1) 0.1364 0.016 0.2317 0.000 0.1664 0.000
Employment (-2) 0.1361 0.003 0.1441 0.001 0.1202 0.003
MW measure -0.3010 0.016 -0.6052 0.000 -1.0445 0.000
Urban -1.9199 0.000 -1.6214 0.000 -1.7580 0.000
Youth 0.5588 0.323 1.1380 0.046 0.9113 0.065
Women -0.0771 0.927 -1.1733 0.045 -0.1503 0.769
Industry 1.0017 0.162 1.4253 0.009 1.3611 0.003
Trade -0.3414 0.423 -0.2697 0.585 -0.1557 0.721
Services 2.5113 0.001 2.0515 0.000 2.4632 0.000
Construction 2.8251 0.091 1.5405 0.162 2.9433 0.002
High school 1.2496 0.000 1.1747 0.001 0.8163 0.005
University 5.8562 0.000 5.2908 0.000 4.6767 0.000
Year 1993 0.2083 0.000 -0.1206 0.032 -0.0661 0.180
Year 1994 0.1097 0.003 -0.1298 0.012 -0.0989 0.026
Year 1995 0.0895 0.067 0.0433 0.470 0.0309 0.552
Year 1996 0.2538 0.000 -0.1312 0.029 -0.1169 0.024
Year 1997 0.0623 0.378 -0.0961 0.066 -0.0636 0.165
Year 1998 0.1178 0.000 -0.1384 0.009 -0.1212 0.009
Year 1999 0.0188 0.804 -0.1169 0.025 -0.1045 0.022
Year 2000 0.0880 0.040 -0.0801 0.118 -0.0698 0.117
Year 2001 0.1727 0.008 -0.2519 0.000 -0.2132 0.000
Year 2002 0.0694 0.163 -0.1258 0.011 -0.1225 0.004
Year 2003 0.0797 0.249 -0.1374 0.006 -0.1156 0.008
Constant -0.0776 0.028 0.1185 0.003 0.1065 0.002
Long Run Effect: 
MW measure -0.4138 0.027 -0.9697 0.000 -1.4642 0.000
Observations 312 312 312









Note: All regressions include year dummies and are estimated using Arellano Bond one-step GMM estimator.
33Similar to the previous section, the toughness and the fraction below elasticities are obtained by 
estimating each of them on the log of real minimum wage and all of the control variables in order to 
make it comparable with the log of real minimum wage coefficient.
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Specifically, the Dynamic Arellano-Bond method is estimated using up to two lags of 
the employment34. The lagged values o f the dependent variables are positive and 
significant, suggesting that the dynamic model dominates the OLS estimate. Relating 
to the potential autocorrelation caused by the lagged effects, the diagnostic test 
suggests that there is no evidence o f the second-order autocorrelation in all o f the 
estimates (see the lower part o f table 5.17)35. This finding implies that the Dynamic 
Arellano-Bond estimates are robust and well-specified.
In summary, the full result suggests that a 1% rise in the minimum wage decreases paid 
employment in the covered sector by between 0.233% and 0.356% in the short run 
depending on the minimum wage measures used. The log o f real minimum wage 
measure is generally “cleaner” than the other measures for Indonesian case because it 
does not suffer the endogeneity problem. In addition, the log o f real minimum wage 
also shows consistently negative and significant effects o f minimum wage on paid 
employment in the covered sector using different methods. In conclusion, we can 
confirm that the log o f real minimum wage measure is the most appropriate measure in 
estimating the effect o f minimum wage on employment, particularly when the 
minimum wage varies across regions. In contrast, it might be not useful when the 
m inimum wage is set at a national level. Relating to the methods used, the Dynamic 
Arellano-Bond estimate generally is more efficient than the other estimates. As 
mentioned above, the other estimates suffer from endogeneity bias and do not include 
the adjustment o f employment to changes in labour demand and supply, providing a 
less efficient estimate.
34 I have tried  to  include up to  th ree  y ear lags o f  em p lo y m en t as add itional ex p lanato ry  v a riab les, but 
the  co effic ien ts  are n o t sig n ifican tly  d iffe ren t from  zero.
35A cco rd in g  to  A re llan o  and B ond (1991), the  firs t-o rd er au to co rrela tio n  does no t im ply  an inconsis ten t 
m odel, bu t the  seco n d -o rd er au to corre la tion  does.
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In comparison, the findings are relatively low compared to the evidences in Colombia 
and Puerto Rico. Bell (1997) found that a 10% increase in minimum wage in Colombia 
reduced low-paid unskilled labour by between 2% and 12%. In Puerto Rico, Castillo- 
Freeman and Freeman (1992) estimated that a 10% increase tended to reduce 
employment by over 9%. However, the results are higher than the evidence in Costa 
Rica and Brazil. In Costa Rica, the minimum wage reduced employment in the covered 
sector by between 0.4% and 1% (Gindling and Terrell, 2007). Finally, Lemos (2004d) 
suggested that a 10% increase in the Brazilian minimum wage increases total 
employment by 0.06% in the short run and decreases it by 0.04% in the long run.
5.5.4. Further Robustness Checks
5.5.4.1. Seemingly Unrelated Regression
In the previous section, the effects o f changes in minimum wage on wage and 
employment are estimated separately (independently) using reduced forms o f wage and 
employment equations. This specification assumes that the error terms between wage 
and employment equations are not contemporaneously correlated, while in practice, 
wage and employment are endogenous and have a close theoretical relationship to each 
other, suggesting that the error terms o f two different equations might be correlated. In 
addition, the control variables o f both equations are collected from the same set o f the 
observations in the labour force survey, supporting the potentially strong error terms 
correlation across the equations. If the error terms across the equations are 
contemporaneously correlated, the joint equation estimate is required in order to gain 
efficiency (Pindyck and Rubinfeld, 1998).
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Table 5.18 SUR Results for Wage and Employment Effects











Coef P value Coef P value Coef P value Coef P value
Log Real MW 0.1666 0.000 -0.0560 0.261 0.3844 0.000 -0.4607 0.000
Urban 0.6773 0.000 -1.6914 0.000 0.4725 0.000 -1.3160 0.000
Youth 1.2554 0.007 1.4129 0.006
Women -1.0485 0.020 -1.4868 0.003
Industry -0.9973 0.006 1.0798 0.022 -0.7683 0.038 0.7058 0.172
Trade -1.4733 0.000 1.4066 0.002 -0.9213 0.008 0.5852 0.239
Services 3.5079 0.000 3.4604 0.000
Construction 3.0314 0.002 2.4766 0.025
High School 0.5852 0.077 0.5986 0.101
University 0.8811 0.174 1.9127 0.041 0.5096 0.445 1.7878 0.083
Unemployment -0.9643 0.011 -0.5934 0.131
Year 1990 0.0764 0.002 -0.5215 0.000 0.0799 0.002 -0.5210 0.000
Year 1991 0.0582 0.039 -0.4202 0.000 0.0584 0.045 -0.4095 0.000
Year 1992 0.0977 0.001 -0.3737 0.000 0.0897 0.003 -0.3366 0.000
Year 1993 0.1952 0.000 -0.3295 0.000 0.1914 0.000 -0.2794 0.000
Year 1994 0.1976 0.000 -0.2854 0.000 0.1894 0.000 -0.2330 0.000
Year 1995 0.2346 0.000 -0.1734 0.004 0.2054 0.000 -0.1195 0.074
Year 1996 0.2815 0.000 -0.1321 0.029 0.2204 0.000 -0.0059 0.929
year 1997 0.3463 0.000 -0.0811 0.192 0.2835 0.000 0.0641 0.348
Year 1998 0.1507 0.000 -0.0835 0.120 0.1233 0.002 -0.0130 0.825
Year 1999 0.2237 0.000 -0.0848 0.111 0.1827 0.000 -0.0041 0.945
Year 2000 0.3613 0.000 -0.0150 0.815 0.2588 0.000 0.1517 0.031
Year 2001 0.4912 0.000 -0.0910 0.177 0.3911 0.000 0.1097 0.139
Year 2002 0.4733 0.000 -0.1055 0.145 0.3678 0.000 0.1013 0.203
Year 2003 0.4860 0.000 -0.1336 0.081 0.3634 0.000 0.0820 0.331
Constant 9.8210 0.000 12.9293 0.000 7.5399 0.000 17.3028 0.000
Observations 390 390 390 390
Number of Areas 26 26 26 26
R square 0.91 0.99 0.91 0.99
Diagnostic Test: 
Breusch-Pagan 9.801 (0.002) 5.707 (0.017)
Note: All regressions include province dummies and are estimated using Seemingly Unrelated Regression.
In order to check for this issue, the Breusch-Pagan test for cross-sectional correlation is 
reported (see the lower part o f table 5.18). The result shows that we can reject the null 
hypothesis o f the error term independence implying that the error terms o f both 
equations are contemporaneously correlated. To control for this correlation, the
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reduced forms o f wage and employment equations are estimated jointly using a system 
approach o f the Seemingly Unrelated Regression (SUR), allowing the error terms to be 
correlated across different equations. Compared to the separate single-equation models, 
SUR improves the efficiency o f estimates in the case that the error terms are highly 
correlated across different equations (Pindyck and Rubinfeld, 1998). Specifically, the 
wage and employment equations are estimated simultaneously by using Generalized 
Least Square (GLS) with the potential correlation in their error terms.
Table 5.18 presents a set o f results for wage and employment effects using the SUR 
method. The log o f real minimum wage is employed as the minimum wage measure, 
while the control variables tend to follow the previous section. Some variables that are 
insignificant based on the previous section wage equation finding are excluded 
including youth labour force, female labour force, and the workforce in the services 
and construction sectors. The unemployment rate is also excluded from the 
employment equation because o f potential correlation with the dependent variable. In 
addition, year and province dummy variables are included to control for year and 
province specifics.
The effects o f the minimum wage on wage and employment using total paid 
employment data are reported in columns 1 and 2 o f table 5.18. The result shows that 
the effect o f minimum wage on average wage o f total paid employment is positive and 
significant. Specifically, it is suggested that a 10% increase in the minimum wage 
increases the average monthly wage o f total paid employment by 1.66%. The 
coefficient is relatively very similar to the previous section’s findings, suggesting a 
consistent estimate across different specifications. Consistent with the previous section
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finding, the effect o f minimum wage on total paid employment is not significantly 
different from zero. The main reason is because o f the non-compliance problem with 
the minimum wage policy in Indonesia, implying that total paid employment does not 
offer a valid measure o f the employment effect o f minimum wage in the Indonesian 
case.
Columns 3 and 4 o f table 5.18 present the estimation results for the effects o f minimum 
wage on paid employment in the covered sector. In this case, paid employment that 
earns a wage below the minimum wage level is excluded from the estimation, 
assuming that they are not covered by the minimum wage policy. The result shows that 
the minimum wage is positively associated with the average monthly wage o f paid 
employment in the covered sector. Consistent with the prediction, the effect of 
minimum wage on average wage o f covered sector employment is stronger than the 
average wage o f total paid employment, implying that covered sector employment is 
more affected by the minimum wage than is total paid employment. The result suggests 
that a 10% increase in minimum wage increases the average wage o f covered sector 
employment by 3.84%.
Turning to the employment equation, the effect o f a change in minimum wage on paid 
employment in the covered sector is negative and significant. The coefficient is also 
relatively close to the previous section finding, suggesting that a 10% increase in 
minimum wage decreases covered sector employment by 4.6%. The full result also 
indicates a potential shift o f the affected workers from the covered sector to the 
uncovered sector as there is no significant impact o f minimum wage on total paid 
employment.
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In summary, the SUR method provides more efficient estimates than a single equation 
model due to the fact that the error terms are contemporaneously correlated across 
wage and employment equations. The results are relatively close and consistent with 
the finding o f the previous section suggesting an increase in average wage and a 
decrease in covered sector employment. However, it is important to note that the SUR 
method used in this section assumes exogeneity across variables and does not control 
for the endogeneity problem between the minimum wage and wage and/or 
employment. Therefore, although the SUR method provides more efficient estimates, it 
does not play an important role as an alternative specification relating to the 
endogeneity problem. As another alternative, the structural employment demand 
equation using the instrumental variable method to eliminate the endogeneity problem 
is discussed in the next section.
5.5.4.2. Structural Employment Demand Equations
In addition to estimating the effects o f minimum wage on wage and employment 
simultaneously, this section examines the structural employment demand equation as 
suggested by Card (1992a) and Machin et al (2003). Specifically, employment is 
estimated on average wage, while minimum wage is used as an instrument for average 
wage36. As pointed out by Card (1992a), the change in employment in response to the 
wage change also reflects a movement along the labour demand function. This 
specification is consistent with the standard theory that minimum wage will affect 
employment if  they first show the significant impact on the wage rate (Burkhauser et 
al, 2000). In other words, this specification implies that minimum wage leads to a
36 F o llo w in g  the p rev io u s estim ates, em p lo y m en t is m easu red  by covered  sec to r em p lo y m en t as the 
ca teg o ry  o f  em p lo y m en t m ostly  a ffected  by the m in im um  w age policy .
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change in employment through the indirect channel o f wage rate. Compared to the 
previous section which uses the separate (or jointly) reduced form equations, this 
specification provides a simple interaction between wage and employment, assuming 
that wage and employment are endogenous. Besides eliminating the endogeneity 
problem, this specification does not suffer from contemporaneous correlation across 
equations.
Specifically, the structural employment demand equation model used in this section has 
the following form:
First-stage estimation:
lnWjt = do + o.i In MWj.it + y/uX  + y, + v, + £jt (5.3)
Second-stage estimation:
InEmpit = a j + 0.4 In Wit + y/itX  + yt + v t + eit (5.4)
This model is estimated using the instrumental variable (two-stage least squares) 
method with the fixed effect specification. In practice, the instrumental variable 
method requires that the instrument is exogenous and uncorrelated with the error term 
in the employment equation. Since this study mostly found that the minimum wage 
measures are endogenously determined with wage and/or employment, the instrument 
(minimum wage measure) is employed with the lagged value in order to eliminate the 
potential biased estimate. Previous studies tended to allow for lagged response o f the 
minimum wage on employment because o f the difficulties o f adjusting other inputs 
immediately (Brown et al, 1982). Machin et al (2003) employed the lagged value o f the 
fraction o f workers earning below the minimum wage level before the introduction of 
the minimum wage (the fraction affected) as an instrument variable, while Card
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(1992a) used the fraction o f teenagers affected by minimum wage before minimum 
wage increases. In addition to the lagged value o f the fraction affected, the lagged 
value o f the log o f real minimum wage is also employed in this study as an instrument 
variable for average wage, while the exogenous control variables tend to follow the 
previous section. In order to check whether average wage is truly endogenously 
determined with employment, the Davidson and MacKinnon endogeneity test for a 
panel data estimate is also reported.
In the first-stage o f estimation, the reduced form of wage equation is estimated by 
regressing the average monthly wage (Wit) on the minimum wage measure 
(instrumental variable), controlling for all other control variables (.X) which are 
exogenous. If  the lagged o f minimum wage is a suitable instrument, it should have a 
strong and positive correlation with the average wage. In practice, the first-stage of 
estimation result will be similar to the wage equation estimation developed in the 
previous section using the fixed effect specification, except that the unemployment rate 
is excluded as one o f the control variables due to the potential simultaneity bias with 
employment. In the second-stage o f estimation, paid employment is regressed on the 
predicted value o f the average monthly wage obtained in the first-stage estimation, 
controlling for all other explanatory variables. The coefficient o f the predicted value of 
the average monthly wage (a*) reflects the wage elasticity o f labour demand (Machin et 
al, 2003).
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Table 5.19 W age Equation using Structural Estimate (First-stage estimation)





Coef P value Coef P value
MW Measure (-1) 0.2545 0.000 0.8031 0.000
Urban 0.4818 0.002 0.3174 0.045
Youth -0.9276 0.047 -0.6311 0.164
Women 0.5146 0.245 -0.3084 0.538
Industry -0.9685 0.034 -0.7212 0.119
Trade -0.7612 0.075 -0.6804 0.131
Services -0.1292 0.773 -0.5773 0.198
Construction 1.3717 0.151 -0.1959 0.836
High school -0.4009 0.196 0.2746 0.363
University 1.4437 0.132 2.8820 0.005
Year 1991 -0.3250 0.000 0.1139 0.004
Year 1992 -0.2726 0.000 0.0173 0.651
Year 1993 -0.2951 0.000 0.0425 0.277
Year 1994 -0.1739 0.001 0.1119 0.004
Year 1995 -0.1380 0.004 -0.0022 0.957
Year 1996 -0.1740 0.004 0.0544 0.261
Year 1997 -0.1424 0.001 -0.0039 0.937
Year 1998 -0.0886 0.044 0.0674 0.093
Year 1999 -0.3712 0.000 -0.3128 0.000
Year 2000 -0.2646 0.000 0.0037 0.923
Year 2001 -0.1087 0.007 0.0912 0.022
Year 2002 0.0326 0.345 0.1266 0.002
Year 2003 0.0007 0.981 -0.0355 0.345
Constant 9.3393 0.000 -0.0776 0.017
Observations 
Number of Areas 















Note: All regressions include province dummies.
Table 5.19 presents the first-stage estimation o f the structural employment demand
equation. Both the lagged values o f the log real minimum wage and the fraction
affected (the instrumental variables) are estimated to be positive and are strongly
correlated with the average monthly wage o f covered sector employment, indicating
that the first-stage o f estimation is suitable. In addition, we argue that using the lagged
value o f the minimum measure is theoretically appropriate as it is not determined by
the current labour market conditions. Moreover, the Davidson and MacKinnon tests
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also strongly reject the null hypothesis o f exogeneity, confirming that employment is 
endogenously determined with average wage as predicted (see the lower part o f table 
5.20). The joint significances (the F tests) o f both instruments in the first-stage 
estimation are higher than the rule o f thumb of ten (Staiger and Stock, 1997), indicating 
that they are valid instruments. Specifically, the joint significance o f the first-stage 
estimation is stronger using the one year lag o f the log o f real minimum wage as an 
instrument than using the one year lag o f the fraction affected suggesting that the 
lagged value o f the log o f real minimum wage is a stronger instrument.
Table 5.20 presents the second-stage estimation o f the structural employment demand 
equation. As predicted, the result indicates that the estimated wage elasticity is negative 
and significant. Using both minimum wage measures as an instrument, the wage 
elasticities are higher than one, suggesting that covered sector employment is very 
responsive to a change in the wage rate as the minimum wage increases. This result 
also implies that the employment effect o f minimum wage is stronger than the wage 
effect itself. Specifically, wage elasticities o f labour demand are -1.09 and -1.30 using 
one year lag o f the log o f real minimum wage and the fraction affected as instruments 
respectively. In comparison, Machin et al (2003) found a moderate size o f wage 
elasticity in the United Kingdom low wage sector o f between -0.35 and -0.55, while 
Card (1992a) found an insignificant result suggesting the presence o f monopsony. The 
potential reason that Indonesia has higher wage elasticity o f labour demand is because 
o f the business’ labour expenses are a high proportion o f total costs compared to the 
proportion o f fixed costs o f capital.
141
Table 5.20 Employment Equation using Structural Estimate (Second-stage 
estimation)





Coef P value Coef P value
Ln Real Wages -1.0954 0.000 -1.3028 0.000
Urban -0.6177 0.023 -1.3121 0.000
Youth 0.1079 0.890 -0.2380 0.745
Women -0.5762 0.392 -0.5945 0.444
Industry -0.1779 0.807 -0.3949 0.581
Trade -1.0036 0.140 -0.8105 0.254
Services 2.8741 0.000 1.5240 0.030
Construction 4.3107 0.004 2.0987 0.153
High school 0.1123 0.816 1.1585 0.014
University 3.3257 0.027 9.5215 0.000
Year 1991 0.0776 0.111 -0.4211 0.000
Year 1992 0.1676 0.003 0.1167 0.053
Year 1993 0.3346 0.000 0.1149 0.059
Year 1994 0.3607 0.001 0.2001 0.003
Year 1995 0.4621 0.000 0.0568 0.364
Year 1996 0.6174 0.000 0.2061 0.007
Year 1997 0.7530 0.000 0.0379 0.621
Year 1998 0.5110 0.000 0.1621 0.009
Year 1999 0.5866 0.000 -0.3131 0.001
Year 2000 0.7972 0.000 0.0877 0.142
Year 2001 0.8765 0.000 0.2224 0.001
Year 2002 0.8322 0.000 0.1392 0.067
Year 2003 0.8170 0.000 -0.0293 0.613
Constant 25.1213 0.000 -0.0168 0.699
Observations 364 338
Number of Areas 26 26
Within group R-sq 0.489 0.336
Note: All regressions include province dummies.
Compared to the methods in the previous section, the structural employment demand 
equation provides evidence that the minimum wage affects employment indirectly 
through the wage rate, which is consistent with the standard theory. As mentioned 
above, standard theory suggests that minimum wage affects employment if there is a 
significant effect on the wage paid to the worker. Therefore, we argue that this 
specification is more complete and relevant than the model in the previous section 
using separate reduced form equations in explaining the effect o f minimum wage on 
employment. In addition, this method does not suffer from the endogeneity problem
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and contemporaneous correlation across equations in separate reduced form equation. 
As a result, we argue that the structural employment demand equation is the more 
preferred specification, showing a simple interaction between wage and employment 
equations.
5.6. Conclusions
This chapter analyses the effects o f changes in the minimum wage on wages and 
employment in Indonesia using a provincial panel data set from 1989 to 2003 across 26 
provinces. Compared to the other developing country studies, the minimum wage 
policy in Indonesia provides a unique characteristic as the minimum wage is set 
differently across regions (provinces). Following Lemos (2004d and 2005), this study 
has applied five different measures o f minimum wage using four standard panel data 
estimates, including the simple fixed effect, Panel Corrected Standard Error (PCSE), 
instrumental variable and Dynamic Arellano Bond estimates.
Although the findings vary across different measures and methods, generally they 
support the standard competitive model, suggesting that an increase in the minimum 
wage increases average wages and causes a reduction in covered sector employment. 
Unlike previous studies, the result shows that there is no significant impact o f the 
minimum wage on total paid employment because o f the non-compliance problem in 
Indonesia. This result implies that total paid employment is not a valid measure for the 
employment effect o f minimum wage in Indonesia. Standard competitive market model 
always assumed that the minimum wage compliance is high and this is not the case 
with Indonesia where there is a high proportion o f uncovered sector employment. This 
result suggests the usage o f covered sector employment as a valid measure for the
143
employment effect o f minimum wage in Indonesia. In practice, the coefficients change 
dramatically when paid employment in the covered sector is used as the dependent 
variable.
Table 5.21 the Effects of Minimum Wage across Measures and Estimates













Panel A: Wage Equation
Simple Fixed 0.1656 - 0.2935 -0.1599 -0.9075
Effects (0.00) (0.021) (0.087) (.019)
PCSE 0.1669 - 0.2881 -0.1766 -0.8040
(0.00) (0.009) (0.098) (0.042)
Instrumental 0.2613 - - 0.1648 -4.839
Variable (0.002) (0.522) (0.209)
Dynamic A-B 0.1221 - 0.099 - -
(0.008) (0.071)
Panel B: Employment Equation (Covered Sector)
Simple Fixed -0.4597 -0.8349 -1.0463 -1.3057 -1.0175
Effects (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.081)
PCSE -0.4175 -0.6851 -0.9590 -1.2063 -
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Instrumental - -1.5660 -6.2963 -1.7307 -11.8607
Variable (0.000) (0.251) (0.000) (0.091)
Dynamic A-B -0.3010 -0.6052 - -1.0445 -
(0.016) (0.000) (0.000)
Table 5.21 presents a comparison table summarizing the basic results o f wage and 
employment equations across measures and estimates which were analyzed above. In 
practice, the reduced forms of wage and employment are estimated separately 
(independently) in explaining the effects o f minimum wage on wage and employment. 
Comparing minimum wage measures, the findings suggest that the log o f real 
minimum wage is superior to the other measures. The log o f real minimum wage 
consistently shows a significant impact across different estimates, providing well- 
suited measurement particularly when the minimum wage varies across regions. 
Although the log o f real minimum wage is endogenous in the wage equation, it is 
exogenously determined with employment, providing a “cleaner” measure o f the 
minimum wage effect on employment. Toughness suffers from the endogeneity bias 
because o f its denominator effect (the real average wage), while the degree of impact
measures are endogenously determined with employment because they measure in a 
similar way with employment in the left-hand-side equation, providing a strongly 
simultaneous correlation with employment. Using the log o f real minimum wage, it is 
suggested that an increase o f the minimum wage by 10% increases the average wage of 
paid employment in the covered sector by 1.22%-2.61% and decreases covered sector 
employment by 3.01%-4.17%, depending on the method used.
In comparison across the basic model, the Dynamic Arellano-Bond method tends to 
provide a more efficient result using wage and employment equation as it measures the 
adjustment o f employment to changes in labour demand and supply. In contrast, the 
PCSE and simple fixed effect estimates tend to suffer from the endogeneity problem as 
they assume exogeneity across variables.
In order to check the robustness of the result obtained by changing specification, the 
effect o f the minimum wage on wages and employment is also estimated using 
different specifications, including the Seemingly Unrelated Regression (SUR) and 
structural employment demand equation. SUR is estimated due to the fact that the error 
terms across wage and employment equations are likely to be correlated. However, the 
SUR estimate does not control for the endogeneity problem in the minimum wage 
measures, suggesting that the results are potentially meaningless.
On the other hand, the structural employment demand equation estimate shows in a 
different way that the minimum wage affects employment indirectly through the wage 
rate, showing a simple correlation between wage and employment equations as 
predicted by the standard theory. In practice, this method does not suffer from the
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endogeneity problem and contemporaneous correlation across equations, providing a 
more efficient estimate than separate reduced form equations. As a result, we conclude 
that the structural employment demand equation is the more preferred specification 
compared to the previous estimates using separate reduced form wage and employment 
equations. In addition, although the specification differs from the previous estimate, 
the finding supports the previous evidence using separate reduced form equations that 
the minimum wage is positively associated with average wages and negatively 
associated with employment. The coefficient o f minimum wage is also similar, 
suggesting that the findings are strong across different specifications.
Thus far, this chapter showed that an increase in minimum wage reduces paid 
employment in the covered sector (as part o f the employment in the formal sector). 
This chapter therefore provided a basic analysis o f the impact o f minimum wage on 
wages and employment in Indonesia. A further area o f research revealed by these 
findings is how the minimum wage policy affects employment in the uncovered sector. 
The effect o f minimum wage on employment in the uncovered sector shows a 
displacement effect that might exist as the result o f decreasing paid employment (the 
covered sector). The full effect o f minimum wage on employment in the covered and 
uncovered sectors will be discussed in the next chapter.
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CHAPTER VI
THE EFFECTS OF CHANGES IN MINIMUM WAGE 
ON WAGES AND EMPLOYMENT 
IN THE COVERED AND UNCOVERED SECTORS:
Evidence from Individual Micro-Level Data
6.1. Introduction
The previous chapter analysed the effects o f changes in minimum wage on wages and 
total paid employment specifically in the covered sector using an aggregate provincial 
panel data set. In this chapter, I extend the analysis by examining the effects of 
changes in minimum wage on employment in the covered and uncovered sectors using 
an individual micro level data set. By estimating the effects o f changes in minimum 
wage on employment in both the covered and uncovered sectors, this study provides a 
complete picture o f the impact o f minimum wage on the labour market in Indonesia, 
given a high proportion o f uncovered sector employment in the case o f Indonesia.
Compared to the previous chapter, the individual micro level data used in this chapter 
provides the possibility to explore the impact o f the minimum wage across different 
sectors (or statuses) o f employment among individual workers. However, unlike the 
previous studies using micro level data in developing country cases (see for example 
Fajnzylber, 2001; and Maloney and Nunez, 2001), this study cannot provide a panel of 
individuals due to data unavailability in Indonesia, so, as an alternative, a pooled 
cross-sectional time-series methodology will be employed. The previous developing 
countries study that is relatively close to this study’s methodology is that o f Gindling 
and Terrell (2005 & 2007) on Costa Rica.
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Specifically, this chapter focuses on two main objectives. First, it examines the effects 
o f changes in minimum wage on monthly wage paid to workers in Indonesia. 
Following a similar format to previous studies (see for example Maloney and Nunez, 
2001; and Baanante, 2004), if  we predict that an increase in minimum wage will affect 
employment, it must first have an impact on wage rates. Under the standard 
competitive model, we could expect that a higher minimum wage causes an increase 
in the wage paid to each paid employment, particularly when the minimum wage is 
binding. Similar to Gindling and Terrell (2007), the effect o f minimum wage will also 
be explored across different points o f the wage distribution. We could expect that the 
effect would be different throughout the wage distribution, and a larger effect should 
be expected to appear in the lower deciles (percentiles) o f the distributions, indicating 
that the minimum wage is binding for workers that earn a wage at near the minimum 
wage level.
Second, this chapter explores the effects o f changes in minimum wage on the 
probability o f being employed in the covered and uncovered sectors. The objective of 
this section is to see how the distribution o f workers across different sectors of 
employment changes as a result o f an increase in minimum wage. As predicted by the 
two-sector model, there is a possibility that an increase in minimum wage will 
displace some workers affected by the minimum wage from the covered sector to the 
uncovered sector (see for example Gindling and Terrell, 2007; Arango and Pachon, 
2004; and Baanante, 2004). In addition, as pointed out by Feridhanusetyawan and 
Gaduh (2000), in the case o f Indonesia, without unemployment benefits provided by 
the government, displaced workers from the covered sector are likely to find a job in 
the uncovered sectors rather than become unemployed.
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Relating to the second objective o f this chapter, the labour market is distinguished into 
three main categories based on differential coverage o f the minimum wage policy: (1) 
covered sector employment; (2) uncovered sector employment; and (3) unemployed. 
As an alternative, this study also distinguishes the labour market into four different 
statuses o f employment, including: (1) self-employed; (2) unpaid family workers; (3) 
paid employment; and (4) unemployed. This is important because, in the case of 
Indonesia, the distinction between sectors covered and uncovered by the minimum 
wage policy is defined on the basis o f employment status (Sukatrilaksana, 2002). In 
general, self-employment and unpaid family workers are grouped in uncovered sector 
employment, while paid employment is categorised as covered sector employment. 
However, it is possible to have paid employment in the uncovered sector because 
some workers are still paid below the minimum wage level. Further detail about the 
definition o f the covered and uncovered sectors is presented in the research 
methodology section. In practice, previous studies have only focused on the effect of 
minimum wage on paid employment and self-employment (or formal and informal 
sectors) (see for example Maloney and Nunez, 2001; Baanante, 2004; and Gindling 
and Terrell, 2007), but not on the detail o f each employment status.
The rest o f this chapter is organized as follows. Section 6.2 discusses the previous 
minimum wage studies using individual level data. Section 6.3 explains the research 
methodology that is used in this chapter. Section 6.4 explains the data used in this 
study. Section 6.5 reports the main findings. The final section provides conclusions.
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6.2. Previous Minimum Wage Studies Using Individual Micro-Level 
Data
In this section, the previous empirical studies on the effects o f minimum wage on 
wages and employment using individual micro level data are reviewed separately in 
the case o f developed and developing countries. In general, the main difference 
between the minimum wage in developed and developing countries is that the degree 
o f compliance with the minimum wage policy is higher in developed countries, while 
in developing countries, including Indonesia, the compliance is likely to be low, given 
the lack o f enforcement and the greater proportion o f the informal uncovered sector 
(see Jones, 1997). In Indonesia, more than 20% o f total paid employment is paid 
below the minimum wage level (paid employment in the uncovered sector).
6.2.1. Developed Country Studies
There are large numbers o f empirical studies in developed countries on the impact of
minimum wages using individual micro level data. One o f the earliest influential
studies o f the minimum wage effect is the study o f the “natural experiments”
conducted by Card and Krueger (1994) in the United States. Using data from 410 fast-
food restaurants, Card and Krueger investigated the impact o f an increase in New
Jersey’s minimum wage on New Jersey and Pennsylvania (nearby states) employment
by comparing the employment, wages, and prices at those restaurants before and after
an increase in minimum wage. The methods used in their study included differences-
in-differences and regression-adjusted model. In practice, they employed a New
Jersey dummy variable and the wage gap between the new minimum wage and the
initial wage to measure the minimum wage variable. As a result, contrary to the
standard competitive model, they found that an increase in New Jersey’s minimum
wage raised the employment in the state, supporting the monopsony model. Evidence
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in support o f a monopsony model was also found for California when Card (1992a) 
examined the effect o f the state minimum wage on the young and less skilled workers. 
He found that an increase in the state minimum wage by 10% was associated with an 
increase in the employment-population rate o f 2-6%.
Another influential study in the United States was conducted by Neumark et al (2004). 
Using an individual level panel data set from 1979 to 1997, Neumark et al (2004)
employed the complete specification o f the minimum wage ratio
mw, -m w,
mw t - \
for
each w orkers’ group position in the wage distribution to measure the minimum wage 
effect. Besides investigating the current effect o f the minimum wage, they also 
estimated a lagged effect to examine the workers’ condition one year after an increase 
in minimum wage. As a result, although wages o f low-wage workers increased, they 
found that the employment and hours o f work o f the workers who initially received 
the minimum wage level in the previous year (t-1) declined as the minimum wage 
increased, indicating that the minimum wage was binding for these groups o f worker. 
Compared to the other groups o f worker, these groups were recognized as the most 
affected by an increase in minimum wage.
To compare the evidence in the United States with other developed countries, Abowd 
et al (1997) examined the transition probability among individual’s employment status 
for youth employment in the United States from 1981 to 1987 and France from 1981 
to 1989 using the individual panel data set. In contrast with a decrease in the United 
States real minimum wage, France experienced an increase in the real minimum wage 
during the sample period. Using a comprehensive multinomial logit model, they found
151
that the effect o f a change in the real minimum wage level in those countries was quite 
similar. In the United States, a decrease in the minimum wage by 1% was associated 
with an increase in the probability o f the young men being employed o f 2.2%, while 
an increase in the French minimum wage o f 1 % was associated with a reduction in the 
probability o f the young men being employed o f 2.5%, supporting the standard 
competitive model.
Currie and Fallick (1996) introduced a “wage gap” variable to identify a group of 
youth workers that was directly affected (“bound”) by an increase in the 1979 and 
1980 federal minimum wage in the United States. In this case, the wage gap variable 
is defined as the difference between the individual’s earning in the previous period 
(t-1) and the new minimum wage level (t), given their previous earnings (t-1) are not 
below the old minimum wage level (t-1). As control groups, Currie and Fallick (1996) 
included those individuals with earnings less than the old minimum wage level, those 
individuals with earnings greater than the new minimum wage level, and those 
individuals employed in the uncovered sectors. The dependent variable was a binary 
variable, where employment is equal to 1 if  the individual was employed in both year 
t-1 and year t, otherwise employment is equal to 0. Using both OLS and fixed effects 
estimation, they concluded that workers who were “bound” were about three percent 
less likely to remain employed in the following year as the minimum wage increased 
in 1979 and 1980.
Zavodny (2000) extended Currie and Fallick’s (1996) model by estimating the effect 
o f minimum wage on the change in wage and the probability o f remaining employed. 
Comparing the data used by Currie and Fallick (1996), firstly, Zavodny (2000) used
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CPS sample with greater sample periods (1979-1993). Secondly, individuals were 
classified as the workers affected by the minimum wage based on an increase in the 
real minimum wage rather than the nominal minimum wage. As a result, she found 
that an increase in minimum wage (the larger the wage gap) was more likely to 
increase the average real wage o f the affected workers by US$ 2.31. In addition, using 
probit estimates, she concluded that an increase in minimum wage decreased the 
probability o f remaining employed for the affected youth employment by 2.2%, 
indicating a smaller effect than in Currie and Fallick (1996).
Yuen (2003) examined the effect o f minimum wages on youth employment using 
Canadian individual level panel data from 1988 to 1990. Similar to Currie and 
Fallick’s (1996) method, Yuen (2003) employed a dummy variable o f the individual 
directly affected by an increase in minimum wage as the minimum wage measure. The 
dummy variable is equal to 1 if  the individual earning in the previous period is 
between the old and new minimum wage level (mwjt-i < Wjt-i < mwjt), otherwise the 
dummy variable is equal to 0. As pointed out by Yuen (2003), the advantage o f using 
the individual panel data set is that it makes it possible to investigate the individual 
transition probability from employed status in the previous period to non-employed 
(or employed) status in the following period. His results indicated that an increase in 
minimum wage o f 8.4% was likely to decrease the number o f low wage teenager 
workers by 7% and to decrease the number o f low wage young adults by 10%.
A similar study was conducted by Kawaguchi and Yamada (2007) in Japan. In this 
case, they used Japanese individual level panel data with the fixed effect estimator to 
estimate the impact o f minimum wage on female employment. They concluded that
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low wage female workers affected by an increase in minimum wage were 20 to 30 
percent less likely to be employed in the following year, compared to low wage 
female workers not affected by an increase in minimum wage.
Based on the previous minimum wage studies in developed countries, as discussed 
above, we can see that the empirical results o f the minimum wage effects generally 
can be viewed from two main frameworks, i.e. the standard competitive and the 
monopsony models. In addition, it is interesting to note that, although the minimum 
wage studies are conducted in the same country (for example the United States or the 
United Kingdom), there is no clear consensus about the direction and size o f the 
minimum wage effects, depending on the methodology used and the object o f study. 
This is actually one o f the reasons why the minimum wage studies are still a 
challenging topic in the international literature, both in developed and developing 
countries. The evidence in developing countries is discussed in the next section where 
the minimum wage compliance is likely to be low, given the lack o f enforcement and 
the greater proportion o f the uncovered (informal) sector. In developing countries, 
therefore, the two-sector model might be more relevant rather than the standard 
competitive or monopsony models, showing a more complete analysis o f workers in 
the covered and uncovered sectors.
154
Table 6.1 Summary of Previous Minimum Wage Studies Using Individual Micro 
Level Data in Developed Countries
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Currie & Fallick 
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Z avodny(2000)
OLS and Probit 
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“high impact” areas.
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OLS and Fixed 
Effect
Dummy variable of 
the individual 
directly affected by 
an increase in the 
minimum wage
Low wage female workers affected by an increase in the 
minimum wage were 20 to 30 percentage points less 
likely to be employed in the following year.
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6.2.2. Developing Country Studies
Compared to developed countries, empirical studies on the effect o f minimum wage in 
developing countries are still limited. Most studies on the effects o f changes in 
minimum wage on employment for developing countries generally support the 
standard competitive model in terms o f adverse employment effects, particularly for 
the covered sector. However, as mentioned above, the two-sector (covered and 
uncovered sector) model might be more relevant to explain the effect o f minimum 
wage than the simple single-sector standard competitive model, giving a more 
complete picture o f the evidence in developing countries.
In developing countries, many o f the recent minimum wage studies based on the 
micro level panel data set largely adopted the method developed by Neumark et al 
(2004). Using this method, some studies, including Maloney and Nunez (2001), 
Baanante (2004) and Fajnzylber (2001), made a number o f improvements by 
comparing the evidence in the formal and informal sectors, given a high proportion of 
workers in the informal sector in the case o f Latin American developing countries.
Maloney and Nunez (2001) compared the impact o f changes in minimum wage on 
wage and employment o f salaried workers (covered sector) and the self-employed 
(uncovered sector) throughout the distribution in Colombia using an individual panel 
data set. Unlike Neumark et al (2004), they found that the impact of an increase in 
minimum wage on salaried workers wage is not only significant for the worker groups 
near the minimum wage level but also for wages throughout the distribution, 
indicating a greater “spillover” effect in Colombia. As mentioned in the previous 
chapter, following Card and Krueger (1995), the spillover effect in this case is defined
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as an increase in the wages o f workers who are already paid above the minimum wage 
level before the minimum wage increases. In addition, for the self-employed, unlike 
the salaried workers, the impact is only significant in the wage distribution below the 
minimum wage level. Moreover, they found that an increase in minimum wage raised 
the probability o f becoming unemployed in the following quarter for the salaried 
workers throughout the wage distribution.
Baanante (2004) estimated the effects o f changes in minimum wage on earnings and 
employment throughout the distribution in Peru using a quarterly panel data set. 
Specifically, he compared these effects on workers in the private formal sector, 
workers in the private informal sector, and independent workers. He modified 
Neumark et al’s (2004) model using the interactions o f dummy variable and the 
minimum wage level that identified each individual on their earning distribution in 
Peru. As a result, the impact o f minimum wage on the formal sector earnings was only 
significant on the group o f workers which earns a wage between the old and new 
minimum wage level. On the other hand, similar to Maloney and Nunez (2001), the 
effect o f a change in minimum wage on earnings in the informal sector was only 
significant at the bottom of distribution and not significant on the distribution above. 
In addition, a negative employment effect was also found for the group o f formal 
sector workers which earns a wage between the old and new minimum wage level. 
Compared to Maloney and Nunez (2001), Baanante (2004) confirmed that there was 
no evidence either for minimum wage effects throughout the distribution (because of 
spillover effects) or for strong effects in the informal sector (because o f lighthouse 
effects) using Peruvian data. According to Gindling and Terrell (2005), the lighthouse 
effect is a term used to describe the effects o f minimum wage on the sectors or
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fraction o f workers not covered by the minimum wage policy. In this case, although 
they are not covered by the minimum wage policy (such as informal sector 
employment), they used the minimum wage level as their reference to set their own 
wages.
Following the same method constructed by Neumark et al (2004), Fajnzylber (2001) 
estimated the effects o f change in a minimum wage at different points o f the wage 
distribution for both formal and informal salaried workers and for self-employed 
individuals, using a Brazilian panel data set. In contrast to Baanante (2004), 
Fajnzylber (2001) found that although the minimum wage policy did not cover both 
the informal sector and self-employed, the minimum wage effect tended not only to 
increase the earnings o f the workers in the formal (covered) sector throughout the 
distribution, but also to increase the earnings o f the informal (uncovered) salaried 
workers and self-employed individuals throughout the distribution, indicating a strong 
lighthouse effect. He also found that the largest impact was at the bottom of the 
distribution, and it declined monotonically afterwards, except for self-employed 
individuals. In addition, Fajnzylber (2001) found that an increase in the minimum 
wage was likely to decrease both formal and informal sector employment. The more 
interesting finding was that the negative impact was stronger for informal salaried 
workers and the self-employed. He argued that an increase in minimum wage had 
induced the informal sector workers to move into the formal sector, which is not 
normally found in the literature.
Unlike most o f the previous studies in developing countries discussed above, it is not 
possible in my study to create a panel o f individuals. Some studies that are relatively
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close to the present study’s methodology are Gindling and Terrell (2005 & 2007). 
Gindling and Terrell (2005 & 2007) examined the effect o f in minimum wage using a 
pooled cross-sectional time-series data in Costa Rica where the minimum wage is set 
across industrial and occupational categories. In their first paper, using the log o f real 
minimum wage to measure the minimum wage variable, they tried to test different 
impacts o f changes in the minimum wage on the hourly wage in the covered and 
uncovered sector across urban and rural areas in Costa Rica. Specifically, they 
distinguished the labour market into six categories, including four covered sectors 
(urban formal sector, urban informal small enterprise sector, rural informal large 
enterprise sector, and rural informal small enterprise sector) and two uncovered 
sectors (urban self-employed and rural self-employed). As a result, they found that an 
increase in minimum wage not only affected earnings in the urban formal sector, but 
also the sector where the minimum wage was not effectively enforced, i.e. the rural 
informal sectors. In addition, the effect o f minimum wage was bigger in the rural 
informal sector than in the urban formal sector. According to them, the rural informal 
sector was characterized by more workers near the minimum wage level than in the 
urban formal sector. In addition, they concluded that an increase in the minimum 
wage reduced wage differences between the rural informal sector and urban formal 
sector. Moreover, they found that there was no evidence that an increase in minimum 
wage reduced the earnings o f the self-employed.
In their second paper, Gindling and Terrell (2007) tried to test whether the minimum 
wage affected wage and employment throughout the distribution, using the predicted 
wage across the skill level o f each worker, separately for the covered and uncovered 
sectors. In this case, paid employees are categorized as covered sector employment,
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while self-employed (and unpaid family worker) are defined as uncovered sector 
employment. Regarding wages, they found that an increase in minimum wage in 
Costa Rica raised the hourly wage in the covered sector throughout the distribution; 
and the biggest impact was the hourly wage in the 3rd skill decile with an elasticity of 
0.113. On the other hand, in the uncovered sector, there was no evidence o f a positive 
effect o f minimum wage on the hourly wage. Relating to the employment equation, 
they employed a categorical variable as dependent variable where it is equal to 1 if the 
worker is employed in the covered sectors; otherwise it is equal to 0. Comparing the 
result from Linear Probability Model (LPM)37 and the Probit model, they found that 
an increase in minimum wage o f 10% is likely to decrease the probability o f being 
employed in the covered sector by between 0.4% and 1%. The effect was larger at the 
bottom o f the distribution.
Arango and Pachon (2004) extended the analysis by asking how the effect o f changes 
in minimum wage on the probability o f being employed and hours worked for 
household heads, as well as unemployment, participation rate and the hours worked 
for the non-head members. They employed pooled cross-sectional time-series data of 
the seven largest cities (which is relatively limited in scope compared to my study of 
26 provinces) in Colombia using the ratio o f the minimum wage to median income as 
the minimum wage measure from 1984 to 2001. This measure is a proxy to capture 
the minimum wage effects, due to the evidence that the single (national) minimum 
wage exists across individuals in Colombia. In general, their result supported the 
standard competitive model that an increase in minimum wage was likely to decrease
37 T he L in ear P ro b ab ility  M odel (L P M ) w as no t m uch  used  in the recen t literatu re, due to  the 
lim ita tion  th a t th e ir p red ic ted  p ro b ab ility  w ill p o ss ib ly  lay ou tside  the lim its o f  0 and 1. In add ition , 
the estim a te  is ineffic ien t b ecause  o f  a po ten tial he tero sced astic ity  p rob lem . T herefo re , m ost o f  the 
e co n o m etrics  literatu re  does not recom m end  use o f  LPM  w hen the  d ep en d en t variab le  is b inary  (see 
for ex am ples G reene, 2000  and G ujarati, 1999).
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the probability o f being employed and the number o f hours worked for all household 
members. Specifically, the effect was larger for women, young people and less 
educated workers.
Although my study’s methodology is relatively close to the methods o f Gindling and 
Terrell (2005 & 2007), there are a number o f improvements to their methodology as 
this study’s contribution to the developing economies literature. Firstly, using the 
multinomial logit model makes it possible to observe the more complete effect o f the 
minimum wage on several categories o f employment in both the covered and 
uncovered sectors by the minimum wage, including paid employment, self-employed, 
unpaid family worker and the unemployed. Compared to my study, Gindling and 
Terrell (2007) only employed two different categories o f employment in their 
employment equation; i.e. paid employees (covered sector) and uncovered sector, 
using probit model. Therefore, my study provides a more complete and specific result 
relating to the effects o f changes in minimum wage on several categories of 
employment in the covered and uncovered sectors.
Secondly, this study treats those effects separately in terms o f the labour market in 
urban and rural areas, as well as in terms o f the male and female labour market, which 
is not considered in Gindling and Terrell (2007). It is generally assumed that the 
minimum wage policy implementation is less effective in rural areas than in urban 
areas, given the dominance o f the traditional agriculture sector. In addition, male and 
female workers are treated separately because they have different labour market 
characteristics. In practice, males are likely to work as either paid employed or self- 
employed, while in contrast there is a high proportion o f females as unpaid family
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workers because o f their domestic responsibilities that require more flexible working 
hours (see further details in table 6.3).
Table 6.2 Summary of Previous Minimum Wage Studies Using Individual 
Micro Level Data in Developing Countries
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6.3. Research Methodology
In order to estimate the effects o f changes in minimum wage on wages and 
employment, two different equations (i.e. wage and employment equations) are 
specified using the pooled cross-sectional time-series data o f the Indonesian Labour 
Force Survey over the period 1996-2003. In general, this study modifies the 
methodology used by Gindling and Terrell (2005 & 2007) for Costa Rica.
Wage equation:
Relating to the first function, this study estimates the effects o f changes in minimum 
wage on the individual’s monthly wage from 1996 to 2003 using OLS. Unlike 
Gindling and Terrell (2005), this study focuses only on wage rates o f paid employees, 
particularly in the covered sector, since the Indonesian Labour Force Survey does not 
cover the self-employed earnings data in the uncovered sector (especially before 
2002). Specifically, the wage equation used in this study has the following form:
IriWirt = ao + aj In MWrt + (3 Xitr + y/ URrt + Ji + v, + eit (6.1)
The dependent variable, W, is the log o f the real monthly wage o f the individual in 
region r and year t. The monthly wage is used in order to make it comparable with the 
minimum wage variable which is set based on monthly terms (not hourly terms). As 
mentioned in the previous chapter, the Indonesian Labour Force Survey (Sakernas) 
also reports the wage data in the monthly terms (not hourly terms). The main focus of 
the explanatory variable in the equation is the log o f real monthly regional minimum 
wage, MW, which applies to each individual in the region r and year t. In general, the 
regional minimum wage used in this study is the provincial minimum wage, except
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some provinces, particularly Java, which have implemented the more complex 
municipality and city minimum wages since the decentralization era. Several 
individual characteristics (.X) used as control variables in this study are as follows:
• age and age squared,
• a set o f highest education completed (did not finish primary school or were 
never in school is the reference group),
•  a set o f sectoral activities o f individual job (the agriculture sector is the 
reference group),
• a set o f family background variables, including head o f household (not head of 
household is the reference group) and number o f children in the household (no 
children is the reference group).
• a set o f marital status (singles are the reference group).
In addition, the unemployment rate (UR) for each province correlated with the 
individual in the survey is included as a control variable to indicate the business cycle 
effect in the labour market. Furthermore, the variables yr and v, are included to control 
for specific provinces and yearly effects respectively. Following Gindling and Terrell 
(2007), the yearly dummy variables are useful to control for the potential endogenous 
changes in the yearly minimum wage which is not covered by the model, such as 
cyclical macro shocks. Relating to the endogeneity problem, as pointed out by Rama 
(2001), the main consideration used to set the minimum wage level in each region, i.e. 
minimum basic living need index (KHM) is mainly exogenous. According to Rama 
(2001), the consumption packages used to measure the KHM can be traded easily 
across regions, so we can argue that the minimum wage is exogenous to the regional 
labour market conditions. In addition, the inclusion o f the complete provincial dummy
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variables will reduce the potential bias from unmeasured province-specific economic 
conditions.
Extending this wage equation, this chapter estimates the effect o f the minimum wage 
on the wage throughout the distribution. To create that effect, this study adopts the 
methodology firstly suggested by Koenker and Bassett (1977) using a quantile 
regression. Unlike OLS where the estimates are obtained by minimising a sum of 
square residuals, the quantile regression estimates are obtained by minimising a sum 
o f absolute residuals (Koenker and Hallock, 2001). Specifically, as pointed out by 
Buchinsky (1998) and Birch and Miller (2006), a quantile regression can be specified 
in general form as follows:
yi = Xi fie + ee; Quante (yt \ x t)  = x,- fa  (6.2)
where Quante (y, | x ,-)  indicates the conditional quantile o f y t and the conditional on the 
vector o f the explanatory variables (x,). As pointed out by Buchinsky (1998), the 
quantile regression estimator (J5) is derived from the following minimisation problem:
mm (6.3)
where <9th, which is 0«9<1, denotes the sample quantile for /?
Compared to the OLS, the quantile regression, firstly, provides a more complete 
characterization o f the regression allowing the entire conditional distribution o f a 
wage equation to be estimated (see Buchincky, 1998, and Koenker and Hallock, 
2001). In contrast, the OLS is estimated based on the conditional mean only. Relating 
to this chapter’s objective, the quantile regression allows the minimum wage effect to 
differ across different points o f the wage distribution. This is important because the
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wage effect at distinct quantiles (percentiles) might be different in response to a 
change in the minimum wage. In practice, a larger effect should be obtained in the 
lowest part o f the distributions, indicating that the minimum wage is binding for the 
workers who earn a wage near the minimum wage level. Secondly, as pointed out by 
Buchinsky (1998), in the case where the error term is not distributed normally, 
quantile regression might provide more efficient estimates than OLS. Kernel density 
estimates will be reported in the empirical results section to illustrate the wage 
distribution among paid employment in both urban and rural areas.
Similar to Machin and Manning (1994), the wage effect is estimated at every tenth 
percentile on the wage distribution. Specifically, the wage equation using quantile 
regression in this study will be estimated as follows:
lnWirt = a e + a e In MWrt + p e X itr + y/e URrt +e yt + ev t + eit (6.4)
where #= 0.1 , 0 .2 , ....... 0.9 is the quantile being estimated (at every tenth percentile on
the wage distribution), while the independent variables follow the previous 
specification.
In addition, similar to Gindling and Terrell (2005), the effects o f minimum wage on 
the individual’s monthly wage will be analysed for the urban and rural labour markets 
separately. This is important because the urban and rural areas have a different range 
o f compliance in the minimum wage policy. Although the minimum wage policy 
legally covers all o f the paid employment in all areas and sectors o f employment 
without exception, the implementation is not actually effective in the rural areas with
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the dominance o f the agriculture sector. In addition, this study also separately analyses 
male and female workers, due to the fact that males and females have different labour 
market characteristics.
Employment Equation:
In the second equation, this study examines the effects o f changes in minimum wage 
on employment using a multinomial logit model estimated by a maximum likelihood 
method. The advantage o f this model is that it makes it possible to distinguish the 
effect o f the minimum wage across several categories o f employment. Thus we can 
see how the worker distribution across different employment categories changes as a 
result o f an increase in minimum wage.
Specifically, the labour market, firstly, is divided into three different employment 
categories (labour market status) based on the minimum wage coverage, represented
by j-
y = 0: uncovered sector employment; 
y = l :  covered sector employment;
7  = 2: unemployed.
Individuals who are out o f the labour force, including individuals with their primary 
activity as a student, a housewife, and those with major activity “other” (unclear 
category) are excluded from the sample, assuming that they are not willing to work. 
According to the standard two-sector model, we might expect that an increase in the 
minimum wage is more likely to decrease the probability o f being employed in the
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covered sector, while those people who lose their jobs will be displaced into the 
uncovered sector in the absence o f unemployment benefits. In general, the uncovered 
sectors are composed o f self-employed and unpaid family workers, while the covered 
sector employment is paid employment (based on the Indonesian CBS definition). 
However, as mentioned in the previous chapter, there is an incomplete coverage 
because o f low compliance and lack o f enforcement by the government, indicating 
that not all paid employment is covered by the minimum wage policy. In order to 
obtain a valid measure o f covered sector employment, paid employees who are paid 
below the minimum wage level in this study will be considered as uncovered sector 
employment, although all paid employment is actually legally covered by the 
minimum wage policy. Therefore, in this study, uncovered sector employment 
includes self-employed, unpaid family workers and paid employment that is paid 
below the minimum wage level (not covered by the minimum wage policy), while the 
covered sector employment is defined as paid employment that is paid at or above the
38minimum wage level (covered by the minimum wage policy) .
These categories are still consistent with the standard practice in developing countries 
studies. Arango and Pachon (2004) defined salaried workers as covered sector 
employment, while self-employed is categorized as uncovered sector employment for 
Colombia. Fajnzylber (2001) classified registered workers as covered sector 
employment, while the uncovered sector is composed o f self-employed and 
unregistered workers for Brazil. On the other hand, Gindling and Terrell (2007)
38 In general, covered sector employment is also defined as formal sector employment and uncovered 
sector employment is defined as informal sector employment, (see Gindling and Ten ell, 2005). 
However, the Indonesian government does not clearly define the difference between the formal and 
informal sectors, particularly for paid employment that is paid below the minimum wage level (paid 
employment in the uncovered sector). In order to avoid the ambiguity of definition, covered-uncovered 
sector is used in this chapter instead of formal-informal sector referring to a distinction on the basis of 
minimum wage coverage.
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classified self-employed (plus unpaid family workers) as uncovered sector 
employment, while paid employees are defined as covered sector employment for 
Costa Rica. A previous study on the impact o f the Indonesian minimum wage on 
employment in the informal sector has also defined informal (uncovered) sector 
employment as non-wage employment; including self-employed and unpaid family 
workers (see Bird and Manning, 2002).
In order to obtain a complete picture o f the Indonesian labour force, unemployed is 
also included as the third category. In line with the ILO standard definition, 
unemployed is simply defined as people who do not have a job and who are actively 
looking for a job, including discouraged workers who are still willing to work.
To obtain a more specific result o f the labour displacement effect o f minimum wage, 
as an alternative, this study estimates the employment equation using four different 
employment categories on the basis o f labour market statuses:
y = 0: self-employed; 
y = l: unpaid family worker;
7  = 2: paid employment;
7  = 3: unemployed.
According to the Indonesian Central Bureau o f Statistics definition, self-employed is 
defined as own-account workers employed in their own enterprises with or without 
assistance from their household members/temporary workers, while unpaid family 
worker is defined as those people who worked on their family-owned business or farm
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without any wage for their work. Moreover, as mentioned above, paid employment is 
the category o f employment legally covered by the minimum wage policy. However, 
the effect o f minimum wage on this category o f employment should be interpreted 
carefully due to the fact that there is a high proportion o f paid employment that is paid 
below the minimum wage level (paid employment in the uncovered sector). In this 
case, we do not separate paid employment in the covered sector from paid 
employment in the uncovered sector in order to see the full effect o f minimum wage 
on the paid employment category.
In order to observe further about the effects o f minimum wage on the probability of 
being paid employed in the covered and uncovered sectors, following the idea o f 
M oretti and Perloff (2000), the paid employment category will also be sub-classified 
into two specific categories: (1) paid employment that is paid at or above the 
minimum wage level (paid employment in the covered sector), and (2) paid 
employment that is paid below the minimum wage level (paid employment in the 
uncovered sector). As a result, five different employment categories are specified:
y = 0: self-employed;
7  = 1: unpaid family worker;
7  = 2: paid employment in the uncovered sector 
7  = 3: paid employment in the covered sector 
7  = 4: unemployed.
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Specifically, a general expression for the conditional probabilities o f each labour 
market status categories in the multinomial logit model, for example in the four labour 
market status model, is as follows:
pgiW
P r ( Y = / |x ) = - i -------  (6.5)
e gk(x) 
k=0
where dependent variable, Y, refers to the employment categories, j ; and x is a set o f 
the independent variables (covariates) as follows:
• log o f real provincial minimum wage;
• a set o f age group (>=50 years old is the reference group),
• a set o f marital status (singles are the reference group),
• a set o f highest education completed (not finished primary school yet or never
been in school is the reference group),
• a set o f provincial dummy variables (West Java is the reference group),
• a set o f year dummy variables (1996 is the reference group).
Following the same format as the wage equation, the multinomial logit estimates will 
be analyzed separately in the urban and rural areas labour markets, as well as the male 
and female labour markets. In order to interpret the analysis, this study reports the 
marginal effects o f each coefficient due to the fact that the interpretation o f the raw 
regression is not directly informative and not comparable within different categories. 
Relating to the employment equation used in this study, the marginal effects provide 
information o f the change in probabilities o f each selected employment categories 
(compared to the base category). Therefore, specifically, an increase in minimum 
wage (and also the change in the other covariates) might increase the probability of 
one selected employment category and might decrease the probability o f the other
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selected employment categories, providing a zero value o f total probabilities across all 
selected categories.
In order to check the robustness o f the selected employment categories used in the 
multinomial logit model, firstly, the Wald test for pooling states over the multinomial 
logit estimate will be reported (see Long and Freese, 2006). This Wald test examines 
whether the selected employment categories used above are behaviourally different, 
and therefore cannot be combined (or pooled). If the result rejects combining o f the 
selected employment categories, it would imply that the selected employment 
categories used above has significantly different slope coefficients, indicating that the 
selected employment categories are robust. On the other hand, if  the result accepts 
combining o f the selected employment categories, therefore the selected categories 
might be pooled as a single outcome because the covariates across the selected 
categories are correlated.
Secondly, the Small and Hsiao test will be undertaken to test the Independence of 
Irrelevant Alternatives (IIA) assumption underlying the multinomial logit estimate. In 
general, IIA assumes that the selected categories are independent o f each other (see 
Long and Freese, 2006). Therefore, adding one new alternative category or deleting 
one o f the selected categories will not affect the proportion o f individuals choosing the 
categories. If  the IIA assumption is rejected, it means that the selected categories are 
not independent, implying that the multinomial logit estimate is inappropriate. Both 
the Wald and Small and Hsiao tests results will be discussed in the empirical results 
section before the analysis.
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6.4. Data
The individual level data set used in this study mostly originates from the Indonesian 
Labour Force Survey (the so-called Sakemas). As mentioned in the previous chapter, 
this survey provides a rich source o f the cross-sectional labour force data conducted 
annually since 1986 by the Indonesian Statistical Office (BPS), covering about
160,000 respondents (about 0.1% of population) each year. In this study, the effects of 
changes in minimum wage on the individual’s wage and employment will be 
estimated using a pooled cross-sectional time-series methodology due to the fact that 
the Indonesian Labour Force Survey data is not an individual panel. In this case, the 
wage and employment equations estimated in this study use survey data from 1996 to 
2003.
In order to assess the impact o f changes in minimum wage on employment, the 
sample consists o f individuals (aged>15) who held one o f the primary activities as 
follows: self-employed, unpaid family worker, paid employment and unemployed. 
Individuals with their primary activity as a student, a housewife (or a house-husband), 
and those with major activity “other” are excluded from the sample. In addition, 
discouraged workers who are not willing to work are also excluded from the sample in 
order to obtain a valid measure o f labour force. Table 6.3 presents cross-tabulation of 
employment classification in our sample across urban-rural locations, as well as across 
male-female labour markets.
173
Table 6.3 Employment Status by Gender and Location (Pooled Data 1996-2003)
Urban Areas Rural Areas
Male Female Total Male Female Total
Self-Employed (%) 36.04 30.51 33.98 60.10 33.07 49.34
Unpaid Family Worker (%) 4.1 17.17 8.97 11.03 45.71 24.83
Paid Employment (%) 51.32 40.00 47.1 25.19 15.45 21.31
Unemployed (%): 8.54 12.31 9.94 3.68 5.78 4.51
Observations (N) 175245 104027 279272 286185 189199 475384
Source: Calculated from Sakernas
As presented in table 6.3, paid employees dominate both male and female urban 
employment. As pointed out by Irawan et al (2000), a large proportion o f paid 
employment in urban areas (47.1%) indicates that urban areas have more advanced 
development achieved than rural areas. The highest proportion o f paid employment in 
urban areas is employed in the manufacturing sector, accounting for more than 30% of 
total paid employment. On the other hand, in rural areas, a large proportion o f self- 
employed and unpaid family worker (49.3% and 24.8% respectively) indicates limited 
jobs in the modern sector. Most o f them (68% o f total self-employed and 85% of total 
unpaid family workers) worked as farmers in the agricultural sector, given the 
dominance o f traditional agriculture and rural activities in rural areas. In addition, 
when comparing by gender, it is seen that unpaid family workers are dominated by 
female employment both in urban and rural areas, while self-employed is dominated 
by male employment particularly in rural areas with the proportion o f 60.1 %.
Moreover, the minimum wage data are the provincial (or regional) monthly minimum
wage level obtained from the Department o f Manpower and the BPS publication. The
provincial consumer price index (CPI) data used to transform the minimum wage and
the average wage variable in real terms was obtained from the BPS publication. In this
case, the CPI data o f each province is a proxy from CPI o f each provincial capital.
Although this is not really applicable particularly for rural areas, the CPI o f provincial
174
capital is the closest data that is available to measure the price index in those areas. 
The summary statistics o f the individual’s characteristics used in this study are 
presented in table 6.4.
Table 6.4 Sample Means (Pooled Data 1996-2003)
Urban Rural
Male Female Total Male Female Total
Marital Status:
Married 0.706 0.570 0.656 0.748 0.705 0.731
Separated
Education:
0.022 0.118 0.058 0.029 0.132 0.070
Primary 0.249 0.260 0.253 0.426 0.397 0.415
Junior H.S. 0.195 0.161 0.182 0.167 0.115 0.146
Senior H.S. 0.352 0.301 0.333 0.122 0.083 0.107
Academy 0.022 0.025 0.023 0.004 0.003 0.004
University 
Age:
0.057 0.051 0.054 0.008 0.005 0.007
age15-24 0.196 0.260 0.220 0.212 0.214 0.213
age25-34 0.297 0.284 0.292 0.250 0.254 0.252
age35-50 0.343 0.308 0.33 0.326 0.333 0.329
Lreal minimum wage 11.108 11.102 11.107 11.034 11.011 11.030
Real wage * 175,639 145,773 168,774 134,528 125,380 133,005
Lreal wage * 11.888 11.727 11.851 11.673 11.521 11.647
Sector of Activities:*
Mining 0.022 0.003 0.018 0.030 0.005 0.026
Industry 0.235 0.311 0.252 0.206 0.313 0.224
Electricity 0.010 0.003 0.009 0.005 0.001 0.004
Construction 0.133 0.020 0.107 0.212 0.032 0.182
Trade 0.129 0.186 0.142 0.052 0.071 0.055
Transportation 0.093 0.022 0.077 0.082 0.009 0.070
Finance 0.028 0.040 0.031 0.009 0.013 0.010
Services 0.311 0.398 0.331 0.230 0.379 0.255
Source: Calculated from Sakemas and BPS publication 
Note: * = is only used in the wage equation
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6.5. Empirical Results
In order to see the full effects o f changes in minimum wages, following the same 
format as Gindling and Terrell (2007), this section firstly discusses the effect of 
minimum wage on wage before exploring this effect on employment. As pointed out 
by Burkhauser et al (2000), we should expect that an increase in minimum wage will 
affect employment only if  it has significant effect on the wage rates. In other words, 
the effect o f minimum wage on the wage is a necessary condition for the employment 
effect o f minimum wage.
6.5.1 The Effects of Changes in Minimum Wage on Individual’s Monthly Wage
Before discussing the results, it is necessary to see the kernel density estimates for the 
wage distribution among paid employment in both urban and rural areas. In this case, 
the shape o f wage distribution can be used to assess whether the minimum wage has 
been effectively enforced in Indonesia. If the minimum wage is effectively enforced, 
we might expect that there is a spike (a cluster) in the wage distribution which is 
relatively close to the minimum wage level, indicating that the minimum wage is 
binding for most workers. On the other hand, if  the minimum wage is not effectively 
enforced, the wage distribution is relatively smooth or the spike is relatively far from 
the minimum wage level, indicating that the minimum wage is not binding for most 
workers.
Figure 6.1 presents the kernel density estimate for the impact o f minimum wage on 
wage distribution among paid employment in urban areas using individual pooled data 
from 1996 to 2003. The y-axis illustrates the density, while the x-axis measures the 
ratio o f real wage to the real minimum wage for each paid employee. The vertical line
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(ratio equal to 1) therefore indicates how binding the minimum wage level. If the 
minimum wage is binding, we might expect to see a spike around the vertical line. As 
presented in figure 6.1, there is a significant spike around the vertical line for both 
males and females paid employment in urban areas. In comparison, the kernel density 
estimate suggests that female workers are more affected by the minimum wage (as 
indicated by the higher density around the vertical line) than male workers. The main 
reason is because women generally earned less than men. As pointed out by Gindling 
and Terrell (2005), the larger wage effect is likely to be found in the category o f  
employment with lower average wage. In addition, there is a cluster found below the 
minimum wage level (on the left side o f the vertical line) for female paid employment, 
suggesting that there is a significant number o f female workers still paid below the 
minimum wage level.
Figure 6.1 The Impact of Minimum Wage on Wage Distribution among Urban 









Notes: Calculated from Sakemas
The vertical line (ratio equal to 1) represents the minimum wage 
An Epanechnicov kernel is used for kernel density with bandwith 0.01.
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As pointed out by Firmana (1996), there are at least two reasons why wom en’s wages 
are generally lower than m en’s wages in Indonesia. First, women tend to have lower 
education levels than men, particularly in rural areas. Second, a high percentage of 
women are employed at lower level o f working processes which tend to be low paid, 
such as farm workers in rural areas and production workers in the textile, garment, and 
footwear industries in urban areas. However, the wage differences are relatively 
narrow in the sectors which require more skill and higher levels o f education, such as 
transportation, construction, and financial sectors (Dhanani and Islam, 2004). As 
pointed out by Dhanani and Islam (2004), in 2000, the female to male earnings ratio 
o f workers in the financial sector was 86%, while it was only 56% in the agriculture 
sector.
Figure 6.2 The Impact of Minimum Wage on Wage Distribution among Rural 







Notes: Calculated from Sakemas
The vertical line (ratio equal to 1) represents the minimum wage 
An Epanechnicov kernel is used for kernel density with bandwith 0.01.
Turning to rural areas, figure 6.2 indicates that paid employment in rural areas is not
greatly affected by the minimum wage. The kernel density estimate reveals that a high
proportion o f paid employment in rural areas is paid below the minimum wage level
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(on the left side of the vertical line) for both males and females. In practice, the 
minimum wage policy is not effectively enforced in rural areas because of the 
dominance of the traditional agriculture sector.
There are several reasons why the minimum wage policy is not effective in the 
agriculture sector (and generally in rural areas). Firstly, as pointed out by Suryahadi et 
al (2003), the enforcement from government is still limited to large and medium 
enterprises mostly found in urban areas and in non-agriculture activities. Rooney and 
Anggriani (2006) reported from their survey in Serang District that some small and 
medium enterprises were unaware about the minimum wage regulation as there was 
no enforcement from local government. On the other hand, for large enterprises, 
control from the local government officers for the minimum wage compliance is 
usually carried out by regular inspection and monitoring every six months, although it 
remains highly selective (randomly) to some enterprises potentially because of limited 
labour inspectors (Rooney and Anggriani, 2006).
Secondly, in some areas, there is limited access to information, particularly when the 
minimum wage changes, due to the limitations of physical infrastructure, 
transportation and socio-economic welfare. If the information is obtained, there is 
usually a time lag between the releasing of the new minimum wage and the receiving 
of the information (Suryahadi et al, 2003). This situation is relatively different with 
the urban areas, where the information is generally received soon after the publishing 
of the new minimum wage regulation; and labour unions also actively play an 
important role in informing the new minimum wage regulation. Thirdly, the level of 
education of workers in agriculture sector is generally lower than that of non­
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agriculture workers. Most of the less educated workers might not be aware of the 
existence of the minimum wage. In practice, it will make compliance more difficult to 
implement in rural areas.
Turning to the empirical results, the effect of minimum wage on actual wage of paid 
employment in the covered sector is estimated using pooled cross-sectional time- 
series data. The dependent variable is the monthly wage paid to each individual 
worker, while the key explanatory variable is the log of real monthly minimum wage. 
This study focuses on the wage of covered sector employees because the self- 
employed (uncovered sector) earnings data is only available from 2002 in the 
Indonesian Labour Force Survey. Paid employees who are paid below the minimum 
wage level are also excluded from the sample to obtain suitable results of the 
minimum wage effects on the wage rates of workers in the covered sector.
Table 6.5 presents a set of results for the wage equation for male and female workers 
in both urban and rural areas. Most of the control variables in the wage equation are 
significant as expected. The results generally suggest that the monthly wage will 
increase as age increases, particularly for younger groups of workers, indicating that 
an increase in earnings is associated with an increase in working experience. 
However, this effect declines among the older groups of workers, as showed by the 
negative effect of age-squared, suggesting an inverted U-shaped (quadratic) 
relationship. The turning point is found at 53 years old for males in urban and rural
39areas and at 47 years old for females in rural areas .
39 The turning point is calculated as the age coefficient divided by (2 x age-squared coefficient).
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In terms of sector of activity, most of the coefficients are positive and significant 
(except the trade sector in urban areas). This result means that wages in the agriculture 
sector (the reference group) are generally lower than non-agricultural sectors of 
activity. This is not surprising since most workers in the agriculture sector are less 
skilled and less educated when compared to those in the non-agricultural sector. In 
other words, individuals employed in the sectors which require more skill and higher 
levels of education, such as the mining and financial sectors, receive the highest 
earnings, particularly in urban areas. In urban areas, for example, male workers 
employed in the mining sector are paid about 43% higher on average than male 
workers employed in the agriculture sector.
In addition, as expected, educational attainment plays an important role on the 
individual’s wage. As we can see in table 6.5, the wages of individuals with a higher 
education qualification increase monotonically. In other words, the effect of 
educational qualifications on the individual’s monthly wage is stronger for those with 
a higher level of education. In urban areas, a university graduate receives 83%-93% 
higher wage compared to those who did not finish primary school (the reference 
group), ceteris paribus. In general, the effect is stronger in urban areas, indicating that 
education is more inferior in rural areas than in urban areas in both quality and 
quantity aspects at all levels of education. Lanjouw et al (2001) reported that although 
the quantity of education has improved in Indonesia, particularly because of a rapid 
growth in schooling opportunities with the nine-year compulsory basic education 
scheme induced by the government, high disparities among urban-rural areas and 
across regions remain exist. In Bengkulu and South Sumatra (outside Java), for 
examples, more than 20% of youths aged 15-17 were not enrolled in school, while in
rural Java, less than 10% of youths aged 15-17 were not enrolled in school (Lanjouw 
et al, 2001).
Table 6.5 Wage Equation in Urban and Rural Areas for Male and Female Workers
Urban Areas Rural Areas
Male Female Male Female
Variables Coef. P value Coef. P value Coef. P value Coef. P value
Log real MW 0.3658 0.000 0.4398 0.000 0.4019 0.000 0.4685 0.000
Age 0.0316 0.000 0.0147 0.000 0.0211 0.000 0.0186 0.000
Age squared -0.0003 0.000 0.0001 0.819 -0.0002 0.000 -0.0002 0.002
Unemployment 0.0508 0.738 -0.5332 0.056 -0.5732 0.003 0.4871 0.374
Married 0.0544 0.000 0.0827 0.000 0.0546 0.000 0.0178 0.327
Separated -0.0514 0.002 -0.0457 0.003 -0.0493 0.008 -0.0465 0.097
Head of HH 0.0827 0.000 0.0582 0.000 0.0394 0.000 -0.0309 0.202
1 child -0.0130 0.002 -0.0075 0.316 -0.0022 0.671 -0.0272 0.045
>=2 children -0.0050 0.291 0.0100 0.262 0.0132 0.019 -0.0209 0.191
Sector
Mining 0.4324 0.000 0.7771 0.000 0.2137 0.000 0.3706 0.000
Industry 0.0069 0.479 0.3456 0.000 0.0764 0.000 0.2778 0.000
Electricity 0.2436 0.000 0.6723 0.000 0.2654 0.000 0.4180 0.019
Construction 0.0063 0.531 0.4463 0.000 0.1082 0.000 0.4037 0.000
Trade -0.0504 0.000 0.3097 0.000 0.0437 0.000 0.2574 0.000
Transportation 0.0983 0.000 0.4953 0.000 0.2073 0.000 0.5236 0.000
Finance 0.2261 0.000 0.6132 0.000 0.1681 0.000 0.4610 0.000
Services 0.0770 0.000 0.4672 0.000 0.2531 0.000 0.5179 0.000
Education
Primary sc. 0.0972 0.000 0.3022 0.000 0.0939 0.000 0.1888 0.000
Junior high sc. 0.2013 0.000 0.4397 0.000 0.1774 0.000 0.2971 0.000
Senior high sc. 0.3922 0.000 0.6073 0.000 0.3302 0.000 0.4686 0.000
Academy 0.7066 0.000 0.8344 0.000 -0.0473 0.004 -0.0180 0.589
University 0.8346 0.000 0.9342 0.000 0.6302 0.000 0.6402 0.000
Year
1997 0.0634 0.000 0.0529 0.000 0.0293 0.000 0.0167 0.392
1998 -0.1156 0.000 -0.1042 0.000 -0.0894 0.000 -0.0664 0.014
1999 -0.1339 0.000 -0.0723 0.000 -0.1133 0.000 -0.0822 0.009
2000 -0.0150 0.088 0.0146 0.343 0.0073 0.476 0.0587 0.035
2001 0.1027 0.000 0.1528 0.000 0.0645 0.000 0.1629 0.000
2002 0.0674 0.000 0.0835 0.000 0.0647 0.000 0.0779 0.008
2003 0.0501 0.000 0.0852 0.000 0.0388 0.000 0.0762 0.016
Constant 6.5693 0.000 5.4294 0.000 6.4140 0.000 5.2109 0.000
Observations 58929 17591 35203 7029
R-sq 0.47 0.5 0.419 0.477
Note: Dependent variable is measured as the log o f real individual’s monthly wage. All regressions include province 
dummies. Estimated by Ordinary Least Square.
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The coefficient on log of real minimum wage is estimated to be positive and 
significant for both men and women in urban and rural areas. The most important 
finding is that the coefficient of the log of real minimum wage for the female labour 
market is slightly higher than for the male labour market in both urban and rural areas. 
In urban areas, for example, an increase in minimum wage by 10%, on average, 
increases females’ real monthly wage by 4.4%, while it will only increase males’ real 
monthly wage by 3.7%. This is actually one indication that the minimum wage is 
more binding for female workers than male workers because women generally tend to 
be paid less than men.
Moreover, as presented in column 3 and 4 of table 6.5, the effect of minimum wage on 
monthly wage in rural areas where the minimum wage is not effectively enforced is 
also positive and significant. The coefficients of real minimum wage in the rural areas 
are 0.40 for men and 0.47 for women, suggesting that an increase in minimum wage 
by 10% will lead to an increase in the real monthly wage by 4% for male workers and 
by 4.7% for female workers respectively, ceteris paribus. It is interesting to note that 
the coefficients are somewhat higher than the minimum wage coefficient in urban 
areas because workers in rural areas typically have lower average wage than workers 
in urban areas. In addition, the significant minimum wage effects in rural areas also 
suggest the potential for a “lighthouse” effect as exists in Indonesia, where the rural 
formal sectors possibly set their wages based on the condition of the urban formal 
sector wages. As pointed out by Rice (2004), there is a tendency that an increase in the 
income growth in urban formal areas has a greater impact to the people living in rural 
areas, particularly in the case of Java. A relatively good transportation infrastructure 
between urban and rural areas makes it possible for people living in rural areas to
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commute to work in the urban modern sector (Rice, 2004). However, it is not the case 
outside Java where the transportation infrastructure is relatively weak.
Extending the wage equation, this section examines the effect of minimum wage at 
different parts of the wage distributions using quantile regression firstly constructed 
by Koenker and Bassett (1977). The important aim of using quantile regression is to 
compare the effect of the minimum wage at one part of the wage distribution with 
another, such as the bottom with the top of the distribution. If the minimum wage 
policy is effective then we should find a stronger effect at the bottom level of the 
distribution, indicating that the minimum wage is effective in helping the lowest part 
of the distribution.
As presented in table 6.6, the effects of minimum wage on individual’s monthly wage 
in the covered sector are positive and significant throughout the distribution across 
male and female workers, representing the extensive spillover effects. As might be 
expected, the effect of minimum wage is strongest at the bottom of the distribution 
and declines monotonically afterwards, except for female employment at the upper 
levels of the distribution. In urban areas, an increase in the minimum wage affects the 
monthly wage at the 1st decile (0.693 for males and 0.802 for females) almost three 
times more than at the 9th decile (0.267 for males and 0.369 for females). As pointed 
out by Machin and Manning (1994), if the effect is strongest at the bottom level of the 
distribution, there is a tendency for the minimum wage to compress the wage 
distribution. The interesting finding is that the effects of the minimum wage on the 
individual’s monthly wage in the rural areas (see column 3 and 4 of table 6.6) are also 
positive and significant throughout the wage distribution, again representing a
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potential “lighthouse” effect. As described above, this lighthouse effect indicates that 
the wages in the rural formal sector are based on the condition of the urban formal 
sector wage. Therefore, although the minimum wage is not effectively enforced in 
rural areas compared to urban areas, the minimum wage will also potentially have 
implications for the employment consequences in rural areas. This is actually one of 
the reasons why it is interesting to compare the effects of minimum wage between 
urban and rural areas.
Table 6.6 Wage Equation by Deciles in Urban and Rural Areas by Gender
Urban Areas Rural Areas
Male Female Male Female
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Decile Coef. P value Coef. P value Coef. P value Coef. P value
1 0.693 0.000 0.802 0.000 0.712 0.000 0.760 0.000
2 0.532 0.000 0.690 0.000 0.582 0.000 0.580 0.000
3 0.432 0.000 0.551 0.000 0.470 0.000 0.481 0.000
4 0.366 0.000 0.479 0.000 0.434 0.000 0.413 0.000
5 0.313 0.000 0.447 0.000 0.409 0.000 0.404 0.000
6 0.284 0.000 0.399 0.000 0.349 0.000 0.391 0.000
7 0.276 0.000 0.353 0.000 0.308 0.000 0.399 0.000
8 0.275 0.000 0.360 0.000 0.264 0.000 0.413 0.000
9 0.267 0.000 0.369 0.000 0.233 0.000 0.474 0.000
Note: Dependent variable is measured as the log o f real individual's monthly wage. All regressions include the
independent variables described in wage equation.
Estimated by Quantile Regression.
In general, the effect of minimum wage on the female wage is stronger throughout the 
distribution than on the male wage. This is actually one indication that female 
employment is more affected by an increase in the minimum wage, suggesting that 
minimum wage might potentially lead to a larger displacement effect from covered 
sector to uncovered sector for women. Moreover, the effects of minimum wage on 
wage rates in rural areas are somewhat higher than in urban areas in some deciles. One
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potential reason is that workers in rural areas generally earn less than workers in urban 
areas.
Compared with studies of other developing countries using individual micro-level data 
sets, the findings are relatively close to those for Brazil and Costa Rica. Fajnzylber 
(2001) found that there are positive effects of the minimum wage on the wage across 
the whole of distributions, indicating an extensive “spillover” effect in Brazil. The 
effect is not only to increase the earnings of workers in the formal (covered) sector, 
but also to increase the earnings of the informal (uncovered) salaried workers and self- 
employed individuals, where the minimum wage is not legally enforced. Similar to my 
findings, the effect on the formal salaried worker is greater for women than for men, 
indicating that the potential displacement effect is stronger for women than for men. 
However, one difference with my study is that Fajnzylber (2001) did not estimate 
separately for urban and rural areas. Similarly to Fajnzylber (2001), Lemos (2004d) 
found that there are positive effects of the minimum wage on the wage throughout the 
distribution in Brazil using panel data method, both in formal and informal sectors. 
The effect is stronger at the bottom of the distribution in the formal sector, but at a 
higher level of the distribution in the informal sector.
On the other hand, Gindling and Terrell (2005) estimated the minimum wage effect on 
the wage rates separately for urban and rural areas. They found that an increase in 
minimum wage in Costa Rica is likely to increase the wages of workers, both in the 
urban and rural formal sectors. In this case, they argued that the largest impact is 
found in the rural informal small enterprise sector, where more workers earn a wage
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near the minimum wage level. Unlike Costa Rica, as mentioned above, the Indonesian 
minimum wage in practice is not effectively enforced in rural areas.
In summary, the full results relating to the effect of the minimum wage on the 
individual’s monthly wage suggest that the minimum wage increases the wage of 
individuals throughout the wage distributions in both urban and rural areas. As a 
result, it is suggested that an increase in minimum wage by 10% will increase 
individual’s monthly wage by 2.67%-8.02% in urban areas and by 2.33%-7.6% in 
rural areas throughout the distribution. This study reveals that the strongest effect is 
found for the individuals at the bottom of the distribution, indicating that the minimum 
wage has improved the standard of living of the workers at the bottom of the 
distribution. Because we have found that there are strong wage effects of the 
minimum wage, particularly at the bottom level of the distribution, there remains a 
concern that the minimum wage potentially affects the employment levels of workers 
in the covered sector.
However, it is important to note that this estimate only focuses on the wages of paid 
employees who are paid at or above the minimum wage level (covered sector 
employment). Using all paid employment data (including paid employment in the 
uncovered sector), the previous chapter found that the effect of minimum wage on the 
wage is not strongest at the bottom of the wage distribution, suggesting that the 
minimum wage is not effective in helping workers in the lowest part of the 
distribution, particularly for paid employment in the uncovered sector.
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6.5.2. The Effect of Minimum Wage on Employment
The effect of minimum wages on employment using the multinomial logit estimate is 
discussed in this section. This study firstly examines the effect of the minimum wage 
on three main categories of employment based on the minimum wage coverage: (1) 
uncovered sector employment, (2) covered sector employment, and (3) unemployed. 
As an alternative, the employment equation will also be estimated across different 
categories of employment based on the employment status: (1) self-employed, (2) 
unpaid family worker, (3) paid employment, and (4) unemployed. Similarly to the 
wage equation, those effects will be estimated separately in urban and rural labour 
markets, as well as male and female labour markets.
6.5.2.1. Three Categories of Labour Market Status 
Diagnostic Tests
Firstly, the effect of the minimum wage on employment is estimated across three 
different employment (labour market status) categories based on the minimum wage 
coverage, including: (1) uncovered sector employment, (2) covered sector 
employment, and (3) unemployed. Before discussing the results, it is necessary to 
check the robustness of the selected employment categories used in this multinomial 
logit estimate using diagnostic tests. The Wald test results for pooling states over the 
multinomial logit estimate are presented in table 6.7. The results are reported 
separately across different combinations of employment categories for male and 
female workers in urban and rural areas. As presented in table 6.7, using all 
combinations of employment categories, we can reject the null hypothesis that the 
selected employment categories can be combined (or pooled). These results imply that 
the selected employment categories used in this section are behaviourally different.
Therefore, we can conclude that the multinomial logit estimate across three different 
categories used in this study is robust.
Table 6.7 Wald Tests for Pooling Employment Categories
C a teg o ries T ested U rban A reas R u ral A reas
M ale F em ale M ale F em ale
















Uncovered Sector & U nem ployed 10608.47
(0 .00)






Notes: Chi-squared test at 45 degree o f freedom, p-value in parentheses.
H0: All coefficients except intercepts associated with a given pair o f categories are 0 (categories can be 
combined).
In addition, the multinomial logit estimate assumes the Independence of Irrelevant 
Alternatives (IIA) between the selected categories (Long and Freese, 2006). As 
mentioned before, IIA implies that the proportion of individuals choosing the selected 
categories will not change when one alternative category is omitted (or added). The 
Small-Hsiao tests for the Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives over the multinomial 
logit estimate using three different employment categories are reported in table 6.8. As 
presented in table 6.8, in all cases, we can accept the null hypothesis suggesting that 
the IIA assumption holds. By implication, the selected categories used in this section 
are independent of each other.
Table 6.8 Small-Hsiao Tests for the Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives
C a teg o ries O m itted U rban A reas R ural A reas
M ale F em ale M ale F em ale
























Notes: Chi-squared test at 46 degree of freedom, p-value in parentheses.
H0: Odds (Outcome-J vs Outcome-K) do not depend on other alternatives
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Urban Areas
Tables 6.9 and 6.10 present the results for males and females separately. As presented 
in tables 6.9 and 6.10, most of the covariates have significant marginal effects. 
Comparing ages, youth employment (age 15-24) has the greatest risk of being 
unemployed relative to older workers. The reason is that youth employment is 
composed of young people who enter the labour market for the first time without any 
job experience. Another reason is that youth ages are the transition period from full­
time education to full-time work, suggesting slightly longer duration of job search 
(Dhanani, 2004). Interestingly, the marginal effect for male youths is relatively lower 
than the marginal effect for female youths due to the fact that male youths are more 
likely to be absorbed in covered sector employment rather than to become 
unemployed. Moreover, in the covered sector, the marginal effects of all the age 
groups are positive and significant compared to the reference group (age>50). This 
result means that younger workers (age=<50) are more likely to work in the covered 
sector, while older workers (age>50) are more likely to have a job in the uncovered 
sector.
In terms of education, there is a significant ranking of workers’ educational 
attainment, particularly in the covered sector. This result means that those people with 
a higher education qualification are more likely than those with lower educational 
qualifications, to be employed in the covered sector. This effect is reflected by an 
increase in marginal effect, for female workers, from 0.070 for primary school 
graduates to 0.390 for university graduates, while for men, the marginal effect 
increases from 0.093 for primary school graduates to 0.3j 6 for university graduates
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relative to the reference group. In contrast, those people with lower educational 
qualifications are more likely to be employed in the uncovered sector.
Table 6.9 Employment Equation in Urban Areas, Males
(3 employment categories)
Uncovered Sector Covered Sector Unemployed
M.E. P value M.E. P value M.E. P value
Lrealmw 0.1540 0.000 -0.1408 0.000 -0.0132 0.026
Married 0.0424 0.000 0.0277 0.000 -0.0700 0.000
Separated 0.0823 0.000 -0.0501 0.000 -0.0321 0.000
Primary -0.0863 0.000 0.0938 0.000 -0.0076 0.041
Junior H.S. -0.1729 0.000 0.1707 0.000 0.0022 0.561
Senior H.S. -0.3060 0.000 0.2660 0.000 0.0400 0.000
Academy -0.3595 0.000 0.3389 0.000 0.0206 0.001
University -0.3759 0.000 0.3390 0.000 0.0369 0.000
age15-24 -0.1161 0.000 0.0844 0.000 0.0317 0.000
age25-34 -0.1111 0.000 0.1236 0.000 -0.0125 0.002
age35-50 -0.0898 0.000 0.1152 0.000 -0.0254 0.000
Head of HH 0.0247 0.000 0.0619 0.000 -0.0866 0.000
1 child -0.0031 0.346 0.0082 0.012 -0.0051 0.005
>=2 children 0.0115 0.002 -0.0054 0.139 -0.0061 0.004
year97 -0.0033 0.473 0.0066 0.140 -0.0034 0.186
year98 0.0596 0.000 -0.0728 0.000 0.0132 0.000
year99 0.0590 0.000 -0.0860 0.000 0.0270 0.000
year2000 0.0216 0.000 -0.0452 0.000 0.0236 0.000
year2001 -0.0320 0.000 0.0205 0.000 0.0114 0.000
year2002 -0.0277 0.000 0.0025 0.567 0.0252 0.000
year2003 -0.0257 0.000 0.0005 0.902 0.0251 0.000
Note: All regressions include province dummies. Estimated by Multinomial Logit. 
Number o f obs = 175245 
Wald chi2(84) = 22434.11 
Prob > chi2 = 0 
Pseudo R2 = 0.1389
The most interesting finding in relation to educational attainment is that there is 
greater probability of being unemployed for both senior high school and university 
graduates (for women, marginal effects are 0.049 and 0.044, while for men, marginal 
effects are 0.040 and 0.037) relative to lower educational qualifications. These results 
support Feridhanusetyawan and Gaduh’s (2000) analysis that without social benefits, 
only people who have higher family income (usually with a high educational level)
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might remain unemployed in search of better-paid jobs. On the other hand, people 
who have lower family income (usually with a lower education level) could not afford 
to be unemployed for a long time and try to find another job in the uncovered sector.
Table 6.10 Employment Equation in Urban Areas, Females
(3 employment categories)
Uncovered Sector Covered Sector Unemployed
M.E. P value M.E. P value M.E. P value
Lrealmw 0.1495 0.000 -0.1366 0.000 -0.0129 0.166
Married 0.1271 0.000 -0.0273 0.000 -0.0998 0.000
Separated 0.0526 0.000 -0.0471 0.000 -0.0055 0.369
Primary -0.0569 0.000 0.0699 0.000 -0.0131 0.019
Junior H.S. -0.1488 0.000 0.1523 0.000 -0.0035 0.543
Senior H.S. -0.3143 0.000 0.2650 0.000 0.0493 0.000
Academy -0.4270 0.000 0.4303 0.000 -0.0033 0.649
University -0.4341 0.000 0.3899 0.000 0.0443 0.000
age15-24 -0.2571 0.000 0.0546 0.000 0.2025 0.000
age25-34 -0.1703 0.000 0.0527 0.000 0.1176 0.000
age35-50 -0.0720 0.000 0.0495 0.000 0.0225 0.012
Head of HH 0.0006 0.931 0.0755 0.000 -0.0761 0.000
1 child 0.0182 0.000 -0.0182 0.000 -0.0001 0.982
>=2 children 0.0349 0.000 -0.0333 0.000 -0.0016 0.628
year97 -0.0234 0.000 0.0290 0.000 -0.0056 0.146
year98 0.0163 0.014 -0.0225 0.000 0.0062 0.240
year99 0.0127 0.070 -0.0434 0.000 0.0307 0.000
year2000 -0.0246 0.000 -0.0036 0.557 0.0282 0.000
year2001 -0.0743 0.000 0.0466 0.000 0.0277 0.000
year2002 -0.0807 0.000 0.0363 0.000 0.0444 0.000
year2003 -0.0971 0.000 0.0491 0.000 0.0480 0.000
Note: All regressions include province dummies. Estimated by Multinomial Logit. 
Number o f obs = 104027 
Wald chi2(86) = 17817.83 
Prob > chi2 = 0 
Pseudo R2 = 0.204
Regarding family characteristics, heads of household are most likely to work in the 
covered sector (marginal effects are 0.062 for males and 0.076 for females). In 
contrast, they are least likely to be unemployed (marginal effects are -0.087 for males 
and -0.076 for females). Males with children in their households are more likely to 
work either in the covered or uncovered sectors, suggesting that they are less likely to
192
remain unemployed. On the other hand, females with children are more likely to work 
in the uncovered sector and less likely to work in the covered sector. The potential 
reason is because of their commitment to their household responsibilities that requires 
more flexible working hours.
As presented in tables 6.9 and 6.10, in general we can see that an increase in minimum 
wage reduces the probability of being employed in the covered sector and increases 
the probability of being employed in the uncovered sector. Specifically, the coefficient 
of log of real minimum wage for male workers in the covered sector is negative with a 
marginal effect o f -0.141 (see table 6.9), suggesting that an increase in minimum wage 
leads to a decline in the probability of men being employed in the covered sector. On 
the other hand, the coefficient of log of real minimum wage in the uncovered sector is 
positive with a marginal effect of 0.154, indicating that there is a potential 
displacement effect from the covered sector to the uncovered sector as the minimum 
wage increases. Similar to males, an increase in minimum wage decreases the 
probability of women being employed in the covered sector (marginal effect is -0.137) 
and increases the probability of women being employed in the uncovered sector 
(marginal effect is 0.150).
Interestingly, the log of real minimum wage is negatively associated with the 
probability of men being unemployed. This result shows that an increase in minimum 
wage reduces the probability of men being unemployed with a marginal effect of - 
0.013. Although the marginal effect is relatively small (-0.013), the result indicates 
that an increase in minimum wage has induced individuals who are unemployed 
(including discouraged workers) to work, particularly in the uncovered sector, for an
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additional family income because of some job losses in the covered sector. In contrast, 
the impact of minimum wage on the probability of women being unemployed is not 
significant. The full results suggest that without unemployment benefits, workers 
affected by an increase in minimum wage are less likely to remain unemployed, while 
others are more likely to find a job in the uncovered informal sectors (as self- 
employed or unpaid family workers).
Rural Areas
In order to provide a more complete picture of the Indonesian labour market, this 
section discusses the effect of minimum wage on employment in rural areas. Based on 
the Minister of Manpower Regulation No. 01/1999, the minimum wage legally covers 
all paid employment without exception, including workers employed in rural areas. 
However, in practice, the minimum wage implementation is not really effective in 
rural areas due to the dominance of the traditional agriculture sector. This evidence is 
revealed by a high proportion of workers in rural areas who earn a wage below the 
minimum wage level (see figure 6.2 above).
The high percentage of workers who earn a wage below the minimum wage level
suggests that workers in rural areas are not greatly affected by the minimum wage
policy. This condition is in line with Moretti and Perloff s (2000) study on the effect
of the minimum wage on agriculture sector employment in the United States. As
pointed out by Moretti and Perloff (2000), although the agriculture sector is legally
covered by the Federal minimum wage, compliance is relatively low because of lack
of enforcement by the government. Compared to urban areas, therefore, we might
expect to find a smaller employment effect (or even no employment effect), given that
the minimum wage is less binding to workers employed in ruial areas. In contrast,
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Gindling and Terrell (2005) found that the largest minimum wage impact in Costa 
Rica is found in the rural informal small enterprise sector because more workers earn 
a wage near the minimum wage level, indicating that minimum wage is more binding 
for them. Unlike Indonesia, Gindling and Terrell (2005) argued that the Costa Rican 
minimum wage is effectively enforced in both urban and rural areas.
Table 6.11 Employment Equation in Rural Areas, Males
(3 employment categories)
Uncovered Sector Covered Sector Unemployment
M.E. P value M.E. P value M.E. P value
Lrealmw 0.0902 0.000 -0.0793 0.000 -0.0109 0.000
Married 0.0186 0.000 0.0170 0.000 -0.0356 0.000
Separated 0.0246 0.000 -0.0125 0.029 -0.0121 0.000
Primary -0.0402 0.000 0.0424 0.000 -0.0022 0.103
Junior H.S. -0.1056 0.000 0.0950 0.000 0.0106 0.000
Senior H.S. -0.2421 0.000 0.1971 0.000 0.0450 0.000
Academy -0.4242 0.000 0.3778 0.000 0.0464 0.000
University -0.4045 0.000 0.3372 0.000 0.0673 0.000
age15-24 -0.1319 0.000 0.1000 0.000 0.0318 0.000
age25-34 -0.1237 0.000 0.1112 0.000 0.0125 0.000
age35-50 -0.0964 0.000 0.0948 0.000 0.0017 0.561
Head of HH 0.0226 0.000 0.0110 0.000 -0.0336 0.000
1 child -0.0077 0.000 0.0070 0.000 0.0007 0.390
>= 2 children -0.0025 0.244 0.0047 0.018 -0.0022 0.030
Year97 -0.0131 0.000 0.0150 0.000 -0.0020 0.135
Year98 0.0210 0.000 -0.0235 0.000 0.0025 0.154
Year99 0.0221 0.000 -0.0349 0.000 0.0127 0.000
Year2000 0.0028 0.406 -0.0230 0.000 0.0202 0.000
Year2001 -0.0271 0.000 0.0090 0.003 0.0181 0.000
Year2002 -0.0328 0.000 0.0077 0.002 0.0251 0.000
Year2003 -0.0233 0.000 -0.0025 0.307 0.0258 0.000
Note: All regressions include province dummies. Estimated by Multinomial Logit. 
Number o f obs = 286185 
Wald chi2(86) = 26929.56 
Prob > chi2 = 0 
Pseudo R2 = 0.1459
Following a similar format to the previous section, the impact of minimum wage on
employment in rural areas is analysed across three different employment (labour
market status) categories based on the minimum wage coverage. The results are
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presented in tables 6.11 and 6.12 for males and females separately. The covariates 
show a relatively similar direction to the urban area’s findings. In terms of education, 
a higher education level leads to an increase in the probability of being employed in 
the rural covered sector. Similar to urban areas, the marginal effects for university and 
academy graduates are much higher, relative to the lowest education qualifications. 
Relating to the age groups, younger workers (age=<50) are more likely to work in the 
covered sectors. The marginal effects are relatively smaller for female workers. Heads 
of household are more likely to work in either covered or uncovered sectors, but they 
are less likely to be unemployed. Males with children in their household are more 
likely to work in the covered sector, while in contrast females with children in their 
household are less likely to work in the covered sector.
For males, an increase in minimum wage leads to a decrease in the probability of 
being employed in the covered sector (marginal effect is -0.08), an increase in the 
probability of being employed in the uncovered sector (marginal effect is 0.09), and a 
decrease in the probability of being unemployed (marginal effect is -0.01). Compared 
to urban areas, the marginal effects are much smaller, indicating that the minimum 
wage is less binding in rural areas than predicted. These results confirm that workers 
in rural areas are less affected by the minimum wage policy.
In contrast, an increase in minimum wage decreases the probability of women being
employed in the covered sector (marginal effect is -0.04) and increases the probability
of women being employed in the uncovered sector (marginal effect is 0.04). The
marginal effects for female workers are smaller than those for male workers indicating
that the minimum wage is less likely to affect female workers in rural areas. In practice,
most rural female workers are employed in the agriculture sector, where generally the
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minimum wage is not binding for them. According to Dhanani and Islam (2004), they 
are generally assigned in simple weeding and harvesting operations in the agriculture 
sector with tasks demanding less skill and which tend to be low paid. The incidence of 
poverty, actually, is the main reason for females in rural areas participating in the labour 
force, although with relatively low earnings, indicating the need for an additional family 
income.
Table 6.12 Employment Equation in Rural Areas, Females
(3 employment categories)
Uncovered Sector Covered Sector Unemployment
M.E. P value M.E. P value M.E. P value
Lrealmw 0.0442 0.000 -0.0423 0.000 -0.0019 0.682
Married 0.0994 0.000 -0.0193 0.000 -0.0801 0.000
Separated 0.0202 0.000 -0.0083 0.002 -0.0119 0.000
Primary -0.0203 0.000 0.0152 0.000 0.0051 0.005
Junior H.S. -0.0740 0.000 0.0498 0.000 0.0242 0.000
Senior H.S. -0.2329 0.000 0.1579 0.000 0.0750 0.000
Academy -0.4327 0.000 0.3888 0.000 0.0439 0.000
University -0.3900 0.000 0.2959 0.000 0.0941 0.000
age 15-24 -0.1312 0.000 0.0244 0.000 0.1068 0.000
age25-34 -0.0758 0.000 0.0165 0.000 0.0593 0.000
age35-50 -0.0398 0.000 0.0221 0.000 0.0176 0.000
Head of HH 0.0188 0.000 0.0215 0.000 -0.0403 0.000
1 child 0.0029 0.080 -0.0014 0.272 -0.0016 0.221
>=2 children 0.0043 0.024 -0.0038 0.008 -0.0006 0.708
Year97 -0.0095 0.000 0.0115 0.000 -0.0020 0.311
Year98 0.0002 0.940 -0.0029 0.216 0.0026 0.312
Year99 -0.0256 0.000 -0.0037 0.120 0.0293 0.000
Year2000 -0.0294 0.000 0.0033 0.181 0.0262 0.000
Year2001 -0.0628 0.000 0.0253 0.000 0.0375 0.000
Year2002 -0.0624 0.000 0.0207 0.000 0.0417 0.000
Year2003 -0.0620 0.000 0.0159 0.000 0.0461 0.000
Note: All regressions include province dummies. Estimated by Multinomial Logit. 
Number o f obs = 189199 
Wald chi2(86) = 21780.6 
Prob > chi2 = 0 
Pseudo R2 = 0.231
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6.5.2.2 Four Categories of Labour Market Status
In this section, extending the analysis, the labour market is distinguished into four 
different categories of employment based on their employment status: (1) self 
employed, (2) unpaid family worker, (3) paid employment and (4) unemployed. As 
pointed out by Sukatrilaksana (2002), the minimum wage coverage in Indonesia refers 
to a difference based on their status of employment. Compared to the previous 
specification using three categories of employment, self-employed and unpaid family 
workers are categorised as uncovered sector employment, while paid employment is 
the category of employment legally covered by the minimum wage policy (covered 
sector employment). Although in practice it is possible to have paid employment in 
the uncovered sector (i.e. paid below the minimum wage level), in this section, we do 
not separate paid employment in the covered sector (paid at or above the minimum 
wage level) from paid employment in the uncovered sector (paid below the minimum 
wage level) in order to see the full effect of minimum wage on the paid employment 
category. In order to obtain more specific results, as an additional point, paid 
employment will also be sub-divided in the next section into two specific categories 
relating to minimum wage coverage: i.e. paid employment in the covered sector and 
paid employment in the uncovered sector.
Diagnostic Tests
Before discussing the results, following the same format as the previous section, the 
Wald test for pooling states over the multinomial logit estimate and the Small-Hsiao 
test for the Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives (IIA) assumption are reported in 
this section. Firstly, the Wald test results obtained using four employment categories 
are presented in table 6.13. Using four different employment categories, the chi-square
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statistics tend to be lower than the previous section using three employment 
categories. However, all combinations significantly reject pooling of any of the 
selected employment categories, implying that the selected employment categories 
used in this section are behaviourally different.
Table 6.13 Wald Tests for Pooling Employment Categories
C a tegories T ested U rban A reas R u ral A reas
M ale F em ale M ale F em ale
















































Notes: Chi-squared test at 45 degree of freedom, p-value in parentheses.
H0: All coefficients except intercepts associated with a given pair of categories are 0 (categories can be 
combined)
It is important to note that four different employment categories used in this section 
are based on their status of employment, while three different employment categories 
used in the previous section are based on the minimum wage coverage (covered or 
uncovered sectors). Therefore, although the selected combinations in the four different 
employment categories significantly reject pooling of any of the selected employment 
categories, it does not mean that the multinomial logit estimate using three different 
employment categories in the previous section is inappropriate. In other words, three 
employment categories discussed in the previous section are not an actual pool of four 
employment categories tested in this section. In three different employment 
categories, for example, paid employment category can be included in covered sector 
employment category (if they are paid at or above the minimum wage level) or 
uncovered sector employment category (if they are paid below the minimum wage 
level). In addition, this comparison result between three and four employment
categories is also useful in order to compare the effects of minimum wage on general 
and specific specifications of employment.
Moreover, table 6.14 reports the Small-Hsiao tests for the Independence of Irrelevant 
Alternatives (IIA) assumption between the selected employment categories. As we 
can see in table 6.14, although the IIA assumption is violated in some cases, 
particularly for female workers in urban areas, we can accept the null hypothesis in 
most cases, suggesting that the selected categories used in this section are independent 
of each other. Therefore, we argue that the multinomial logit estimate using four 
different categories is robust.
Table 6.14 Small-Hsiao Tests or the Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives
C ateg o ries O m itted U rban A reas R ural A reas
M ale F em ale M ale F em ale
































Notes: Chi-squared test at 46 degree of freedom, p-value in parentheses.
H0: Odds (Outcome-J vs Outcome-K) do not depend on other alternatives
Urban Areas
This section discusses the multinomial logit estimate for employment equation in 
urban areas using four different employment categories based on their employment 
status. The results for men and women are presented in tables 6.15 and 6.16 below. In 
terms of education level, in line with the previous section using three different 
categories of employment, we can see that an improvement in educational attaimnent 
leads to an increase in the probability of being paid employed. In this case, the 
marginal effect for university graduates is 0.31 for both male and female workers, 
suggesting that the university graduates are 31% more likely to be in paid employment 
relative to individuals who did not finish primary school or were never in school (the
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reference group). In contrast, the negative coefficients of educational qualifications for 
both self-employed and unpaid family worker categories suggest that the less educated 
workers are more likely to be absorbed in these employment categories as a part of 
employment in the uncovered sector.




Worker Paid Employment Unemployed
M.E. P value M.E. P value M.E. P value M.E. P value
Lrealmw 0.0220 0.036 0.0071 0.163 -0.0169 0.139 -0.0122 0.041
Married 0.1049 0.000 -0.0142 0.000 -0.0195 0.001 -0.0712 0.000
Separated 0.1257 0.000 -0.0157 0.000 -0.0788 0.000 -0.0311 0.000
Primary -0.0463 0.000 -0.0061 0.002 0.0581 0.000 -0.0057 0.135
Junior H.S. -0.1088 0.000 -0.0061 0.002 0.1086 0.000 0.0063 0.113
Senior H.S. -0.2532 0.000 -0.0217 0.000 0.2320 0.000 0.0429 0.000
Academy -0.3098 0.000 -0.0310 0.000 0.3135 0.000 0.0274 0.000
University -0.3214 0.000 -0.0300 0.000 0.3074 0.000 0.0440 0.000
age 15-24 -0.1482 0.000 -0.0244 0.000 0.1405 0.000 0.0321 0.000
age25-34 -0.0770 0.000 -0.0349 0.000 0.1256 0.000 -0.0136 0.001
age35-50 -0.0677 0.000 -0.0298 0.000 0.1238 0.000 -0.0263 0.000
Head of HH 0.1053 0.000 -0.0863 0.000 0.0658 0.000 -0.0847 0.000
1 child -0.0153 0.000 -0.0002 0.875 0.0206 0.000 -0.0051 0.004
>=2 children -0.0019 0.577 -0.0020 0.196 0.0100 0.009 -0.0061 0.004
year97 0.0014 0.738 0.0054 0.008 -0.0031 0.502 -0.0037 0.143
year98 0.0247 0.000 0.0125 0.000 -0.0505 0.000 0.0133 0.000
year99 0.0263 0.000 0.0095 0.002 -0.0631 0.000 0.0274 0.000
year2000 0.0348 0.000 0.0122 0.000 -0.0698 0.000 0.0228 0.000
year2001 0.0015 0.772 0.0080 0.002 -0.0199 0.000 0.0104 0.001
year2002 0.0074 0.068 -0.0003 0.895 -0.0318 0.000 0.0246 0.000
year2003 0.0170 0.000 0.0009 0.653 -0.0422 0.000 0.0243 0.000
Note: All regressions include province dummies. Estimated by Multinomial Logit. 
Number o f obs = 175245 
Wald chi2( 135)= 31250.78 
Prob > chi2 = 0 
Pseudo R2 = 0.1776
Classified by age groups, older workers (age >50) are more likely, relative to the other 
groups, to be self-employed and less likely to be paid employed. On the other hand, 
younger workers (age=<50) are more likely to be in paid employment. In addition, in
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line with the previous finding, youths (aged 15-24) are more likely to become 
unemployed than the other groups with the marginal effects of 0.032 and 0.19 for men 
and women respectively. As mentioned above, youth employment is dominated by 
young people who enter the labour market for the first time without any job 
experience.
Relating to family characteristics, heads of household are more likely to be either self- 
employed or paid employed because of their responsibilities to gain income for their 
households. In addition, men with one child in their household are more likely to be 
paid employed and less likely to be self-employed or unemployed, compared to men 
without children in their household. In contrast, women with children in their 
household are more likely to be self-employed and less likely to be paid employed. In 
line with this evidence, married women are more likely to be either self-employed or 
unpaid family worker, but less likely to be in paid employment.
As presented in tables 6.15, there is no significant impact of minimum wage on the 
probability of men being paid employed in urban areas, while in the previous section, 
using three employment categories, we can see that an increase in minimum wage 
significantly decreases the probability of men being employed in the urban covered 
sector. This evidence indicates that, for male workers, there is a shift from the paid 
employment category in the covered sector to the paid employment category in the 
uncovered sector as the minimum wage increases. In contrast, as presented in table 
6.16, an increase in minimum wage decreases the probability of women being paid 
employed in urban areas (marginal effect is -0.029), indicating that an increase in the 
minimum wage is more likely to affect females’ paid employment rather than males’ 
paid employment.
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Worker Paid Employment Unemployed
M.E. P value M.E. P value M.E. P value M.E. P value
Lrealmw -0.0038 0.781 0.0319 0.009 -0.0287 0.048 0.0006 0.947
Married 0.1667 0.000 0.0638 0.000 -0.1285 0.000 -0.1020 0.000
Separated 0.1483 0.000 -0.0728 0.000 -0.0708 0.000 -0.0047 0.431
Primary 0.0123 0.003 0.0025 0.537 -0.0147 0.019 0.0000 0.996
Junior H.S. -0.0021 0.676 0.0033 0.463 -0.0223 0.001 0.0210 0.001
Senior H.S. -0.1360 0.000 -0.0822 0.000 0.1490 0.000 0.0691 0.000
Academy -0.2698 0.000 -0.1538 0.000 0.3789 0.000 0.0448 0.000
University -0.2655 0.000 -0.1408 0.000 0.3062 0.000 0.1001 0.000
age15-24 -0.2401 0.000 -0.0600 0.000 0.1103 0.000 0.1899 0.000
age25-34 -0.1106 0.000 -0.0723 0.000 0.0795 0.000 0.1035 0.000
age35-50 -0.0460 0.000 -0.0552 0.000 0.0894 0.000 0.0119 0.173
Head of HH 0.2020 0.000 -0.1724 0.000 0.0440 0.000 -0.0736 0.000
1 child 0.0092 0.011 -0.0079 0.013 -0.0011 0.784 -0.0001 0.967
>=2 children 0.0146 0.001 -0.0034 0.360 -0.0091 0.059 -0.0022 0.500
year97 -0.0139 0.004 0.0208 0.000 -0.0011 0.844 -0.0058 0.129
year98 -0.0233 0.000 0.0406 0.000 -0.0270 0.000 0.0097 0.070
year99 -0.0167 0.018 0.0336 0.000 -0.0525 0.000 0.0356 0.000
year2000 -0.0468 0.000 0.0559 0.000 -0.0380 0.000 0.0288 0.000
year2001 -0.0462 0.000 0.0396 0.000 -0.0199 0.003 0.0265 0.000
year2002 -0.0616 0.000 0.0329 0.000 -0.0140 0.012 0.0426 0.000
year2003 -0.0628 0.000 0.0430 0.000 -0.0250 0.000 0.0449 0.000
Note: All regressions include province dummies. Estimated by Multinomial Logit. 
Number o f obs = 104027 
Wald chi2( 135) = 21053.08 
Prob > chi2 = 0 
Pseudo R2 = 0.189
Another important finding is the fact that an increase in the minimum wage raises the 
probability of being self-employed for men (marginal effect is 0.022). In contrast, 
women show a different story where an increase in the minimum wage increases the 
probability of being unpaid family worker (marginal effect is 0.032). This pattern 
might also reflect limited the self-employment opportunities for female workers, as 
many occupations in self-employment category are dominated by men, such as street 
traders or taxi drivers. In addition, as pointed out by Rice (2004), Indonesian law, such 
as the marriage law, makes it more difficult for women to operate a new business as a
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self-employee, due to the fact that the new business registration and access to credit 
and bank loans should be under the husband’s name. In contrast, traditionally, the 
unpaid family workers are mostly dominated by female workers for whom the barriers 
to entry are relatively low. According to Singh et al (2004), females are more likely to 
be unpaid family workers, compared to males, because of their home-based locations 
and flexible working hours related to female domestic tasks.
In addition, the effect of minimum wage on the probability of being unemployed is 
negative for male workers (marginal effect is -0.012), while it is not significant for 
female workers. The results are consistent with Gindling and Terrell’s (2007) finding 
that workers who lose their jobs in the covered sector (i.e. paid employment) are less 
likely to remain unemployed, and more likely to find a job in the uncovered sector.
In general, the finding is relatively consistent with the previous section using three 
employment categories. In the previous section, the employment categories are 
distinguished based on the minimum wage coverage, suggesting that an increase in 
minimum wage decreases the probability of being employed in the covered sector and 
increases the probability of being employed in the uncovered sector. In this section, 
the employment categories are distinguished based on their employment status (using 
four employment categories), showing that an increase in minimum wage reduces the 
probability of being paid employed, particularly for female workers, and increases the 
probability of being self-employed and unpaid family worker. As mentioned above, 
the limitation of multinomial logit estimate using four employment categories used in 
this section is that we do not separate between paid employment in the covered sector 
and paid employment in the uncovered sector, while in practice there is a significant
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amount of paid employment that is paid less than the minimum wage level (paid 
employment in the uncovered sector).
Table 6.17 Compliance with the Minimum Wage among Paid Employees (%),
(Pooled Data 1996-2003)
P rop ortion  E arn ing  
A t or A b ove  the  
M in im u m  W age L evel
P rop ortion  E arn ing  
B elow  the M in im u m  
W age L evel
O b serv a tio n s (N )
U rb an  A reas
Urban Areas -  Males 78 .54 21 .46 85155
Urban Areas -  Females 61.21 38.79 40025
Urban Areas -  Total 73 27 125180
R u ra l A reas
Rural Areas -  Males 67.9 32.1 62748
Rural Areas -  Females 44.83 55.17 25381
Rural Areas -  Total 61.26 38.74 88129
Source : Calculated from Sakernas
As presented in table 6.17, there is a high proportion of paid employees who are paid 
below the minimum wage level. The proportion is generally higher for female 
workers, indicating that they are paid less than male workers. Moreover, the 
proportion of paid employees who are paid less than the minimum wage level is also 
higher in rural areas, because most are working in the traditional agricultural sector 
and hence are less affected by the minimum wage regulation. In order to obtain more 
specific results, as an additional point, paid employment is sub-divided into two more 
specific categories relating to the minimum wage coverage: (1) paid employment that 
is paid at or above the minimum wage level (paid employment in the covered sector), 
and (2) paid employment that is paid below the minimum wage level (paid 
employment in the uncovered sector).
Moretti and Perloff (2000), using a logit model, found that an increase in the 
minimum wage raised the probability of being paid less than the minimum wage level 
in the agriculture sector where the minimum wage coverage is incomplete. Using 
multinomial logit estimation, my study extends the analysis by estimating the effects
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of minimum wage on five different employment categories: self-employed, unpaid 
family worker, unemployed, paid employment in the covered sector, and paid 
employment in the uncovered sector.
Before discussing the results, we need consider that paid employment in the covered 
sector and paid employment in the uncovered sector categories potentially have 
similar slope coefficients because they have similar characteristics. In order to ensure 
whether the multinomial logit using five employment categories is suitable 
specification, the Wald test for pooling selected categories is reported in table 6.18. 
The results suggests we can reject the null hypothesis indicating that paid employment 
in the covered sector and paid employment in the uncovered sector is behaviourally 
different. However, as might be predicted, the chi-squared value is relatively lower 
than the other combinations, although the results remain significant.
Table 6.18 Wald Tests for pooling employment categories
C a tegories T ested U rban A reas R ural A reas
M ale Fem ale M ale F em ale
























































Notes: PE is Paid Employment
Chi-squared test is employed at 45 degree of freedom, p-value in parentheses.
H0: All coefficients except intercepts associated with a given pair of categories are 0 (categories can be 
combined)
Tables 6.19 and 6.20 report the findings for males and females separately across five
employment categories in urban areas. Interestingly, there is evidence that the
minimum wage decreases the probability of being paid employed in the covered sector
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and increases the probability of being paid employed in the uncovered sector (paid 
less than the minimum wage level) for both males and females in urban areas. This 
evidence is consistent with Moretti and Perloff (2000) finding that an increase in the 
minimum wage reduced some workers in the sectors where the minimum wage is 
effectively enforced and induced the affected workers to accept below minimum wage 
level jobs in the sectors where the minimum wage is not effectively enforced. In 
practice, there is a case in Indonesia where employers can apply for a temporary 
waiver if they are not able to comply with the minimum wage policy, indicating that 
they are not violating the laws by paying their workers below the minimum wage level 
(Suryahadi et al, 2001). Unfortunately, there is no information in our data set about 
paid employment that is paid below the minimum wage level because of a temporary 
waiver. However, I argue that it is less likely due to the fact that the requirements to 
obtain this waiver tend to be difficult and expensive (see Suryahadi et al, 2001). In 
addition, Rama (2001) also confirmed that the number of temporary waivers proposed 
by the companies were not significant.
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Lrealmw 0.0084 0.426 0.0054 0.289 -0.148 0.000 0.1501 0.000 -0.0156 0.009
Married 0.1058 0.000 -0.0140 0.000 0.012 0.039 -0.0324 0.000 -0.0712 0.000
Separated 0.1302 0.000 -0.0156 0.000 -0.075 0.000 -0.0081 0.289 -0.0312 0.000
Primary -0.0518 0.000 -0.0067 0.001 0.092 0.000 -0.0261 0.000 -0.0078 0.038
Junior H.S. -0.1152 0.000 -0.0069 0.000 0.166 0.000 -0.0463 0.000 0.0028 0.473
Senior H.S. -0.2562 0.000 -0.0220 0.000 0.259 0.000 -0.0214 0.000 0.0403 0.000
Academy -0.3124 0.000 -0.0314 0.000 0.314 0.000 0.0080 0.185 0.0222 0.000
University -0.3239 0.000 -0.0304 0.000 0.316 0.000 0.0002 0.975 0.0380 0.000
age15-24 -0.1467 0.000 -0.0240 0.000 0.096 0.000 0.0415 0.000 0.0331 0.000
age25-34 -0.0769 0.000 -0.0346 0.000 0.121 0.000 0.0026 0.498 -0.0125 0.002
age35-50 -0.0676 0.000 -0.0296 0.000 0.115 0.000 0.0079 0.026 -0.0255 0.000
Head of HH 0.1067 0.000 -0.0863 0.000 0.067 0.000 -0.0033 0.382 -0.0844 0.000
1 child -0.0150 0.000 -0.0002 0.883 0.008 0.010 0.0118 0.000 -0.0051 0.005
>=2 children -0.0019 0.587 -0.0020 0.202 -0.004 0.230 0.0143 0.000 -0.0061 0.005
year97 0.0012 0.777 0.0054 0.008 0.005 0.221 -0.0083 0.010 -0.0038 0.133
year98 0.0180 0.002 0.0116 0.000 -0.076 0.000 0.0351 0.000 0.0116 0.001
year99 0.0185 0.002 0.0085 0.005 -0.090 0.000 0.0374 0.000 0.0252 0.000
year2000 0.0331 0.000 0.0121 0.000 -0.048 0.000 -0.0198 0.000 0.0222 0.000
year2001 0.0019 0.703 0.0081 0.002 0.018 0.001 -0.0388 0.000 0.0105 0.001
year2002 0.0085 0.038 -0.0001 0.957 0.002 0.704 -0.0348 0.000 0.0248 0.000
year2003 0.0185 0.000 0.0010 0.594 -0.001 0.871 -0.0435 0.000 0.0247 0.000
Note: All regressions include province dummies. Estimated by Multinomial Logit. 
Number o f obs = 175245 
Wald chi2( 180) = 34286.93 
Prob > chi2 = 0 
Pseudo R2 = 0.1472
Looking at the control variables, higher education qualifications lead to an increase in 
the probability of being paid employed in the covered sector. In contrast, paid 
employment in the uncovered sector is dominated by workers with less educational 
qualifications. Interestingly, youth employment (age group 15-24 years) is the group 
of employment that is more likely to be paid less than the minimum wage level. This 
is one indication that young workers are one of the most vulnerable sectors of
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employment to be affected by an increase in minimum wage, particularly because of 
their limited working experience.






















Lrealmw -0.0205 0.136 0.0206 0.091 -0.1374 0.000 0.1504 0.000 -0.0131 0.161
Married 0.1658 0.000 0.0642 0.000 -0.0337 0.000 -0.0945 0.000 -0.1019 0.000
Separated 0.1468 0.000 -0.0709 0.000 -0.0501 0.000 -0.0199 0.006 -0.0059 0.320
Primary 0.0027 0.515 -0.0047 0.224 0.0702 0.000 -0.0547 0.000 -0.0135 0.016
Junior H.S. -0.0184 0.000 -0.0083 0.053 0.1468 0.000 -0.1156 0.000 -0.0045 0.438
Senior H.S. -0.1480 0.000 -0.0893 0.000 0.2622 0.000 -0.0744 0.000 0.0496 0.000
Academy -0.2764 0.000 -0.1577 0.000 0.4388 0.000 -0.0066 0.385 0.0019 0.805
University -0.2723 0.000 -0.1463 0.000 0.3964 0.000 -0.0269 0.000 0.0490 0.000
age15-24 -0.2404 0.000 -0.0597 0.000 0.0440 0.000 0.0660 0.000 0.1901 0.000
age25-34 -0.1103 0.000 -0.0722 0.000 0.0429 0.000 0.0360 0.000 0.1036 0.000
age35-50 -0.0464 0.000 -0.0554 0.000 0.0381 0.000 0.0519 0.000 0.0117 0.176
Head of HH 0.1984 0.000 -0.1725 0.000 0.0796 0.000 -0.0332 0.000 -0.0723 0.000
1 child 0.0089 0.014 -0.0083 0.009 -0.0199 0.000 0.0201 0.000 -0.0008 0.768
>=2 children 0.0138 0.001 -0.0040 0.281 -0.0357 0.000 0.0285 0.000 -0.0026 0.414
year97 -0.0152 0.001 0.0199 0.000 0.0268 0.000 -0.0249 0.000 -0.0066 0.085
year98 -0.0288 0.000 0.0361 0.000 -0.0246 0.000 0.0124 0.073 0.0049 0.353
year99 -0.0227 0.001 0.0287 0.000 -0.0453 0.000 0.0099 0.172 0.0293 0.000
year2000 -0.0495 0.000 0.0532 0.000 -0.0071 0.235 -0.0226 0.000 0.0259 0.000
year2001 -0.0482 0.000 0.0378 0.000 0.0423 0.000 -0.0573 0.000 0.0255 0.000
year2002 -0.0620 0.000 0.0324 0.000 0.0333 0.000 -0.0465 0.000 0.0428 0.000
year2003 -0.0633 0.000 0.0425 0.000 0.0450 0.000 -0.0697 0.000 0.0455 0.000
Note: All regressions include province dummies. Estimated by Multinomial Logit. 
Number of obs = 104027 
Wald chi2( 180) = 24155.79 
Prob > chi2 = 0 
Pseudo R2 = 0.1745
The impact of the minimum wage on the probability of being self-employed is not 
significant for both males and females using five categories of employment. This 
result suggests that the affected paid employment from the covered sector is more 
likely to accept below minimum wage jobs perhaps in the same sector of activities that
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they have experienced, but less likely to be self-employed. Another reason that people 
are less likely to be self-employed is because the business failure rate (risk) is usually 
high, particularly among new self-employees (Rice, 2004). In addition, for females, 
there is a tendency that an increase in minimum wage raises the probability of being 
an unpaid family worker, although the marginal effect is relatively small.
In summary, the multinomial logit estimate using four (and five) employment 
categories showed more complete displacement effects for paid employment from the 
covered sector to the uncovered sector as minimum wage increases in Indonesia. This 
study found that a 10% increase in minimum wage reduces the probability of being in 
paid employment in the covered sector in urban areas by 0.137%-0.148%. On the 
other hand, an increase in minimum wage increases the probability of being paid 
employed in the urban uncovered sector by 0.15%. For females, there is evidence that 
an increase in minimum wage raises the probability of being unpaid family worker by 
0.02%. These effects are relatively smaller than Gindling and Terrell (2007) estimate 
for Costa Rica. Using probit estimates, they found that a 10% increase in minimum 
wage decreases the probability of being employed in covered sector by 0.47%-0.68%, 
suggesting that the minimum wage policy is more binding in Costa Rica than 
Indonesia. However, in line with my study, their result generally indicates that those 
workers who lose their jobs in the covered sector are more likely to find a job in the 
uncovered sectors suggested by two-sector model.
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Rural Areas
This section discusses the effects of minimum wage on employment in rural areas 
using four (and five) different categories of employment. Similar to the previous 
section, this study specifies the selected employment categories as: (1) self-employed, 
(2) unpaid family worker, (3) paid employment, and (4) unemployed. The results for 
four different categories of employment are presented in tables 6.21 and 6.22 for 
males and females separately. For male workers, an increase in minimum wage has a 
negative effect on the probability of being paid employed in rural areas with a 
marginal effect o f -0.020. In contrast, there is no significant effect for female workers, 
suggesting that they are less affected by the minimum wage since many of them (more 
than 50%, see table 6.17) are paid less than the minimum wage level.
Within the uncovered sector, an increase in minimum wage raises the probability of 
men being self-employed (marginal effect is 0.023). In contrast, for women, an 
increase in minimum wage reduces the probability of being self-employed (marginal 
effect is -0.039). This feature suggests that self-employed opportunities for women 
are limited (see previous discussion). On the other hand, unpaid family worker plays 
an important role in providing an alternative job for women in rural areas. As 
presented in table 6.22, an increase in the minimum wage has a positive effect on the 
probability of being an unpaid family worker with a marginal effect of 0.037. In 
addition, similar to the previous section using three categories of employment, an 
increase in the minimum wage decreases the probability of being unemployed for 
men, although the coefficient is relatively small with a marginal effect of only -0.01.
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Worker Paid Employment Unemployed
M.E. P value M.E. P value M.E. P value M.E. P value
Lrealmw 0.0233 0.003 0.0067 0.217 -0.0202 0.010 -0.0097 0.002
Married 0.1100 0.000 -0.0268 0.000 -0.0452 0.000 -0.0380 0.000
Separated 0.0625 0.000 -0.0120 0.000 -0.0374 0.000 -0.0131 0.000
Primary -0.0191 0.000 -0.0038 0.023 0.0249 0.000 -0.0020 0.153
Junior H.S. -0.0696 0.000 -0.0099 0.000 0.0677 0.000 0.0118 0.000
Senior H.S. -0.2322 0.000 -0.0415 0.000 0.2263 0.000 0.0474 0.000
Academy -0.5195 0.000 -0.0772 0.000 0.5473 0.000 0.0494 0.000
University -0.4807 0.000 -0.0736 0.000 0.4828 0.000 0.0715 0.000
age15-24 -0.1902 0.000 -0.0117 0.000 0.1700 0.000 0.0318 0.000
age25-34 -0.1123 0.000 -0.0404 0.000 0.1418 0.000 0.0109 0.000
age35-50 -0.0826 0.000 -0.0439 0.000 0.1241 0.000 0.0025 0.404
Head of HH 0.2771 0.000 -0.2790 0.000 0.0326 0.000 -0.0306 0.000
1 child -0.0121 0.000 0.0014 0.299 0.0100 0.000 0.0008 0.371
>=2 children -0.0028 0.239 0.0007 0.622 0.0042 0.076 -0.0022 0.032
year97 -0.0190 0.000 0.0075 0.000 0.0135 0.000 -0.0020 0.127
year98 0.0094 0.015 0.0150 0.000 -0.0269 0.000 0.0025 0.152
year99 0.0109 0.008 0.0092 0.001 -0.0330 0.000 0.0129 0.000
year2000 0.0123 0.001 0.0162 0.000 -0.0482 0.000 0.0197 0.000
year2001 -0.0196 0.000 0.0166 0.000 -0.0145 0.000 0.0175 0.000
year2002 -0.0200 0.000 0.0021 0.294 -0.0070 0.015 0.0249 0.000
year2003 -0.0166 0.000 0.0240 0.000 -0.0322 0.000 0.0249 0.000
Note: All regressions include province dummies. Estimated by Multinomial Logit. 
Number o f obs = 286185 
Wald chi2(138) = 6873.32 
Prob > chi2 = 0 
Pseudo R2 = 0.2532
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Worker Paid Employment Unemployed
M.E. P value M.E. P value M.E. P value M.E. P value
Lrealmw -0.0395 0.000 0.0366 0.002 0.0027 0.738 0.0002 0.971
Married 0.0853 0.000 0.0743 0.000 -0.0782 0.000 -0.0814 0.000
Separated 0.1264 0.000 -0.0871 0.000 -0.0264 0.000 -0.0129 0.000
Primary 0.0146 0.000 -0.0107 0.000 -0.0106 0.000 0.0067 0.000
Junior H.S. 0.0447 0.000 -0.0672 0.000 -0.0048 0.143 0.0273 0.000
Senior H.S. -0.0695 0.000 -0.2353 0.000 0.2195 0.000 0.0853 0.000
Academy -0.2897 0.000 -0.4272 0.000 0.6498 0.000 0.0670 0.000
University -0.2582 0.000 -0.3987 0.000 0.5307 0.000 0.1261 0.000
age15-24 -0.1449 0.000 -0.0382 0.000 0.0779 0.000 0.1052 0.000
age25-34 -0.0559 0.000 -0.0646 0.000 0.0637 0.000 0.0568 0.000
age35-50 -0.0164 0.000 -0.0579 0.000 0.0582 0.000 0.0161 0.000
Head of HH 0.4408 0.000 -0.4721 0.000 0.0673 0.000 -0.0360 0.000
1 child 0.0079 0.003 -0.0021 0.457 -0.0040 0.054 -0.0018 0.152
>=2 children 0.0031 0.309 0.0091 0.004 -0.0116 0.000 -0.0007 0.631
year97 -0.0434 0.000 0.0356 0.000 0.0097 0.001 -0.0020 0.299
year98 -0.0505 0.000 0.0501 0.000 -0.0023 0.551 0.0028 0.283
year99 -0.0499 0.000 0.0259 0.000 -0.0058 0.159 0.0297 0.000
year2000 -0.0863 0.000 0.0750 0.000 -0.0138 0.000 0.0251 0.000
year2001 -0.1085 0.000 0.0726 0.000 -0.0003 0.936 0.0363 0.000
year2002 -0.0719 0.000 0.0357 0.000 -0.0047 0.114 0.0409 0.000
year2003 -0.1286 0.000 0.0995 0.000 -0.0152 0.000 0.0442 0.000
Note: All regressions include province dummies. Estimated by Multinomial Logit. 
Number of obs = 189199 
Wald chi2(138) = 38840.59 
Prob > chi2 = 0 
Pseudo R2 = 0.1847
Tables 6.23 and 6.24 report the marginal effects for males and females in rural areas 
across five different employment categories. Similar to urban areas, this study found 
that an increase in minimum wage decreases the probability of being in paid 
employment in the covered sector (marginal effects are -0.077 for males and -0.041 
for females) and increases the probability of being paid employed in the uncovered 
sector (marginal effects are 0.052 for males and 0.041 for females). In addition, there 
is evidence that the minimum wage raises the probability of being self-employed for 
men (marginal effect is 0.027) and raises the probability of being unpaid family
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worker for females (marginal effect is 0.038), suggesting that males and females 
behave differently as the minimum wage increases.






















Lrealmw 0.0271 0.001 0.0075 0.165 -0.0773 0.000 0.0521 0.000 -0.0094 0.002
Married 0.1112 0.000 -0.0267 0.000 -0.0061 0.085 -0.0404 0.000 -0.0380 0.000
Separated 0.0680 0.000 -0.0114 0.001 -0.0360 0.000 -0.0077 0.071 -0.0130 0.000
Primary -0.0223 0.000 -0.0046 0.006 0.0419 0.000 -0.0125 0.000 -0.0024 0.078
Junior H.S. -0.0762 0.000 -0.0113 0.000 0.0950 0.000 -0.0184 0.000 0.0108 0.000
Senior H.S. -0.2390 0.000 -0.0429 0.000 0.1988 0.000 0.0373 0.000 0.0458 0.000
Academy -0.5212 0.000 -0.0779 0.000 0.3680 0.000 0.1836 0.000 0.0474 0.000
University -0.4831 0.000 -0.0743 0.000 0.3368 0.000 0.1515 0.000 0.0690 0.000
age15-24 -0.1927 0.000 -0.0118 0.000 0.1111 0.000 0.0617 0.000 0.0317 0.000
age25-34 -0.1151 0.000 -0.0406 0.000 0.1066 0.000 0.0383 0.000 0.0108 0.001
age35-50 -0.0852 0.000 -0.0444 0.000 0.0960 0.000 0.0314 0.000 0.0022 0.451
Head of HH 0.2772 0.000 -0.2793 0.000 0.0156 0.000 0.0171 0.000 -0.0307 0.000
1 child -0.0120 0.000 0.0014 0.286 0.0075 0.000 0.0024 0.131 0.0008 0.364
>=2 children -0.0025 0.291 0.0008 0.598 0.0060 0.003 -0.0021 0.238 -0.0022 0.034
year97 -0.0199 0.000 0.0073 0.000 0.0149 0.000 -0.0002 0.932 -0.0021 0.108
year98 0.0094 0.015 0.0151 0.000 -0.0232 0.000 -0.0037 0.196 0.0025 0.155
year99 0.0106 0.009 0.0092 0.001 -0.0346 0.000 0.0019 0.537 0.0129 0.000
year2000 0.0121 0.001 0.0162 0.000 -0.0232 0.000 -0.0247 0.000 0.0196 0.000
year2001 -0.0209 0.000 0.0163 0.000 0.0085 0.005 -0.0213 0.000 0.0174 0.000
year2002 -0.0217 0.000 0.0018 0.371 0.0075 0.002 -0.0122 0.000 0.0246 0.000
year2003 -0.0183 0.000 0.0236 0.000 -0.0035 0.144 -0.0265 0.000 0.0247 0.000
Note: All regressions include province dummies. Estimated by Multinomial Logit. 
Number o f obs =286185 
Wald chi2( 180)=  69617.12 
Prob > chi2 = 0 
Pseudo R2 = 0.2202
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Lrealmw -0.0380 0.001 0.0382 0.001 -0.0413 0.000 0.0409 0.000 0.0002 0.967
Married 0.0850 0.000 0.0739 0.000 -0.0211 0.000 -0.0565 0.000 -0.0814 0.000
Separated 0.1261 0.000 -0.0871 0.000 -0.0102 0.000 -0.0161 0.000 -0.0128 0.000
Primary 0.0131 0.000 -0.01,28- --OrOOO 0.0156 0.000 -0.0209 0.000 0.0051 0.006
Junior H.S. 0.0401 0.000 -0.0718 0.000 0.0482 0.000 -0.0398 0.000 0.0233 0.000
Senior H.S. -0.0769 0.000 -0.2425 0.000 0.1594 0.000 0.0820 0.000 0.0780 0.000
Academy -0.2925 0.000 -0.4297 0.000 0.4133 0.000 0.2585 0.000 0.0504 0.000
University -0.2619 0.000 -0.4021 0.000 0.3229 0.000 0.2333 0.000 0.1079 0.000
age15-24 -0.1451 0.000 -0.0385 0.000 0.0238 0.000 0.0548 0.000 0.1050 0.000
age25-34 -0.0562 0.000 -0.0650 0.000 0.0157 0.000 0.0490 0.000 0.0565 0.000
age35-50 -0.0167 0.000 -0.0585 0.000 0.0210 0.000 0.0384 0.000 0.0157 0.000
Head of HH 0.4396 0.000 -0.4722 0.000 0.0277 0.000 0.0412 0.000 -0.0362 0.000
1 child 0.0079 0.003 -0.0021 0.457 -0.0017 0.168 -0.0023 0.209 -0.0018 0.152
>=2 children 0.0031 0.309 0.0091 0.004 -0.0041 0.004 -0.0074 0.001 -0.0007 0.634
year97 -0.0442 0.000 0.0343 0.000 0.0109 0.000 0.0013 0.599 -0.0024 0.221
year98 -0.0509 0.000 0.0493 0.000 -0.0032 0.158 0.0024 0.509 0.0025 0.339
year99 -0.0501 0.000 0.0253 0.000 -0.0039 0.096 -0.0006 0.869 0.0294 0.000
year2000 -0.0869 0.000 0.0738 0.000 0.0025 0.289 -0.0141 0.000 0.0248 0.000
year2001 -0.1102 0.000 0.0694 0.000 0.0236 0.000 -0.0182 0.000 0.0355 0.000
year2002 -0.0737 0.000 0.0327 0.000 0.0194 0.000 -0.0186 0.000 0.0401 0.000
year2003 -0.1301 0.000 0.0965 0.000 0.0141 0.000 -0.0241 0.000 0.0436 0.000
Note: All regressions include province dummies. Estimated by Multinomial Logit. 
Number o f obs =189199 
Wald chi2( 180) = 40970.79 
Prob > chi2 = 0 
Pseudo R2 = 0.1758
Compared to urban areas, the marginal effect of the minimum wage in rural areas is 
relatively smaller, suggesting that the minimum wage is more binding in urban areas 
than in rural areas. In addition, this evidence actually confirmed the existence of a 
dualistic employment structure in Indonesia between urban and rural areas (Manning, 
2003a). As pointed out by Manning (2003a), workers in rural areas are mostly 
engaged in traditional agricultural activities and hence are less affected by the 
minimum wage policy because of low compliance in rural areas, while workers in
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urban areas are mostly employed in the modem sector and most directly affected by 
the minimum wage policy and any other labour regulation.
6.5.2.3 Youth Employment
As a final point, the effect of minimum wage on youth employment is discussed in 
this section. This sector of employment is the category that is typically at the bottom 
of the wage distribution and, therefore, is predicted to be more affected by the 
minimum wage (Card, 1992b). Following the ILO definition, youth employment is 
defined as those young people between 15 and 24 years old who actively participate in 
the labour market. In practice, this age group is the range of ages from the earliest 
school leaving age (lower secondary level)40 to the age when most people are 
expected to complete their tertiary level of education (university degree).
The youth labour force forms around 20 percent of the total labour force in Indonesia, 
with more than 60 percent of them living in rural areas. Looking at the distribution 
(table 6.25), most young males and young females in urban areas work as paid 
employees, while in rural areas, most work in the uncovered sectors, i.e. self- 
employed and unpaid family worker. Actually, this situation is related to the scarcity 
of jobs in the rural covered sector, compared to urban areas.
40 T he low er seco n d ary  level (jun io r h igh  school) is the earlie st school leav ing  level in Indonesia. Since 
the early  2000s, the Indonesian  governm en t has induced  you n g  p eop le  to  fin ish  at least low er secondary  
level by  nine y e a rs ’ schooling , a lthough the  im plem entation  varies across regions.
2 1 6
Table 6.25 Youth Employment Status by Gender and Location
(Pooled Data 1996-2003)
Urban Areas Rural Areas
Male Female Total Male Female Total
1. Self-Employed (%) 15.64 8.64 12.55 24.76 16.74 21.55
2. Unpaid Family Worker (%) 12.47 15.44 13.78 36.10 45.32 39.79
3. Paid Employment (%) 44.76 47.07 45.77 25.88 19.05 23.14
4. Unemployed (%) 27.13 28.86 27.89 13.27 18.88 15.51
Observations (N) 34387 27108 61495 60672 40437 101109
Source: Calculated from Sakemas
According to the school-to-work transition survey in three provinces of Indonesia 
(ILO, 2003), in practice there are some barriers for young people to finding a job in 
the labour market. Firstly, according to the survey findings, the main obstacle for the 
surveyed employers and managers in recruiting young people as their employees is 
that they have low education and skills. Secondly, most young people lack work 
experience particularly because they enter the labour market for the first time without 
any work experience. From the survey finding, only around 40% of young people 
joined in work experience programmes as part of their educational attainment (ILO, 
2003). In addition, the weak linkages between the education system and the labour 
market make the problem more difficult. As pointed out by the Indonesian Youth 
Employment Network (2003), there is still a large part of the education curriculum 
that is unrelated to the needs of the labour market. Thirdly, in the regions that are poor 
and least modernized, such as East Nusa Tenggara (see Jones et al, 1998), the job 
opportunities are relatively limited. As a consequence, most educated youths will 
accept work in the informal sector, move elsewhere in Indonesia or abroad, or will 
remain unemployed depending on their expected wage (Jones et al, 1998).
In terms of minimum wage, almost 50% of Indonesian young workers are paid below 
the minimum wage level (see table 6.26). The highest proportion is located in rural
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areas where the minimum wage is less binding. There are several reasons why young 
people are paid below the minimum wage level. Firstly, the majority of young 
employees work in small enterprises41 (see ILO, 2003) with the proportion between 
56% and 79% depending on their region. Most of them work in the small enterprise 
because of low barriers of entry and limited access to the large and medium 
enterprises with the higher recruitment standard. Suryahadi et al (2001) pointed out 
that in general workers in small enterprises, on average, are paid 10% below the 
minimum wage level. According to Suryahadi et al (2003), the enforcement from the 
government is often not really effective and is still limited to large and medium 
enterprises.
Table 6.26 Compliance with the Minimum Wage among Youth Employees (%),
(Pooled c ata 1996-2003)
P rop ortion  E arning  
A t or A b ove the
P rop ortion  E arning  
B elow  the M in im um
O b servation  (N )
M in im u m  W age L evel W age L evel
U rb an  A reas
U rb an  A reas -  M ales 62.3 37.7 15391
U rban  A reas -  Fem ales 47 .34 52.66 12758
U rban  A reas -  T otal 55.52 44.48 28149
R u ra l A reas
R ural A reas -  M ales 52.97 47.03 15700
R ural A reas -  Fem ales 33.67 66.33 7704
R ural A reas -  T otal 46.62 53.38 23404
Source : Calculated from Sakernas
Secondly, the majority of young workers are not registered as members of a labour 
union. According to Indonesia Youth Employment Network (2003), therefore they 
often do not have any representation and bargaining position to present their concerns 
and needs. In practice, in the sector where the labour union is effective, such as the 
manufacturing sector in urban areas, the labour union has an important role in 
encouraging the business environment to comply with the minimum wage regulation
41 Sm all en te rp rise  is defined  as a business w ith less than  ten co-w orkers.
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and in preventing any labour abuses (Agrawal, 1995). Thirdly, in the case of rural 
areas, their knowledge about the minimum wage policy might be limited due to the 
fact that most of them have a low level of education. Even though some young 
workers might understand about the minimum wage policy, they do not object 
because it seems there is a lack of choice of job opportunities for them and they 
consider their income to be comparable with their low level of education, limited 
working experiences and the financial condition of the employer.
To see the effects of changes in the minimum wage on youth employment, the 
employment equation is re-estimated using the sample of young people between 15 
and 24 years old. The independent variables are the same as in the previous section, 
except different age groups variables will be included as part of the independent 
variables. Following a similar format to the previous section, the results obtained from 
the youth employment equation above are reported separately for urban and rural 
areas, as well as for the male and female youth labour market.
The results of the youth employment equation in urban areas are presented in tables 
6.27 and 6.28 using five different employment categories. Looking at the control 
variables, an increase in age is associated with an increase in the probability of being a 
paid employee for both males and females. An increase in age means that young 
people have possibly gained more experiences. Therefore, older workers are more 
likely to work as paid employed because they have more experience.
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Lrealmw 0.0299 0.126 -0.0161 0.416 -0.1972 0.000 0.2209 0.000 -0.0375 0.099
Married 0.1312 0.000 -0.0281 0.002 0.0420 0.000 -0.0097 0.302 -0.1354 0.000
Primary -0.0276 0.001 0.0138 0.162 0.0074 0.606 -0.0235 0.012 0.0299 0.054
Junior H.S. -0.0635 0.000 0.0314 0.002 0.0030 0.829 -0.0501 0.000 0.0792 0.000
Senior H.S. -0.1384 0.000 -0.0141 0.116 0.0075 0.568 -0.1023 0.000 0.2472 0.000
Academy -0.1231 0.000 -0.0754 0.000 -0.0395 0.081 -0.0868 0.000 0.3248 0.000
University -0.1032 0.000 -0.0966 0.000 -0.1030 0.000 -0.0940 0.000 0.3967 0.000
Age19-21 0.0077 0.257 -0.0555 0.000 0.1165 0.000 -0.0072 0.254 -0.0615 0.000
Age22-24 0.0443 0.000 -0.0709 0.000 0.1771 0.000 -0.0101 0.137 -0.1405 0.000
Head of HH 0.1287 0.000 -0.1222 0.000 0.1517 0.000 0.0277 0.011 -0.1859 0.000
1 child -0.0016 0.779 0.0046 0.367 0.0013 0.852 0.0044 0.455 -0.0087 0.189
>=2 children 0.0089 0.211 0.0025 0.682 -0.0071 0.421 0.0184 0.016 -0.0227 0.005
year97 0.0009 0.905 0.0128 0.082 0.0307 0.002 -0.0264 0.000 -0.0181 0.053
year98 0.0245 0.026 0.0253 0.016 -0.0945 0.000 0.0393 0.001 0.0054 0.672
year99 0.0013 0.903 0.0130 0.224 -0.1135 0.000 0.0467 0.000 0.0525 0.000
year2000 0.0132 0.232 0.0070 0.478 -0.0510 0.000 -0.0215 0.033 0.0523 0.000
year2001 -0.0079 0.387 0.0209 0.025 0.0176 0.124 -0.0459 0.000 0.0153 0.187
year2002 -0.0090 0.220 -0.0068 0.334 0.0111 0.228 -0.0611 0.000 0.0658 0.000
year2003 -0.0152 0.036 -0.0098 0.164 0.0192 0.040 -0.0737 0.000 0.0795 0.000
Note: All regressions include province dummies. Estimated by Multinomial Logit. 
Number o f obs = 34387 
Wald chi2( 172)= 5285.83 
Prob > chi2 = 0 
Pseudo R2 = 0.0864
Married male youths are more likely to be either paid employees or self-employees. In 
contrast, married female youths are less likely to be paid employees in the covered 
sector and are more likely to be unpaid family workers or self-employees in the 
uncovered sector. By working in the uncovered sector, married females generally have 
more flexible working hours to combine with their household responsibilities, while 
the covered sector usually needs more commitment and fixed working hours.
220
In terms of education, the most interesting finding is that youths with a university 
degree more likely to be unemployed compared to young people with no educational 
qualifications (the marginal effects are 0.397 and 0.351 for males and females 
respectively). This effect is much higher than those in the aggregate employment 
equation. Firstly, it implies that the linkage between education and the labour market 
(school-to-work transition) is relatively weak in Indonesia. Besides there still being a 
gap between the education curriculum and the labour market needs, some education 
institutions also lack career counselling, internships and work experience 
programmes. Therefore, as pointed out by Indonesia Youth Employment Network 
(2003), young people have longer periods of unemployment than adults. Secondly, the 
result also implies that only young people with a high education level (usually with a 
higher family income) are able to remain unemployed, while young people with a low 
education level (usually with a lower family income) could not afford to be 
unemployed and will find a job either in the informal or formal sector but with lower 
wages.
As presented in tables 6.27 and 6.28, an increase in minimum wage decreases the 
probability of young people being paid employed and earning a wage at or above the 
minimum wage level. The effects are relatively similar between men and women with 
a marginal effect of 0.197 for males and 0.203 for females. Compared to the total 
employment, the marginal effects are slightly higher, implying that young people are 
more likely to be hurt by the minimum wage, particularly in the firms that strictly 
comply with the minimum wage policy.
On the other hand, an increase in minimum wage raises the probability of young
people being employees paid below the minimum wage level (the marginal effect is
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0.221 for males and 0.258 for females). As discussed above, the firms that are not 
complying with the minimum wage policy are mainly found in small enterprises, due 
to the lack of enforcement and effective trade unions in these sectors.






















Lrealmw -0.0058 0.763 0.0047 0.849 -0.2027 0.000 0.2584 0.000 -0.0546 0.041
Married 0.1217 0.000 0.1336 0.000 -0.0180 0.021 -0.1124 0.000 -0.1250 0.000
Primary 0.0011 0.887 0.0038 0.764 0.0622 0.003 -0.0415 0.001 -0.0256 0.183
Junior H.S. -0.0130 0.074 0.0302 0.018 0.1115 0.000 -0.1316 0.000 0.0029 0.880
Senior H.S. -0.0569 0.000 -0.0363 0.002 0.1402 0.000 -0.2334 0.000 0.1864 0.000
Academy -0.0712 0.000 -0.1014 0.000 0.1229 0.000 -0.1494 0.000 0.1990 0.000
University -0.0762 0.000 -0.1107 0.000 0.0180 0.573 -0.1823 0.000 0.3512 0.000
Age19-21 0.0334 0.000 -0.0649 0.000 0.0871 0.000 0.0089 0.258 -0.0645 0.000
Age22-24 0.0599 0.000 -0.0643 0.000 0.1360 0.000 0.0084 0.331 -0.1401 0.000
Head of HH 0.0658 0.000 -0.1497 0.000 0.2499 0.000 -0.0011 0.950 -0.0645 0.000
1 child 0.0051 0.278 -0.0034 0.556 -0.0270 0.000 0.0267 0.000 -0.1401 0.000
>=2 children 0.0071 0.226 -0.0177 0.012 -0.0396 0.000 0.0426 0.000 0.0076 0.431
year97 -0.0161 0.004 0.0061 0.475 0.0706 0.000 -0.0441 0.000 -0.0165 0.115
year98 -0.0020 0.817 0.0251 0.041 -0.0450 0.000 0.0065 0.640 0.0154 0.289
year99 -0.0144 0.096 0.0079 0.537 -0.0653 0.000 0.0160 0.280 0.0558 0.000
year2000 -0.0192 0.011 0.0074 0.513 -0.0096 0.453 -0.0287 0.021 0.0502 0.001
year2001 -0.0334 0.000 0.0076 0.464 0.0513 0.000 -0.0604 0.000 0.0350 0.009
year2002 -0.0417 0.000 -0.0111 0.183 0.0367 0.000 -0.0753 0.000 0.0914 0.000
year2003 -0.0315 0.000 -0.0107 0.211 0.0624 0.000 -0.1165 0.000 0.0963 0.000
Note: All regressions include province dummies. Estimated by Multinomial Logit. 
Number o f obs = 27108 
Wald chi2( 172)= 6207.48 
Prob > chi2 = 0 
Pseudo R2 = 0.1132
Compared to the other studies, the findings are relatively close to Moretti and Perloff 
(2000) and Hinnosaar and Room (2003). Moretti and Perloff (2000) found that an 
increase in minimum wage increased the probability of agriculture workers being paid 
less than the minimum wage level with a marginal effect of 0.017. According to them,
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a significant number of agriculture workers are paid below the minimum wage level in 
the agriculture sector because of lack of enforcement or due to receiving other 
compensation, indicating an incomplete compliance. On the other hand, Hinnosaar 
and Room (2003) found that an increase in the Estonian minimum wage increased the 
probability of being paid below the minimum wage by 2%. They argued that an 
increase in minimum wage decreased the rate of compliance with the minimum wage 
policy in Estonia, where the enforcement is relatively low.
The other interesting finding is that the effect of minimum wage on paid employed 
youths with a wage below the minimum wage level is stronger than on the self- 
employed youths. According to Indonesia Youth Employment Neetwork (2003), there 
are some barriers for Indonesian young people to working as a self employee, 
compared to adults. Firstly, most self-employed jobs need adequate funding. The 
problem is that most young people lack access to credit loans or financial assistance 
from the official financial institutions due to their limited collateral. Therefore, the 
easier way to get funding is to borrow money from their family or friends, where the 
amount is very limited. In addition, as pointed out by Rice (2004) the failure 
probability among “new” self-employed is usually high because of the limited 
knowledge in their new environment. Secondly, it seems that young people lack the 
entrepreneurial culture (see Indonesia Youth Employment Network, 2003 for further 
discussion). In this case, they are more likely to work as a paid employee with a 
permanent wage, although with a rate below the minimum wage level, rather than 
being a self employee with a relatively unstable income. In addition, the ILO (2003) 
survey finding confirmed that only one-half to two-thirds of self-employed youth is 
more likely to remain self-employed, while the others tend to move to paid
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employment if there is a possibility. This situation tells us that being a self employee 
seems a last resort for those unable to enter the formal sector but need an income to 
make a living.






















Lrealmw -0.0320 0.069 0.0327 0.106 -0.0511 0.000 0.0922 0.000 -0.0418 0.001
Married 0.1232 0.000 -0.0326 0.000 0.0107 0.062 -0.0103 0.059 -0.0910 0.000
Primary -0.0051 0.365 0.0047 0.485 0.0143 0.010 -0.0189 0.000 0.0050 0.405
Junior H.S. -0.0275 0.000 -0.0048 0.503 0.0229 0.000 -0.0465 0.000 0.0559 0.000
Senior H.S. -0.0845 0.000 -0.1034 0.000 0.0236 0.001 -0.0547 0.000 0.2190 0.000
Academy -0.1524 0.000 -0.2169 0.000 0.0228 0.450 0.0002 0.995 0.3462 0.000
University -0.1271 0.007 -0.2468 0.000 -0.0511 0.117 0.0135 0.720 0.4116 0.000
Age19-21 0.0436 0.000 -0.0816 0.000 0.0555 0.000 0.0010 0.785 -0.0185 0.000
Age22-24 0.0737 0.000 -0.1108 0.000 0.0860 0.000 0.0058 0.174 -0.0547 0.000
Head of HH 0.3458 0.000 -0.3737 0.000 0.0512 0.000 0.0535 0.000 -0.0768 0.000
1 child -0.0048 0.251 -0.0027 0.565 0.0068 0.057 0.0021 0.548 -0.0013 0.699
>=2 children -0.0010 0.845 -0.0029 0.602 0.0094 0.047 0.0042 0.338 -0.0096 0.019
year97 -0.0362 0.000 0.0148 0.027 0.0252 0.000 0.0014 0.748 -0.0052 0.319
year98 -0.0211 0.007 0.0399 0.000 -0.0117 0.081 -0.0045 0.498 -0.0026 0.698
year99 -0.0358 0.000 0.0227 0.025 -0.0373 0.000 0.0102 0.165 0.0402 0.000
year2000 -0.0413 0.000 0.0244 0.009 -0.0206 0.001 -0.0317 0.000 0.0691 0.000
year2001 -0.0752 0.000 0.0202 0.018 0.0154 0.023 -0.0253 0.000 0.0649 0.000
year2002 -0.0455 0.000 -0.0298 0.000 0.0052 0.325 -0.0187 0.000 0.0888 0.000
year2003 -0.0709 0.000 0.0226 0.002 0.0022 0.673 -0.0410 0.000 0.0871 0.000
Note: All regressions include province dummies. Estimated by Multinomial Logit. 
Number o f obs = 60672 
Wald chi2( 172)= 11930.05 
Prob > chi2 = 0 
Pseudo R2 = 0.1186
The results of the minimum wage effect on youth employment in rural areas are 
presented in tables 6.29 and 6.30. As discussed above, the minimum wage is less 
effective in rural areas due to the dominance of the agriculture sector. In addition, the 
fraction of young workers who earn a wage below the minimum wage level is much
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bigger than those in urban areas (see table 6.26). Therefore, we might expect that the 
effect of the minimum wage is smaller (or may have no effect) than that found in 
urban areas.






















Lrealmw -0.0799 0.000 0.0623 0.022 -0.0356 0.004 0.1019 0.000 -0.0487 0.007
Married 0.0893 0.000 0.1680 0.000 -0.0381 0.000 -0.0638 0.000 -0.1555 0.000
Primary 0.0003 0.963 -0.0181 0.023 0.0120 0.033 -0.0196 0.000 0.0255 0.001
Junior H.S. -0.0126 0.055 -0.0592 0.000 0.0375 0.000 -0.0538 0.000 0.0882 0.000
Senior H.S. -0.0602 0.000 -0.2196 0.000 0.0483 0.000 -0.0309 0.000 0.2625 0.000
Academy -0.1409 0.000 -0.3599 0.000 0.0860 0.001 0.0852 0.002 0.3296 0.000
University -0.1478 0.000 -0.3393 0.000 0.0708 0.063 0.0126 0.725 0.4036 0.000
Age 19-21 0.0291 0.000 -0.0473 0.000 0.0334 0.000 0.0086 0.064 -0.0238 0.000
Age22-24 0.0615 0.000 -0.0612 0.000 0.0454 0.000 0.0181 0.001 -0.0638 0.000
Head of HH 0.3824 0.000 -0.4262 0.000 0.1105 0.000 0.0823 0.000 -0.1489 0.000
1 child 0.0089 0.061 -0.0021 0.731 -0.0088 0.004 0.0051 0.231 -0.0030 0.512
>=2 children 0.0072 0.211 0.0054 0.456 -0.0060 0.111 -0.0081 0.117 0.0015 0.791
year97 -0.0380 0.000 0.0131 0.112 0.0203 0.000 0.0017 0.755 0.0029 0.684
year98 -0.0442 0.000 0.0295 0.013 0.0065 0.318 0.0067 0.434 0.0015 0.872
year99 -0.0505 0.000 -0.0157 0.219 -0.0029 0.650 0.0076 0.403 0.0615 0.000
year2000 -0.0581 0.000 0.0065 0.560 0.0043 0.481 -0.0190 0.008 0.0662 0.000
year2001 -0.0720 0.000 -0.0082 0.441 0.0160 0.019 -0.0251 0.000 0.0892 0.000
year2002 -0.0377 0.000 -0.0635 0.000 0.0207 0.000 -0.0406 0.000 0.1211 0.000
year2003 -0.0748 0.000 -0.0114 0.208 0.0040 0.428 -0.0465 0.000 0.1287 0.000
Note: All regressions include province dummies. Estimated by Multinomial Logit. 
Number o f obs = 40437 
Wald chi2(86) = 8980.52 
Prob > chi2 = 0 
Pseudo R2 = 0.1262
As presented in tables 6.29 and 6.30, the minimum wage is negatively associated with 
the probability of young people being paid employed in the covered sector. However, 
the effect is much lower than those found in urban areas, indicating that the minimum 
wage is less binding in rural areas. On the other hand, there is a significant positive 
effect of the minimum wage on young workers paid below the minimum wage level
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(in the uncovered sector). The result is similar to what is found in urban areas 
although the marginal effect is much smaller.
Another interesting finding relating to young people in rural areas is that the real 
minimum wage has a negative marginal effect for the self-employed and unemployed 
categories. Firstly, it seems that an increase in the minimum wage has encouraged 
unemployed youths to participate in the uncovered sector for an additional family 
income, due to some job losses in the covered sector. Secondly, another possible 
reason is that an increase in minimum wage has attracted those unemployed (and self- 
employed) to migrate from rural areas to urban areas where the minimum wage is 
more binding and the average wage is much higher42. As pointed out by ILO (2003), 
migration is an important factor affecting youth employment. This migration is not 
only in the case of the least educated youths, but also of the educated youths. A 
relative scarcity of jobs in the formal sector has also forced young people to leave for 
urban areas, rather than work in unsuitable jobs or in the informal sector in rural areas 
(see Jones et al, 1998). However, the expansion of the number of young workers from 
rural areas in urban areas will create another problem, the fact that labour absorption 
capacity in the urban formal sectors is very limited. Besides limited labour absorption 
capacity, young workers tend to have limited knowledge of the employment 
opportunities in their new environment (ILO, 2003). It makes the situation more 
difficult for young workers. As a result, young people who are unable to find a job in 
the urban formal sectors have no choice other than to enter the informal sector or to be 
paid below the minimum wage level in urban areas. According to the ILO survey,
42S im ilarly , F a jn zy lb e r (2001) found that an increase in the m in im um  w age in B razil has a ttrac ted  the 
inform al sec to r w orkers to m ove into the form al sector, w here  the m inim um  w age is m ore b inding.
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more than 50% of self-employed youth in some urban areas, such as Jakarta, come 
from poor rural areas.
An interesting further area of study revealed by these findings is how the minimum 
wage policy motivated the employment in rural areas to migrate to urban areas, where 
the average earnings are higher and the minimum wage is more binding. 
Unfortunately, the Indonesian Labour Force Survey does not report the migration data 
from rural to urban areas.
6.6 Conclusions
This study has investigated the effects of the minimum wage on employment and 
wage distribution using an individual micro-level data set. Since the data set is not a 
panel, I have applied pooled cross-sectional time-series methodology to explore the 
impact of the minimum wage across individual workers. In general, this study has 
modified the methodology used by Gindling and Terrell (2005 & 2007) in Costa Rica. 
To provide more complete results, all of the equations are analyzed separately in 
urban and rural labour markets, as well as the male and female labour market.
Firstly, in terms of the wage equation, this study found that an increase in minimum 
wage increases the individual’s monthly wage for both men and women in urban and 
rural areas. It is suggested that the coefficient of the log of real minimum wage in the 
female labour market is slightly higher compared to the male labour market, 
indicating that the minimum wage is more binding for women. In addition, the effect 
of the minimum wage is relatively stronger in urban areas than in rural areas because
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rural areas are not greatly affected by the minimum wage due to the dominance of the 
agriculture sector.
This study also estimated the effect of the minimum wage on the individual’s monthly 
wage throughout the distribution. Using quantile regression, this study found that the 
effects of the minimum wage on the individual’s monthly wage are positive and 
significant throughout the distribution across gender and location, representing the 
extensive “spillover” and “lighthouse” effects. In general, the effect of the minimum 
wage is strongest at the bottom of the distribution and will decline monotonically 
afterwards, indicating that there is a tendency for the minimum wage to compress the 
wage distribution.
Secondly, in terms of employment equation, I examined the effect of the minimum 
wage on the probability of being employed according to the employment status 
using multinomial logit model. Unlike the previous studies, I have classified the 
labour market into several employment categories including worker employed in 
uncovered sector (i.e. self-employed and unpaid family worker), worker employed 
in covered sector (i.e. paid employment) and unemployed.
Interestingly, the findings show that male and female employment responds 
differently across the urban-rural location if the minimum wage increases. In urban 
areas, generally, an increase in the minimum wage is more likely to decrease the 
probability of being employed in the covered sector and to increase the probability of 
being employed in the uncovered sector, as suggested by the two-sector model. 
Specifically, within the uncovered sector, female workers are more likely to be
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engaged as unpaid family workers, while male workers tend to become self­
employees. In addition, I found the displacement effect is stronger for women, 
indicating that female workers are the more likely to be hurt as the result of an 
increase in minimum wage. Compared to urban areas, the effects in rural areas are 
somewhat lower, indicating that minimum wage is less binding, given the dominance 
of the traditional agriculture sector.
Thirdly, I found that an increase in minimum wage is associated with a decrease in 
the probability of young people being a paid employee who earns a wage at or above 
the minimum wage level. On the other hand, interestingly, I found that an increase 
in minimum wage will increase the probability of young people being a paid 
employee who is paid below the minimum wage level, given their barriers when 
looking for a job. This result implies that young workers are one of the most 
vulnerable sectors of employment to be affected by an increase in minimum wage.
By implication, this study found that an increase in minimum wage which is 
designed to create a higher standard of living in the formal sectors will also have a 
big impact on the uncovered informal sectors. As discussed above, an increase in 
minimum wage will displace some covered formal sector workers to the uncovered 
informal sector to maintain appropriate income for survival. Compared to the 
covered sector, employment in the uncovered informal sectors usually does not 
benefit from permanent job security, health insurance, and old-age pensions. In 
consequence, it could be predicted that household consumption expenditure tends to 
be higher compared to those who are still working in the formal sector. Moreover, 
the expansion of employment from the formal covered sector to the informal
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uncovered sector will create another problem because the labour absorption capacity 
in the uncovered informal sectors is limited. Therefore, this displacement effect is 
predicted to decrease the earnings in the informal sectors. If our prediction is 
correct, as a consequence, the number of people who are living below the poverty 
line will increase. As a result, a comprehensive strategy of poverty reduction that 
also creates more job opportunities is urgently needed by the Indonesian 
government.
Secondly, I found that female and youth employment are the sectors of employment 
that are most likely to be hurt by an increase in the minimum wage. As in other 
developing countries, women generally have less education opportunities than men. 
Therefore, it is not surprising that women have greater barriers to entering the labour 
market because of their low education and discrimination in the same sector of 
activities. In this case, the government needs to ensure equality of access to 
education and the labour market for them. For youth employment, the government 
needs to strengthen the education and training system for the school-to-work 
transition to fill the gap with what the labour market needs. To achieve this 
objective, all the relevant stakeholders should be actively involved, including 
government, employers (particularly private sector), and university (school).
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CHAPTER VII
THE EFFECTS OF CHANGES IN MINIMUM WAGE 
ON HOURS WORKED IN INDONESIA:
Evidence from selection biased corrections model
7.1. Introduction
A standard competitive model suggests that a minimum wage which is above 
equilibrium level will reduce demand for labour. Based on the standard literature, the 
effects of an increase in minimum wage on demand for labour can be analysed from 
employers’ decisions on how many workers would be employed (a stock variable) and 
how many hours they should work (a flow or utilization variable) (see Hart, 1987 and 
Hamermesh, 1993). On the demand side, employers, therefore, have the option of 
either (or both) changing the number of workers employed or changing the number of 
hours worked of their existing workers in response to an increase in minimum wage. 
Specifically, Hamermesh (1993) pointed out that, in response to minimum wage, 
employers might reduce (or increase) the number of workers employed (employment) 
at the extensive margin, while on the other hand employers might also adjust the 
labour utilization at the intensive margin by changing their working time or changing 
the relative use of their full-time and part-time employment of the existing workers.
The previous chapters presented empirical evidence on the effects of minimum wage 
on employment in terms of workers using regional and individual level data. In this 
chapter, this study focus specifically on the effects of minimum wage on hours 
worked as an alternative measure to employment, providing a complete analysis of 
any shifts in labour demand (see Stewart and Swaffield, 2008).
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Based on the established theoretical framework, the effect of a change in minimum 
wage on hours worked per worker is ambiguous (Stewart and Swaffield, 2008). In the 
presence of high fixed employment costs (such as hiring costs, training costs, and 
fringe benefits), an increase in minimum wage has been predicted to cause an increase 
in hours worked of workers who remain employed (usually high-skilled workers) and 
to cause a decrease in the number of low-skilled workers (Metcalf, 2008). This 
evidence suggests that employers make adjustments by employing their existing 
workers for longer hours in order to compensate for a decrease in the number of 
workers employed as minimum wage increases, implying a substitution effect 
between hours worked and employment (Stewart and Swaffield, 2008 and Gindling 
and Terrell, 2007).
In contrast, if the fixed employment costs are relatively low, an increase in minimum 
wage tends to raise variable employment costs (such as hourly wages) relative to fixed 
employment costs, suggesting that employers are likely to make adjustments by 
employing their existing workers for less hours and hiring more workers (Costa, 2000 
and Connolly and Gregory, 2002). However, in the long run, this increase in 
employment (workers) might be offset by employing more capital than workers, 
suggesting a potential decrease in both hours and employment (Costa, 2000).
Considering the scale effect, Michl (2000) argued that, using normal inputs, an 
increase in minimum wage is predicted to increase total labour costs. According to the 
standard competitive market model, an increase in labour costs induces employers to 
raise output price, suggesting a decrease in the demand for output. By implication,
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employers would be predicted to reduce their demand for hours of labour, as well as 
demand for workers, unambiguously.
Although there are some empirical studies about the effects of minimum wage on 
hours worked in developed countries (see for example Zavodny, 2000, Couch and 
Wittenburg, 2001, and, Stewart and Swaffield, 2008), the empirical studies of the 
effect of a change in minimum wage on hours worked in developing countries are 
very limited. In practice, the effect of minimum wage varies depending on the labour 
market characteristics and the domination of the substitution or the scale effects. 
Evidence from Costa Rica using panel data across industries indicates that an increase 
in minimum wage increased hours worked, suggesting the presence of monopsony 
power (El-Hamidi and Terrell, 2002). In Brazil, Lemos (2004d) found some positive 
effects of minimum wage on number of hours worked (hours effect) using regional 
panel data analysis, although the effect on the employment rate (jobs effect) was 
negative. In a more recent study, Gindling and Terrell (2007) found that an increase in 
the Costa Rican minimum wage reduced the number of hours worked per worker in 
the covered sector using an individual micro level data set.
This study specifically examines the effect of a change in minimum wage on hours 
worked of paid employment in Indonesia. Relating to hours worked, the regional 
minimum wages in Indonesia are primarily set for full-time workers based on monthly 
terms (not hourly terms) minimum wage with a standard of 40 hours worked per week 
(see Rama, 2001). Based on previous minimum wage studies, it is not clear how the 
minimum wage affects hours worked in terms of monthly minimum wage, since the 
previous empirical studies and theoretical predictions are mainly based on hourly
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minimum wage analysis. This is actually one of the reasons why the effect of 
minimum wage on hours worked in Indonesia is an interesting topic, particularly in 
the context of developing country studies. Although the minimum wage is primarily 
set for full-time workers, based on government regulation, minimum wage level is 
also flexible and can be adjusted for part-time workers who work less than 40 hours 
per week on a pro-rata basis. In addition, the overtime wage rates (overtime premium) 
will also be applied for workers who work more than 40 hours per week.
This study explores a complete specification on the impact of minimum wage on 
hours worked of paid employment, using the Indonesian Labour Force Survey 
(Sakemas) from 1996 to 2003. Following a similar pooled cross-sectional time-series 
data methodology to the previous section, this study contributes to the previous 
developing countries literature in two respects. Firstly, compared to the existing 
developing countries literature, the sample selection corrections based on a 
multinomial logit for a potential selection bias from a non-random sample will be 
taken into account. This is important particularly to control for the potential selection 
bias arising from the correlation between the unobserved factors that affect the choice 
of employment sectors (i.e. covered and uncovered sectors) and the unobserved 
factors that affect their hours worked. In practice, individuals who expect fixed (or 
standard) working hours are more likely to select themselves (self-selection) into the 
paid employment category, while individuals who expect more flexible (part-time) 
working hours might put themselves into uncovered sector employment (such as the 
self-employed and unpaid family workers categories), leading to potential sample 
selection bias in the OLS estimates.
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Specifically, this study compares the estimates from two different approaches to 
correct for a potential selection bias based on multinomial logit, including Lee’s 
(1983) and Bourguignon et al’s (2007) selection biased correction approaches. This 
comparison is necessary to obtain the most robust specification in examining the 
effect of minimum wage on hours worked in Indonesia. Further detail about Lee’s and 
Bourguignon et al’s methods is presented in the research methodology section below.
Secondly, this study extends the hours worked specification by analysing the effects 
of minimum wage on hours worked separately across individuals in different groups 
of workers, in terms of gender (male-female workers) and their residences (urban- 
rural areas). As discussed in the previous chapter, male and female workers behave 
differently as minimum wage increases because they have different labour market 
characteristics. Female workers with young children in their household, for example, 
tend to work shorter hours (part-time) because of their domestic responsibilities. In 
addition, workers in urban and rural areas also have a different range of compliance in 
minimum wage policy as minimum wage is more effectively enforced in urban areas 
than in rural areas. In urban areas, on average, more than 70% of paid employment is 
paid at or above the minimum wage level, while in rural areas around 60% of paid 
employment is paid at or above the minimum wage level (see table 6.17 in the 
previous chapter). Although Gindling and Terrell (2007) estimated separate equations 
for workers in the covered and uncovered sectors, they have not specifically separated 
the effects of minimum wage by gender and their residences.
The rest of this chapter is structured as follows. The second section describes the 
Indonesian hours of work conditions in practice. The third section examines the
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theoretical framework used in this study. The fourth section discusses the literature 
review of previous studies on the effects of minimum wage on hours worked. The 
fifth section describes the research methodology used in this study. The sixth section 
summarises the data used in this study. The seventh section reports the findings. 
Finally, the last section provides conclusions and policy implications.
7.2. Hours Worked in Practice
Based on government regulations, the official standard working hours for workers in 
Indonesia are 40 hours per week (equivalent to 8 hours per day for business with 5 
days of work or 7 hours per day for business with 6 days of work)43. Compared to the 
other developing countries, standard working hours in Indonesia are slightly lower. In 
comparison, the standard working hours for Chile and Mexico are 48 hours per week, 
44 hours per week for South Korea, while for Malaysia it is the same as Indonesia, at 
40 hours per week (Nayar, 1996). In addition to the standard working hours, 
Indonesian workers are allowed to work 3 hours overtime per day or 14 hours 
overtime per week (equivalent to a maximum of 54 hours in total for the workweek) 
with the overtime wage rates (the so-called overtime premium). The overtime 
premium is set at 1.5 times the normal hourly wage for the first overtime hour and 
twice the normal hourly wage for subsequent hours.
However, in practice, most industries in the manufacturing sector (and some other 
sectors) are likely to apply 48 hours per week (equivalent to 8 hours per day for 
businesses with 6 days per week) as the normal working hours (without overtime 
premium) for their workers, which is 8 hours longer than the official standard working
43 T he Indonesian  M in istry  o f  M anpow er R egulation  N o. 102/2004
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hours based on government regulation (see Irawan et al, 2000). Related to this issue, 
according to Tjandraningsih (2000), most industries, particularly in textile, garment, 
and footwear (TGF)44 industries, applied so-called “compulsory overtime”. In other 
words, although the working hours in the manufacturing sector are relatively longer 
(overtime) than the official standard working hours based on the regulation, this 
overtime is considered as normal working hours (with standard rate payment). 
Pangestu and Hendytio (1997) found that only 30% of workers in the manufacturing 
sector received the overtime premium based on the government regulation, although 
more than 70% of workers in the manufacturing sector are reported to work overtime 
(more than 40 hours per week). In practice, most of the TGF industries made their 
own overtime rates and did not comply with the government regulation for their 
overtime payment, usually at constant rates (see Tjandraningsih, 2000). In this case, 
government seems to allow employers to apply flexible standard working hours for 
their workers, as long as there is a mutual agreement between employers and their 
workers. As a result, workers are more likely to be in a vulnerable position because of 
non-compliance with the government regulation and the limited effectiveness of the 
labour union to ensure the compliance of government regulation. In addition, 
according to Pangestu and Hendytio (1997), workers’ knowledge of standard overtime 
payment is also limited. More than 90% of survey responses from women workers do 
not know specifically about the detailed overtime payment regulation.
According to Pangestu and Hendytio (1997), there are two main reasons for non- 
compliance to the overtime premium by employers based on government regulation. 
The first is the fact that employers have limited financial capacity to offer the statutory
44T G F  industries have been the m ain industries in the Indonesian  m anufactu ring  sectors.
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overtime wage rates and other benefits to their workers, particularly during the 
slowdown of the economy. The second reason is a lack of enforcement capabilities of 
the government. The Legal Aid Institute of Surabaya (1998) confirmed from their 
survey on wages of workers in East Java that there is a weak control of the 
government on the firms who fail to comply with the regulation. In practice, there are 
no effective sanctions from the government for those employers who do not comply 
with the regulation. Thus far, the focus of the government enforcement is minimum 
wage compliance, although it is also not really effective and is limited to large and 
medium enterprises45. This over-consideration by the government to minimum wage 
compliance in practice has made employers compensate for their higher labour costs 
as minimum wage increases by reducing other labour costs, including costs for the 
overtime premium (Pangestu and Hendytio, 1997)46. However, most workers seem to 
overlook this evidence, particularly due to their limited knowledge, ineffective labour 
unions, and a low level of education. Although the overtime rate is relatively lower 
than the official standard overtime payment from the government (or perhaps the same 
rate as normal hourly wages), workers will continue to work overtime, due to the fact 
that their total earnings still increase (see Pangestu and Hendytio, 1997). In this case, 
workers have limited choices for additional income rather than enter the informal 
sector or are paid below the minimum wage level.
45 Suryahadi et al (2001) reported  from  their su rvey  th at less than  5%  o f  w orkers in large and m edium  
en te rp rises are paid  below  the  m in im um  w age level, w hile  m ore  than  60%  o f  w orkers in sm all 
en te rp rises are paid  be low  the m in im um  w age level.
46 In add ition , N ay ar (1996) also found ev idence that em ployers com pensa te  the m in im um  w age 
increases in Indonesia  by reducing  the ho liday  bonus paym ents.
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Table 7.1 Average Hours Worked per week of Paid Employment by Gender,
Urban Areas Rural Areas
Male Female Total Male Female Total
Sector:
Agriculture 43.36 31.78 39.91 39.90 31.87 37.10
Mining 47.59 40.24 47.11 45.92 40.09 45.38
Electricity 43.31 41.22 43.10 42.98 39.88 42.71
Construction 47.51 46.33 47.46 47.66 47.18 47.64
Transportation 51.88 46.74 51.50 52.30 46.37 52.12
Finance 44.40 42.74 43.89 44.68 40.75 43.64
Manufacturing 47.41 45.46 46.71 46.81 43.35 45.58
Trade 50.55 50.06 50.37 50.11 49.98 50.07
Services 41.76 41.41 41.62 39.60 38.14 39.10
Total 45.78 43.27 44.98 43.58 37.52 41.85
Source: Calculated from Sakernas
Table 7.1 shows the average hours worked in paid employment categorised by gender, 
location (residence) and sector. As shown, there is a substantial variation in the hours 
worked of different groups of workers. In both urban and rural areas, workers in the 
transportation and trade sector, which usually do not require fixed hours worked per 
week, tend to work longer hours than the other sectors. Moreover, workers in the 
agriculture sector were, on average, working fewer hours due to a domination of part- 
time workers. In practice, hours worked of workers in the agriculture sector are likely 
to be seasonal. In addition, female workers tend to work shorter hours (part-time 
work) than male workers, particularly because of their domestic responsibilities that 
require less working hours.
Table 7.2 Full-time and Part-time Paid Employment by Gender and Location
Urban Areas Rural Areas








































Source: Calculated from Sakernas
2 3 9
Although the minimum wage is set based on monthly terms for full-time workers (40 
working hours per week), minimum wage policy also covers part-time workers 
(workers who work less than 40 hours per week) using some adjustment on a pro-rata 
basis, depending on how many days and hours they worked47. As pointed out by 
Smyth (1995) and Dhanani (2004), part-time work is attractive for some workers at 
particular stages of their life-cycle, for example, women with young children and 
young people who are attending school, due to the fact that there is no need for them 
to work full-time or other tasks make it impossible to work full-time (or permanently). 
In practice, as presented in table 7.2, the majority of part-time workers (more than 
50%) are found in rural areas, given the dominance of agriculture sectors with 
seasonal and shorter working hours, while workers in urban areas are generally 
working full-time. However, Dhanani (2004) confirms that the dominance of part-time 
workers in rural areas declines over time because of the urbanization from rural to 
urban areas and the structural transformation from the agriculture to the 
manufacturing sectors during the recent period. In addition, the proportion of females 
who work part-time in rural areas is about 55% of total female workers in rural areas, 
while in urban areas it is only 38% (see table 7.2).
As pointed out by Dhanani (2004), most part-time workers are voluntarily in that 
status. As presented in table 7.3, less than 10% of part-time workers were looking for 
additional work, indicating a big proportion of voluntary part-time workers in 
Indonesia. This condition implies that the incidence of part-time workers in Indonesia 
is mostly dominated by supply-side effects. In addition, part-time workers are 
typically characterized by flexible working time and casual jobs that are paid on a 
piece-rate basis or a daily basis (Smyth, 1995). Therefore, most of them are usually
47 B ased on the M inistry  o f  M anpow er R egulation  No: PE R -01 /M E N /1999
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not covered by a permanent contract and do not benefit from permanent job security, 
health insurance, and old-age pensions.
Table 7.3 Part-time Workers and ho were looking for additional or other work 
by gender, locations and sectors (% of total employment-Pooled data 1996-2003)
Urban Areas Rural Areas
Male Female Total Male Female Total
Sector:
Agriculture 8.8 4.32 6.91 9.96 4.58 7.57
Mining 7.6 - 6.51 12.17 2.82 10.79
Electricity 8.87 2.38 7.93 7.53 - 6.73
Construction 18.07 5.26 17.43 13.14 7.96 6.93
Transportation 10.82 9.77 10.73 11.81 10.95 11.5
Finance 5.68 6.66 6.2 8.63 12.68 10
Manufacturing 6.63 5.36 6.05 9.16 3.29 6.39
Trade 10.63 8.36 9.77 11.81 10.95 11.5
Services 4.58 5.49 4.98 4.78 6.86 5.55
Total 6.64 5.53 6.19 8.32 5.44 7.2
Source: Calculated from Sakernas
Figure 7.1 illustrates the kernel density estimate for the distribution of the hours 
worked among paid employment in urban areas using individual pooled data from 
1996 to 200348. The x-axis of the kernel density indicates the number of hours worked 
per week, while the y-axis shows the density. A spike (or a cluster) in the kernel 
density estimate indicates a large proportion of workers found relating to their hours 
worked. As we can see in figure 7.1, there is a substantial spike of workers who work 
around 48 hours per week for both men and women, which has to be viewed as a 
standard workweek particularly in the manufacturing sector. This spike actually 
represents around 20% of the urban workers who are working 48 hours per week 
during the sample periods. The second substantial spike is 40 hours (representing over 
10% of the urban workers), indicating that some businesses, particularly in the public 
sector, have applied 40 hours per week as a normal workweek based on the
48 T he kernel density  is estim ated  using  an E panechnicov  kernel with bandw ith  o f  0.05
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government regulation. The third highest cluster is found around 54-55 hours per 
week, indicating the maximum hours worked allowed based on the government 
recommendation.
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Moreover, there is no clear spike found at less than 40 hours per week (part-time 
workers), although there are some clusters for female workers, supporting evidence 
that urban workers are mostly working full-time. In addition, there are some clusters 
found above 60 hours per week representing some workers with very long working 
hours (and usually with very low earnings) that still exist in the labour markets. Based 
on the labour force survey data, most o f these are found working in the domestic 
helper activities, although Agrawal (1995) and Tjandraningsih (2000) also found some 
cases in the manufacturing sector. Agrawal (1995) specifically showed that workers in 
the manufacturing sector often were likely to work 12-14 hours per day usually 
without sufficient overtime payment in order to meet employer’s target. On the other 
hand, Amnesty International (2007) also reported that many women domestic workers 
worked on average 70 hours per week usually without a day off during the week, 
confirming potential workers exploitation. In practice, the government regulation for 
fundamental worker’s rights (such as Ministy of Manpower Regulation No. 13/2003)
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is more effective to be enforced to workers in business activity but less effective in 
private households and domestic workers (Amnesty International, 2007). The main 
reason is because their work takes place in the private sphere and most o f them are 
uneducated and poor.
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Figure 7.2 shows the kernel density estimate for the distribution o f hours worked 
among paid employment in rural areas mostly dominated by the agriculture sectors. 
For male workers, similar to the urban areas, there are significant spikes around 48 
and 40 hours, indicating that most of the activities in the rural areas have also applied 
48 and 40 hours per week as normal working hours (although with relatively lower 
density compared to urban areas) following the standard working hours in urban areas. 
In contrast, there are some clusters below 40 hours per week for female workers, 
confirming that there is a big proportion o f workers in rural areas with shorter working 
hours (part-time workers) than workers in urban areas. It is not surprising that a 




As mentioned in the previous section, the effect o f the minimum wage on overall 
labour demand can be assessed through the employers’ decision on how many 
workers should be employed and how many hours they should work (see Hart, 1987 
and Hamermesh, 1993). An important starting point that motivates the analysis on the 
effects o f minimum wage on hours worked is represented by the workers-hours 
demand model. In this section, the basic analysis of the employers’ choice between 
workers and hours worked based on the conventional labour demand model will be 
reviewed. Later, this study modifies the basic workers-hours labour demand model for 
the Indonesian case where the minimum wage policy exists, assuming that the 
minimum wage is binding for all paid employment in the covered sector. This model 
will actually be used as a guide to the next section analysis regarding the empirical 
work on the effects o f changes in minimum wage on hours worked in Indonesia.
7.3.1. Basic Workers-Hours Demand Model
Some influential analysis on the workers-hours demand model was conducted by Hart 
(1987) using a cost minimization approach. This model assumes that the cost of 
employing extra workers is not the same as the costs of hiring additional working 
hours. In practice, both choices relating to workers and hours require extra costs. At 
the extensive margin, employing new workers requires turnover costs, including hiring 
cost, termination cost and any other costs referred to the quasi-fixed cost of 
employment (per-worker costs), while at the intensive margin, hiring an additional 
working hour also requires extra labour costs, such as the overtime wage rates for 
workers who are in excess of their standard working hours (per-hour costs). As 
pointed out by Hart (1987), employers will employ the combinations o f workers and
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hours up to the point where the marginal cost of employing an additional worker is 
equal to the marginal cost of hiring additional hours.
Following Hart (1987), suppose the total labour cost consists of variable and fixed 
labour costs. Therefore, the simple total labour costs (C£) are:
C , = w ( h ) N  +ZN  (7.1)
where the first cost w(h) is total wage cost per worker per period of time for a number 
of hours of work, representing the variable labour cost. The second cost, Z, is the fixed 
labour cost for each worker employed relating to their specific labour investment. TV is 
the number of workers employed.
In the production function, it is usually assumed that the labour service (L) is a 
function of number of workers employed (TV) and the hours worked per workers (H). 
TV represents a stock of labour, while H  shows a flow or utilization variable. The 
simple labour service function therefore can be specified in general form as follows: 
L=F(h,N); Fh, F N> 0  (7.2)
Relating to the labour service function, it is important to note that the hours worked 
(H) is not always positively related with the labour service but it will be declining 
after long hours worked, suggesting a decline in their productivity (see Hart, 1987 and 
Calmfors and Hoel, 1988). In contrast, the number of workers (TV) tends to be 
positively associated with the labour service.
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Specifically, following Ehrenberg (1971) and Hart (1987), the labour service function 
is modified as follows, assuming that the equilibrium of hours is independent of scale. 
L = g(h) N!'a; (7.3)
g ’(h)>0 a n d g ”(h)<0 
where g(h) provides the relationship between the productivity of each worker being 
employed and their working time relating to the labour service function.





It is suggested that productivity will increase as h increases (g ’(h)>0) and after 
reaching the peak at a certain point, g(h) will be diminishing as h increases (g ”(h)<0). 
The main reason for this diminishing returns property is that productivity and 
effectiveness declines, particularly after long working hours because of a greater 
fatigue (Hart, 1987 and Calmfors and Hoel, 1988). This condition is illustrated in 
figure 7.3. g(h)/h indicates the average productivity per worker being employed per
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hour. In terms of marginal product, it is also indicated that the marginal product, g ’(h), 
will be declining after h*.
Supposing an employer would like to minimize its total labour costs by choosing the 
combination of h and N  subject to the labour services constraint, the Lagrangian is as 
follows:
J  = w{h)N + Z N -  X{L -  g{h)Nx~a) (7.4)
where X is the Lagrangian multiplier.
The first order conditions for this problem, therefore, are:
r
—  = w'(h)N -  Xg'(h)Nl~a = 0 
dh
f  = «<A) + Z - A ( l - a ) # ) r = 0
dN
~  = L -  g(h)N'~“ = 0
OA
Combining the first two conditions provides:
w \ h ) = w{h) + Z 
g \h )  (1 - a ) g ( h )
This equation provides the equilibrium level of the combination of h and N using the 
cost-minimizing approach. It confirms that firms will minimize their costs by 
employing the combinations of workers and hours worked up to the point where the 
marginal cost of employing additional workers at the extensive margin
w(h) + (Z) A
(1 -a ) g ( h )
is equal to the marginal cost of employing more hours at the intensive
margin . According to the substitution effect, if the marginal cost of
employing additional workers increases relative to the marginal cost of employing
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additional hours, employers are therefore likely to substitute additional hours for 
workers. In contrast, if the marginal cost of employing more hours rises relative to the 
marginal cost of employing more workers, employers tend to hiring more workers and 
to employing less hours for their existing workers.
7.3.2. Firms with an Overtime Premium
Hart (2004) extends the analysis of workers-hours demand model in the case of the 
presence of overtime premium legislation. As mentioned in the previous section, the 
overtime wage rate (overtime premium) is applied for workers who work a larger 
number of hours than the standard number of working hours (so-called overtime 
working). The overtime premium is usually set by government legislation as a fixed 
multiple of the standard hourly wages. In the United States, for example, workers are 
paid 1.5 times the normal hourly wage in excess of their standard hours, while in 
Indonesia workers are paid 1.5 times the normal hourly wage for the first overtime 
hour and twice the normal hourly wage for subsequent hours. However, as pointed out 
by Hart (2004), overtime is not always paid at higher rates (premium rate) than the 
standard hours’ rates. As an alternative, employers might offer the days off in lieu 
instead of premium wage rates to compensate for their overtime hours. In addition, 
some countries, including Sweden and the Netherlands, do not have premium wage 
rates legislation for workers in excess of the standard working hours (see Hart, 2004).
Similar to the previous section, Hart (2004) reviews the workers-hours demand 
analysis in the presence of overtime premium using cost-minimisation approach, 
suggesting that the hours worked are independent of scale. For simplicity, the 
overtime wage rate is assumed to be constant with respect to the number of overtime
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hours. Assuming the output is fixed, suppose an employer would like to combine their 
workers and working hours to minimize their costs. In the case of overtime, the total 
labour costs (CL) are therefore given by:
CL = w 0h0N +  wl( h - h 0)N +  ZN ;if h>h0 (7.6)
where two different wages apply to the firms, i.e. the normal wage rates (wq) for 
standard hours (ho) and the overtime premium rates (wj) for the overtime hours (h -  
ho) as long as the actual working time (h) is above the standard working time (ho). The 
labour services constraint is given by L = N x'a g(h) , which assumes that the 
equilibrium of hours is independent of scale.
Forming the Lagrangian, we have:
J  = [w0/i0N  + w, (h - h 0) N  + ZN  -  X(L -  A N “ g(h))\  (7 .7 )
The first order conditions for this problem are:
—  = w lN - X A N ag '(h) = 0 
dh
—  = w„h0 + w, (h -  h„) + Z -  X A a N “-'g(h)  = 0
ON
—  -  L -  A N °g (h )  = 0 
8A
Combining the first two conditions give:
___________   S'(h)  (7 g)
WoK +w^(h-hQ) + Z g(h)
This equation has the same structure as that in the previous section. It indicates that
the equilibrium level achieved when the ratio of the marginal cost to the marginal
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product for workers equals the ratio of the marginal cost to the marginal product for 
hours.




Source: Filer et al (1996)
Figure 7.4 presents the equilibrium level for firms with the overtime premium using 
isocost and isoquant analysis (see Filer et al, 1996 and Hart, 2004). The isoquant 
curves (Lo and Li) present the workers-hours combination that produces the same 
effective labour services. The isocost curves (Co and Ci) are kinked at the point where 
the premium rate starts to exist {ho). Therefore, the isocost area on the left-hand-side 
of ho illustrates the area where workers work shorter hours than the standard working 
hours, while the isocost area on the right-hand-side of h0 shows the area where 
workers work longer hours than the standard working hours (where the overtime 
premium is applied). In the area where the overtime premium exists, the isocost
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curves become steeper, indicating that every additional hour employed for the existing 
workers requires the sacrifice of a number of workers in order to keep the cost 
constant. In addition, the isocost is convex to the origin because of the diminishing 
marginal rates of substitution between hours and workers showing the fatigue and 
start-up effects that influence their productivity. The equilibrium level of the workers- 
hours combination, therefore, is indicated by the tangency point between the isocost 
and the isoquant curves.
7.3.3 The Minimum Wage Effect
Using the basic workers-hours demand model described in the previous section, the 
effect of minimum wage on workers-hours is discussed in this section, assuming that 
the minimum wage policy is binding for all paid employment (workers in the covered 
sector). This section can also be seen as a part of the theoretical model used in this 
chapter, providing an additional contribution particularly to the developing economies 
literature
Unlike the previous section, the profit-maximisation approach will be used, allowing 
the existence of the additional scale effect when minimum wage increases and 
assuming the output is endogenously determined. In this case, all workers-hours are 
assumed to be homogenous suggesting that the relative use of workers and hours are 
indifferent. Therefore, hours worked are assumed to be positively associated with the 
labour service (see equation 7.2), ignoring the productivity variation assumed in the 
cost-minimising approach.
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Using the same labour cost function as the previous section (see equation 7.6), the 
total labour cost function is given by:
CL = w 0h0N + wl( h - h 0)N + ZN ;if h>h0 (7.9)
where CL is total per-worker cost, w0 is the standard wage per hour, w,is the
overtime premium, /z is the actual hours, and h0 is the standard normal hours. The
overtime premium is assumed to be at constant rate.
In the case of Indonesia, it is assumed that the monthly minimum wage (M) is equal to 
the standard wage per hour ( w0) multiplied by the normal hours worked ( h0)
( w0h0 > M ),  allowing part-time workers to be included in the model. Therefore, the
firms maximize the labour service as:
L = f ( h , N ) - w 0h0N - w 0k ( h - h 0) N - Z N  (7.10)
Substituting minimum wage (M) for wQh0 gives:
L = /(/?, N ) - M N -  w0khN + kMN - Z N  (7.11)
L = f ( h , N ) - ( \ - k ) M N  - w 0khN -  ZN (7.12)
The first-order conditions for this problem are:
Lh = f h - w 0kN = 0 (7.13)
l n  = f N - w 0k h - Z  = 0 (7.14)
Lm = -(1 -  k)N = 0 (7.15)
As pointed out by Hart (2004), the second-order sufficient conditions are satisfied if 
f m  < °»/«. < 0 and Aa/aw “ > °> where the last expression is the determinant
of the cross-partials of the objective function (Jacobian determinant = D).
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Differentiating equations 7.13 and 7.14 with respect to h, N, and Musing the Cramer’s 
rule, we obtain:
fhh fh N  ~ w ok dM "0
f m  ~ w 0k f N N dN _(\-k)_
dh
dM










As fhN < fh/N using Cobb-Couglas, therefore, ----- >0.
dM
By a similar process, the effect of a change in Mon N  yields:
dN = f hh 0 







As f hh < 0 by assumption, the numerator is negative. Therefore ------ < 0.
dM
As presented in equation (7.17) above, the relationship between the minimum wage 
(M) and the actual hours (h) is positive, while the effect of the minimum wage (M) on 
employment is negative. This result is consistent with the substitution effect prediction
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that an increase in the monthly minimum wage is predicted to decrease the number of 
workers and is compensated for by requiring longer hours for the existing workers, 
due to the fact that an increase in the monthly minimum wage is per-worker cost and 
not per-hour cost.
7.4. Literature Review
This section reviews the previous empirical studies in international publications on the 
effects of minimum wages on hours worked. According to the standard competitive 
model, an increase in the minimum wage is generally predicted to reduce the demand 
for labour. However, in the standard textbook presentations, this reduction is usually 
interpreted as a reduction in number of workers (employment) rather than a reduction 
in hours worked per worker (see for example Filer et al, 1996). In practice, besides 
reducing their numbers of workers at the extensive margins, employers might also 
adjust their labour utilization at the intensive margin by changing their workers’ hours 
worked or changing the relative use of full-time and part-time for their existing 
workers (Hamermesh, 1993). In addition, Hamermesh (1993) also pointed out that, in 
the short run, employers are more likely to change their workers’ hours worked than 
to change their number of workers in response to minimum wage. The potential 
reason is because the hours worked adjustment costs tend to be lower than the 
employment adjustment costs (Connolly and Gregory, 2002).
Although there are large numbers of empirical studies on the effect of minimum wage 
on employment, there are only a few studies that specifically focus on the effect of 
minimum wage on hours worked. According to Brown (1999), one of the reasons is 
because of data unavailability on workers’ weekly hours for long time periods. One of
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the earliest studies that examined the effect of minimum wage on hours worked, as an 
alternative measure to employment, is the study of minimum wage and long run 
elasticity of demand for low-wage labour in the United States manufacturing sector 
conducted by Zucker (1973). Using a dynamic panel data method from seven non­
durable goods industries, Zucker (1973) found that an increase in minimum wage 
reduced both the number of workers and the average weekly hours with the long-run 
elasticities o f -0.79 and -0.91, respectively. To check the robustness of the result, he 
also estimated the effect of minimum wage on labour demand using a two-stage least 
squares method. The result remained negative and significant with the estimated 
elasticities o f -1.01 for workers and -1.15 for hours worked, suggesting that the result 
was robust across different specifications. Relating to this result, Zucker (1973) 
argued that employers respond to an increase in minimum wage by substituting more 
capital for their unskilled labour (both in terms of hours worked and workers), 
particularly in the long run. In addition, the hours effects were relatively larger than 
workers effects because of high fixed employment costs.
In more recent panel data studies, Zavodny (2000) and Couch and Wittenburg (2001) 
found contradictory results using different sets of United States data. Couch and 
Wittenburg (2001) estimated the effect of the minimum wage on teenage hours 
worked using CPS monthly data from January 1979 to December 1992. The average 
hours of work by all teenagers in their primary job was employed as the dependent 
variable, while minimum wage measure used in the equation was the log of state 
minimum wage. Couch and Wittenburg (2001) found that an increase in the state 
minimum wage level reduced the average hours of work with an elasticity of -0.48. 
Similar to Zucker (1973), Couch and Wittenburg (2001) found that the hours worked
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elasticity was larger than the size of workers elasticity, suggesting that employers 
adjusted their labour utilization in the short run by changing their workers’ hours 
rather than changing their number of workers (employment).
Zavodny (2000) employed state annual panel data for teenage workers from 1979 to 
1993 to explore the effects of the minimum wage on hours and employment. Similar 
to Couch and Wittenberg (2001), she used the average hours worked of both “all 
teens” and “among teen workers” as dependent variables, while minimum wage 
measures were the log of real minimum wage and the log of relative minimum wage 
(weighted by the average adult earnings). Contrary to Couch and Wittenberg (2001), 
Zavodny (2000) found that an increase in minimum wage was positively associated 
with the teens average hours worked. The reason for this positive effect was because 
employers make adjustment by substituting their high-skilled teenage employment for 
low-skilled adult and teenage employment, indicating the presence of a dominating 
substitution effect. Consistent with the panel data estimate, using an individual level 
estimate Zavodny (2000) also found that the minimum wage was positively associated 
with the hours worked. Specifically, she found that an increase in minimum wage 
(indicated by the larger wage gap) by US$1 increased hours worked of the affected 
teen workers who remained employed by 4.1 hours.
A more comprehensive study using the United States data was conducted by Neumark 
et al (2004). Using the individual level panel data set from 1979 to 1997, they 
estimated the effect of minimum wage on the full set of the margins, including hourly 
wage, employment, hours worked, and labour income, at different points of wage 
distribution. Evidence from the hours effect suggested that effects of the minimum
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wage on hours worked were mixed, depending on the workers’ position in the wage 
distribution. Specifically, Neumark et al (2004) found that an increase in minimum 
wage reduced hours worked for those who are initially paid around minimum wage 
level (low-wage workers) with the elasticites about -0.3. In contrast, hours worked 
were predicted to increase for those who are initially paid above minimum wage level 
(high-wage worker). Similar to Zavodny (2000), this result suggested that employers 
substituted their high-wage workers hours worked for low-wage workers hours 
worked in response to an increase in minimum wage. In addition, the lagged effects 
were relatively stronger than the contemporaneous effects suggesting that employers 
tended to adjust their workers’ hours worked with lagged response.
Stewart and Swaffield (2008) investigated the effect of the 1999 minimum wage 
introduction in the United Kingdom on the working hours for low-wage workers using 
difference-in-differences estimates from the individual level panel data sets. The 
“treatment” group was constructed using the group of individuals paid below the 
minimum wage level before the minimum wage introduction (directly affected by the 
minimum wage introduction), while the “control” group was the group of individuals 
already paid above the minimum wage level before the minimum wage introduction. 
Srtewart and Swaffield (2008) focused on two different hours of work measures, 
including basic paid working hours (before overtime hours) and total paid working 
hours (after overtime hours). The result showed that the introduction of minimum 
wage generally reduced basic and total paid working hours for both male and female 
low-wage workers by between 1 and 2 hours per week. In addition, similar to 
Neumark et al (2004), the lagged effects were found to be stronger than the initial 
effects for both basic and total paid working hours.
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A few studies have examined the effects of minimum wage on the relative use of full­
time and part-time employment. One of the earliest studies of the effects of minimum 
wage on the shift between full-time and part-time employment is the study conducted 
by Gramlich (1976) by using the quarterly time series data of the United States from 
1963 to 1975. He found that an increase in the minimum wage reduced full-time 
employment and substituted part-time employment, particularly for teenage and adult 
male workers. For adult male workers, Gramlich (1976) argued that the result might 
be downward biased because the value of leisure time was not taken into account in 
this study. In contrast, there was no tendency towards substitution away from full-time 
employment into part-time employment for adult female workers, suggesting that they 
clearly benefited from an increase in minimum wage.
In the more recent study, Ressler et al (1996) investigated the effect of minimum wage 
on the part-time/full-time employment ratio using the annual time series data of the 
United States from 1950 to 1987. Similar to Gramlich (1976), Ressler et al (1996) 
found that an increase in minimum wage induced employers to substitute more part- 
time workers for full-time workers. Unlike Gramlich (1976), they argued that the 
reason was because of the spillover effects of minimum wage to the fringe benefits 
costs and training costs for full-time workers, suggesting a potential increase in the 
fixed employment costs to hire more full-time workers. In practice, Neumark et al 
(2004) pointed out that the substitution from full-time employment into part-time 
employment was in line with a decrease in hours worked.
In contrast to developed countries studies, there are an extremely limited number of 
publications in examining the effect of minimum wage on hours worked in developing
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countries. However, there have been some studies conducted in Latin-America that 
have used hours worked per worker as an alternative measure of the effect of 
minimum wage on employment, such as El-Hamidi and Terrell (2002) and Gindling 
and Terrell (2007) for Costa Rica, and Lemos (2004d) for Brazil. As mentioned in the 
previous chapter, the main difference between minimum wage implementation in 
developed and developing countries is the fact that the degree of compliance with 
minimum wage policy is relatively lower in developing countries, given the lack of 
enforcement and the greater proportion of the informal uncovered sector employment.
El-Hamidi and Terrell (2002) estimated the effect of the Costa Rican industrial 
minimum wage on employment using industrial panel data for the covered and 
uncovered sectors from 1980 to 1992. In Costa Rica, the minimum wage is set 
differently across occupations and skill-levels, providing more variation in minimum 
wage level. Two different measures of employment were used as dependent variables. 
Those were log of total number of workers employed and log of hours worked in the 
average week. Specifically, El-Hamidi and Terrell (2002) found that the minimum 
wage was positively associated with hours worked particularly when toughness (the 
ratio of minimum wage to the average wage) was low, indicating the presence of 
monopsony power in the labour market. However, a minimum wage increase was 
negatively associated with hours worked when minimum wage reached 66%-71 % of 
the average wage (when toughness was high). The result suggests that an increase in 
minimum wage by 1% reduced hours worked of covered sector employment by 0.2% 
when toughness was high. In addition, El-Hamidi and Terrell (2002) also found that 
there was a significant positive effect of minimum wage on hours worked of workers
2 5 9
in the uncovered sector. The result showed that an increase in minimum wage by 1% 
increased uncovered sector employment (i.e. self-employment) by 1.2%.
Contrary to the previous Costa Rican study, Gindling and Terrell (2007) found 
different results using individual pooled cross-section data from 1988 to 2000. They 
found that an increase in minimum wage reduced the average number of hours worked 
by 0.062% in the covered sector. The result confirmed that employers respond to an 
increase in the minimum wage by reducing the number of hours worked as well as the 
number of workers. However, they found that there was no significant effect of 
minimum wage on hours of work of workers in the uncovered sector. In addition, 
Gindling and Terrell (2007) extended the analysis by asking how minimum wage 
affects hours worked throughout the wage distribution. They found that an increase in 
minimum wage reduced hours worked only at the bottom half of the skills 
distribution, where the largest effect was found in the 2nd skill deciles of the 
distribution. In conclusion, Gindling and Terrell (2007) confirmed that the 
employment effect is larger than the hours effect, indicating that employers are more 
likely to adjust their number of workers’ than their workers hours worked in the short 
run in response to minimum wage increases.
Table 7.4 summarises the estimated effects of minimum wage on hours worked in the 
literature. Previous studies generally showed two different ways that the minimum 
wage can affect hours worked. Firstly, a higher minimum wage might lead to a 
decrease in hours worked. This evidence supports the standard competitive model that 
an increase in the minimum wage reduces the quantity of labour demanded, implying 
that hours demanded also fall, particularly in the short run. This evidence also
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suggests that the effects of the minimum wage on hours worked are dominated by the 
scale effect rather than the substitution effect. Moreover, from the supply-side, as 
pointed out by Zavodny (2000), workers who earned a higher wage because of an 
increase in minimum wage might also want to reduce their hours worked, indicating a 
combination of income and substitution effects. However, in contrast to Zavodny 
(2000), full-time workers in Indonesia are unlikely to move to part-time employment 
because part-time employment is usually not covered by a permanent contract and do 
not receive any benefits, such as job security, health insurance, and old-age pensions 
from employers.
Secondly, an increase in the minimum wage might lead to an increase in hours 
worked. The main argument behind this evidence is that employers might substitute 
their high-skilled workers hours worked for less-skilled workers hours worked, 
confirming the presence of a substitution effect. The other reason is the monopsony 
present in their labour market that increases their employment, as well as their hours 
worked.
Comparing this chapter to the previous minimum wage studies, firstly, the minimum 
wage in Indonesia is set based on a monthly term, while the minimum wages in most 
of the other countries are set based on hourly terms. Therefore, it might be expected 
that the hours worked will be more sensitive to a change in minimum wage in the 
countries where the minimum wage is set based on an hourly term rather than in 
Indonesia where the monthly minimum wage exists. Secondly, this chapter extends 
the previous minimum wage studies in developing countries by employing the sample 
selection corrections based on the multinomial logit model. As mentioned above, this
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is important to control for the potential selection bias arising from the correlation 
between the unobserved factors that affect the choice of employment categories (i.e. 
covered and uncovered sectors) and the unobserved factors that affect their hours 
worked. For developing countries, the choice of employment categories is important 
for discussion, given a high proportion of workers in the uncovered sector. As far as 
we know, none of the previous minimum wage studies particularly in developing 
countries are concerned with this selection bias issue. Thirdly, similar to the previous 
chapter, the effect of minimum wage on hours worked will be discussed separately 
across individuals in different groups of workers, in terms of gender (male-female 
workers) and their residences (urban-rural areas) because they have different labour 
market characteristics. Gindling and Terrell (2007), for example, discussed only 
separately across workers in covered and uncovered sectors, but not separately across 
gender (male and female workers) and their residences (urban and rural areas).
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Table 7.4 Previous Studies on t
C o u n try /A u th or M ethod M in im um  W age  
M easure
R esult








In (1-MW/Wage.,) An increase in the minimum wage reduced both 
the number o f workers and the average weekly 
hours with the long-run elasticities of -0.79 for 
number employed and -0.91 for the hours 
worked.
Unted States: Couch 
& Wittenburg (2001)
OLS; Fixed 
effect for each 
state-month
Log of state minimum 
wage
An increase in the state minimum wage level 




OLS; State level 
and individual 
panel data
(1). Log of state minimum 
wage (deflated using PCE 
index or the relative 
minimum wage)
(2). Wage gap for affected 
teens worker
An increase in the minimum wage was 
positively associated with the teens average 
hours worked.
United States: 
Neumark et al (2004)
OLS; Fixed 
effect for each 
state-year
mwt - m w t_x
group
wage
An increase in the minimum wage reduced the 
hours worked for those who are initially paid at 
around the minimum wage level (low-wage 
worker). On the other hand, hours worked were 
shown to increase for those who are initially 
paid above the minimum wage level (high-wage 
worker).
MW
or each worker’s 
position in the 
listribution
United Kingdom: 
Dickens et al (1999)
Industrial Panel 
Data estimates
'foughness Positive effects across measures and 
specifications
United Kingdom: 







(1) Proportion of workers 
paid below the MW level
(2) Wage Gap
The introduction of the minimum wage led to a 
reduction in both number employed and total 
hours of work of the residential care home sector 
employment, with elasticities between -0.14 and 
-0.39.
United Kingdom: 





Individuals who earn 
below the minimum wage 
level at the time of the 
minimum wage 
introduction
The introduction of the minimum w age reduced 
the paid working hours for both male and female 
low' wage w'orkers.
D ev elo p in g  C ou ntries :
Costa Rica: El- 




Toughness An increase in the minimum wage was 
associated with an increase in both number 
employed and hours worked in the covered 
sectors, indicating the existence of monopsony. 
There was also a significant positive effect on 
the hours worked in the uncovered sector.
Costa Rica: 
Gindling & Terrell 
(2007)
OLS Log of real minimum wage An increase in the minimum wage reduced the 
average number of hours w orked by 0.062% in the 
covered sectors. There was no significant effect on 
the hours worked in the uncovered sector.
Colombia:
Arango & Pachon 
(2004)
OLS Ratio o f the minimum wage 
to median income
An increase in the minimum wage reduced the 
number of hours worked of the household heads 
and non-head members, being stronger for 
household heads.
Brazil: Lemos (2004d) Regional Panel 
Data estimates
Log of Real Minimum 
Wage. Toughness. Fraction 
Affected, Fraction At, and 
Fraction Below
An increase in the minimum wage by 10% 
decreased the employment rate (jobs effect) by 
0.001% but increased the hours worked (hours 
effect) by 0.059%. suggesting an increase in total 
employment (man-hours) in short run. In the long 
run. an increase in the minimum wage reduced e 
total employment (man-hours) across all 
estimates, but the hours effect was still positive.
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7.5. Research Methodology
The effects of changes in minimum wage on hours worked will be estimated 
particularly for paid employment in both urban and rural areas using the individual 
level panel data set. As mentioned above, there is a potential problem relating to the 
appropriate specification in this hours worked estimation. In practice, individuals 
selected in the sample might select themselves (self-selection) into an employment 
sector (or category) where they have a preference depending on their potential hours 
worked, suggesting that they are likely to be non-random samples from the 
population. Specifically, individuals who expect fixed (or standard) working hours 
might select themselves into the paid employment category, while individuals who 
expect more flexible working hours might put themselves into the self-employed and 
unpaid family workers categories. As a result, the choice of employment sectors (for 
instance, paid employment in the covered sector or self-employed and unpaid family 
worker in the uncovered sector) tends to be closely related with their hours of work. 
This implies that the unobserved factors which affect the choice of employment 
sectors (covered or uncovered sectors) are also likely to be correlated with the 
unobserved factors in the hours worked equation, suggesting a potential sample 
selection bias in the Ordinary Least Square (OLS) estimator.
To control for a potential sample selection bias, two-step procedure of selection biased 
corrections will be employed when estimating the effects of minimum wage on hours 
worked in Indonesia. This study presents the comparison of the estimates from two 
methods to correct for selection bias based on the multinomial logit model, including 
Lee’s (1983) and Bourguignon et al’s (2007) methods. This comparison is important 
in order to obtain the most robust estimates of the effects of minimum wage on hours
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worked in Indonesia. For comparison purpose, the hours worked equation will also be 
estimated using OLS (without correction process).
In general, following Lee (1983) and Bourguignon et al (2007), the two-step 
procedure of selection biased corrections are as follow:
y* = z7 s +rls> s = 1,2, 3,4, (7.16)
hj = xpj + fij\ j  = 3 = paid employment (7.17)
In the first equation (first-stage of estimation), y] is a latent dependent variable
representing four different employment categories, including (1) self-employed, (2) 
unpaid family worker, (3) paid employment, and (4) unemployed. Therefore, 5 is a 
categorical variable, indicating the selection process between these four different 
employment categories. The multinomial logit model of these four categories of 
employment will be estimated in order to obtain the predicted values used to generate 
the selectivity term(s) associated with each employment categories. This selection 
term(s) will then be used as an additional explanatory variable(s) in the hours worked 
equation (second-stage of estimation). Specifically, in equation 7.17 (second-stage of 
estimation), h is the hours worked variable (as the outcome variable) examined for 
paid employment in the covered sector category. On the right-hand-side of the 
equations, z and x are a set of the explanatory variables, while 77 and p  are the error 
terms. Further detail about the difference between Lee’s and Bourguignon et al’s 
methods will be presented in section 7.5.1 and 7.5.2.
As indicated in Bourguignon et al (2007), a general expression for the conditional
probabilities of each employment category that will be used to generate the selection
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term(s) associated with each employment category in the first-stage of estimation is 
given by:
exp (zy)
P* --T ------------------------------------------------  (7.18)
£ e x p  (zys)
k=0
where the explanatory variables (z) used in the multinomial logit model are:
• log of real provincial minimum wage;
• gender (female is the reference group),
• a set of age group (>=50 years old is the reference group),
• a set of marital status (singles are the reference group),
• a set of highest education completed (not finished primary school yet or never
been in school is the reference group),
• a set of provincial dummy variables (West Java is the reference group),
• a set of year dummy variables (1996 is the reference group).
• a set of family background variables, including head of household (not head of 
household is the reference group) and number of children in the household (no 
children is the reference group).
Relating to the explanatory variables, as pointed out by Zhang (2004), Asadullah 
(2006) and Ewoudou and Vencatachellum (2006), the identifying variables (at least 
one variable) that are likely to affect the employment sector choices (in the first-stage 
of estimation) but unlikely to affect the outcome variable (hours worked in the 
second-stage of estimation) are necessarily needed to identify the selection term(s). 
Otherwise, the selection biased corrections will provide similar results to OLS (see 
Ewoudou and Vencatachellum, 2006). In practice, it is relatively difficult to find good
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identifying variables in this study because there is a close relationship between the 
employment categories and their hours worked. In other words, most of the observable 
and the unobserved variables that affect the employment categories are also predicted 
to affect their hours worked.
As suggested by Purwaningsih and Murtiningsih’s (2006) study of Central Java in 
Indonesia, dummy variables of highest education completed are suitable to be 
employed as the identifying variables for selection equation purposes (first-stage of 
estimation). As pointed out by Purwaningsih and Murtiningsih (2006), the individuals’ 
hours worked will not be affected by the levels of education as workers tend to work 
similar hours regardless their levels of education. In other words, there is no 
significant difference in terms of hours worked between workers with a higher level of 
education and workers with a lower level of education. However, levels of education 
are likely to substantially affect the employment categories. In practice, higher levels 
of education are expected to increase the probability of being in paid employment, 
while lower levels of education are predicted to increase the probability of being self- 
employed and an unpaid family worker in the uncovered sector.
Looking at the correlation coefficients, levels of education have higher correlations 
with the employment categories than the hours worked across gender (male and 
female workers) and their residences (urban and rural areas) (see table 7.5). Compared 
to the other identifying variable candidates, such as marital status, number of children 
in the household, or family background variable (head or non head of household), 
levels of education also have lower correlations with the hours worked. Therefore, we 
argue that levels of education will be the most appropriate as the identifying variables
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in the selection equation of the hours worked estimation using our labour force survey 
data. In this case, highest education completed are divided into six education 
categories including (a) university, (b) academy (vocational education), (c) senior high 
school, (d) junior high school, (e) primary school, (f) not finished primary school (as a 
reference variable).
Table 7.5 Correlation Coefficients between Levels of Education and Employment
Categories/Hours Wor ted (Pooled Data 1996-20( 3)
P rim ary
School
Jun ior  H igh  
School
Sen ior H igh  
School
A cadem y U n iversity
E m ploym ent:
U rban A reas -  M ales 0.1769 0.0359 0.2197 0.0938 0.1252
U rban A reas -  F em a les 0.1926 0.0340 0.2879 0.1388 0.1599
Rural A reas -  M ales 0.0733 0.0717 0.2121 0.1093 0.0962
Rural A reas - F em ales 0.0401 0.0717 0.2340 0.1235 0.0961
H ours W orked:
U rban A reas -  M ales 0.0202 0.0418 0.0376 0.0387 0.0482
U rban A reas -  F em a les 0.0084 0.0131 0.0673 0.0059 0.0060
Rural A reas -  M ales 0.0319 0.0121 0.0502 0.0008 0.0027
Rural A reas - F em ales 0.0094 0.0186 0.0814 0.0403 0.0174
Source: Calculated from Sakem as
As noted above, two different methods to correct for selection bias based on 
multinomial logit model, including Lee’s and Bourguignon et al’s methods will be 
employed. Specifically, these two different correction methods are as follows.
7.5.1. Lee’s Method
Lee (1983) extends the traditional Heckman’s (1979) selection biased correction using 
the multinomial logit model (with more than two choices) in the selection equation. 
As pointed out by Trost and Lee (1984) and Bourguignon et al (2007), Lee’s method 
assumes that the error terms in the selection equations and the error term in the 
outcome equation are jointly normally distributed. Based on this assumption, 
specifically, the consistent estimator (/?7) in the hours worked equation will be 
obtained by estimating the following equation in the second-stage of estimation.
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f
=  XP, - —( p ) '  K  + Vj ’ fo r j= 3  (7.19)j  r j
4o‘lpJ •^ y  is the selection term generated using Lee’s method, where O is the standard
normal probability density function, (j) is the standard normal cumulative distribution 
function, and Ps is the conditional probabilities of each employment category (see 
equation 7.18). Therefore, Lee’s selection term is equivalent to Heckman’s inverse 
Mills ratio which is defined as the ratio between standard normal probability density 
function and standard normal cumulative distributive function (Hilmer, 2001 and 
Zhang, 2004). As a consequence the selection term for individuals self-selecting into j  
employment category is negative (see equation 7.19). This implies that the 
interpretation is different (reverse) to the common coefficients (see Hilmer, 2001 and 
Zhang, 2004). For instance, a negative selection term therefore indicates a positive 
selection effect, implying that individuals selected into the sample are likely to work 
more hours than individuals randomly selected from the population. On the other side, 
a positive estimate indicates a negative selection effect, suggesting that individuals 
selected into the sample are likely to work fewer hours than individuals randomly 
selected from the population.
Using the Monte Carlo simulation, Bourguignon et al (2007) indicated that there are at
least two main limitations of Lee’s correction method. Firstly, because Lee’s method
assumes that the error terms are jointly normally distributed, this implies that the
estimator will be robust when the correlations between the unobserved factors that
make one more likely to choose one employment sector choice against any other
employment sector choices and the unobserved factors in the outcome equation (hours
worked equation) are identical with the same sign or direction. In other words, the
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estimator is likely to be biased when the correlations among the unobserved factors 
have opposite (or different) direction. In practice, it is not clear whether the 
unobserved factors that make one more likely to choose paid employment against any 
other employment sector choices are correlated in the same sign or direction with the 
unobserved factors in hours worked equation. Secondly, using Monte Carlo 
experiments, Bourguignon et al (2007) also indicated that Lee’s method is robust only 
in the case of small samples. Using relatively big samples, Lee’s method tends to 
provide inconsistent results, particularly compared to Dubin and McFadden’s method 
using more than one parameter in the selection term.
7.5.2. Bourguignon et al’s method
As an alternative, Bourguignon et al’s method will be employed in order to correct for 
a potential selection bias49. Bourguignon et al’s method is actually a modification of 
Durbin and McFadden’s (1984) correction method, suggesting a set of normal 
distributions in the error terms, both in the selection and the outcome equation. 
Moreover, it is assumed that there is a linear correlation between the normalized error 
terms in the selection equation and the normalized error term in the outcome equation 
(see Bourguignon et al, 2007). In contrast to Lee’s method, both Bourguignon et al’s 
and Dubin and McFadden’s method estimates all correlation patterns between the 
error term for each employment sector choices in the multinomial logit model and the 
error term in the outcome equation. Therefore, the number of selection terms will be 
equal to the number of employment sector choices from the first-stage estimation 
(Dimova and Gang, 2007). In contrast, Lee’s method provides only one choice
49 It is estim ated  using the com m and selm log (dm f2) in the statistical program  STA TA .
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parameter of selection term, assuming that all of the error terms are jointly normally 
distributed.
Specifically, following Bourguignon et al (2007), the hours worked equation in the 
second-stage of estimation is as follows:
p
hj = xfij + r, m(P, ) + 2J r'] m(P] ) — ± -  + (7.20)
7=4 ( T y  -  U
where is the correlation between the error term in the hours worked equation and 
the normalized error term in the selection equation for all of the employment sector 
choices, while Pj is the probability that a category j  is selected and m(Pj) is the fitted 
probabilities of multinomial logit model in the first-stage estimation.
Using the Monte Carlo experiment, Bourguignon et al (2007) indicated that their 
method is generally robust across different sample sizes and different number of 
choices designs compared to Lee’s method. Moreover, Bourguignon et al (2007) 
indicated that their method is superior to the other methods particularly when 
normality is needed in the outcome equation. In addition, as pointed out by Dimova 
and Gang (2007), using Bourguignon et al’s method, we can identify which 
employment category in the samples causes the selection bias. Although Lee’s method 
tells us whether the direction of sample selection bias is positive or negative, it is not 
clear which employment category causes the selection bias in the estimation.
Compared to Lee’s method, the interpretation of selection terms is relatively
straightforward. In other words, a positive estimate indicates a positive selection
effect, while a negative estimate indicates a negative selection effect. Specifically, as
suggested by Dimova and Gang (2007), a negative coefficient in the outcome equation
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therefore would mean that individuals in a specific sector are likely to work fewer 
hours than a random set of comparable individuals in the population because 
individuals with worse (less suitable) unobserved characteristics have allocated 
themselves into this sector out of an alternative one, or because individuals with better 
(more suitable) unobserved characteristics have allocated themselves elsewhere from 
this sector. On the other side, a positive coefficient in the outcome equation would 
mean that individuals in a specific sector are likely to work more hours than a random 
set of comparable individuals in the population because individuals with better (more 
suitable) unobserved characteristics have allocated themselves into this sector out of 
an alternative one (see Dimova and Gang, 2007 for a further example of interpretation 
of Bourguignon et al’s method).
Using both Lee’s and Bourguignon et al’s method, two additional explanatory 
variables will be added in the hours worked equation (as second-stage estimation). 
Two additional explanatory variables in the hours worked equation are as follows:
• a set of sectoral activities of individual jobs (the agriculture sector is the 
reference group).
• the provincial unemployment rate correlated with individual residence in the 
survey.
All of the hours worked equations will be estimated separately for male and female 
workers in the urban and rural areas. This is important in order to capture any 




Similar to the previous chapter, the main source of the individual level data set used in 
this study is the Indonesian Labour Force Survey (the so-called Sakemas) for the 
years 1996-2003. The individuals (aged>15) included in the sample are those who 
held one of the primary activities as follows: self employed, unpaid family worker, 
paid employment and unemployed. Following the same definition as the previous 
section, paid employment is the category of employment that is legally covered by 
minimum wage, while self-employed and unpaid family workers are categorized as 
employment in the uncovered sector.
Individuals who reported that their primary activity is a student, a housewife (or a 
house-husband), or those with a major activity “other” than working at least one hour 
during the week prior to the survey were excluded from the sample. Unemployed or 
discouraged workers who were not willing to work were also excluded from the 
sample, suggesting that they were not in the labour force. As a result, about 35% of 
the Labour Force Survey samples were not used in this study because they were not in 
the labour force.
The sample means in the selection equation (first-stage estimation) are presented in 
table 6.4 in the previous chapter as we used the same sample as the previous chapter. 
Regarding to the outcome equation (second-stage of estimation), this study focuses 
specifically on paid employment as the category of employment legally covered by 
minimum wage, consisting of 129,883 workers in urban areas and 99,703 workers in 
rural areas. A high proportion of paid employment in urban areas confirms that
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workers in urban areas are predominantly in the paid employment category and 
therefore legally covered by the minimum wage policy, while in contrast, low 
proportion of paid employment in rural areas indicates that workers in rural areas are 
dominated by workers in the uncovered sectors.
In terms of hours worked, individuals reported total hours worked in their primary 
activity on a daily and weekly basis during the week prior to the labour force survey. 
Following the previous studies (see for example Zavodny, 2000 and Gindling and 
Terrell, 2007), this study uses hours worked per week as a common unit of the hours 
worked variable rather than hours worked per day. All observations that reported zero 
or missing hours worked are excluded from the sample. Moreover, as mentioned 
before, the samples are divided into several groups of workers, including gender 
(males and females) and their residence (urban and rural areas).
In addition, similar to previous chapters, minimum wage data used in this study is the 
regional monthly minimum wage level obtained from the Department of Manpower 
and Central Bureau of Statistics (CBS) weighted by the provincial consumer price 
index (CPI). Finally, the provincial unemployment rate is obtained from the CBS 
publication.
Table 7.6 presents the sample means of paid employment for both males and females, 
as well as in both urban and rural areas. As indicated in table 7.6, in terms of marital 
status, in urban areas, the proportion of married women (46.2%) is lower than the 
proportion of married men (72.2%) due to the possible higher commitment for female 
workers with their household responsibilities. However, the proportion of married
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women in rural areas (61.2%) is relatively higher due to a higher possibility of 
working part-time, particularly in the agriculture sector.
Table 7.6 Sample Means (Pooled Data 1996-2003)
Urban Rural
Male Female Total Male Female Total
Marital Status: 
Married 0.722 0.462 0.638 0.745 0.612 0.707
Separated 0.015 0.089 0.039 0.021 0.148 0.057
Single 0.263 0.449 0.323 0.234 0.24 0.236
Education: 
Below Primary 0.098 0.054 0.069 0.149 0.242 0.174
Primary 0.180 0.191 0.184 0.381 0.325 0.365
Junior H.S. 0.138 0.178 0.165 0.174 0.104 0.154
Senior H.S. 0.437 0.394 0.423 0.211 0.201 0.209
Academy 0.056 0.093 0.068 0.031 0.052 0.037
University 0.091 0.090 0.091 0.054 0.076 0.061
Age:
age15-24 0.169 0.339 0.224 0.217 0.264 0.231
age25-34 0.344 0.334 0.341 0.313 0.289 0.306
age35-50 0.369 0.259 0.333 0.351 0.318 0.342
Age >50 0.118 0.068 0.102 0.119 0.129 0.121
Sector of Activities: 
Agriculture 0.049 0.042 0.045 0.304 0.404 0.331
Mining 0.015 0.003 0.011 0.025 0.006 0.02
Industry 0.213 0.244 0.223 0.156 0.214 0.173
Electricity 0.009 0.002 0.007 0.004 0.001 0.003
Construction 0.114 0.012 0.082 0.167 0.014 0.123
Trade 0.141 0.168 0.150 0.043 0.050 0.045
Transportation 0.085 0.018 0.064 0.059 0.005 0.044
Finance 0.03 0.029 0.029 0.007 0.006 0.007
Services 0.344 0.482 0.389 0.235 0.300 0.254
Source: Calculated from Sakernas
In terms of levels of education, the modal education category of a worker in urban 
areas is senior high school qualification (42.3%), while in rural areas the modal 
education category of a worker is primary school qualification (36.5%). Relating to 
the age groups, the proportion of workers increases as age increases but it will decline 
among the older groups of workers, indicating an inverted U-shaped relationship. 
Finally, in terms of sector of activities, the employment proportions of workers in 
urban areas are services (39%) and manufacturing sectors (22%), while the
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employment proportions of workers in rural areas are the agriculture (33%) and 
service sector (25%).
7.7. Empirical Results
7.7.1. Paid Employment in Urban Areas
This section discusses the empirical results of the effects of changes in the minimum 
wage on hours worked of paid employment in urban areas. Following the same 
classification as defined in the previous chapter, paid employment is classified as the 
category of employment legally covered by the minimum wage policy, while self- 
employed and unpaid family workers are classified as workers employed in the 
uncovered sector. As mentioned in the previous chapter, although paid employment is 
the category of employment legally covered by the minimum wage policy, there is a 
high proportion of paid employment which earns a wage below the minimum wage 
level. In this section, the effects of changes in minimum wage on overall paid 
employment are examined, while in the next section the effects of the minimum wage 
on hours worked of paid employment in the covered sector will specifically be 
discussed.
As mentioned above, in practice individuals might select themselves (self-selection) 
into an employment category (such as paid employment or self-employed) depending 
on their potential hours worked preference, suggesting the presence of sample 
selection bias. As discussed in the research methodology section, if there is a 
correlation between the unobserved characteristics which affect the employment 
categories (i.e. paid employment in the covered sector or self-employed and unpaid 
family workers in the uncovered sector) and the unobserved characteristics which
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affect their hours worked, then Ordinary Least Square (OLS) estimation is likely to be 
biased. Therefore, the selection biased corrections are required to provide consistent 
and efficient estimates.
Table 7.7 Employment Equation in Urban Areas, Males (First-stage Estimation)
Self-Employed
Unpaid Family 
Worker Paid Employment Unemployed
M.E. P value M.E. P value M.E. P value M.E. P value
Lrealmw 0.0220 0.036 0.0071 0.163 -0.0169 0.139 -0.0122 0.041
Married 0.1049 0.000 -0.0142 0.000 -0.0195 0.001 -0.0712 0.000
Separated 0.1257 0.000 -0.0157 0.000 -0.0788 0.000 -0.0311 0.000
Primary -0.0463 0.000 -0.0061 0.002 0.0581 0.000 -0.0057 0.135
Junior H.S. -0.1088 0.000 -0.0061 0.002 0.1086 0.000 0.0063 0.113
Senior H.S. -0.2532 0.000 -0.0217 0.000 0.2320 0.000 0.0429 0.000
Academy -0.3098 0.000 -0.0310 0.000 0.3135 0.000 0.0274 0.000
University -0.3214 0.000 -0.0300 0.000 0.3074 0.000 0.0440 0.000
age15-24 -0.1482 0.000 -0.0244 0.000 0.1405 0.000 0.0321 0.000
age25-34 -0.0770 0.000 -0.0349 0.000 0.1256 0.000 -0.0136 0.001
age35-50 -0.0677 0.000 -0.0298 0.000 0.1238 0.000 -0.0263 0.000
Head of HH 0.1053 0.000 -0.0863 0.000 0.0658 0.000 -0.0847 0.000
1 child -0.0153 0.000 -0.0002 0.875 0.0206 0.000 -0.0051 0.004
>=2 children -0.0019 0.577 -0.0020 0.196 0.0100 0.009 -0.0061 0.004
Year 1997 0.0014 0.738 0.0054 0.008 -0.0031 0.502 -0.0037 0.143
Year 1998 0.0247 0.000 0.0125 0.000 -0.0505 0.000 0.0133 0.000
Year 1999 0.0263 0.000 0.0095 0.002 -0.0631 0.000 0.0274 0.000
Year 2000 0.0348 0.000 0.0122 0.000 -0.0698 0.000 0.0228 0.000
Year 2001 0.0015 0.772 0.0080 0.002 -0.0199 0.000 0.0104 0.001
Year 2002 0.0074 0.068 -0.0003 0.895 -0.0318 0.000 0.0246 0.000
Year 2003 0.0170 0.000 0.0009 0.653 -0.0422 0.000 0.0243 0.000
Note: All regressions include province dummies. Estimated by Multinomial Logit.
Number o f obs = 175245 
Wald chi2( 135) = 31250.78 
Prob > chi2 = 0 
Pseudo R2 = 0.1776
Table 7.7 presents the first-stage estimation of multinomial logit selection model for
male workers. The results are exactly the same as for the multinomial logit estimation
developed in the previous chapter using four different employment categories,
including self-employed, paid employment, unpaid family workers and unemployed
(see table 6.15 in chapter 6). As discussed in the previous chapter, both the Wald test
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for pooling states over the multinomial logit estimate and the Small-Hsiao test for the 
Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives (IIA) assumption suggest that the multinomial 
logit estimate using four different employment categories is appropriate (see tables 
6.13 and 6.14 in chapter 6). Similar to the previous chapter, the marginal effects are 
used to interpret the first-stage of estimation analysis due to the fact that the 
interpretation of the raw regression coefficients is not directly informative and 
comparable within different categories.
As presented in table 7.7, an increase in the minimum wage increases the probability 
of being self-employed (marginal effect is 0.022) and decreases the probability of 
being unemployed (marginal effect is 0.012) for male workers. A potential 
explanation of a decrease in the probability of being unemployed is that there are no 
social benefits provided by the government to being unemployed in Indonesia. 
Moreover, the effect of the minimum wage on the probability of being in paid 
employed for male workers is negative but the coefficient is not significantly different 
from zero50.
The identifying variables (the levels of education) are significant in explaining each 
category of employment. This result indicates that the levels of education are suitable 
as the identifying variables due to the fact that they are strongly correlated to the 
employment categories. In terms of paid employment, men with higher education are 
more likely to be in the paid employed category. This effect is reflected by an increase 
in the marginal effect in the paid employed category from 0.058 for primary school 
graduates to 0.307 for university graduates, relative to the reference group (paid
50 M ore detail about the interpretation  o f  the exp lanatory  variables is presented  in the p revious chapter.
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employed who have not finished primary school or have never been in school). In 
contrast, men with higher education are less likely to be employed as unpaid family 
workers and less likely to be self-employed. These effects are reflected by the 
negative coefficients in both unpaid family worker and self-employed categories. In 
addition, it is interesting to note that there is a greater probability for men with higher 
education to be unemployed. This result is consistent with Feridhanusetyawan and 
Gaduh’s (2000) analysis that in the absence of employment benefits provided by the 
government, only individuals who have higher family incomes (usually with a high 
education level) might remain unemployed in search of better-paid jobs.
In the second-stage of estimation, using the procedure presented in the research 
methodology section, the selection term(s) obtained from the first-stage of estimation 
is included in the paid employment hours worked equation in order to correct for 
potential selection bias. As mentioned before, two different methods to correct for 
selection bias based on multinomial logit, including Lee’s and Bourguignon et al’s 
methods are employed. The first column of table 7.8 presents the hours worked 
estimation for male paid employment in urban areas using Lee’s method. As indicated 
in the first column, the sample selection term is negative and significantly different 
from zero, suggesting evidence of a positive selection effect in the male paid 
employment hours worked equation51. In other words, this result suggests that there is 
an upward bias in the hours worked equation without a correction process. However, 
the result from Lee’s method seems to be inconsistent. As presented in the third 
column of table 7.8, the estimated coefficient of the minimum wage using OLS is 
0.024 which is slightly lower than the estimated coefficient of the minimum wage
51 D etail o f  how  to in terpret the selection term  in L ee ’s m ethod is p resented  in the research 
m eth o d o lo g y  section.
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using Lee s method, indicating a downward bias (not an upward bias as predicted by 
Lee’s method). In practice, this result is consistent with Bourguignon et al (2007) 
analysis that Lee’s method is likely to be inconsistent and inefficient in the case of big 
samples. In addition, Lee’s method has a very strict assumption that the unobserved 
factors that make one more likely to choose one employment sector choice against any 
other employment sector choices in the first-stage of estimation should be correlated 
in the same sign (direction) as the unobserved factors in the second-stage of 
estimation (Bourguignon et al, 2007). In practice, there is no clear indication that the 
unobserved factors in the employment equation has the same direction as the 
unobserved factors in the hours worked equation.
In order to check the robustness of the result obtained from Lee’s method, as the 
second alternative, Bourguignon et al’s selection biased correction method is 
estimated (see the second column of table 7.8). As indicated in the research 
methodology section, Bourguignon et al’s method provides information on all 
correlation patterns or selection terms between the unobserved factors in the 
employment categories and the unobserved factors in the paid employment hours 
worked equation. Using this method, all of the selection terms are significantly 
different from zero, confirming that there is a strong evidence of sample selection bias 
in the hours worked equation for male paid employment. This evidence also suggests 
that the OLS estimate without selection process is not robust to provide a consistent 
and efficient estimate due to selection bias.
2 8 0
Table 7.8 Hours Worked Equation in Urban Areas, Males (Second-stage Estimation)
Lee Bourguignon OLS
Coef. P value Coef. P value Coef. P value
Lrealmw 0.0260 0.003 0.0270 0.002 0.0243 0.005
Married 0.0240 0.000 0.0235 0.000 0.0184 0.000
Separated -0.0313 0.000 -0.0277 0.003 -0.0186 0.023
Head of HH 0.0092 0.006 0.0188 0.012 0.0004 0.894
1 child 0.0076 0.001 0.0084 0.000 0.0065 0.005
>=2 children 0.0038 0.141 0.0057 0.026 0.0043 0.097
Age 15-24 0.0781 0.000 0.0738 0.000 0.0614 0.000
Age25-34 0.0874 0.000 0.0762 0.000 0.0581 0.000
Age35-50 0.0652 0.000 0.0591 0.000 0.0391 0.000
Industry 0.1567 0.000 0.1519 0.000 0.1413 0.000
Trade 0.2104 0.000 0.2062 0.000 0.1934 0.000
Services 0.0305 0.000 0.0281 0.000 0.0014 0.728
Mining 0.1482 0.000 0.1446 0.000 0.1310 0.000
Electricity 0.0712 0.000 0.0649 0.000 0.0455 0.000
Construction 0.1478 0.000 0.1440 0.000 0.1420 0.000
Transportation 0.2182 0.000 0.2132 0.000 0.2059 0.000
Finance 0.1080 0.000 0.1080 0.000 0.0759 0.000
Unemployment -0.0413 0.632 -0.0324 0.706 -0.0398 0.645
Year 1997 -0.0022 0.491 -0.0015 0.648 -0.0022 0.487
Year 1998 -0.0138 0.002 -0.0137 0.003 -0.0077 0.086
Year 1999 -0.0035 0.493 -0.0046 0.372 0.0038 0.458
Year 2000 -0.0062 0.207 -0.0064 0.200 0.0024 0.629
Year 2001 -0.0022 0.620 -0.0023 0.601 -0.0012 0.778
Year 2002 -0.0150 0.000 -0.0165 0.000 -0.0123 0.003
Year 2003 -0.0044 0.297 -0.0062 0.152 -0.0005 0.915
A1 -0.5089 0.000
A2 -0.2409 0.000
A3 -0.1010 0.000 -0.1874 0.000
A4 -0.4246 0.000
Constant 3.2265 0.000 3.1167 0.000 3.3630 0.000
Observations 88828 88828 88828
F test 189.84 (0.00) 185.102 (0.00) 183.04 (0.00)
R squared 0.0966 0.0995 0.0918
Note: All  regress ions  m u u u c  p l u v i a l  uumum.w. , , n , u l  , A
Selection term: (Al) Self-employed, (A2) Unpaid Family Workers. (A3) Paid Employed, (A4) Unemployed
The negative coefficients of the selection terms in Bourguignon et al’s method mean 
that there are strong negative selection effects, indicating a downward bias in the OLS 
estimate without correction process. As suggested by Dimova and Gang (2007), any
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negative coefficients in the outcome equation would also mean that individuals in this 
sector are likely to work fewer hours than a random set of comparable individuals 
because individuals with less suitable unobserved characteristics have allocated into 
this sector out of an alternative one or because individuals with more suitable 
unobserved characteristics for this sector have allocated elsewhere from this sector. 
Specifically, a downward bias in the hours worked equation therefore means that paid 
employees (not randomly selected) are likely to work fewer hours than random ones 
from the population because of the allocation of individuals that are basically more 
suitable for paid employment category (based on their unobserved characteristics) into 
the other categories.
The strongest effect is found in the self-employed (A,i) and unemployed (^4) 
categories, indicating that the downward selection bias is mostly caused by the 
allocation of individuals that are basically more suitable for paid employment 
category into the self-employed and unemployed categories. The potential reason for 
this allocation could be that they are more likely to work more flexible working hours 
compared to paid employees with fixed (or standard) working hours. Consistent with 
Bourguignon et al’s method, the minimum wage coefficient using OLS without a 
correction process (see the third column of table 7.8) is slightly lower than 
Bourguignon et al’s method estimate, supporting evidence of downward bias using 
OLS.
Using Bourguignon et al’s method, most of the explanatory variables are significant at
5% level. In terms of ages, all of the coefficients are positive, implying that the
younger workers (age=<50) are likely to work longer hours than older workers
(age>50 or the reference group). However, the hours worked declines among older
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groups of workers, suggesting an inverted U-shaped relationship. For instance, young 
male workers (age 15-24 and age 25-34), on average, work 7.4% and 7.6% longer 
hours compared to the reference group (age>50), but the older male workers (age 35- 
50), work only 5.9% longer hours compared to the reference group.
The coefficient of marital status is significant at 5% level for male workers. The 
coefficient of married men is positive indicating that married men work longer hours 
compared to single men (the reference group). It is suggested that married men in 
urban areas work 2.3% longer hours compared to single men. The potential reason is 
that they have more responsibilities to their households encouraging them to work 
more hours in order to gain extra income compared to single men. Moreover, male 
heads of household also tend to work longer hours, compared to non-heads of 
household, due to their responsibilities to their households. In addition, male workers 
with children in their households are also likely to work more hours, compared to 
male workers without children in their households.
In terms of sector of activity, most of the coefficients are positive and significant at 
5% level. These positive coefficients suggest that all sectors of activity are likely to 
work longer hours compared to the agriculture sector (the reference group), given the 
dominance of part-time workers in that sector. Workers in the transportation and trade 
sectors, which usually do not require a fixed number of hours worked, are likely to 
work longer hours. The result suggests that, on average, male workers in the 
transportation sector work 21.3% longer hours than male workers in the agriculture 
sector. On the other side, male workers in the finance, services, and electricity sectors
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tend to work fewer hours than male workers in the transportation sector, but still 
longer hours than male workers in the agriculture sector.
Compared to the OLS estimate (without correcting the selectivity bias), the main 
difference (in terms of explanatory variables) is the fact that the heads of household 
variable now has a positive and significant coefficient using Bourguignon et al’s 
method, while it is not significant using the OLS estimate. Moreover, in terms of 
sector of activity, the service sector also has a positive and significant coefficient 
when corrected for selection bias using Bourguignon et al’s method. In addition, based 
on Bourguignon et al’s method, married men work many more hours compared to 
single men. As noted above, using Bourguignon et al’s method, it is suggested that 
married men work 2.3% longer hours compared to single men, while using OLS, it is 
suggested that married men work only 1.8% more hours compared to single men.
As indicated in Bourguignon et al’s result, it is suggested that an increase in minimum 
wage by 10% increases the average hours worked for male paid employment in urban 
areas by 0.27%. This evidence is generally in line with Zavodny’s (2004) findings that 
an increase in minimum wage is predicted to decrease employment but increase hours 
worked of the existing workers. The potential reason is that a decrease in employment 
is compensated by requiring the existing workers to work longer hours when 
minimum wage increases (substitution effect between employment and hours 
worked). In addition, based on the Bourguignon et al’s method estimate, this study 
found that there is a downward bias in the OLS estimate without correction process. It 
is suggested that the minimum wage coefficient in the OLS estimate is underestimated 
by 0.27%, compared to Bourguignon et al’s method.
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Head of HH 0.2020 0.000
1 child 0.0092 0.011
>=2 children 0.0146 0.001
Year 1997 -0.0139 0.004
Year 1998 -0.0233 0.000
Year 1999 -0.0167 0.018
Year 2000 -0.0468 0.000
Year 2001 -0.0462 0.000
Year 2002 -0.0616 0.000











































Note: All regressions include province dummies. Estimated by Multinomial Logit.
Number o f obs = 104027 
Wald chi2( 135) = 21053.08 
Prob > chi2 = 0 
Pseudo R2 = 0.189
Table 7.9 presents the first-stage estimation of selection bias corrections for female 
paid employment in urban areas. Following the same format as the previous section, 
the sector of employment in the multinomial logit model is divided into four different 
employment categories, including self-employed, paid employment, unpaid family 
workers and unemployed. In practice, the result is exactly the same as table 6.16 in the 
previous chapter. Using the same format to the previous section, the marginal effects 
are used to interpret the analysis. As indicated in table 7.9, an increase in minimum 
wage tends to decrease the probability of being in paid employment (marginal effect is 
0 029) for female workers. In contrast to male workers, an increase in the minimum
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wage is likely to increase the probability of women being unpaid family workers 
(marginal effect is 0.032). As discussed in the previous chapter, women are more 
likely to enter the unpaid family workers category, compared to men, because of their 
home-based locations and flexible working hours related to domestic tasks (Singh et 
al, 2004). In addition, the effects of the minimum wage on the probability of being 
self-employed and unemployed are not significantly different from zero.
Most of the educational attainment marginal effects are significant at 5% level, 
suggesting that they are appropriate as the identifying variables. Classified by the 
levels of education, in line with the male workers findings, an improvement in 
educational attainment (senior high school and university level of education) leads to 
an increase in the probability of being paid employed, although this effect is not clear 
at the lower levels of education. On the other side, the negative coefficients in both the 
self-employed and unpaid family worker categories suggest that the less educated 
workers are more likely to join these categories of employment. Moreover, similarly 
to male workers, an increase in educational attainment leads to an increase in the 
probability of being unemployed, supporting evidence that without employment 
benefits provided by the government, only people with higher family income (with 
usually a high education level) might remain unemployed.
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Table 7.10 Hours Worked Equation in Urban Areas, Females (Second-stage
Estimation)________
Lee Bourguignon OLS
Coef. P value Coef. P value Coef. P value
Lrealmw 0.0369 0.026 0.0467 0.005 0.0369 0.026
Married -0.1226 0.000 -0.1812 0.000 -0.1113 0.000
Separated 0.0196 0.020 -0.0056 0.595 0.0405 0.000
Head of HH -0.0665 0.000 -0.0637 0.000 -0.0768 0.000
1 child 0.0146 0.001 0.0111 0.009 0.0146 0.001
>=2 children 0.0089 0.074 0.0024 0.634 0.0098 0.050
age15-24 0.1630 0.000 0.1887 0.000 0.1466 0.000
age25-34 0.0987 0.000 0.0949 0.000 0.0734 0.000
age35-50 0.0838 0.000 0.0554 0.000 0.0611 0.000
Industry 0.3677 0.000 0.3535 0.000 0.3555 0.000
Trade 0.4540 0.000 0.4542 0.000 0.4339 0.000
Services 0.2992 0.000 0.2902 0.000 0.2712 0.000
Mining 0.2792 0.000 0.2774 0.000 0.2658 0.000
Electricity 0.3617 0.000 0.3593 0.000 0.3353 0.000
Construction 0.4199 0.000 0.4315 0.000 0.4032 0.000
Transportation 0.4200 0.000 0.4238 0.000 0.3937 0.000
Finance 0.3605 0.000 0.3698 0.000 0.3278 0.000
Unemployment 0.0863 0.614 0.1438 0.397 0.0907 0.597
Year 1997 0.0084 0.157 0.0063 0.289 0.0078 0.189
Year 1998 0.0036 0.662 0.0094 0.265 0.0050 0.543
Year 1999 0.0113 0.230 0.0344 0.000 0.0152 0.107
Year 2000 0.0172 0.057 0.0330 0.001 0.0204 0.024
Year 2001 0.0046 0.575 0.0198 0.022 0.0047 0.566
Year 2002 -0.0025 0.754 0.0208 0.015 -0.0030 0.710
Year 2003 0.0105 0.200 0.0346 0.000 0.0117 0.155
A1 -0.4624 0.000
A2 -0.4722 0.000
A3 -0.0754 0.000 -0.2479 0.000
A4 -0.0228 0.686
Constant 2.8699 0.000 2.7713 0.000 2.9550 0.000
Observations 41055 41055 41055
F test 153.99 (0.00) 158.22 (0.00) 154.01 (0.00)
R squared 0.1581 0.1698 0.1554
Note: Al l  regressions mciuue piuvun.c uumin.vo. , , ,
Selection term: (M ) Self-employed, (A2) Unpaid Family Workers. (A3) Paid Employed, (X.4) Unemployed
Table 7.10 presents the second-stage estimation for female paid employment in urban 
areas. Similar to the previous section, for comparison purposes, Lee s and
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Bourguignon et al s selection biased corrections are estimated. As presented in the 
first column, the selection term of Lee’s method is significant at 5% level, suggesting 
that there is significant evidence of selection bias in the hours worked equation for 
female workers. The selection term is negative, indicating that there is a potential 
positive selection effect (or an upward bias in the OLS estimate) in the hours worked 
equation. In other words, this result suggests that individuals selected into the sample 
are likely to work more hours than individuals randomly selected from the population.
Similar to the urban areas finding for males, although the selection term is negative 
and significant, there is no clear evidence of upward bias in the OLS estimate without 
correction process (see the third column of table 7.10) suggested by the Lee’s method 
finding. There is also no large difference between Lee’s and the OLS estimate, 
suggesting that Lee’s correction method might not necessarily be needed in examining 
the effects of minimum wage on hours worked.
As indicated in the previous section, Lee’s method tends to be problematic in the case 
of big samples (see Bourguignon et al, 2007). In addition, Lee’s method also has a 
very strict assumption that that the unobserved factors in the employment categories 
equation should be correlated in the same direction with the unobserved factors in the 
hours worked equation. Therefore, we need to interpret this carefully as Lee’s method 
has a potential inconsistency problem in its specification particularly if its assumption 
does not hold. As an alternative, Bourguignon et al’s method is presented in the 
second column of table 7.10.
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As presented in the second column, most of the selection terms of Bourguignon et al’s 
method are significant at 5% level, supporting evidence that selection biased 
correction is needed. In contrast to Lee’s method, the selection terms of this method 
are significantly negative, suggesting a downward bias in the hours worked estimate 
using OLS without correction procedure. These negative selection effects suggest that 
female paid employees selected into the sample tend to work longer hours than female 
paid employees randomly selected from the population. This downward bias is mostly 
caused by the allocation of women who are basically more suitable for paid 
employment category into self-employed (A,i) and unpaid family worker 
categories in the uncovered sectors.
Looking at the explanatory variables, in contrast to male workers, the coefficients of 
married women are negative, indicating that married women work fewer hours 
compared to single women (the reference group). Using Bourguignon et al’s method, 
it is suggested that married women work 18.1% fewer hours, compared to single 
women. The potential reason is the fact that married women in general are more 
committed to their household responsibilities by working fewer hours outside their 
households, compared to single women. In addition, it is interesting to note that 
female heads of household work fewer hours compared to female non-heads of 
household, although the marginal effect is relatively small. The possible reason is that 
female heads of household are dominated by older groups of female workers.
Using Bourguignon et al’s method, the effect of the minimum wage on hours worked 
is positive and significant at 5% level. The result indicates that, on average, a 10% 
increase in minimum wage increases hours worked of female paid employees in urban
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areas by 0.47%. By implication, an increase in hours worked of female workers 
indicates that there is an hours worked substitution of the existing female workers for 
female workers who lose their job as minimum wage increases. Moreover, the 
coefficient supports the Bourguignon et al’s method which predicts that there is a 
downward bias in the OLS estimate. Using OLS, minimum wage effect is 
underestimated by 1% compared to Bourguignon et al’s finding. In general, the result 
confirms that Bourguignon et al’s method finding is more robust compared to Lee’s 
method, in the case of female paid employment in urban areas.
Compared to male workers, the effects of the minimum wage on hours worked are 
much stronger for female workers. This evidence supports the previous finding that 
female workers are more likely to be affected by minimum wage. The reason is the 
fact that female workers, particularly in urban areas, are mostly employed in industries 
which contain more low-wage workers, such as in the manufacturing labour-intensive 
industries (Pangestu and Hendytio, 1997).
In summary, the full results of the effects of minimum wage on hours worked in urban 
areas reveal that hours worked increase as the minimum wage rises. Using 
Bourguignon et al’s method, it is suggested that an increase in the minimum wage by 
10% increases hours worked of male workers by 0.27% and increases hours worked of 
female workers by 0.47%. The result confirms that employers make an adjustment by 
employing their existing workers for more working hours in response to an increase in 
minimum wage. In other words, there is a tendency for employers to compensate for 
their loss of employment by requiring longer hours from the existing paid employees 
(substitution effect between hours worked and employment). Moreover Bourguignon
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et al s method tends to be more appropriate than Lee’s method in explaining the 
effects of minimum wage on hours worked in urban areas due to the fact that Lee’s 
method has a tendency to be inconsistent in the case of big samples. On the other 
hand, using OLS without accounting for selection bias, the minimum wage effect is 
underestimated by 0.27% for male workers and 1% for female workers.
In addition, the finding is relatively similar to that of Zavodny (2000) in the United 
States who found positive minimum wage effects on the hours worked. She argued 
that an increase in the minimum wage increased the number of hours worked because 
employers make adjustments by employing their high-skilled teenage employment for 
longer hours in order to compensate a decrease in number of low-skilled adult and 
teenage employment.
7.7.2 Paid Employment in Rural Areas
Extending the analysis, this study estimates the effects of changes in minimum wage 
on paid employment hours worked in rural areas. Compared to urban areas, the 
minimum wage in rural areas is less binding, particularly because of the dominance of 
the agriculture sector which is less likely to be covered by the minimum wage policy. 
Therefore, we might expect that paid employment in rural areas is less affected by a 
change in minimum wage. Following a similar format to the previous section, the 
effects of changes in minimum wage on hours worked in rural areas is estimated using 
the two-step procedure of selection biased corrections, including Lee s and 




----------------- - v ^ ,
Unpaid Family 
Worker Paid Employment Unemployed
M.E. P value M.E. P value M.E. P value
_________ r f______
M.E. P value
Lrealmw 0.0233 0.003 0.0067 0.217 -0.0202 0.010 -0.0097 0.002
Married 0.1100 0.000 -0.0268 0.000 -0.0452 0.000 -0.0380 0.000
Separated 0.0625 0.000 -0.0120 0.000 -0.0374 0.000 -0.0131 0.000
Primary -0.0191 0.000 -0.0038 0.023 0.0249 0.000 -0.0020 0.153
Junior H.S. -0.0696 0.000 -0.0099 0.000 0.0677 0.000 0.0118 0.000
Senior H.S. -0.2322 0.000 -0.0415 0.000 0.2263 0.000 0.0474 0.000
Academy -0.5195 0.000 -0.0772 0.000 0.5473 0.000 0.0494 0.000
University -0.4807 0.000 -0.0736 0.000 0.4828 0.000 0.0715 0.000
age15-24 -0.1902 0.000 -0.0117 0.000 0.1700 0.000 0.0318 0.000
age25-34 -0.1123 0.000 -0.0404 0.000 0.1418 0.000 0.0109 0.000
age35-50 -0.0826 0.000 -0.0439 0.000 0.1241 0.000 0.0025 0.404
Head of HH 0.2771 0.000 -0.2790 0.000 0.0326 0.000 -0.0306 0.000
1 child -0.0121 0.000 0.0014 0.299 0.0100 0.000 0.0008 0.371
>=2 children -0.0028 0.239 0.0007 0.622 0.0042 0.076 -0.0022 0.032
Year 1997 -0.0190 0.000 0.0075 0.000 0.0135 0.000 -0.0020 0.127
Year 1998 0.0094 0.015 0.0150 0.000 -0.0269 0.000 0.0025 0.152
Year 1999 0.0109 0.008 0.0092 0.001 -0.0330 0.000 0.0129 0.000
Year 2000 0.0123 0.001 0.0162 0.000 -0.0482 0.000 0.0197 0.000
Year 2001 -0.0196 0.000 0.0166 0.000 -0.0145 0.000 0.0175 0.000
Year 2002 -0.0200 0.000 0.0021 0.294 -0.0070 0.015 0.0249 0.000
Year 2003 -0.0166 0.000 0.0240 0.000 -0.0322 0.000 0.0249 0.000
Note: All regressions include province dummies. Estimated by Multinomial Logit.
Number of obs = 286185 
Wald chi2(138) = 6873.32 
Prob > chi2 = 0  
Pseudo R2 = 0.2532
Table 7.11 presents the first-stage estimation of the selection biased corrections based 
on the multinomial logit for male workers in rural areas. More detail about this result 
has been discussed in the previous chapter (see table 6.21 in chapter 6). As indicated 
in table 7.11, an increase in minimum wage reduces the probability of being paid 
employed (marginal effect is 0.020). Within the uncovered sector, an increase in 
minimum wage leads to an increase in the probability of men being self-employed, but 
there is no significant effect on the probability of a man being an unpaid family 
worker. In addition, an increase in minimum wage is associated with a decline in the
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probability of being unemployed, although the effect is relatively small (marginal 
effect is 0.01).
Following a similar format to the previous section, levels of education are used as the 
identifying variables. In terms of paid employment, men with university qualifications 
are likely to be in paid employment. The coefficient is slightly stronger than paid 
employment with university qualifications in urban areas. The potential reason is that 
men with university qualifications are still limited in rural areas, providing a bigger 
probability of entering the paid employment category in rural areas than in urban 
areas. Moreover, similar to workers in urban areas, men with lower levels of education 
are more likely to be employed in the uncovered sector (as self-employed and unpaid 
family workers). These effects are reflected by the negative coefficients in both the 
unpaid family worker and self-employed categories.
Table 7.12 presents the second-stage estimation for male paid employment in rural 
areas. As presented in the first column, the effect of minimum wage on male paid 
employment hours worked is estimated using Lee’s method. The selection term 
obtained using Lee’s method is negative and significant at 5% level, suggesting that 
there is a positive selection effect. This positive selection effect indicates that paid 
employees selected in the sample are likely to work longer hours than paid 
employment randomly selected from the population. Compared to OLS (see the third 
column of table 7.12), the minimum wage coefficient is slightly lower, supporting the 
evidence of an upward bias in the hours worked equation using OLS as predicted by 
Lee’s method estimate.
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Table 7.12 Hours Worked Equation in Rural Areas, Males (Second-stage
Estimation)___________
Lee Bourguignon OLS
Coef. P value Coef. P value Coef. P value
Lrealmw 0.0491 0.000 0.0509 0.000 0.0500 0.000
Married 0.0339 0.000 0.0292 0.000 0.0333 0.000
Separated -0.0576 0.000 -0.0636 0.000 -0.0552 0.000
Head of HH -0.0059 0.184 -0.0178 0.151 -0.0084 0.060
1 child 0.0070 0.018 0.0074 0.013 0.0052 0.080
>=2 children 0.0044 0.191 0.0055 0.102 0.0042 0.212
age15-24 0.0923 0.000 0.0837 0.000 0.0710 0.000
age25-34 0.1080 0.000 0.0946 0.000 0.0810 0.000
age35-50 0.0897 0.000 0.0793 0.000 0.0678 0.000
Mining 0.1547 0.000 0.1539 0.000 0.1523 0.000
Industry 0.1918 0.000 0.1903 0.000 0.1859 0.000
Electricity 0.0865 0.000 0.0837 0.000 0.0687 0.001
Construction 0.2067 0.000 0.2058 0.000 0.2048 0.000
Trade 0.2458 0.000 0.2442 0.000 0.2372 0.000
Transportation 0.2753 0.000 0.2743 0.000 0.2704 0.000
Finance 0.1537 0.000 0.1533 0.000 0.1304 0.000
Services 0.0322 0.000 0.0313 0.000 0.0076 0.028
Unemployment -0.0881 0.461 -0.0762 0.524 -0.0886 0.459
Year 1997 0.0060 0.144 0.0065 0.116 0.0040 0.335
Year 1998 -0.0050 0.391 -0.0038 0.512 -0.0028 0.630
Year 1999 0.0067 0.311 0.0068 0.305 0.0093 0.159
Year 2000 -0.0010 0.880 -0.0001 0.990 0.0032 0.612
Year 2001 0.0028 0.629 0.0031 0.605 0.0017 0.774
Year 2002 -0.0122 0.030 -0.0138 0.016 -0.0135 0.016
Year 2003 -0.0112 0.054 -0.0100 0.103 -0.0087 0.135
A1 -0.1910 0.000
A2 -0.0569 0.126
A3 -0.0603 0.000 -0.0062 0.532
A4 -0.1498 0.000
Constant 2.8915 0.000 2.8389 0.000 2.9749 0.000
Observations 71131 71131 71131
F test 180.68 (0.00) 171.74 (0.00) 181.13 (0.00)
R squared 0.1128 0.1135 0.111
Selection <»>™  * * * * < ” >
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In contrast, the selection terms obtained using Bourguignon et al’s method (see the 
second column of table 7.12) show a different result. Using this method, two of the 
selection terms are negative and significant indicating that there are negative selection 
effects. These negative selection effects suggest that paid employees in the sample 
work fewer hours than a random set of comparable paid employees because 
individuals that are basically more suited for the paid employment category (based on 
their unobserved characteristics) have been allocated into self-employed (k\) and 
unemployed (L4) categories.
Similar to urban areas, the minimum wage coefficient using Bourguignon et al’s 
method is slightly higher compared to the OLS estimate suggesting a downward bias 
in the hours worked estimation without accounting for the selection process. In 
comparison, there is no clear justification about which method, between Lee’s and 
Bourguignon et al’s, is the more robust in the case of male paid employment in rural 
areas. However, we need to interpret this cautiously as Lee’s method seems to have 
failed in the urban areas case with relatively big samples. In the previous section 
(urban areas), Lee’s method leads to inconsistent results because the selection term 
shows an opposite direction to what we might expect. Therefore, in practice, we have 
more confidence using the Bourguignon et al’s method estimate than using the Lee’s 
method estimate.
Using Bourguignon et al’s method, it is suggested that a 10% increase in the minimum 
wage raises the average male paid employment hours worked in rural areas by 0.51%. 
Using OLS without a selection process, the minimum wage effect is underestimated 
by 0.1% compared to Bourguignon et al’s finding. In general this positive effect
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supports the previous findings in urban areas indicating that an increase in the 
minimum wage increases male paid employment hours worked. Combining the result 
from the previous chapter, the full results indicate that an increase in minimum wage 
is predicted to decrease the probability of being paid employed and is compensated for 
by requiring longer hours for existing paid employees in rural areas, supporting the 
presence of substitution effect between employment and hours worked. Compared to 
urban areas, the minimum wage coefficients for paid employment in rural areas are 
slightly higher. This feature perhaps indicates a process of structural transformation in 
Indonesia marked by a shift in employment from the agriculture sector to the other 
sectors. As discussed in the previous section, most workers in the agriculture sector 
tend to work fewer hours than the other sectors due to the fact that the hours worked 
in the agriculture sector are likely to be seasonal.
Turning to the female workers, table 7.13 presents the first-stage estimation of the 
selection biased corrections for female workers in rural areas. Contrary to men, there 
is no significant effect of minimum wage on the probability of being in paid 
employment, suggesting that female workers in rural areas are less affected by the 
minimum wage policy. On the other hand, an increase in minimum wage increases the 
probability of women being unpaid family workers (marginal effect is 0.037). As 
mentioned in the previous chapter, unpaid family work plays an important role 
providing an alternative job, particularly for women with young children or women 
with higher household responsibilities that require more flexible working hours. In 
addition, an increase in minimum wage decreases the probability of women being 
self-employed (marginal effect is -0.040).
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Self-Employed





M.E. P value M.E. P value M.E. P value M.E. P valiip
Lrealmw -0.0395 0.000 0.0366 0.002 0.0027 0.740 0.0002 0.967
Married 0.0853 0.000 0.0744 0.000 -0.0783 0.000 -0.0815 0.000
Separated 0.1264 0.000 -0.0871 0.000 -0.0264 0.000 -0.0129 0.000
Primary 0.0146 0.000 -0.0106 0.000 -0.0106 0.000 0.0067 0.000
Junior H.S. 0.0447 0.000 -0.0670 0.000 -0.0049 0.137 0.0272 0.000
Senior H.S. -0.0694 0.000 -0.2352 0.000 0.2194 0.000 0.0852 0.000
Academy -0.0335 0.442 -0.0629 0.195 0.1045 0.000 -0.0082 0.191
University -0.2601 0.000 -0.4021 0.000 0.5357 0.000 0.1265 0.000
age15-24 -0.1449 0.000 -0.0382 0.000 0.0778 0.000 0.1052 0.000
age25-34 -0.0558 0.000 -0.0646 0.000 0.0637 0.000 0.0568 0.000
age35-50 -0.0164 0.000 -0.0580 0.000 0.0583 0.000 0.0162 0.000
Head of HH 0.4409 0.000 -0.4721 0.000 0.0673 0.000 -0.0360 0.000
1 child 0.0079 0.003 -0.0021 0.452 -0.0040 0.055 -0.0018 0.155
>=2 children 0.0031 0.369 0.0067 0.056 -0.0100 0.000 0.0002 0.885
Year 1997 -0.0434 0.000 0.0357 0.000 0.0097 0.001 -0.0020 0.293
Year 1998 -0.0505 0.000 0.0502 0.000 -0.0024 0.541 0.0028 0.285
Year 1999 -0.0499 0.000 0.0260 0.000 -0.0059 0.153 0.0297 0.000
Year 2000 -0.0863 0.000 0.0752 0.000 -0.0139 0.000 0.0251 0.000
Year 2001 -0.1085 0.000 0.0728 0.000 -0.0004 0.918 0.0362 0.000
Year 2002 -0.0719 0.000 0.0358 0.000 -0.0047 0.107 0.0408 0.000
Year 2003 -0.1286 0.000 0.0996 0.000 -0.0152 0.000 0.0442 0.000
Note: All regressions include province dummies. Estimated by Multinomial Logit.
Number of obs = 189199 
Wald chi2(138) = 38851.31 
Prob > chi2 = 0 
Pseudo R2 = 0.1847
Following the same format as the previous section, table 7.14 presents the second- 
stage estimation of the selection biased corrections for female workers in rural areas. 
Looking at the selection terms, both Lee’s and Bourguignon et al’s method are 
significant at the 5% level. Both Lee’s and Bourguignon et al’s method show similar 
positive selection effects indicating that there is an upward bias in the hours worked 
estimation using OLS without selection process. More specifically, Bourguignon et 
al’s method suggests that paid employees in the sample are likely to work more hours 
than a random set of paid employees in the population because individuals that are
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basically more suitable for paid employment categories have been allocated into 
unpaid family workers (X,2) and unemployed (A4) categories.
Table 7.14 Hours Worked Equation in Rural Areas, Females (Second-stage
Lee Bourguignon OLS
Coef. P value Coef. P value Coef. P value
Lrealmw 0.0359 0.147 0.0377 0.128 0.0328 0.186
Married -0.1163 0.000 -0.1569 0.000 -0.1044 0.000
Separated -0.0472 0.000 -0.0807 0.000 -0.0378 0.002
Head of HH 0.0082 0.445 -0.1031 0.001 -0.0089 0.402
1 child -0.0119 0.047 -0.0141 0.020 -0.0111 0.065
>=2 children -0.0151 0.038 -0.0165 0.024 -0.0121 0.096
age15-24 0.1811 0.000 0.2320 0.000 0.1642 0.000
age25-34 0.1455 0.000 0.1693 0.000 0.1202 0.000
age35-50 0.1494 0.000 0.1578 0.000 0.1279 0.000
Mining 0.2390 0.000 0.2383 0.000 0.2374 0.000
Industry 0.3204 0.000 0.3239 0.000 0.3117 0.000
Electricity 0.2924 0.001 0.3072 0.000 0.2525 0.003
Construction 0.3931 0.000 0.3949 0.000 0.3886 0.000
Trade 0.4241 0.000 0.4283 0.000 0.4062 0.000
Transportation 0.3686 0.000 0.3727 0.000 0.3490 0.000
Finance 0.2781 0.000 0.2847 0.000 0.2302 0.000
Services 0.2200 0.000 0.2272 0.000 0.1734 0.000
unemployment 0.0647 0.808 0.0748 0.778 0.0771 0.772
Year 1997 0.0045 0.597 0.0098 0.260 0.0008 0.925
Year 1998 -0.0149 0.214 -0.0091 0.453 -0.0180 0.133
Year 1999 0.0008 0.952 0.0127 0.368 -0.0019 0.890
Year 2000 0.0169 0.193 0.0361 0.010 0.0160 0.219
Year 2001 0.0518 0.000 0.0785 0.000 0.0467 0.000
Year 2002 0.0196 0.101 0.0367 0.004 0.0166 0.167
Year 2003 0.0070 0.585 0.0396 0.011 0.0070 0.589
A1 -0.0240 0.610
A2 0.2259 0.000
A3 -0.0774 0.000 0.1303 0.000
A4 0.2898 0.000




F test 113.75 (0.00) 108.0 (0.00)
113.87 (0.00)
R squared 0.1663 0.1672
0.1636
“  S ) P - d  Family Workers. (>.3) Paid Employed. (A4) Unemployed
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Looking at the explanatory variables, similar to female paid employment in urban 
areas, the coefficients of married women are negative, indicating that married women 
work fewer hours compared to single women (the reference group). Moreover, female 
heads of household also work fewer hours compared to female non-heads of 
household. As indicated in the previous section, the potential reason is that female 
heads of household are dominated by older female workers. In addition, female paid 
employees with children work fewer hours compared to female workers without 
children in their household.
In contrast to male workers, the effects of the minimum wage on female workers’ 
hours worked are not significantly different from zero using different methods. The 
result is in line with the employment effect in the first-stage of estimation suggesting 
that there is no significant effect of the minimum wage on the probability of being in 
paid employment for female workers in rural areas. As mentioned in the previous 
chapter, female paid employees in rural areas are less affected by the minimum wage, 
since most of them are still paid below the minimum wage level. In addition, female 
workers in rural areas are also dominated by workers in the agriculture sector which is 
not directly affected by the minimum wage policy. Compared to female workers in 
urban areas, these results also indicate that the minimum wage has a stronger effect in 
urban areas where the minimum wage is more binding due to greater enforcement and 
more effective labour unions.
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7.7.3 Robustness Checks
In the previous section, the effects of changes minimum wage on hours worked of 
overall paid employment are estimated. Although paid employment is the category of 
employment legally covered by the minimum wage policy, in practice there is a high 
proportion of paid employment which earns a wage below the minimum wage level 
(paid employment in the uncovered sector), given the low compliance and lack of 
enforcement by the government. In order to check the robustness of the results for the 
inclusion of paid employment in the uncovered sector, the effects of changes in the 
minimum wage on hours worked are re-estimated using paid employment in the 
covered sector data only. In other words, paid employment in the uncovered sector is 
excluded from the sample in the hours worked equation (second-stage estimation), 
although it is still used in the first-stage estimation.
In the first-stage of estimation, specifically, the multinomial logit model is extended 
using five different employment categories: (1) self-employed, (2) unpaid family 
worker, (3) paid employment in the covered sector, (4) unemployed, (5) paid 
employment in the uncovered sector. In practice, the results from this multinomial 
logit specification are exactly the same as the previous chapter discussion using five 
employment categories (see tables 6.19, 6.20, 6.23 and 6.24 in the previous chapter). 
Following the same format as the previous section, the multinomial logit model is 
estimated in order to provide the selection terms associated with each employment 
category which are used as additional explanatory variables in the hours worked 
equation (second-stage estimation). In the second-stage of estimation, then, the hours 
worked equation is estimated specifically using only data of paid employment in the 
covered sector category. This section continues to use Bourguignon et al’s selection
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bias correction method given the inconsistent results of Lee’s method in the previous 
section.
Table 7.15 presents the estimation results for the effect of minimum wage on hours 
worked of covered sector paid employment in urban areas. The minimum wage 
coefficients show consistently a positive effect on hours worked, indicating a 
substitution effect between employment and hours worked. Compared to the previous 
section estimates using overall paid employment, the coefficients are relatively high, 
confirming that paid employment in the covered sector is more affected by the 
minimum wage. Using Bourguignon et al’s method, it is suggested that an increase in 
minimum wage by 10% increases the average hours worked of paid employment in 
the covered sector by 0.77% for male workers and 0.49% for female workers. 
Although the effects are stronger than the effects of minimum wage on hours worked 
of overall paid employment, the coefficients are still smaller than the coefficients of 
minimum wage effects on employment. In the previous chapter, using a regional 
panel data method, it is suggested that an increase in minimum wage by 10% 
decreases paid employment in the covered sector by 3.01%-4.17%. Similar to 
Gindling and Terrell (2007), this result indicates that hours worked is less sensitive 
than employment to a change in minimum wage. The potential explanation is that the 
minimum wage in Indonesia is set based on monthly terms (not hourly terms), 
suggesting a change in per-worker cost (not a change in per-hour cost). By 
implication, although the minimum wage effect on hours worked is positive, we 
predict that man-hours will still fall as a result of an increase in minimum wage.
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Most of the selection terms are significant at 5% level, implying that the selection bias 
correction is needed. For males, the strongest selection term effect is found in paid 
employment in the uncovered sector category (7,5), which shows a positive effect on 
hours worked. This positive selection effect indicates that there is an upward bias in 
the OLS estimate without correction process because of the re-allocation of 
individuals who are more suitable for covered sector employment from paid 
employment in the uncovered sector category (L5). However, this positive selection 
effect seems to be offset by the negative selection effects found in self-employed and 
unpaid family workers categories due to the fact that in practice the OLS estimate 
shows a downward bias compared to Bourguignon et al’s method estimate (see the 
third column of table 7.15). This is indicated by the coefficient that is slightly lower 
than Bourguignon et al’s method estimate.
Turning to female workers, the selection term of paid employment in the uncovered 
sector category (A,5) for female workers is not significantly different from zero. This 
result suggests that there is no significant sample selection bias because of the 
allocation of individuals between paid employment in the covered sector and the 
uncovered sector. In other words, this evidence would imply that a selection biased 
correction model based on multinomial logit using five different employment 
categories (separating paid employment in the covered and uncovered sector) is not 
necessarily needed because the selection bias is mostly caused by the allocation of 
individuals from paid employment category into self-employed, unpaid family 
workers, and unemployed categories (not caused by the allocation between paid 
employment in the covered and uncovered sectors).
3 0 2
Table 7.15 Hours Worked Equation for Covered Sector Employment in Urban Areas
Bourguignon OLS
Male Female Male Female
Coef. P value Coef. P value Coef. P value Coef. P value
Lrealmw 0.0770 0 . 0 0 0 0.0492 0.009 0.0456 0.000 0.0566 0.002
Married -0.0419 0 . 0 0 0 -0.1182 0 . 0 0 0 0.0026 0.477 -0.0568 0 . 0 0 0
Separated -0.0348 0 . 0 0 0 -0.0256 0.024 0.0185 0.038 0.0607 0 . 0 0 0
Head of HH -0.0319 0 . 0 0 0 -0.0252 0.131 -0.0079 0.015 -0.0397 0.000
1 child 0.0121 0 . 0 0 0 -0.0012 0.813 0.0078 0.001 0.0098 0.041
>=2 children 0.0118 0 . 0 0 0 -0.0131 0.032 0.0094 0 . 0 0 0 0.0054 0.350
age15-24 0.1163 0 . 0 0 0 0.2002 0 . 0 0 0 0.0598 0 . 0 0 0 0.1307 0 . 0 0 0
age25-34 0.0923 0 . 0 0 0 0.1604 0 . 0 0 0 0.0515 0 . 0 0 0 0.0944 0 . 0 0 0
age35-50 0.0577 0 . 0 0 0 0.0779 0 . 0 0 0 0.0222 0 . 0 0 0 0.0454 0 . 0 0 0
Mining -0.0280 0 . 0 0 0 0.0171 0.642 -0.0568 0 . 0 0 0 -0.0374 0.320
Industry -0.0358 0 . 0 0 0 0.0533 0.001 -0.0562 0 . 0 0 0 0.0277 0.094
Electricity -0.0833 0 . 0 0 0 0.0452 0.240 -0.1238 0 . 0 0 0 -0.0287 0.466
Construction -0.0382 0 . 0 0 0 0.0836 0 . 0 0 0 -0.0396 0 . 0 0 0 0.0324 0.128
Trade 0.0278 0 . 0 0 0 0.1308 0 . 0 0 0 0.0032 0.563 0.0699 0 . 0 0 0
Transportation 0.0611 0 . 0 0 0 0.1109 0 . 0 0 0 0.0475 0 . 0 0 0 0.0334 0.107
Finance -0.0464 0 . 0 0 0 0.0642 0.001 -0.1068 0 . 0 0 0 -0.0318 0.091
Services -0.0990 0 . 0 0 0 0.0109 0.504 -0.1516 0 . 0 0 0 -0.0756 0 . 0 0 0
Unemployment 0.0179 0.831 0.2240 0.221 -0.0169 0.843 0.2748 0.144
Year 1997 -0.0001 0.963 0.0095 0.152 0 . 0 0 0 0 0.991 0.0071 0.295
Year 1998 0.0007 0.879 0.0134 0.149 0.0017 0.711 0.0130 0.159
Year 1999 0.0062 0.230 0.0063 0.566 0.0088 0.080 -0.0049 0.641
Year 2000 -0.0295 0 . 0 0 0 -0.0066 0.530 -0.0107 0.024 -0.0267 0.007
Year 2001 -0.0156 0 . 0 0 0 0.0166 0.079 -0.0142 0.001 -0.0138 0.113
Year 2002 0.0105 0.046 0 . 0 0 0 0 0.999 -0.0159 0 . 0 0 0 -0.0253 0.005
Year 2003 0.0086 0.087 0.0152 0.131 -0.0105 0.014 -0.0135 0.139
A1 -0.3134 0 . 0 0 0 -0.1148 0.017
A2 -0.1395 0.001 -0.1050 0.023
A3 -0.0152 0.213 0.1152 0 . 0 0 0
A4 0.0571 0.208 0.1786 0.006
A5 0.4306 0.000 -0.0072 0.898
f ' n n Q t a n t 3.0092 0.000 3.0067 0 . 0 0 0 3.3759 0 . 0 0 0
3.0871 0 . 0 0 0
u U I  lO L d l I t
Observations 60121 18450 60121
18450
F test 181.36 (0.00) 77.01 (0.00)
143.21 (0.00) 61.35 (0.00)
R squared 0.1402 0.1844
0.1046 0.1404
 I _____________ L i ® -------------------------------  1~ -------
Selection F a . i ^  Workers, (A3> Paid Employed in the Covered See,or
(A.4) Unemployed, (A5) Paid Employed in the Uncovered Sector
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As mentioned in the previous chapter, in practice there is a potential problem in using 
five employment categories used in this study because paid employment in the 
covered sector and paid employment in the uncovered sector categories has similar 
observed and unobserved factors, indicating that they do not necessarily need to be 
separated in the multinomial logit estimation (the first-stage estimation). Although the 
Wald test for pooling employment categories is significant (see table 6.18 in the 
previous chapter), the chi-squared coefficients are relatively much lower than the chi- 
squared coefficients in the four employment categories specification suggesting that 
they are less robust than four employment categories specification.
In addition, some of the explanatory variables in the selection biased corrections 
model based on multinomial logit using five different employment categories also 
show unexpected direction (sign), suggesting the potential biased estimate. Using five 
different employment categories, for instance, married men and male heads of 
household are now negatively associated with hours worked, suggesting that they 
work fewer hours than single men and non-heads of household. In addition, some 
sectors of activity, such as electricity, finance and services sectors, have negative 
coefficients suggesting that workers in those sectors are likely to work fewer hours 
than the agriculture sector (the reference group) which does not seem relevant in our 
case. As a result, we might conclude that Bourguignon et al’s selection biased 
corrections model based on multinomial logit using five different employment 
categories is less robust compared to Bourguignon et al’s method estimates based on 
multinomial logit using four different employment categories. However, the minimum 
wage effect on hours worked remains positive and significant across different
3 0 4
specifications, indicating that the positive effect of minimum wage is relatively 
strong.
Table 7.16 presents the estimation results for the hours worked equation of paid 
employment in the covered sector in rural areas. Consistent with the previous section 
finding, the coefficients of minimum wage are positively associated with hours 
worked. However, using Bourguignon et al’s selection biased correction method, the 
minimum wage effect for male workers is only significant at 10% level, indicating 
that hours worked of male workers in rural areas is less affected by minimum wage. 
In contrast, the minimum wage effect for female workers is significant at 1% level. 
However, similar to the urban areas, the selection term of paid employment in the 
uncovered sector category (X5) is not significant. This indicates that there is no need 
to separate paid employment in the covered and uncovered sectors because there is no 
significant sample selection bias across both employment categories. This result 
supports the evidence in urban areas that the selection biased corrections model based 
on the multinomial logit model with four different employment categories is more 
robust than with five different employment categories.
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Bourguignon
iiic iii in  ivu ra i A rea s  
OLS
Male Female Male Female
Coef. P value Coef. P value Coef. P value Coef. P value
Lrealmw 0.0236 0.082 0.1062 0.007 0.0282 0.039 0.0949 0.013
Married -0.0136 0.095 -0.1098 0.000 0.0054 0.307 -0.0555 0.000
Separated -0.0293 0.017 -0.0429 0.038 -0.0094 0.422 0.0155 0.379
Head of HH -0.0352 0.006 0.0004 0.992 -0.0058 0.204 -0.0166 0.293
1 child 0.0112 0.000 -0.0131 0.133 0.0063 0.045 -0.0093 0.289
>=2 children 0.0139 0.000 -0.0228 0.027 0.0126 0.000 -0.0170 0.104
age15-24 0.1058 0.000 0.2081 0.000 0.0562 0.000 0.1546 0.000
age25-34 0.1019 0.000 0.1810 0.000 0.0501 0.000 0.1295 0.000
age35-50 0.0668 0.000 0.1257 0.000 0.0251 0.000 0.0836 0.000
Mining 0.0234 0.004 0.0550 0.233 0.0178 0.029 0.0269 0.566
Industry 0.0147 0.001 0.0666 0.000 0.0001 0.975 0.0228 0.072
Electricity -0.0311 0.103 0.0567 0.624 -0.0712 0.000 -0.0384 0.744
Construction 0.0212 0.000 0.0888 0.000 0.0185 0.000 0.0714 0.002
Trade 0.0797 0.000 0.1767 0.000 0.0579 0.000 0.1028 0.000
Transportation 0.1302 0.000 0.1926 0.000 0.1203 0.000 0.1249 0.002
Finance 0.0192 0.152 0.0967 0.005 -0.0393 0.003 -0.0380 0.267
Services -0.0683 0.000 0.0210 0.153 -0.1328 0.000 -0.1107 0.000
Unemployment -0.1649 0.168 -0.4057 0.254 -0.1966 0.105 -0.4603 0.203
Year 1997 0.0116 0.004 -0.0069 0.590 0.0064 0.119 -0.0133 0.301
Year 1998 -0.0123 0.045 0.0219 0.213 -0.0059 0.340 0.0131 0.460
Year 1999 -0.0020 0.778 0.0437 0.031 0.0066 0.347 0.0228 0.257
Year 2000 -0.0250 0.000 0.0269 0.162 -0.0129 0.042 0.0045 0.803
Year 2001 -0.0114 0.082 0.0183 0.340 -0.0274 0.000 -0.0098 0.571
Year 2002 0.0083 0.306 0.0004 0.983 -0.0120 0.052 -0.0218 0.227
Year 2003 -0.0123 0.138 -0.0079 0.725 -0.0251 0.000 -0.0228 0.240
A1 -0.1614 0.000 -0.0550 0.407
A2 0.0267 0.507 -0.0325 0.639
A3 0.0421 0.000 0.0855 0.000
A4 -0.0609 0.172 0.1384 0.114
A5 0.3010 0.000 0.1854 0.081
Constant 3.5248 0.000 2.4333 0.000 3.5619 0.000
2.7114 0.000
Observations 35980 7223 35980
7223
F test 111.03 (0.00) 29.04 (0.00) 97.56 (0.00)
25.45 (0.00)
R squared 0.143 0.1793 0.1174
0.1479
Selection ( « )  ^  ^  W o te s ' ,U ) M d EmP'0yed *" ^
(A4) Unemployed, (A5) Paid Employed in the Uncovered Sector
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7.8. Conclusions
This study has examined the effects of changes in minimum wage on hours worked of 
paid employment using an Indonesian micro level data set, covering the period 1996 
to 2003. Unlike the other countries, the Indonesian minimum wage is set on a monthly 
basis, particularly for workers with a standard 40 hour workweek, although it is 
flexible and can be adjusted for part-time workers on a pro-rata basis. Using the 
similar pooled cross-sectional time-series data methodology of Gindling and Terrell 
(2007) in Costa Rica, this study extends the hours worked specification by employing 
two different methods of the selection biased corrections based on multinomial logit, 
including Lee’s and Bourguignon et al’s methods. This study also extends the hours 
worked specification by analysing the effects of minimum wage on hours worked 
across male-female workers and urban-rural areas.
This study found that an increase in the minimum wage increases hours worked of the 
existing paid employees. In this case, employers appear to make adjustments by 
employing the existing workers for more hours as the monthly minimum wage 
increases. Using Bourguignon et al’s method, it is suggested that an increase in the 
minimum wage will increase the average of paid employment hours worked by 
0.27%-0.47% in urban areas, while in rural areas an increase in minimum wage will 
raise the average male paid employment hours worked by 0.51 /o. Compared to urban 
areas, the minimum wage coefficient in rural areas is slightly higher because of the 
structural transformation in Indonesia marked by a shift in employment from the 
agriculture sector to the other sectors that require more working hours. In addition, 
compared to the employment effect in the previous chapter, the effect of minimum 
wage on hours worked is relatively small. This result implies that hours worked are
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less sensitive to a change in minimum wage compared to employment due to the fact 
that the Indonesian minimum wage is set based on monthly terms (not hourly terms) 
suggesting a change in per-worker cost rather than in per-hour cost.
Bourguignon et al s selection biased correction tends to provide more robust findings 
in explaining the effects of minimum wage on hours worked in Indonesia. Lee’s 
method seem to give inconsistent results particularly in the case of urban areas, 
supporting Bourguignon et al’s (2007) findings that Lee’s method is not robust in the 
case of big samples. In addition, one of the other advantages of Bourguignon et al’s 
method is that this method provides information about which employment category in 
the samples causes the selection bias. Compared to OLS, although the difference is 
relatively small, it is suggested that the minimum wage coefficient using the OLS 
estimate is underestimated because of sample selection bias.
As mentioned above, this study found that an increase in minimum wage will increase 
hours worked. By implication, the government should ensure a greater compliance of 
their labour policy relating to hours worked, including overtime premium, job security 
for overtime working and minimum wage compliance. An effective control (both from 
government and trade union at the enterprise level) and sanction for employers who 
fail to comply with the regulation is required in order to protect workers from any 
potential exploitation. Moreover, this study found that the effect of minimum wage on 
hours worked is stronger for female workers as the most vulnerable workers in the 
labour market. In this case, there needs to be much greater effort made by the 
government to reduce possible gender discrimination and to ensure equality for them
in access to the labour market.
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Thus far, this study found that an increase in minimum wage in Indonesia increases 
hours worked of the existing paid employees (covered sector employment). A further 
area of research is how the minimum wage affects the relative use of full-time and part- 
time employment. Gramlich (1976) found that an increase in minimum wage reduced 
full-time employment and substituted part-time employment. However, it might be 
different in the case of Indonesia due to that part-time employment being dominated by 
supply side effects, suggesting that part-time employment is only attractive for some 
workers at particular stages of their life-cycle, such as women with young children.
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CHAPTER VIII 
CONCLUSIONS AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS
This thesis examines the effects of changes in minimum wage on wages, employment 
and hours worked in Indonesia. The main motivation for this thesis was to evaluate 
the minimum wage policy changes in Indonesia since the end of 1980s. In practice, 
the minimum wage has been used as an important labour market policy intervention 
by the Indonesian government since that period as a result of international pressure 
relating to the violation of international labour standard issues in Indonesia. As 
pointed out by Rama (2001), this condition forced the Indonesian government to 
become more concerned about the minimum wage policy by increasing the minimum 
wage level three-fold in nominal terms (or two-fold in real terms) at the end of 1980s.
Although this thesis is not the first Indonesian minimum wage study, the previous 
Indonesian studies only focused specifically on the impact of minimum wage on 
workers in the covered sector or sectors of activities with a high compliance level, 
such as workers in manufacturing sectors and workers in urban areas (see for example 
Rama, 2001, and Suryahadi et al, 2003). Moreover, the latest published Indonesian 
minimum wage study conducted by Alatas and Cameron (2008) focused specifically 
on the case study of the compliance extension of Jakarta’s provincial minimum wage 
on the Botabek area (Jakarta and West Java border). Compared to the previous 
minimum wage studies in Indonesia, therefore, this thesis generally contributes to the 
literature by providing a more comprehensive study of the impact of minimum wage 
in Indonesia on several aspects of employment (and wage distribution), including
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covered and uncovered sectors, urban and rural areas, male and female workers, and 
hours worked.
Compared to developed country studies, there has been little research conducted on 
the impact of minimum wage changes in developing countries, which are mostly 
dominated by the studies of Latin American minimum wages. The existing developing 
country studies usually suggest that an increase in minimum wage reduces 
employment in the covered sector. More specifically, it is suggested than an increase 
in the minimum wage displaces the affected workers from the covered sector to the 
uncovered sector as suggested by the two-sector model, given the large size of the 
uncovered sector (see for example Gindling and Terrell, 2007; Arango and Pachon, 
2004; and Baanante, 2004). Using a rich source of the cross-sectional labour force 
survey data (Sakemas), this thesis provides a more specific analysis by observing how 
the distribution of workers changes (including self-employed, paid employment, 
unpaid family worker, and unemployed) as a result of minimum wage changes. In 
addition, this thesis also contributes to the literature by examining the impact of 
minimum wage changes on hours worked in Indonesia using a particular selection 
biased correction model, providing a complete analysis of any changes in labour 
demand as minimum wage increases.
There are three main conclusions relating to the study of effects of changes in 
minimum wage on employment and hours worked in Indonesia as conducted in this 
thesis. Firstly, the empirical result of this thesis is generally consistent with the 
competitive model showing the negative impact of minimum wage on covered sector 
employment. This result is in line with the previous developing country studies
311
suggesting that there is no evidence to support the monopsony model in the case of 
Indonesia or generally developing countries. Using a regional panel data method, it is 
suggested that an increase in minimum wage by 10% decreases covered sector 
employment by 3.01%-4.17%. The magnitude is fairly similar to the other developing 
country studies. In comparison, an increase in minimum wage by 10% in Colombia 
reduces employment by 2%-12%, while it is only 0.4%-l% in Costa Rica (Arango and 
Pachon, 2004 and Gindling and Terrell, 2007).
Secondly, extending the standard competitive model, this thesis shows that an increase 
in minimum wage is more likely to decrease covered sector employment and to 
increase uncovered sector employment. This suggests a displacement effect from the 
covered sector to the uncovered sector as predicted by the two-sector model firstly 
constructed by Welch (1974). Within the uncovered sector, specifically, this thesis 
finds that the affected female workers tend to be engaged as unpaid family workers, 
while the affected male workers are more likely to become self-employed. This 
displacement effect is stronger for female workers, suggesting that they are more 
affected by an increase in minimum wage than male workers. Comparing urban and 
rural areas, the effect is slightly lower in rural areas, supporting evidence that the 
minimum wage is less binding in rural areas due to the dominance of the traditional 
agriculture sector, which is less likely to comply with the minimum wage.
My findings generally provide a richer classification than the existing developing 
country studies. Gindling and Terrell (2007), for example, examined the effects of 
minimum wage across just two different employment categories, i.e. paid employment 
(covered sector) and uncovered sector. In addition, this study finds that an increase in
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minimum wage is less likely to increase the probability of being unemployed. This 
finding suggests that people are less likely to be unemployed and more likely to be 
employed in the uncovered sector as the minimum wage increases, given that no 
unemployment benefits are provided by the Indonesian government.
Thirdly, besides adjusting their numbers of workers (employment) at the extensive 
margin, this thesis shows that employers respond to the minimum wage changes by 
adjusting their workers’ hours at the intensive margin, providing a complete 
adjustment to labour demand as the minimum wage changes. The result contributes to 
the literature by employing the selection biased correction method based on 
multinomial logit in order to control for the potential selection bias arising from the 
correlation between the unobserved factors that affect the choice of employment 
sectors (i.e. covered and uncovered sectors) and the unobserved factors that affect 
their hours worked. The empirical results show that an increase in the minimum wage 
by 10% increases the average of paid employment hours worked by 0.27%-0.51%. 
This result implies that employers respond to an increase in minimum wage by 
employing the existing workers for more hours in order to compensate for their loss of 
employment. However, compared to the employment effect, this thesis suggests that 
the hours effect is relatively small. The main reason for this is that the Indonesian 
minimum wage is set based on monthly terms (not hourly terms like in many 
developed countries), suggesting a greater change in per-worker cost than change in 
per-hour cost. This evidence contrasts with the developed country studies findings 
where the minimum wage is usually set based on hourly terms. In developed 
countries, employers are more likely to respond to a change in minimum wage by 
adjusting their workers’ hours worked than by changing their number of workers since
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the hours worked adjustment costs tend to be lower than the employment adjustment 
costs, particularly in the short term (see for example Connolly and Gregory, 2002).
These findings have important policy implications, particularly for Indonesia. Firstly, 
this thesis finds that an increase in minimum wage reduces employment in the covered 
sector and increases employment in the uncovered sector, suggesting a displacement 
effect from the covered to the uncovered sector. As mentioned in chapter 6, the 
uncovered sector employment usually does not benefit from job security, health 
insurance, or old-age pensions (employment benefits). This evidence implies that 
there is a need for labour market policy which is designed not only to improve the 
standard of living (or welfare) of workers in the covered sector but also for workers in 
the uncovered sector, given the high proportion of workers in the uncovered sector. 
The labour market policy that focuses only on workers in the covered sector will lead 
to wider welfare inequality between workers in the covered and uncovered sectors 
This displacement effect might even damage uncovered sector employment more if 
this effect significantly reduces the earnings for uncovered sector employment due to 
the fact that the labour absorption capacity for uncovered sector employment is also 
limited.
Second, there is an urgent need to provide clear and detailed guidelines on how the 
minimum wage is set across regions (provinces). As pointed out by Suryahadi et al 
(2003) and Widarti (2006), the minimum wage setting, particularly in the 
decentralization era, relies too much on the workers needs, without considering the 
other economic factors, indicated by using the cost of KHM (basic living needs) as the 
main benchmark for minimum wage setting. Besides the cost of KHM, there is a need
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to consider the other economic factors, such as productivity at firm level and 
international competitiveness. Although KHM is typically one of the most important 
considerations in determining the level of minimum wage, it seems that there needs to 
be more intensive collective bargaining in the wage commission negotiating process 
in order to provide a suitable minimum wage that increases the workers’ standard of 
living but without harming sustainable productivity gains and international 
competitiveness. As a result, the negative employment effects of minimum wage 
might be diminished.
Third, the minimum wage policy in Indonesia, in practice, is primarily designed to 
provide a higher standard of living for workers, particularly for workers in the covered 
sector. However, most workers in the covered sector are not among those people who 
are living below the poverty line. As pointed out by Rama (2001), people who are 
living below the poverty line tend to work in the informal sector and small firms 
which are less likely to be covered by the minimum wage policy. Moreover, chapter 5 
confirms that the minimum wage does not have a strong effect at the bottom ot 
distribution, suggesting that the minimum wage policy is not effective in helping the 
lowest part of the wage distribution due to the lack of enforcement and low 
compliance. As a result, the minimum wage policy in Indonesia might not have a 
significant impact on poverty reduction. In addition, Widianto (2003) argues that the 
minimum wage policy might harm poverty even more if employers respond to an 
increase in minimum wage (an increase in production costs) by passing the costs to 
the consumers through increasing their product price (cost push inflation).
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Finally, an increase in the minimum wage without sustained economic growth and 
investment, as in Indonesia, tends to make the impact on the minimum wage more 
severe. As pointed out by Manning (2003a), if there is no sustained growth in the 
economy, it will tend to reduce work opportunities in the covered sectors and will 
create a greater expansion in the uncovered informal sectors. In this case, the 
Indonesian government has to be able to discover the sources of growth, such as 
investment and exports, which will absorb more formal employment, particularly in 
the long run. However, the prospects of investment do not depend only on economic 
factors, but also political conditions that ensure investor confidence in Indonesia after 
the economic recession. At the same time, an increase in the minimum wage can be 
minimized if the government has the capability to push the inflation rate down (and 
maintain low inflation at a sustainable level), so there is no significant increase in the 
minimum living needs index which determines the level of the minimum wage.
The first important area for further research regarding the effects of minimum wage 
on employment in Indonesia is how the minimum wage policy affects welfare of 
workers in the uncovered (or informal) sector, given the high proportion of workers in 
the uncovered sector. Standard theory predicts that an increase in minimum wage 
reduces the earnings for uncovered sector employment because the limitation of 
labour absorption capacity for uncovered sector employment. Secondly, it is important 
to see the differential impact across regions given that regional minimum wage exists 
in Indonesia. According to the standard competitive model, the effects of minimum 
wage on wage and employment is expected to be higher in regions or groups of 
observations with a high proportion of workers affected by an increase in the 
minimum wage compared to the regions or groups of observations with a low
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proportion of the affected workers. This differential impact across regions is necessary 
to provide a recommendation or policy evaluation specifically for regional 
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